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ABSTRACT 
MICHAEL W. CREED: Planning, Problem Solving, and Kirton’s A-I Theory 
Within an Organizational Framework 
(Under the direction of Emil E. Malizia) 
  
Planners must be technically competent in many disparate facets of contemporary 
urban society. And, since planners cannot be experts in all things they must be skilled in 
problem-solving processes involving people with widely varying motives, knowledge, and 
personalities. This research investigates problem-solving processes in small groups solving a 
non-trivial and non-value-laden problem under tight constraints.  
 Planners are, first and foremost, problem solvers. Problem solving requires learning 
and learning requires reframing perspectives; i.e., destroying old conceptions and biases to 
make room for new understanding. These are cognitive processes that are explained in 
Kirton’s Adaption-Innovation theory (cognitive style) which will be the major theoretical 
framework for this research. This research is based on the assumption that the most elemental 
decision-making unit in planning organizations is a small group. This research investigates 
interpersonal dynamics in small groups based on cognitive style theory and its relative 
cognitive gap theory.  
 A group of 88 volunteers from a multi-office engineering firm participated in one of 
12 trials of the Hollow-Square: A Communications Experiment. Findings from these 
  iv
experiments were compared with prior research from two major university studies using ad 
hoc volunteers. In contrast, all participants in this research worked for the same company and 
were assumed to comprise intact small groups. Hypotheses were advanced positing superior 
problem-solving outcomes by intact groups over ad hoc groups. Participants were placed on 
teams based on their relative cognitive styles (KAI scores). The experiments were conducted 
under tight time and rule constraints. Means tests were conducted on proportions of 
successful outcomes for this research and the prior research. The intact groups in this 
research were no more successful in solving the puzzle than the comparison ad hoc groups.  
 Video recording of the exercises provided serendipitous opportunities to explore 
broader considerations than the initial hypotheses anticipated. The Jablokow-Booth problem- 
solving model was examined and its cognitive gap propositions were operationalized and 
employed in empirical research for the first time. These considerations were presented using 
an adaptation of Flanagan’s critical incident technique. Cognitive style extremes and 
cognitive gaps were identified as causal impediments to successful small group problem 
solving.  
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CHAPTER I  PLANNING AND GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING 
1. Plan versus Planning 
 Since the arrival of T. J. Kent’s (1964) definitive statement of what The Urban 
General Plan should contain, the field of planning has evolved from an emphasis on product 
(plan) to an emphasis on process (planning-value determination and consensus building). 
Kent’s classic work was based on his extensive experience in the field—the prior 30 years. It 
was published during a time of profound change in American society—from a democracy of 
obedience to a democracy of conflict. American society in 1960 was largely racially 
segregated, most married women were stay-at-home mothers, and draftees to military service 
acquiescently reported to their duty stations. The decade ended with desegregation in full 
force of law if not reality, women’s liberation at the forefront of political and social 
consciousness, and with many American men and women openly refusing to report for 
military service. This decade in American history saw the death of Whyte’s (1956) 
Organization Man and the emergence of tension between the establishment and burgeoning 
college aged Baby Boomers who openly questioned prevailing authority. This turbulence 
contributed to the evolution of the field of city and regional planning; it was no longer 
sufficient to be proficient in architectural form, transportation systems, water supply and 
wastewater collection systems, and commercial, retail, and residential interdependencies. 
Only a year after Kent’s The Urban General Plan became the guiding template for city and 
regional planners, Davidoff (1965) announced an expanded responsibility for the planning 
profession: 
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The present can become an epoch in which the dreams of the past for an enlightened and 
just democracy are turned into a reality. The massing of voices protesting racial 
discrimination have roused this nation to the need to rectify racial and other social 
injustices.  
 
The emotional energy generated by this expanded vision of the role of the master planner of 
an earlier generation can trivialize the mundane need for planning in everyday life in both 
public and private organizations. An example of the degree to which the planning profession 
was impacted by the profound social changes of the 1960s is given by Kaiser et al.’s (1995) 
perennial textbook for graduate planning schools, Urban Land Use Planning in its fourth 
edition, 
Our proposed planning model is based on rational planning, which was also the primary 
planning theory base for earlier editions of this text. But it now incorporates critical 
theory and communicative competence, dispute resolution, and adaptive planning 
concepts within a broader model of discourse and consensus-building among the players 
in the land use planning game (p.3). 
 
Clearly, process, in many varieties, has become a necessary part of the planner’s education. 
Process includes many examples but all include interacting with people, establishing values 
and related facts, and collective problem solving with groups of interested people. For the 
last century the role of the professional planner has evolved from the technical expert to the 
facilitator of group decision-making meetings, as evidenced by Kaiser et al.’s quote above.  
 The focus of this research project will be to improve group problem solving processes 
for the purpose of improving organizational decision processes and outcomes. The 
organization could be a local municipal government, a civic club, or a private industrial 
concern. There is little difference in group problem-solving behavior within public 
bureaucracies or private corporations, but for the profit motive (Downs 1967).  
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2. Planning as Learning  
 Arie P. de Geus (1988), head of planning for the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of 
companies, used Planning as Learning to posit the importance of learning in planning. He 
asserted “…that the only competitive advantage the company of the future will have is its 
managers’ ability to learn faster than their competitors” (p.74). Certainly Shell is a private, 
for-profit company. But, its revenue volume exceeds that of many small countries and, 
therefore, it is a valid subject of observation. De Geus’ view is similar to earlier comments 
about planners’ role as facilitators, “…every living person—and system—is continuously 
engaged in learning. In fact, the normal decision process in corporations is a learning 
process, because people change their own mental models and build up a joint model as they 
talk” (p.71). And, he acknowledged that who learns is important, “The only relevant learning 
in a company is the learning done by those people who have the power to act (at Shell, the 
operating company management teams). So the real purpose of effective planning is not to 
make plans but to change the microcosm, the mental models that these decision makers carry 
in their heads.” 
 Three important findings have come from the last century of theoretical and empirical 
work in the field of administrative science which informs this work. They are: 
1. From man as machine to man as decision maker 
2. Boundedly rational actors enabled by organizational constraints 
3. Groups as the most elemental decision unit 
 Fredrick Winslow Taylor’s (1911) Principles of Scientific Management stimulated 
significant interest in the study of organizations and the people inside them. Unfortunately, 
the gist of his work produced the “man as machine” model. Following Taylor’s lead, a group 
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of scholars that came to be known as the structuralists produced considerable theoretical 
work asserting the importance of, among other things, unity of purpose, scalar chain, 
hierarchy, division of labor, specialization, autocracy, and executive span of control (Fayol 
1949; Gulick 1937; Urwick 1943; Mooney and Reiley 1931; and Graicunas 1937). This 
group extended Taylor’s man as machine model. While the man as machine model has long 
since been discredited, the structural aspects of these scholars remain important in varying 
degrees in consideration of how organizations function.  
 The much cited Western Electric Hawthorne Experiments showed in great detail the 
ways that people mattered in organizations and firmly introduced the person into the middle 
of the stimulus-response model commonly in use in lower forms of animal research. This 
work was richly detailed in the omnibus Management and the Worker (Roethlisberger and 
Dixon 1939) and stands as, perhaps, the most important empirical research involving humans 
in organizations in the first half of the last century. The idea of the efficacy of the informal 
organization was shown in several examples. Barnard (1938) also mentioned informal 
organization in his important Functions of the Executive but his observation was anecdotal in 
contrast to Roethlisberger and Dixon’s. The Hawthorne Experiments showed that workers 
responded positively to almost any attention shown them by management. For example, 
when management increased lighting levels daily over many days, the productivity increased 
each day. And, when the lighting levels were diminished daily slightly over many days, 
productivity also improved even to the point that the employees could not see their tasks in 
the dim light! This work also showed unintended responses when management attempted to 
manipulate working environments or supervision. This important research provided 
convincing proof that the rational actor in the middle of the stimulus-response chain made 
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research in the social sciences a bit more challenging than the earlier deterministic man as 
machine view from Taylor and his disciples. The focus of how human actors made decisions 
and they interacted with others in their social groups became the object of administrative 
science research following these important findings. These scholars were called 
behavioralists. 
 Simon (1947), drawing from the behavioralists’ research, attempted to define a 
science of administration in his important Administrative Behavior. That work was the first to 
challenge classical economic theory about conditions necessary to rationality. Simon posited 
that human actors were unable to acquire complete information, process it, and make 
decisions within a constantly changing environment and therefore, only incomplete or 
“bounded” rationality was possible. Simon was interested in optimizing the potential for 
good decisions and he called decisions made under these circumstances “satisficing” rather 
than maximizing.  
 Simon realized that the decision-making process is even more confounded if there is 
more than one individual involved in the process. A group, i.e., more than one, will add 
further complications, 
 …each individual, in order to determine uniquely the consequences of his actions, must 
know what will be the actions of the others. This [the way group members interact in 
problem solving] is a factor of fundamental importance for the whole process of 
administrative decision-making (p.71) [my inclusion]. 
 
It is noteworthy that Simon realized that group problem solving presented considerable 
challenges. He devoted much of his career on techniques to improve decision making (or 
problem solving) in organizations which led to his development of “procedural rationality,” 
in contrast to substantive (or objective) rationality. Boundedly rational actors operating 
within an organization will be enabled to solve more complex problems when the 
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organization sets forth procedural constraints; i.e., based on pre-established rules which 
anticipate a variety of choices. In a general sense, organizations imbue its members with 
important psychological meaning and frames of reference which shape their world view.  
Thus, the socializing environment of organization plays an important role in the stimulus-
response activity of actors therein. Simon’s (1947) words captured the thought quite well, 
“Social institutions may be viewed as regularizations of the behavior of individuals through 
subjection of their behavior to stimulus-patterns socially imposed on them. It is in these 
patterns that an understanding of the meaning and function of organization is to be found” 
(p.109).  
 Simon (1947), like Barnard (1938), recognized the importance informal organizations 
play in formal organization communications. He, therefore, included “training” as a method 
of communication that disseminates knowledge but its effectiveness depends on the 
participants’ attitudes toward the training. Ideally, if the informal organization can be 
mobilized to care about training, it can be accomplished.  If successful decision making 
depends, in an organizational context, on members understanding the standard operating 
procedures (thereby defining procedural rationality) it naturally follows that member 
education (training) is important. This is similar to de Geus’ opinions mentioned above.  
 Harris and Sherblom (2005:4), small-groups and systems scholars, assert that 
“Groups are the fundamental building blocks of any organization.” Small groups usually 
range in size from three to not more than 20 people during decision processes. Larger groups 
dilute the ability for each member to engage in meaningful participation. And, it is usually 
found that more effective groups are less than 10 people in size (see, e.g., Hare 1952; James 
1951; Slater 1958; and Ziller 1957). Individuals are important, but only in relationship to all 
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others participating together to solve problems (Aritzeta et al. 2005). And, for this research, 
the small group is the unit of analysis.  
 Groups may be classified as ad hoc and intact. The former consists of people who 
have little or no prior knowledge of each other, have no common sense of purpose, and who 
are not likely to be together again in the future. The latter consists of people who know each 
other, share a common set of normative views often because they work in the same 
organization, and who understand that they will be required to work together in the future. 
Interpersonal behavior and group problem solving between the two classes can be expected 
to vary; e.g., Axelrod (1984) conducted extensive empirical tests employing the “prisoner’s 
dilemma” game and found that one-off tests revealed much more aggressive (greedy and 
destructive) behavior than in tests where the participants expected to be working together 
indefinitely into the future, what he called the “iterated prisoner’s dilemma games.” Axelrod 
called this the “long shadow of the future” and it helps explain the significant difference 
between ad hoc and intact groups. This is a subject that this inquiry will investigate. 
 Small groups can be found in every variety of society; institutions, organizations, and 
municipal governments employ small groups to help guide and operate most of what 
transpires in their operations. The objects about which they come together to decide are 
usually problems which need resolution; i.e., problem solving. How can small group problem 
solving be made to be more effective? That is the central question this research seeks to 
address.  
 
 8
3. Problem A and Problem B 
 In any field of endeavor people come together for the purpose of solving problems. 
The problem about which the group comes together to solve may be called Problem A. The 
group which comes together to solve Problem A encounters another problem due to the 
differences of its members. The management of diversity that arises by virtue of a group of 
people being called upon to make decisions may be called Problem B. The objective of any 
such process should be to expend more time and other scarce resources on solving Problem 
A than on solving Problem B. Kirton (2003), a noted British industrial psychologist, has 
argued that the Problem A-Problem B analogy is the central challenge for the survival of 
civilization. This is a small part of Kirton’s Adaption-Innovation (A-I) theory. Kirton 
approached both Problem A and Problem B from the perspective of cognitive psychology, 
covering any problem in any sphere. Inside organizations problem solving usually occurs in 
small groups in exactly the manner cited in the Problem A-Problem B analogy. Whether it is 
in the boardroom, the executive suite of offices, or in the production room, Problem B exists. 
How might organizations or institutions manage diversity in order to achieve optimal 
solutions is the question Herbert Simon (1947) wrestled with over 60 years ago. Kirton’s 
work has been used in a variety of milieu for improving the allocation of resources between 
Problem A and Problem B and to help researchers understand behavioral preferences. In 
addition, Kirton’s (1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1978a, 1978b, 1994, 1999, and 2003) A-I theory is 
rich in explanatory power for group interaction and problem solving, which is ideally suited 
to organizational and small group behavioral studies. This inquiry will explore A-I theory’s 
potential contribution to the improvement of any type of group problem solving—which I 
view as a critical building block of the planning-learning process.  
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4. Small Groups and Teams  
 Harris and Sherblom (2005) reported that, by the mid-1990s, over 70% of all U.S. 
firms used small groups (teams) for execution of work. While the emergence of small group 
research seems relatively recent, it has long been a subject of study by scholars. In an early 
empirical study Watson (1928) asked, “Do Groups Think More Efficiently than Individuals?” 
He observed that no uniform opinion then existed about group versus individual thinking. 
But some, even then, suspected that there was a special potential for groups: 
In every coming together of minds that are serious in the effort to understand, there is 
something more than the minds. There is the Creative Plus, which no one mind by itself 
could achieve. A series of directions for discussion groups contains the statement, ‘Trust 
the group.’ There is no person in it who is not superior to the rest in at least one respect. 
The experience of all is richer than the experience of any. The group as a whole can see 
further and more truly than its best member (Overstreet 1925).  
 
Overstreet was well ahead of his time, as was Follett (1924) in her suggestion of the 
integration of interests when two or more people are resolving a problem together. But, with 
the emergence of total quality management (TQM), exemplified by W. Edwards Deming 
(1986), Joseph Juran (1992), and Philip Crosby (1979), the concept of team problem solving 
became de rigueur in American business by the end of the last century.  
 While I have conflated the terms small groups and teams, there are important 
differences between the two. Harris and Sherblom (2005) differentiate small groups from 
teams. Small groups are generally less integrated. Teams share common boundaries, 
understand that members are interdependent, have a clear sense of purpose, and a common 
sense of goals; i.e., have Problem A’s – a group may not. Tuckman (1965) and Fisher (1970) 
found four distinct stages in the transformation of small groups into teams—form, storm, 
norm, and perform. Kirton’s (1978a) work illuminates the psychological factors that may 
help explain how the stages of development work as they do. In the interest of precision for 
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this study I will use the term group or small group rather than team. Also, I will use the term 
ad hoc group to mean people with no prior knowledge or familiarity of each other. And, I 
will use the term intact group to mean people who have a general knowledge and familiarity 
of each other by working in the same office.  
  
5. Management of Diversity 
 Small group problem solving, depending on the nature and complexity or the 
problem, is a form of social learning (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Small group problem 
solving is the process of building sufficient consensus to resolve different opinions which 
may contain conflicting frames of reference, different value systems, or different desires—all 
of which are affective cognitive states (Goffman 1974). Simon (1947) interestingly discussed 
the fact-value dichotomy as having significant importance in problem solving. Different 
values are often discovered solving Problem B while more manageable facts are encountered 
in Problem A. In the field of planning the values-facts dichotomy is usually resolved in the 
political arena. An organization’s values are usually part of its culture and “the way things 
are around here.” However, individual actors sometimes have personal value systems that 
can inhibit or accelerate their support for problem solving. The process that includes groups 
meeting, exploring the nature of problems and conflicts, considering varying alternative 
courses of action, considering the potential outcomes including relative risks, and arriving at 
the most desirable choice I call learning—it is group decision making.  
 The central thesis for this study is that all humans are problem solvers and, hence, 
creative. When two or more people come together to solve problems, there are cognitive style 
differences, level (e.g. IQ) differences, and motive differences (among others) that impinge 
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on the process and could reduce the quality of the solution if improperly managed (see e.g., 
Jablokow 2008 and Kirton 2003). Judicious application of Kirton’s A-I theory should 
improve group problem solving, facilitate the management of diversity, and help ameliorate 
those possible points of conflict. A-I theory posits that all people have unique cognitive 
styles that frame their views and approach to problem solving (Kirton 1976). When members 
of social groups (organizations or otherwise) assemble for solving difficult issues and 
planning for future activities, there could be value laden conflicting viewpoints (Schön and 
Rein 1994). Different problem-solving styles amongst the people can also impede optimal 
outcomes. High adaptors and high innovators are the terms which Kirton (1976) assigned to 
the extreme positions of a problem-solving style continuum which approximates a normal 
curve and which all people fall between depending on each person’s need or distain for 
structure in problem solving.  
  High adaptors prefer to approach problem solving from within the existing rules 
(structure) and commonly held belief systems. They are perceived to be predictable and 
reliable (Kirton 1978a). High innovators, on the other hand, have relative disdain for the 
rules, and are viewed as unpredictable and not reliable. High innovators view high adaptors 
as “boring,” while high adaptors view high innovators as “dangerous.” Kirton (2003) is 
critical of the American (and now world-wide) propensity for “innovation bias,” which views 
all innovation as good and all adaption as bad. Rogers’ (2003) classic work in Diffusion of 
Innovation acknowledges innovation bias in research. I should note that Rogers’ definition of 
innovation is somewhat broad; i.e., “An innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is 
perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (p.12). Kirton is quite specific in 
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his use of the terms adaptor and innovator. He takes issue with Rogers’ more subjective 
definition of innovation, for which the term “change” might be usefully substituted. 
 Kirton drew from Kuhn’s (1962) work, which popularized the term paradigm. As an 
example, Kuhn (1957) had earlier described the process of moving from the Ptolemaic view 
of the universe, which dominated from the fourth century B.C., to Copernicus’ view in 1543 
that was contained in his life’s work, titled De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium. The 
Ptolemaic paradigm, which was deeply ingrained in church dogma, held that the earth was a 
small sphere at the geometric center of a very large rotating sphere upon which the stars were 
distributed. Ptolemy worked from centuries old concepts including the Theory of 
Homocentric Spheres, attributed to Eudoxus (c.408-c.355 B.C.), a student of Plato and 
Aristotle who had his own conceptual explanation for the cosmos (Kuhn 1957:p.55 and 79). 
Most ancient views explained that the sun, the moon, and other planets moved in the large 
space between the earth and the stellar sphere. Each was on a form of concentric sphere 
between the earth and the stellar sphere. And, outside the outer sphere there was nothingness.  
 Nearly five centuries after Aristotle, Ptolemy formulated his concept of the universe. 
While these were not the only theories of the universe at the time, the Aristotelian version 
was the one which gained most support and which Ptolemy embraced. But to do so Ptolemy 
made copious adaptive adjustments to the mathematical formulation of the spherical 
trajectories that the planets, the sun, and the moon traveled on—these were called epicycles 
and deferents—a description of which would be exceedingly lengthy and excruciatingly 
detailed. I would suggest that Ptolemy was a high adaptor (and high level as well) based on 
the evidence of his work today. I make that observation to contrast Copernicus, who asserted 
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that the sun, not the earth, was the center of the universe, was a high innovator, in Kuhn’s 
vernacular.  
 Copernicus’ proposition was highly controversial and initially almost universally 
rejected, particularly by the church. Some have suggested that Copernicus did not publish his 
book on the topic until his death was imminent just so he would not have to withstand the 
assault from the church and the scientific community which opposed this threat to the 
stability of science and religion. It was no small feat for Copernicus to advance such a radical 
reordering of the cosmos. The fact that Copernicus was only partly correct is secondary to the 
magnitude of the paradigm shift he initiated. In the sense first advanced by Kuhn, Copernicus 
was an innovator. In the sense advanced by Kirton (1976) Ptolemy was an adaptor. Clearly 
both were very high level and both contributed significant advances to the prevailing 
scientific knowledge of the day—one in an adaptive way and one in an innovative way.  Note 
the particular precision of definition that Kirton uses to describe an innovator—it is 
something much less subjective as that employed by Rogers (2003) and should constrain the 
use of the term (and adaptor as well). 
 
6. Adaption-Innovation Continuum 
 Kirton (1976) developed a psychometric instrument called KAI, or the Kirton 
adaption-innovation inventory. The inventory (KAI) places all people on a non-pejorative bi-
polar continuum between high adaptors and high innovators (note the circumscribed use of 
the term from the previous example). See Figure I-1 for a graphical depiction of the normal 
distribution with the theoretically high, low, and average KAI scores.  
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Figure I-1. Adaptor-Innovator Continuum for Large General Population 
 
 
 
 
        
  
  
  
 
             KAImin=32   KAIµ=96            KAImax=160 
          High Adaptor              High Innovator 
 
 
I will elaborate on the scoring system which produces an absolute minimum (KAImin) of 32, 
an absolute maximum (KAImax) of 160, and a theoretical mean (KAIµ) of 96 in a later 
section. It should be noted that those scoring near the theoretical mean (and by statistical 
theory most do) are not considered lacking; i.e., being near the mean of a measure such as 
height does not mean one has no height. People whose scores are near the mean have less 
pronounced behavioral tendencies than those toward the extreme of high adaptor or high 
innovator. Table I-1 contains preferred behaviors and characteristics of adaptors and 
innovators who are near the extreme ends of the continuum shown in Table I-1. These should 
not be viewed as a dichotomy; rather, it is a continuum. The development of the inventory 
will be more fully described in Chapter II.  
 
7. A-I Theory in Action  
 I propose to employ A-I theory in execution of an experiment on small group problem 
solving following two previous studies—Hammerschmidt (1996) and Scott (2007). The 
former was a study of mid-career professionals enrolled in Eckerd College Leadership 
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 Table I-1. Behavior Descriptions of Adaptors and Innovators1 
The Adaptor The Innovator 
Characterized by precision, reliability, efficiency, 
methodicalness, prudence, discipline, conformity. 
 
Concerned with resolving problems rather than 
finding them. 
 
Seeks solutions to problems in tried and understood 
ways. 
 
Reduces problems by improvement and greater 
efficiency, with maximum of continuity and 
stability. 
 
Seen as sound, conforming, safe, and dependable. 
 
Liable to make goals of means. 
 
Seems impervious to boredom, seems able to 
maintain high accuracy in long spells of detailed 
work. 
 
Is an authority within given structures 
 
Challenges rules rarely, cautiously, when assured of 
strong support. 
 
Tends to high self-doubt. Reacts to criticism by 
closer outward conformity. Vulnerable to social 
pressure and authority; compliant. 
 
 
Is essential to the functioning of the institution all 
the time, but occasionally needs to be “dug out” of 
his systems. 
 
Seen as undisciplined, thinking tangentially, 
approaching tasks from unsuspected angles.  
 
Could be said to discover problems and discover 
awareness of solutions. 
 
Queries problems’ concomitant assumptions; 
manipulates problems. 
 
Is catalyst to settled groups, irreverent of their 
consensual views; seen as abrasive, creating 
dissonance 
 
Seen as unsound, impractical; often shocks his 
opposite. 
 
In pursuit of goals treats accepted means with little 
regard. 
 
Capable of detailed routine (system maintenance) 
work for only short bursts. Quick to delegate 
routine tasks. 
 
Tends to take control in unstructured situations. 
 
Often challenges rules, has little respect for past 
custom.  
 
Appears to have low self-doubt when generating 
ideas, not needing consensus to maintain certitude 
in face of opposition. 
 
In the institution is ideal in unscheduled crises, or 
better still to help to avoid them, if he can be 
controlled.  
 
When collaborating with innovators When collaborating with adaptors 
Supplies stability, order and continuity to the 
partnership. 
 
Sensitive to people, maintains group cohesion and 
cooperation. 
 
Provides a safe base for the innovator’s riskier 
operations.  
Supplies the task orientations, the break with the 
past accepted theory. 
 
Insensitive to people, often threatens group 
cohesion and cooperation.  
 
Provides the dynamics to bring about periodic 
radical change, without which institutions tend to 
ossify. 
 
                                                 
1 This first appeared as shown in Kirton’s (1976) original development of the KAI theory and also verbatim in 
Kirton’s (1994) later work.  
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Development programs between 1990 and 1994. The latter was a study of engineering and 
technology students between 2002 and 2005 in the School of Polytechnic Studies at a 
Midwestern university. In both cases, the groups were ad hoc.  
 Hammerschmidt (1996) conducted a problem-solving experiment on 952 managers 
with average age of 42, 80% of whom were males. The participants were not told their KAI 
scores prior to the experiment. Between August 1990 and June 1992, the teams were 
assembled without regard to their KAI scores. There were 50 eight-person teams, hence, 400 
participants. But, from August 1992 to August 1994, the remaining 552 participants were 
formed into teams using their KAI scores (more details will be discussed below). 
 Hammerschmidt used “Hollow Square: A Communications Experiment” (Pfeiffer and 
Jones 1974) for his problem-solving experiment. As the name implies, a hollow-square 
puzzle must be assembled during a fixed time period. The experimental setup requires each 
eight-person team2 to be composed of a four-person planning subteam and a four-person 
operations subteam. Planning subteams are given a fixed time period to prepare assembly 
instructions for the operations subteam. The planning subteam must make its plans without 
the operations subteam present. After a prescribed time period the planning subteam presents 
the assembly instructions to the operations subteam. The operations subteam then has a fixed 
time period in which to assemble the puzzle. 
 The planning role is rule bound and structured. It is also relatively time constrained. 
Hammerschmidt posited that this part of the exercise was adaptive in nature. He 
hypothesized that the more adaptive subgroups would find this role in the exercise more in 
harmony with their cognitive style preferences (this was termed “team role conformity;” 
                                                 
2 Contrary to my earlier comments about the use of terms group and team, Hammerschmidt used the terms team 
for the large (eight-person group) and subteam for the smaller specialized four-person group). For simplicity I 
will employ his terminology in this description. 
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similarly, if an adaptive subgroup were assigned a role more favored by innovative groups 
that would be termed “team role non-conformity”). 
 Conversely, Hammerschmidt posited that the assembly part of the exercise, which is 
the role of the operations subteam, was more innovative since it was somewhat less 
structured, unlike part one. Consequently, he varied the KAI score makeup of the subteams 
to investigate the predictability of performance based on cognitive style preferences and role 
match. Hammerschmidt assembled all subteams (four-person groups) to be “homogeneous,” 
which he defined as the KAI scores varied by less than 20 points. Subteams were “paired” 
with other four person subteams which were either similar (mean subteam KAI scores were 
less than 15.7 apart) or dissimilar (mean subteam KAI scores were over 15.7 points apart). 
The roles of the subteams were also manipulated: team role conformity and team role non-
conformity.  
 Hammerschmidt formed five types of teams as follows: 
1. Homogeneous Similar-KAI Style and Team Role Conformity. Relatively “adaptive” 
same score planners working with relatively “innovative” same score implementers.  
2. Homogeneous Dissimilar-KAI Style and Team Role Conformity. Relatively 
“adaptive” same score planners working with relatively “innovative” same score 
implementers. 
3. Homogeneous Similar-KAI Style and Team Role Non-Conformity. Relatively 
“innovative” same score planners working with relatively “adaptive” same score 
implementers. 
4. Homogeneous Dissimilar-KAI Style and Team Role Non-Conformity. Relatively 
“innovative” same score planners working with relatively “adaptive” same score 
implementers. 
5. Non-Homogeneous Dissimilar. Randomly arranged non-same score subteams with a 
KAI mean of 104.  
 
The terms “relatively adaptive” and “relatively innovative” refer to the other subteam which 
combines to form the eight person big team. In fact, both subteams may have KAI scores 
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which are on the adaptive or the innovative side of the theoretical mean. He hypothesized 
that the subgroup homogeneity would foster better communication leading to better 
performance rates for categories one and three. He also hypothesized that subteam role 
conformity would contribute to improved problem solving performance.   
 Hammerschmidt found that the relatively adaptive planners working with the 
relatively innovative implementers where the subteam KAI scores were more than 15.7 
points apart were the most successful. He also found that relatively innovative planners and 
relatively adaptive implementers whose intergroup scores were more than 15.7 points apart 
actually performed worse than the randomly assembled teams, but the differences were not 
statistically significant.  
 It is important to note that subteam role assignment and KAI style preference 
compatibility were shown to be an important variable of consideration in this work. It is also 
noteworthy that all the subteams were composed so as to be homogeneous which was 
theorized to lead to better communication. This was borne out by the experiment. In addition, 
considerable communication conflict was noted between dissimilar subteams during the 
problem solving exercise where the subteams were performing non-preferred roles. In 
category four relatively innovative planners worked with relatively adaptive implementers 
and the subteams were dissimilar. The observers noted considerable conflict and the 
implementers used the following words to describe the planners, “abrasive, unprepared, 
unstructured, and insensitive” (p.19). Hammerschmidt said that it was clear the relatively 
adaptive implementers were uncomfortable in their role which was unstructured with few 
rules and little clarity of purpose. He said it was as if the two subteams were speaking a 
different language and, apparently, perceived the Hollow-Square exercise quite differently. 
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Animosity was common in this category and even when the teams were successful in solving 
the puzzle they seemed to not credit the other subteam. These types of behaviors between 
adaptors and innovators have elsewhere been reported by Kirton (1978a, 1994, and 2003) 
and Schroder 1994. When considering the degree of conflict and intergroup communication 
dysfunction reported here, it is important to note that the subjects were ad hoc.  
 Scott (2007) also used the Hollow Square puzzle in her study. Scott composed all 
teams (she used six-person teams rather than eight) based on a balance around the theoretical 
mean. Her teams were similar—meaning KAI scores were within 15 points of each other, 
and dissimilar—meaning KAI scores were over 15 points from each other. Scott did not 
further specify the definitions she used for subteams. Her independent variable was 
“knowledge of A-I theory.” Her dependent variable was the solution of the puzzle within a 
given period of time. Scott found that the similar KAI score teams were most successful. 
This, it might seem, is in some conflict with Kirton’s assertion that diversity in problem-
solving groups improves outcomes, but that is if the problem contains diverse elements (is 
complex, i.e., diverse sub-problems), not if the problem is characterized by a particular 
quality—which is found in the group, as Hammerschmidt found. Scott did not make up 
subteams according to preference, so her results could have been compromised by subteams 
which were inadvertently more adaptive in the innovative role or more innovative in the 
adaptive role. Scott recommended that further research was needed using intact groups in 
industrial settings.  
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8. Research Objectives 
 I propose to conduct controlled experiments (specifically the “Hollow Square: A 
Communications Experiment”) in professional services consulting firms among subjects who 
regularly work and interact with each other. This research intends to answer the following 
questions: 
1. To what degree may group problem-solving outcomes be improved by judicious 
selection of group membership based on cognitive style preference? 
2. To what degree do intact groups outperform ad hoc groups in solving problems 
which are outside the groups’ problem-solving style preference as measured by 
group mean KAI scores? 
3. To what degree do members of an intact organization modulate preferred problem 
solving style behavior to cope with fellow organization members? 
  
The following chapter will review the extant literature on A-I theory, cognitive 
schema, the ways learning theory intersects with A-I theory, and identify hypotheses for 
testing. The third chapter will provide the proposed experimental set up, details about the 
execution of the experiment, methods of analysis, expectations, potential threats, and 
generalizations that may be drawn from this work. Appendix A contains the full statement of 
the “Hollow Square: A Communications Experiment.” Appendix B contains a mockup of the 
KAI inventory. Appendix C contains forms which will also be used to collect information 
from participants. Appendix D contains a structured survey form for collecting post-exercise 
impressions. 
 
  
CHAPTER II  THEORIES, APPLICATIONS, AND HYPOTHESES  
 
1. Group Problem Solving and Organizational Learning  
 When two or more people come together for the purpose of problem solving, there 
are a variety of interpersonal processes which are activated and which, ideally, should be 
understood (Kirton 2003). Within an organizational framework groups routinely meet for the 
purpose of solving any number of problems, including change initiatives and strategic 
planning (de Geus 1988). Planning, in any context, is about purposive change. And, planning 
is learning in the sense de Geus (1988) and his colleagues view the concept. To be more 
specific, group learning; i.e., a group (social group assembled for any decision-making 
purpose) must move from one set of collective beliefs and values to a new place in its 
collective belief system. This may be change within the existing paradigm (adaptive) or 
change which breaks the existing paradigm (innovative). In any given circumstance either 
type of change may require significant energy to “unfreeze” the existing system (Lewin 
1951) and either type of change may be appropriate, depending on the situation (Kirton 
2003).  Searle (1995) called the existing knowledge/belief conditions backgrounds and 
Sabatier (1988) called them deeply held beliefs. Contemporary planning holds that the 
process of collective problem solving (fact finding and truth seeking) is at least as important 
as the final decision (see e.g., Elliott 1999; Forester 1999; Godschalk and Paterson 1999 and 
Innes 1998). This position accepts the proposition by Berger and Luckmann (1967) that 
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reality is socially constructed. This relationship between group learning and organizational 
change is the way change is presently understood to occur in organizations and groups.   
 Kirton began his work as an industrial psychologist in Great Britain in the late 1950s 
and processes instrumental to organizational change were less well understood. In an effort to 
fully explicate A-I theory’s genesis, I will elaborate on Kirton’s early work in organizational 
change. 
 
2. Management Initiative 
 Kirton (1961) studied how decision processes occur in organizations. (For my 
purposes, problem solving is the most elemental form of a decision process.)  At the time of 
his research, organizational change processes were called management initiatives, hence the 
title of the book reporting the work. He found that there were three dominant and consistent 
processes involved in any management initiative: 
1. In some instances, significant time lags—sometimes a number of years—were 
observed between the time the idea first emerged in organizations and the time the idea or 
change was implemented. Conversely, some initiatives became fully implemented policy 
with seemingly little analysis or resistance. Size of initiative was not highly correlated 
with time lag, although most of the initiatives in the study frame were quite large.  
2. There seemed on very noticeable occasions to be well-reasoned resistance to change 
which retarded the adoption until some kind of precipitating event occurred; e.g., a 
competitor introduced a new product in the market, etc.  
3.  Perhaps the most revealing of Kirton’s early findings was that the unpopular ideas 
were almost always the ones proposed by managers “who were themselves on the fringe, 
or even unacceptable to the ‘establishment group.’” He also noted that, often, such 
outsiders failed to gain much acceptance to the mainstream management group (whatever 
its level or style), even after his/her proposed initiative became successfully 
implemented. And, conversely, the in-group managers who put forth more bland 
proposals were more acceptable to the establishment whether their proposals were 
accepted or even if their proposals were implemented and were unsuccessful. 
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 Kirton’s (1961) observations on processes involved in management initiatives are 
reflected in varying forms in other important work. Burns and Stalker (1961) were the first to 
explicitly assert that organizational innovation3 could be influenced by management 
initiatives. They observed that experiments with different types of authority systems could 
accelerate or retard change. For example, they described mechanistic form and organic form 
as rough equivalents to the formal organization from the structuralists and informal 
organization from the behavioralists. These forms are both rational forms of organization in 
the sense Simon (1947) would recognize. The mechanistic form was more suited to stable 
situations and organic form was more appropriate to changing situations. Characteristics of 
the organic form are very nearly like Follett’s (1924) of “power with” versus “power over” 
while the mechanistic form are much like the command and control authority relationships 
advanced by Gulick (1937). 
 While studying several industrial firms in post war England, Burns and Stalker (1961) 
isolated three variables that were important in their study of organizational change.  The first 
variable was the rate of market and technical change. Since their research was in for-profit 
firms, there was an important motivation of firm leaders to change, based on market 
pressures for survival; i.e., a compelling reason to “unfreeze” or as Kirton’s observed, a 
potential “precipitating event.”  
 The second variable was “…the strength of personal commitments to the 
improvement or defense of status or power” (p.209). This variable is clearly about the human 
condition (personal power) and personal motivations, and is very much present in any social 
group in any organization. This variable is manifest in Kirton’s observation that many 
                                                 
3 Burns and Stalker specifically used the term innovation in the sense of organizational change. They imbued 
the term with positive connotation, a bias that is common in organizational change research. 
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organizational changes take considerably longer than expected. Personal power and position 
in organizations which are hard won are not easily relinquished. 
 Burns and Stalker’s third variable concerns the degree to which managers understand 
the proposed change and are successfully able to interpret it to subordinates in ways that 
enlist the psychic energy and commitment of employees to support the change. This is 
similar to Barnard’s (1938) assertion that the primary role of the executive was to 
communicate. Kirton (1961) also acknowledged an important role of managers in fostering 
the change initiative. 
 Another important contribution in the organizational change literature was 
contributed by Kaufman (1971). Writing on the ability of organizations to change, Kaufman 
provided observations similar to Kirton and Burns and Stalker. He identified three important 
considerations: 1) the inertia against change due to established power structures, giving rise 
to 2) calculated opposition to change, and 3) the mental or physical inability to adopt the 
change. While Kaufman’s propositions suggest highly selfish motives which retard the rate 
of change, Rogers (2003) cited numerous examples of organizational and social change that 
took incredibly long periods of time to occur. Rogers attributed such resistance to change as 
naturally occurring in humans, based on deeply held beliefs, biases, and prejudices; similar to 
Kuhn’s (1962) observations of the difficulty of scientists to even perceive empirical evidence 
which differed from their expectations.  
 The well-reasoned resistance to change is a common thread throughout organizational 
behavior research, as evidenced by the Burns and Stalker (1961) and Kaufman (1971) 
observations above (see also, e.g., Hage and Aiken 1967; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Schön 
1971; and Tsouderos 1955). Kirton’s observation that the originator of a change idea is 
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frequently outside the existing power structure does not imply that the change suggested is 
necessarily innovative; it is simply different from the prevailing system or process. Should 
the existing power structure happen to be innovative, a high adaptive change would also be 
unpopular. In either case this is consistent with organizational change literature’s (see e.g., 
Bennis et al. 1962 and Lippitt et al. 1958) assertion that a facilitator is helpful as suggested 
by Simmel’s (1950) stranger and Rogers’ (2003) change agent. Kirton’s (2003) agent of 
change is a slightly different type of change initiator. In contrast to Simmel and Rogers, 
Kirton views aggressive change agents as being largely responsible for creating the apparent 
resistance to change that often is experienced.  Kirton is quite specific in his critique on the 
“resistant to change” charge leveled against someone who does not like a particular 
proposition. He asserts that there is no who one likes all changes and, conversely, there is no 
one who likes no changes. A-I theory seeks to help people listen without prejudice to a 
variety of change options and to understand the aspects of cognitive processes which divide 
and/or  unite joint problem solvers. In particular, A-I theory seeks to avoid placing people in 
out-groups and in-groups during problem solving and decision making exercises.  
  Kirton (1978a) recalled Drucker’s (1969) observation that the objectives of 
organizations have been to accomplish tasks in ways that were consistent with prevailing 
norms. Drucker suggested that bureaucrats and managers were highly effective in solving 
problems within the established policies and procedures acceptable to the predictable 
functioning of the organization. He also suggested that others may have the “courage to do 
things differently” (p.50). Kirton (1978a) used this to explain the differences between people 
who had markedly different approaches to problem solving. From this and his own extensive 
experience in the difficulty that change initiatives had in gaining acceptance within 
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organizations, Kirton hypothesized that those who preferred problem solving within the 
prevailing paradigms (Kuhn 1962) and structures of thought were more adaptive in problem-
solving style. Conversely, he posited that people whose problem-solving preferences were to 
look outside the existing paradigms and structures preferred more innovative problem-
solving styles. Kirton (2003) makes a strong argument that the two preferences of cognitive 
style (problem solving-approaches) actually lie on a continuum, and all, in general, are 
equally desirable on any given occasion—and all create change. He reasons that particular 
problems may require problem solvers who are either more adaptive or more innovative in 
approach, given the nature of the problem.  
 
3. Theoretical Grounding for Psychometric Inventory 
 Kirton’s (1976) theoretical development of linguistic inventory items that would 
isolate distinct cognitive style preferences was drawn from work of Carl Rogers (1959), Max 
Weber (1946), and Robert Merton (1957). He built his inventory on the theoretical arguments 
of these scholars and, via the process of factor analysis, found a high degree of support for a 
three-factor system.  
 Rogers (1959) was a scholar of creativity. He described a concept of “the creative 
loner,” but his bias toward the innovator pole of the continuum led him to conflate creativity 
and the innovative style. High innovators seem to never cease creating ideas. While high 
adaptors also have the ability to generate many ideas (limited only by level), they appear to 
more quickly become satisfied as to the sufficiency of their ideas; hence, this factor is called 
the sufficiency versus proliferation (SO) factor. The quantity of ideas does not necessarily 
equate to quality of ideas, as Rogers might imply. However, the differing propensities for 
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idea generation contribute to adaptors and innovators viewing each other pejoratively 
according to Kirton (1976). The adaptor is viewed wrongly by the innovator as unwilling to 
move forward (when they mean: out of the system when it is needed) while the adaptor views 
the innovator wrongly as unwilling to stop even for a little while (when they mean, in, for 
them, unlikely directions – at alarming speed); e.g., Kirton (1994) captured the essence of 
this different perspective as, “…the innovator claims that the adaptor originates with a finger 
on the stop button. The adaptor, in turn, sees the innovator as an originator who cannot find 
such a button” (p.25).  
  The second factor (E) evolved from Weber’s (1946) work on the purpose of 
bureaucratic structure, improving efficiency, precision, and reliability. This is obviously 
focused on the adaptive pole in the A-I continuum. Innovation is usually anything but what 
we traditionally consider to be “efficient.” It often is disruptive and causes delays and 
unreliable circumstances—at least at first. It is of course, more efficient in breaking out of 
the current system, while not necessarily solving this problem. 
 The third factor (R) is labeled rule/group conformity. This is similar to Merton’s 
observation of bureaucratic structure as that which, “… exerts a constant pressure on officials 
to be methodical, prudent, disciplined … [and to attain]…an unusual degree of conformity” 
(Merton 1957:198). Kirton observed that high adaptors seem to respond as predicted and 
appropriately in this environment, while high innovators appear to be more immune to these 
pressures. Whyte’s (1956) Organization Man exemplifies this factor. 
 A weakness of the adaptor is that he may stay within the existing systems and 
structures for problem solving when the problem demands different thinking. Merton 
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(1957:198) paints a clear picture of what Kirton (1976) called a pathologically inappropriate 
response: 
Trained incapacity refers to that state of affairs in which one’s abilities function as 
inadequacies or blind spots. Actions based upon training and skills which have been 
successfully applied in the past may result in inappropriate responses under changed 
conditions. An inadequate flexibility in the application of skills, will, in a changing 
milieu result in more or less serious maladjustments.  
 
Alternatively, the innovator behaves in ways that include higher degrees of risk and, 
consequently, is often viewed as threatening to the prevailing and acceptable problem-
solving approaches (Kirton 1976).  
 
4. Cognitive Schema and A-I Theory 
 Kirton, a cognitive psychologist, developed a cognitive schema between the years he 
first introduced A-I theory in 1976 and the publication of his seminal work in 2003.  
Cognitive psychology is concerned with the study of thinking processes. It is metaphorical 
and representational in that it attempts to define how the human organism perceives external 
stimuli, processes it, and activates a response. Kirton (2003) conceptualized cognitive 
functioning as composed of three independent but closely connected parts: cognitive affect, 
cognitive effect, and cognitive resource.  
 Cognitive affect is the gate-keeper for sorting through all external stimuli and, based 
on motive, determines what information will be accepted and processed and what the thinker 
needs and wants. Motive is determined by subjective needs, values, attitudes, and beliefs. 
Cognitive affect is the means by which the human organism apprehends opportunity in the 
external environment.  Motive and opportunity are two important variables that influence 
human behavior. Motive is contained within the human subjective experience, while 
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opportunity is external to the person and represents the environment in which the human 
exists. 
 Cognitive effect is the function through which behavior is manifest and is composed 
of cognitive level (how good-capacity) and cognitive style (in what way-preferred manner). 
An individual who is required to work outside his preferred cognitive style can do so for 
short periods of time at a cost, increasing with amount over time, through coping behavior. 
However, over long periods of time (with decreasing gain and motive) the individual who is 
working outside his preferred style will seek to leave the environment (Kirton and de Ciantis 
1994). This has been demonstrated by research in climate theory where, through the process 
of “attraction, selection, and attrition,” groups of people in organizations evolve to become 
isomorphic (see e.g., DiMaggio and Powel 1983; Kirton and McCarthy 1988; Schneider 
1987 and Schneider et al. 1995). In A-I theory, this means high innovators will dislike highly 
adaptive environments, and high adaptors will be uncomfortable in highly innovative 
environments. Those with modest adaption or innovation scores will be wary of either 
extreme. See Figure I-1 in Chapter I for further descriptive information of adaptors and 
innovators.  
 Cognitive resource is the third aspect of the human brain. It is the repository for all 
learning, skills development, and knowledge accumulated by the person in his history. 
Cognitive resource stores coping techniques, which the individual develops through life. 
 An important aspect of A-I theory is Kirton’s (1994) assertion that cognitive style and 
cognitive level are independent—not correlated. Kirton (1976) hypothesized the 
orthogonality of style and level in his initial work, but offered no proof. Since then, this has 
been corroborated by independent research (see e.g., Kirton 1978b; Torrance and Horng 
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1980; and Kirton and de Ciantis 1986). There are high-level adaptors who have made great 
contributions; e.g., Edison exhibited all the characteristics of a high adaptor and was a 
brilliant (high-level) inventor  who was quoted as saying, “My principal business consists of 
giving commercial value to the brilliant, but misdirected, ideas of others” (Jablokow 2007). 
Similarly, there are high innovators who have made their own contributions; e.g., Nikola 
Tesla was considered eccentric and was less methodical or concerned with detail. However, 
his ideas were often ahead of his time, and some have proved to have high commercial value, 
such as the hydropower generator and guided missiles (Jablokow 2007).   
 Kirton (2003), consistent with earlier British philosophers Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume, accepts the tabula rasa theory; i.e., that all people begin life with a blank mental slate. 
Thus, everyone begins life on the same footing relative to stored knowledge. This is 
consistent with Berger and Luckmann (1967) and Searle (1995), who contend that all 
learning is a social construct. Also, mankind, unlike all other animals in creation, does not 
possess instinct4—rather, he must learn all necessary survival information (Jones 1999 and 
Kirton 2003). The fact that each human has a unique life journey, which ensures that he 
views the world differently from anyone else, is important in A-I theory.  This contributes to 
the diversity which is manifest in Problem B. Consequently, problem- solving style 
preference is of keen importance to human understanding.   
 Problem-solving style is, indeed, an aspect of personality that appears to be deeply 
ingrained within the psyche or personality development of individuals. Adaptors and 
innovators may have comparable cognitive capacity but quite different cognitive style 
preferences, and vice versa.   
                                                 
4 Instinct, in this usage, is strictly defined. Lower animals have differing degrees of pre-programmed 
determinism to do certain things at certain times, [perhaps] always triggered by specific stimuli, e.g., a specific 
climate or age change.  
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 Some research has shown that there are biological differences between individuals 
which explain different behaviors that Kirton has termed more adaptive versus more 
innovative in problem-solving styles (van der Molen 1994). Citing work done by Cloninger 
(1986 and 1987), van der Molen reported how naturally occurring monoamine 
neuromodulators dopamine and norepinephrine have been measured in individuals in ways 
which support the argument that cognitive style is an inherited trait. This provides 
independent support for the argument that cognitive style is enduring through life and is 
consistent with test-retest experiments which have shown little variation over time. These 
findings led Italian KAI researcher Prato Previde (1984) to suggest that the concept 
(cognitive style) may be more deeply embedded in the psyche than culture (Kirton 1994). 
  
5. Kirton’s Psychometric Inventory 
 Kirton’s (1976) psychometric inventory was developed over many years following 
his work on Management Initiative (1961). He resists attempts to call his instrument a test as 
being too threatening and misleading since tests are more commonly associated with level 
measurements. Likewise he resists attempts to call his instrument a survey as being too 
trivial. He prefers the more precise term KAI Inventory to characterize his instrument.5  
 A mock-up of the KAI Inventory (without the control item) is shown in Appendix B. 
The actual instrument is paper with carbon-back duplicate that makes for ease of scoring. 
Kirton’s five-point Likert measurement instrument contained 33 items that are summed to 
yield a total KAI score. Since 32 items are scored (omitting control), they, therefore, produce 
a minimum score of 32 and a maximum score of 160, with a theoretical mean of 96. Kirton 
identified behavioral characteristics of people who scored fewer points on his inventory more 
                                                 
5 Kirton made this comment during my KAI Certification Course in December 2006. 
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adaptive and those who scored more points more innovative in their preferred cognitive style 
as described above. His original work found that members of his research sample closely 
approximated a normal distribution around a mean of 95.33, nearly the exact theoretical 
mean. His work has been extensively tested and used in different cultures and languages, and 
large populations have produced means of 95, male means of 98, and female means of 91. 
The practical range of scores runs from 45 to 145, and the standard deviation is 
approximately 18.  
 Based on the items contained within the instrument, Kirton was able to conduct factor 
analyses and ultimately found three principal components that related to the typologies 
theorized by Rogers (1959) (SO-sufficiency versus proliferation of ideas), Weber (1946) (E-
precision, reliability, efficiency), and Merton (1957:198) (R-rule-group conformity), as 
mentioned above.  Kirton (1994) noted that these three factors (traits) were internally stable 
and reliable. He suggested that the three traits may also be viewed on the continuum by 
mathematically standardizing the three trait scores. If these three subscores exceed a certain 
degree of variance between what standardized expectations would predict, some 
interpretation may be required. Kirton and others have found that it is uncommon for these 
standardized scores to vary significantly on the adaptor-innovator continuum.  
 Kirton’s (1976) original work was subjected to considerable test-retest reliability 
analyses. His initial validation sample (N=532) achieved an internal reliability coefficient of 
.88 using the Kuder-Richardson Formula 20, which accounted for 78% of the internal 
variance. He performed a replication sample test one year later and the K-R 20 was again .88. 
Cronbach Alpha coefficients were also calculated, which produced reliability of .88. Since 
Kirton’s early work, over 7,000 KAI Inventories have been conducted in 12 countries using 
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several different languages, which have yielded internal reliability scores of .79 to .91 
(Kirton 1999). 
 Several additional studies have been performed for the purpose of comparing the KAI 
Inventory with other measures (see e.g., De Ciantis 1987; Goldsmith 1985; Goldsmith and 
Matherly 1986; Hammond 1986; Keller and Holland 1978; Mulligan and Martin 1980; Prato 
Previde 1984; and Pulvino 1979). The studies referenced were factor studies of the 
consistency of Kirton’s KAI Inventory items. They included different population samples 
from the UK, USA, New Zealand, Ireland, and Italy. The average across all studies of all the 
items falling into the same factor as the original Kirton (1976) study was 83 percent, a 
finding that supports the stability of the underlying factor structure of the KAI inventory 
items. The KAI Inventory is widely held as a highly validated and reliable instrument 
(Jablokow 2005). 
 Construct validity is a consideration of whether the inventory actually measures what 
it intends to measure. Since the time of its inception, the KAI Inventory has been included in 
nearly 300 chapters in books or journal articles and has been employed in almost 100 higher-
degree theses or dissertations. There have been no recorded incidents of problems by 
administrators who have used the inventory. Kirton has attributed the high construct validity, 
in part, to the fact that the factorial study indicated a high correlation with theoretical work 
by Merton (1957), Rogers (1959), and Weber (1946)— which was the basis of Kirton’s 
original theory building, if not the genesis of the idea (Kirton 1999:30). 
 A good psychometric instrument should discriminate, meaning scores should be 
spread, the mean should appear near the theoretical mean, and extreme scores are rare. The 
reported range of responses is 45 to 145 and the scores distribute normally about the mean. 
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This means that two-thirds of the population falls within one standard deviation of the mean. 
All these factors contribute to support KAI  as a well-conceived psychometric inventory.  
 One of the factors which may contribute to the success of the KAI Inventory may be 
the certification requirement for administrators of the measure. The course in question is five 
days in length and requires considerable reading preparation and a personal interview with 
Kirton himself. The certification course concludes with an approximately 50-item 
examination which covers the theoretical development of the measure, proper administration 
of the measure, feedback instruction on the inventory, and scoring information.  
 
6. Problem Solving, Creativity, Level, and Style 
 A-I theory holds that all humans solve problems and are, therefore, creative (Kirton 
2003). Humans solve problems with differing styles and with differing levels of cognitive 
function. As simple as these two sentences appear, they require some elaboration for 
complete understanding.  
 Problem solving, according to Gagné (1965), is the eighth, or top, hierarchy of 
learning types. Learning theory, in which Gagné is a significant contributor, contributes to A-
I theory in its explication of the accumulation of learning. Gagné identified the following 
stages or hierarchies of learning (pp.33-57): 
-Type 1-Signal Learning: This may be thought of as learning that occurs as a reflexive 
(or emotional) response to some stimuli. For example, an air jet to the eye which is 
closely preceded by a sound will, over several repetitions, result in signal learning where 
the sound alone will produce the eye blink even without the subsequent air jet. This is 
referred to as S—R link 
-Type 2-Stimulus-Response Learning: This type of learning includes more thought 
processes than the Type 1 learning. The external stimulus creates a mental signal which 
then stimulates a response. These stimulus-response cognitions are what Skinner (1938) 
called a discriminant operant. This is referred to as Ss          R link. 
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-Type 3-Chaining: This is a common occurrence in learning situations. It simply 
involves a series of two or more Ss   R links. Language study provides an example 
of this type of learning; e.g., horse and buggy, boy and girl, love and marriage. The first 
name in a sequence gives rise to a second, etc.  
-Type 4-Verbal Association: This is an extension of Type 3 but involves a number of 
chains which are contiguous in time with the next; i.e., contiguity is necessary for 
learning. This is most effective in learning when it occurs on a single occasion.  
-Type 5-Multiple Discrimination: This means that the human has many chains which 
have been learned about various topics and retained in separate registers for future recall. 
They have been discriminated for appropriate use when needed.  
-Type 6: Concept Learning: This is dependent on internal neural processes of 
representation. Gagné used the comparative analysis as a description of this learning type 
in which prior learning must be called upon to discriminate between alternative choices.  
-Type 7: Principle Learning: Formally, principle learning is a chain of two or more 
concepts. It could be termed a relationship between concepts.  
-Type 8: Problem Solving: The highest level of learning depends on all the lower levels 
of learning. All humans must grow to this level of learning through the earlier steps or 
hierarchies. Gagné defined four conditions which must be satisfied for this type of 
learning to occur: 
1. The learner must be able to identify the essential features of the response 
that will be the solution before he arrives at it.  
2. Relevant principles, which have previously been learned, are recalled. 
3. The recalled principles are combined so that a new principle emerges and is 
learned.  
4. The individual steps involved in problem solving may be many, and 
therefore the entire act may take some time. Gagné (1965) observed, 
“Nevertheless, it seems evident that the solution is arrived at ‘suddenly,’ in 
a ‘flash of insight.’” 
 
 Gagné offered a description of conditions which must exist for each type of learning 
to occur. He identified four conditions of learning under Type 8: Problem Solving. It is 
similar to the findings of other scholars of problem solving—an illumination following 
search and processing. For example, Wallas (1926) defined a process of thought that 
contained four distinct steps (pp.79-80): 
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1. Preparation-directed thought and compilation of extant information. 
2. Incubation-non-directed thought, relaxation of body and mind away from the 
problem to be solved, thereby allowing the subconscious mind the freedom to 
explore and work on the problem. 
3. Illumination-the “ah ha” moment that the problem solution appears readily available 
to the problem solver. 
4. Verification-in the scientific world, this means observing the degree of congruence 
between the asserted solution and empirical application results.  
 
Wallas’ description of problem solving is remarkably similar to the Poincaré (1914) four 
aspects of problem solving: 1) search, 2) gestation and diversion, 3) illumination, and 4) 
verification. And Helmholtz (1896) much earlier offered similar phases of problem solving: 
an initial investigatory stage, the rest and recovery stage, the stage of illumination or the “ah 
ha experience.” Gagné’s conditions pursuant to problem solving (the highest form of 
learning) are an ordered process in much the same way as all eight levels in his hierarchy for 
learning. 
 The consistent findings of an illumination or “ah ha” experience in the study of 
problem solving raises the question of the relationship of creativity, level, style, and their 
influence on problem solving. Eysenck (1995) devoted considerable attention to the subject 
and voiced considerable disagreement with Sir Francis Galton’s (1869) position that 
eminence and genius are somehow the same and are appropriately represented by the normal 
curve. The normal curve may adequately represent the distribution of intelligence but not of 
eminence, according to Eysenck. Eysenck cited many cases of high IQ children who achieve 
modest success in life. Also, true genius is quite rare. See Figure II-1 for Eysenck’s 
formulation that includes three important classes of variables important to this discussion6:  
                                                 
6 See Eysenck (1995:39) Fig. 1.4: Creative achievement is a multiplicative function of cognitive, environmental 
and personality variables.  
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Figure II-1 Eysenck’s Model of Creative Achievement 
Variable Classes Variable Components Outcomes 
Cognitive Variables 
Intelligence 
Knowledge 
Technical Skills 
Special Talent 
Environmental 
Variables 
Political-religious Factors 
Cultural Factors 
Socio-economic & Educational Factors 
Personality Variables 
Internal motivation 
Confidence 
Non-conformity 
Creative Achievement  
 
Eysenck went to great lengths to differentiate “true” creative achievement and “average” 
achievement. Clearly, he holds the bar of creative achievement very high for special 
recognition. In his approach, only those whose achievement can be rated as great by experts 
in the field can be called creative. Most people will never reach the pantheons of intellectual 
genius sufficient to satisfy Eysenck’s definition. Conversely, A-I theory views all people as 
problem solvers and, hence, creative but at different levels and with different styles. 
Therefore, Kirton’s (2003) emphasis on the great mass, 99% of the population, should offer 
more hope for future human understanding than the fixation on the elusive 1% that has so 
consumed the likes of Eysenck.  
 Figure II-1 indicates three classes of variables which interact multiplicatively 
(synergistically) for creative achievement, according to Eysenck. He shows cognitive 
variables and personality variables as two different classes of variables. Kirton would argue 
that personality is part of the cognitive self. However, it is noteworthy to observe that 
Eysenck places non-conformity in the personality variables. Non-conformity could be 
considered a form of problem-solving style, perhaps tending toward the innovative end of the 
continuum. Eysenck places intelligence (or IQ) in a different variable class. This is consistent 
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with Kirton’s assertion that level (e.g., IQ) and style (e.g., KAI) are independent. Clearly 
they interact to contribute to problem solving, as both Kirton and Eysenck proposed. 
Eysenck’s model has some of the attributes of Kirton’s cognitive schema, including external 
environment providing opportunity, internal motivation helping decide which external 
stimuli to address, and the combination of cognitive level, resource, and style to manifest 
creative achievement or what Kirton called behavior.  
 Eysenck (1995) also offered a provisional theory for consideration that illuminated 
creative achievement and processes that contribute to it. His theory included ten points that 
are informative to this inquiry and will be presented for consideration (pp.81-82): 
1. All cognitive endeavors require new associations to be made, or old ones to be 
reviewed. 
2. There are marked differences between individuals in the speed with which associations 
are formed. 
3. Speed in the formation of associations is the foundation of individual differences in 
intelligence. 
4. Only a sub-sample of associations is relevant in a given problem. 
5. Individuals differ in the range of associations considered in problem solving. 
6. Wideness of range is the foundation of individual differences in creativity. 
7. Wideness of range is, in principle, independent of speed of forming associations, 
suggesting that intelligence and creativity are essentially independent. 
8. However, speed of forming associations leads to faster learning, and hence to a greater 
number of elements with which to form associations. 
9. The range of associations considered for problem solving is so wide that a critical 
evaluation is needed (comparator) to eliminate unsuitable associations. 
10. Genuine creativity requires: 
a) A large pool of elements to form associations. 
b) Speed in providing associations, and 
c) A well-functioning comparator to eliminate false solutions. 
 [The emphasis (italics) in Eysenck’s 10 items were Eysenck’s] 
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Figure II-2 is an illustrative representation of thought processes that integrates 
Gagné’s (1965) learning theory and Eysenck’s (1995) theory of creative achievement.  
I created this figure to help facilitate a visual conceptualization of the material presented 
earlier in this section. The terms used are taken from Gagné and Eysenck and for purposes of 
simplification I will italicize the specific terms used from those sources.  Inside Concept A 
there are many S—R learned bits and Ss—R learned bits. Many of these are chained; i.e., A—
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B represents a series of Ss—R bits which are related and sequentially stored. These are called 
chains. Chains are combined and stored in our cognitive resource in ways which allow our 
brains to retrieve them for useful purposes.  
This process, called multiple discrimination simply means that the cognitive resource 
catalogs chains in ways that allow them to maintain separate elements of memory and be 
accessible at times when they are called upon. 
 A group, or block of chains which are related, forms an important part of concept 
learning; e.g., Concept A in Figure II-2 is composed of a number of blocks which Gagné 
asserted are used in groups of three such that the middle block is considered in comparison 
with the first and third block. Two or more concepts which are chained form principle 
learning; e.g., Principle X shown above represents Concept A and Concept B chained by 
association M-N. I am using the term association in the sense proposed by Eysenck (1995), 
presented earlier. Eysenck asserted that creative achievement was an outcome largely 
dependent on the speed with which individuals form associations during the process of 
problem solving. He posited that individual differences in intelligence (level) were manifest 
by the speed of association formation. However, all people problem solve by a process of 
associations and, by Eysenck’s definition, are creative (at different levels). 
 Gagné placed problem solving at the highest level of his learning hierarchy. Problem 
solving requires the ability to recall previously learned principles whose antecedents are 
necessarily hierarchical in order of learning. Figure II-2 depicts two Principles, X and σ, 
which are linked by association Δ-Σ. Problem solving, according to Gagné, requires the 
recollection of learned principles which are combined (associated) in ways that a new 
principle is determined. The discovery of a new principle through the process of problem 
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solving may involve many steps and take some time. By all accounts, this process may be 
called creative, whether by Gagné, Eysenck, Poincaré, or Helmholtz—all four of whom 
acknowledged the “ah ha” experience that accompanies the act of problem solving. Kirton 
(2003) would add the possibility that creativity manifest in problem solving may range 
between largely adaptive to largely innovative. Note that in Eysenck’s (1995) ten point 
theory, item seven asserts that intelligence and creativity are independent. This partially 
supports Kirton’s (2003) view that level, style, and creativity are all independent. 
 Jablokow (2008) has made the largest application of A-I theory in the development 
and implementation of a three-course sequence for engineering graduate students at the 
Pennsylvania State University’s Great Valley School for Graduate Professional Studies. It is 
now also being converted into distance learning mode. She, like her mentor Kirton, makes 
great distinction between such terms as creativity and innovation in her courses on problem-
solving leadership. One can be creative in different ways; i.e., from adaptively creative to 
innovatively creative—and all points in between. One can be creative while being high level 
or while being low level in cognitive capacity (IQ) or manifest knowledge. Finally, Jablokow 
offered her summary version of A-I theory (p.939): 
In summary: all humans are creative and solve problems, at different levels and with 
different styles, driven by different motives, and exposed to different opportunities 
(which they also view differently). In problem solving, we must—at a minimum—
manage this individual diversity in order to manage change; to manage wider change, we 
must manage wider social diversity (i.e., that of the group) as well. 
 
For a useful definition of creativity in this fashion, I will accept Kirton’s (2003) simple 
statement, “… the generation and resolution of novelty.” Jablokow (2008) extends this 
thinking to the definition of problem solving, “…the act of bridging a gap (of cognition and 
resource) between ‘what you have’ and ‘what you want or need,’ with variations in how (and 
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where—as in ‘which discipline’) that occurs encompassed in the four key variables7 
described above” (p.938).  
 
7. The Paradox of Structure and Kuhnian Science 
 Kelly (1963) theorized a psychology of personal constructs wherein he described the 
human brain as operating through a vast network of pathways. He said, “The network is 
flexible and is frequently modified, but it is structured and it both facilitates and restricts a 
person’s range of action.” Kirton (2003) employed similar logic in the development of A-I 
theory in his concept of the paradox of structure. Structure is, at the same time, enabling and 
limiting—similar to Kelly’s theory. It clearly sets forth the bounds of known solution regions 
and is, therefore, enabling for problem solvers. However, by definition, it also sets forth a 
limit of acceptable problem solutions; thus, the paradox of structure. Again, Figure II-2 may 
be used to illustrate this and Kuhn’s (1962) explanation of scientific discoveries. Principle X 
may be said to represent a region in scientific exploration. There are some known facts in this 
region represented, e.g., by Concept A and Concept B. There are, however, many 
unanswered questions inside region X, which, using Kuhn’s description, are called residual 
puzzles. Kuhn used the word paradigm to describe a prevailing scientific body of knowledge. 
He provided examples of the difficulty scientists have in resolving anomalies—answers 
outside the expectation of scientists. Some anomalies are residual puzzles; i.e., questions 
which will be ultimately answered within the prevailing scientific paradigm (Region 
(Principle) X in the current example). But, some anomalies may never be resolved inside 
Region X. They will require a paradigm-breaking discovery. The anomalies may be resolved 
by the emergence of a new Region; e.g., Region (Principle) σ in Figure II-2. Region σ 
                                                 
7 The four key variables mentioned herein are opportunity, motive, level, and style (p. 938).  
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provides a new scientific arena for scientific exploration and will attract more research until a 
new paradigm-breaking discovery is made. Practically speaking, the invention of the airplane 
did not make the automobile obsolete, nor did the invention of the automobile make the horse 
and carriage obsolete. But the new paradigms did dramatically change the degree of use of 
the older technologies in specific situations. There is conflict, however, in the progression of 
science. Jablokow (2005), an engineering educator, termed it, “…the catalytic nature of 
science,” using the chemical definition of effecting decomposition, dissolution, or release. 
Similarly, catalyze means to produce fundamental change in or transpose. This is at the heart 
of individual, group, or organizational resistance to learning (change): those most resistant to 
change are those that perceive the change to be detrimental to their position of power and 
prestige, are usually those who have the most invested in the existing paradigm. 
 Kirton (2003) suggested that high adaptors would be most likely to favor solving 
residual puzzles or working within the existing paradigm – or at least on the edges of it. 
Conversely, high innovators would be more likely to seek solutions outside the existing 
paradigm. The paradox of structure is enabling for both the adaptors and the innovators just 
as it is restricting to them both. Again, refer to Table I-1 for descriptions of preferred 
behaviors of adaptors and innovators that illuminate this discussion. 
 
8. Decision Making and Group Problem Solving 
 The issue of problem solving was discussed earlier from the perspective of an 
individual. There is not a clear distinction between problem solving and decision making at 
an individual level of analysis. However, when considering any form of collective decision 
making or group problem solving, there are special considerations which come into play. 
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Kirton (2003) makes clear his purpose is to help resolve Problem B; i.e., in the management 
of diversity which has been central to the foregoing development. This means that when two 
or more people come together to problem solve, the first problem which must be solved is the 
fact that the individuals have uniquely different perspectives on virtually everything.  
 There has been a democratization of decision making in the last 80 years which is 
exemplified by Bernard’s (1938) early assertion that executives were the sole purveyor of 
decision making in organizations, to the present time when work “groups and teams are 
ubiquitous in organizations” and which function to make collective decisions about product 
design, customer service, and a host of other decisions (Devine et al. 1999). Devine et al. 
provided a typology of teams in organizations that include dimension, purpose, and temporal; 
i.e., team size, team mission, and intact versus ad hoc. In contrast to Bernard’s early 
description of decision making in organizations, Devine et al. concluded that the typical team 
performs multiple tasks, employs consensus in decision making, has a formal leader, operates 
non-hierarchically as a peer group, and is moderately diverse with regard to age and gender.  
 Devine (1999) asked an important question, “Do groups of experts with diverse 
backgrounds make decisions that reflect the sum of their collective knowledge?” (p.608). 
From the perspective of city and regional planning, this has been a major point of emphasis 
for decades, the answer of which produced Lindblom’s (1959) disjointed incrementalism. 
Janis (1972) argued that highly cohesive groups can become more interested in group 
cohesion than discovering truth, an outcome he dubbed groupthink. Devine asserted that 
group conflict was constructive if handled properly—in agreement with Kirton, except that 
debate is preferred as less costly than conflict. Devine said cognitive conflict was about 
differences over the best way to achieve a group goal or objective. Kirton would agree but 
  45
would include both cognitive level and cognitive style in his explanation of types and sources 
of conflict. Devine said affective conflict is personal and directed at others in the group. 
Kirton would call this cognitive affect conflict, but would generally agree that in the region of 
affect lie values and belief systems that are deeply ingrained and often intractable. Devine 
called cognitive conflict (cognitive style and level) strategic and suggested that it has the 
potential to increase the sharing of unique information and, thereby, increase the quality of 
decision making. Conversely, cognitive affect conflict is interpersonal and is destructive in 
decision making. This is consistent with accepted knowledge about the way emotion clouds 
decision making (which was Weber’s (1946) central argument in advancing bureaucracy as 
the most perfect form of administration or decision making). Dialectical inquiry and devil’s 
advocacy are two methods of inducing cognitive style (and level) conflict into debate leading 
to the management of cognitive diversity and on to solving of problems.  
 
9. Synthesis and Extensions  
 From the beginning of this exposition I have focused on the important prerequisite of 
improving organizational decision making—improving small group problem solving. I have 
also shown from Gagné’s (1965) work in learning theory that problem solving is the highest 
level of learning for Homo sapiens. And, I have classified the amalgamation of three to 20 
people as a small group—the elemental decision unit in organizations (Harris and Sherblom 
2005). If, as de Geus (1988) asserts, the only competitive advantage future companies have is 
the ability to learn faster than their competition, helping small groups maximize their 
problem solving ability may be the most important thing companies can do with their 
employees. In point of fact, Kirton (2003) said “problem solving is the key to life,” and that 
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in this ever changing world man must constantly deal with change in order to survive. 
Adaption-Innovation is the preferred cognitive style with which a person approaches problem 
solving and is, therefore, an important building block to achieve this research’s ultimate 
goal—improving organizational decision making.  The frame of reference for this study is 
organizations (irrespective of the fact that the unit of analysis is “small groups”). Important 
considerations stemming from organizational research and theorizing must be highlighted. 
 I noted that Roethlisberger and Dixon’s (1939) ground breaking empirical work 
revealed that formal organizational rules, policies, and procedures only partly explain actual 
observed behavior which was described as informal organizational practices or tacit rules, 
policies, and procedures. March and Simon (1958) observed that organizational change 
(behavior) may be actively influenced or directed by either individual learning or by 
changing the specific rules that must be adhered to.  They described this from a 
psychological perspective as follows: “Empirically, it appears that changes in the total 
content of the memory take place relatively slowly through the processes generally called 
learning.”  And behavior changes may be created, “…by bringing about changes in the 
memory content (learning), or by changing the active determiners of current behavior 
(evocation)” (p.29). This argument was simply that organizations could teach actors new 
information (and thereby achieve behavior outcomes desired) and/or provide behavioral 
constraints such that actors must make certain decisions in given circumstances. This view 
failed to acknowledge the well accepted fact that there is gap in congruence between formal 
organization and informal organization which became the central focus of latter-day 
behavioralists (see, e.g., Argyris 1957, Likert 1967, and McGregor 1960). The degree of gap 
is an indication of the degree to which organization members are psychologically integrated 
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into the value system and mission of the organization. I would argue that the degree of 
congruence in question may be approximated by the difference between ad hoc group 
problem solving and intact group problem solving when both are solving non-role preferred, 
non-trivial problems.  
 March and Simon (1958), in the previous paragraph, rightfully acknowledged the 
importance of rules, policies, and procedures which manifest the values of an organization. 
Earlier, Simon (1947) defined organizational members as “boundedly rational actors” to 
emphasize the limited cognitive capacity for group members to understand all alternatives, 
know all consequences of actions, and have a well ordered preference of choices. Kirton’s 
(1994 and 2003) paradox of structure provides a conceptual explanation of the boundedly 
rational actor who is, at once, enabled to problem solve within the established boundaries, 
and limited to the range of possible solutions by those boundaries themselves. If behavior 
change (different organizational outcomes) is desired, it logically follows that the rules, 
policies, and procedures defining the boundaries must be moved. I consider it the province of 
the sovereign (in organizations the board of directors and its delegate the chief executive 
officer) to modify the values from which the rules, policies, and procedures derive. Thus, that 
is outside the scope of this study. But once those rules, policies, and procedures are set, the 
question of conveying that information to the membership becomes paramount, as March and 
Simon noted above. How might that best be achieved in context of this research?  
 Overstreet’s (1925) optimistic assertion of the “Creative Plus” points to small groups 
as the source of great potential. Since Roethlisberger and Dixon’s Management and the 
Worker, the small work group has been viewed as the fundamental unit for study. And, as 
Harris and Sherblom (2005) observe, most organizations are today substantially run by small 
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groups of people, it naturally follows that an emphasis on helping small groups learn faster is 
a worthy focus of study. I make an important distinction here between in-group and out-
group classes of small groups; i.e., within organizations small groups are considered in-group 
and I have called these intact groups. Out-groups are not members of the organization and I 
have called them ad hoc groups.   
 I have amplified much of Kirton’s (1976, 1994, and 2003) A-I theory in order to 
establish the valuable contribution it offers for improving problem solving in groups. In 
addition, I have recalled some important aspects of organizations because organizations 
matter in very important ways. Overlapping these two pieces of scholarship will enable me to 
investigate the important question about how organizations may learn faster—the only 
sustainable advantage that companies of the future may rely upon (Schein 1993). 
 Hammerschmidt (1996) and Scott (2007) have shown that appropriate consideration 
of individual problem-solving styles of members constituting problem-solving groups can 
make statistically significant impacts in the direction A-I theory predicts. They performed 
their experiments with ad hoc groups. I propose to employ the same experimental test within 
an organization using intact group subjects in contrast to the earlier work.   
 
10. Summary and Hypotheses for Testing 
 I will summarize the essence of my exposition for the purpose of bringing all key 
concepts to the same location. All people are problem solvers and, hence, creative, but using 
different styles (KAI) and at different levels (e.g., IQ) (Goldsmith 1994 and Kirton 2003). 
Most problems in organizations are today solved by groups or teams (Devine et al. 1999 and 
Harris and Sherblom 2005). The problem about which the team is formed is called Problem 
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A, and the problem which arises in trying to manage the different people trying to solve a 
problem is Problem B. Most of the time and resources should be invested in Problem A and 
not Problem B.  
 People have problem-solving style preferences which may be located along a bi-polar 
continuum between high adaptors and high innovators (see Figure I-1). High adaptors prefer 
to work safely inside existing rules and structures. High innovators have less regard for 
existing rules and structures. High adaptors and high innovators view each other somewhat 
pejoratively (see Table I-1).  
 Cognitive style (adaptor versus innovator) is independent of cognitive level. 
Creativity may be manifest as adaptive or innovative regarding cognitive style. People may 
be creative high adaptors (Edison) or creative high innovators (Tesla) (Jablokow 2007 and 
Kirton 1978b).  
 Each person is unique in his mental representation of reality which is shaped by 
socialization (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Homo sapiens enjoy no instinct and, 
consequently, must learn all necessary information for problem solving and decision making 
in group contexts (which is at the heart of Problem B) (Jones 1999 and Kirton 2003).  
 The paradox of structure enables problems to be solved but restricts the range of 
problems which might be solved at the same time. The more adaptive differ from the more 
innovative in resolving this paradox.  The former are more trusting of the limits and tighten 
them in making “better” changes.  The more innovative are more wary of the limits and tend 
to loosen them in order to get different solutions (Drucker 1969 and Kirton 2003).   
 Individuals arrive at problem solving via opportunities in the external environment 
(either created or happened upon) and, depending on motive, tackle problems using their 
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particular style and aided by their level and accumulated wisdom in memory (Jablokow and 
Booth 2006 and Jablokow 2008).  
 Lastly, with improved understanding of Problem B, we may achieve what Overstreet 
(1925) called the “Creative Plus,” meaning the group performed better than the sum of the 
individuals. 
 My essential interest is helping improve group problem solving and, in turn, improve 
organizational decision-making outcomes. Recall my three objectives shown earlier: 
1. To what degree may group problem-solving outcomes be improved by judicious 
selection of group membership based on cognitive style preference? 
2. To what degree do intact groups outperform ad hoc groups in solving problems 
which are outside the groups’ problem-solving style preference as measured by 
group mean KAI scores? 
3. To what degree do members of an intact organization modulate preferred problem 
solving style behavior to cope with fellow organization members? 
 
I will answer these research questions by conducting a controlled experiment in an 
organizational setting. The following hypotheses will be tested by the experiment: 
 H1: Intact groups will perform better at problem solving than ad hoc groups, ceteris 
paribus.  
 H2: Intact groups will perform better at problem solving even when performing non-
role preferred tasks in comparison to ad hoc groups performing role-preferred tasks—for 
limited duration tasks.  
 H3: The degree of congruence between formal organization and informal 
organization may be approximated by the degree to which intact groups out perform ad 
hoc groups on the same tasks. 
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 Chapter III will present a description of the context into which the experiment will be 
introduced, a discussion of the experiment, expectations of the findings, and both limitations 
and potential generalizations of the results.  
 
 
     
CHAPTER III  EXPERIMENTATION PROCEDURES AND METHODS 
 
1. Context and Controls for Experiment 
 I will conduct an experiment using subjects from professional services organizations 
who routinely work in teams or groups during the execution of their daily work. The subjects 
to which this experiment will be applied are technical professionals and, consequently, will 
be above average problem solvers in their respective domains. The teams that are assembled 
are knowledgeable of each others’ basic abilities and integrity as a result of being employed 
at the same place of business and as a result of knowing the standards of qualifications that 
exist at that business. Consequently, groups formed will be considered intact for this study, 
while in their daily work they may not serve in the same subteam inside the organization. 
 Kirton (2003) asserts that the size of groups for problem solving should be that 
required by the problem; however, there are two dimensions of importance in this assertion: 
1) the number of group members and 2) the range of KAI scores. I will focus my 
experimental setup based on the number of group members and will, therefore, hold the 
group size constant. Each subteam in the proposed experiment will consist of four people. 
That will effectively control for the size element of group problem solving. The subteams 
will be set according to dimension number two; i.e., I will compose the subteams based on 
the KAI scores.  
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In city and regional planning exercises, facilitators often spend considerable time on 
the “values” question as described above. Since the frame of reference of this research is 
within an organizational context the question of values determination is somewhat more 
easily established; i.e., as noted in the last chapter, the sovereign is assumed to have already 
established the values from which the rules, policies, and procedures derive. However, 
values’ conflicts still persist in organizations—note the formal and informal organization 
discussion earlier. In an effort to control for the potential confounding effect of values’ 
conflicts, I have selected a value neutral problem for the experiment.  
 The experiment selected for this research comes from the fields of human relations, 
leadership training, organization development, and communications, and has previously been 
used for studies involving A-I theory (Hammerschmidt 1996 and Scott 2007). 
 
2. The Hollow Square: A Communications Experiment 
 The Hollow Square (Pfeiffer and Jones 1974) experiment requires two subteams to 
collaborate for the purpose of solving a puzzle. A planning subteam has 25 minutes to 
determine how to teach an implementation team to assemble the puzzle and to teach the 
implementation team. The implementation team has 25 minutes to solve the puzzle. After the 
planning team has completed its instruction to the implementation team, it may provide no 
additional instruction. Each subteam will conduct its work in rooms that are separated except 
for the instruction period. Proctors will observe the subgroups during the work process but 
will not be permitted to answer any questions or give advice. A full copy of the Hollow 
Square: A Communications Experiment is in Appendix A.  
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3. Group Identification  
 All subjects will initially be grouped together to complete the KAI Inventory. 
Additional information will be collected at that time pertaining to time in the organization, 
work unit in the organization, and position in the organization. During the initial assembly of 
the subjects, there will be no explanation of A-I theory to avoid biasing effects.  
 I will follow Hammerschmidt’s (1996) general process of manipulating the makeup 
of subteams based on KAI scores. Hammerschmidt composed his subteams using the 
definition of homogeneous where the KAI score range was less than 20 points. He also 
defined “relatively more or less adaptive or innovative” as the basis for subgroup formation 
with the breakpoint between the two at 15.7 points. These definitions, however, were based 
on his range of KAI scores from his participants and could vary in different settings. 
 The outcome to be measured will be the percentage of total teams (meaning two 
subteams collaborating to solve the puzzle) which solved the puzzle in the prescribed time 
limit. I will deviate from Hammerschmidt during the subteam assembly and the subteam role 
assignment to investigate the particular psychological influence (“integrating” influence 
consistent with Argyris (1957), Likert (1967) and McGregor (1960)), and the organization 
has for its members. (See also Hayward and Everett 1983; Kirton et al. 1991; Kirton and 
deCiantis 1994; and Kirton and McCarthy 1988.) 
 For this research, two team types will be established. The first will be the same as 
Hammerschmidt’s category two which will be used as a control for the experiment. The 
second will be the same as Hammerschmidt’s category four. The difference, in both cases, is 
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that subjects are part of an ongoing organization; i.e., intact groups. The following team 
arrangement will be tested8: 
1) Dissimilar subteams with adaptive planning subteams and innovative 
implementation subteams. 
2) Dissimilar subteams with innovative planning subteams and adaptive 
implementation subteams.  
  
4. Analysis Methods and Expectations 
 Difference of means tests will be analyzed, based on number of teams which 
successfully completed the puzzle in the prescribed time. I will use all the prior findings by 
Hammerschmidt (1996) and Scott (2007) for ad hoc success rates, since both used ad hoc 
teams. I will compare those data with all findings for intact groups. Additionally, I will 
compare Hammerschmidt’s findings for the cases shown above with the findings on intact 
groups this research will yield. All these data will enable me to test hypothesis H1: Intact 
groups will perform better at problem solving than ad hoc groups, ceteris paribus.  
 Difference of means tests will be conducted on findings from this research on the two 
team arrangements listed above in order to test the remaining hypotheses. Based on A-I 
theory, combined with prior research, I would expect the two teams to produce the following 
relative results: 
 Intact teams which are working in role-preferred tasks should perform better than ad 
hoc teams also working in role-preferred tasks. In the Hollow-Square Experiment that means 
that adaptive planners and innovative implementers will be working on tasks more 
                                                 
8 Notwithstanding Hammerschmidt’s definition of similar and dissimilar subteams and his definition of 
homogeneous KAI score subteam make-up, the final definition of these terms must follow the collection of KAI 
scores on the participants in this experiment.  
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compatible with their preferred problem-solving style. The average KAI subteam scores will 
be what Hammerschmidt called “dissimilar” for both classes of experiments. This means 
there will be wider KAI score diversity between subteams working together; i.e., the mean 
KAI score of the planner subteam will be very different from the mean KAI score of the 
implementer subteam. This poses a serious communications challenge between the two 
subteams working together to solve a single problem. I would expect that communications’ 
problem to be more pronounced in ad hoc groups than intact groups. This is consistent with 
small group research which asserts a time dependent evolution of group functioning which is 
based on personal integration with the group (Tuckman 1965 and Fisher 1970).  
 The second team arrangement proposed for this research was based on the worst 
performing category reported in Hammerschmidt’s research. My proposition is that intact 
groups will have sufficient individual motivation for cooperation that they will perform well 
even outside their preferred problem solving style for relatively brief periods. This is 
premised on the assumption that organizations provide an integrating influence—which some 
have called a psychological atmosphere or climate which could be said to be the degree of 
separation (gap) between the formal organization and the information (see, e.g., Kirton and 
deCiantis 1994; Kirton and McCarthy 1988; Lewin, et al. 1939; Schneider 1975, 1983b, 1987 
and 1990). 
 Each subteam will be observed by proctors during the experiments. Each participant 
will be identified by code-name tag such that comments, behaviors, and participation levels 
may be attributed to someone according to KAI score. Also, following the completion of the 
exercise a short structured questionnaire will be administered which will ask for impressions 
as to each subject’s role satisfaction, comfort or discomfort with the exercise, attitudes 
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toward other participants, and appropriateness of the time permitted for the exercise. These 
findings will be compiled for qualitative evaluation of A-I theory as it is applied in this 
experiment. The Post Exercise Impressions questionnaire is shown in Appendix D. This 
feedback will add important qualitative findings that will illuminate the personal motivation 
and degrees of coping that would be predicted in A-I theory. 
 
5.  Threats and Generalizations 
 A-I theory holds that individuals can function satisfactorily outside their preferred 
problem-solving style for relatively long periods of time through the process of coping 
behavior. In this research, there is a relatively short period of time allocated for the 
experiment. While Hammerschmidt (1996) found statistically significant differences in the 
expected directions for adaptors and innovators, the short time of the experiment is a threat to 
the findings. However, I am purposefully composing subteams in non-preferred role tasks so 
as to magnify the influence of style on performance.  
 A-I theory views motivation as an important variable which, when presented with 
opportunity, determines the degree of interest and effort an individual will invest in problem 
solving (generation of and resolution of novelty). This presents the researchers with a 
precautionary thought; i.e., participants should not become too interested in competition 
against other teams. This means that the introduction and instructions provided in this 
exercise should eschew competition and emphasize collaborative participation. 
Consequently, a strict outline of information and instructions will be administered for all 
participants with minimal variation across offices or firms. Subjects will be invited to 
participate in a communications exercise as part of a research project for a doctoral student in 
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the City & Regional Planning Department at UNC Chapel Hill. There will be no 
compensation for participants, and the exercise will be conducted outside regular work hours 
for the volunteers.  
 The experiment chosen for this research involves the solution of a puzzle of 
geometrical shapes which combine to form a 12-inch square with a two-inch square hole in 
its center. By virtue of the puzzle being geometrical, there is the threat of bias toward 
subjects which have more cognitive resource developed in the area of spatial relationships. 
As a method of control for this threat, I will ask the participants to indicate their preference 
for directions; i.e., would you prefer a map or written directions? This will serve as a proxy 
for and a possible indication of spatial intelligence. 
 A-I theory holds that the management of diversity is of critical importance in today’s 
complex society in order to facilitate sufficient and appropriate change to help society 
survive. Simply put, that means methods for optimal solution of Problem B need to be 
developed and communicated. Within an organizational context there is great need to 
become a “learning organization,” consistent with the earlier de Geus (1988) assertion. If the 
findings of A-I theory can be combined with organizational theory concerning formal and 
informal organization there may be opportunity for accelerating the learning upon which the 
future of all organizations is based.  
 Also, as A-I theory becomes more well known there is an opportunity to expand its 
application usefully into broader settings. Societal problems continue to get more complex 
and there are opportunities for more adaptive solutions and more innovative solutions 
depending on the problem. 
  
CHAPTER IV   IMPLEMENTATION, FRAMING, LITERATURE, AND TRIALS 
 
1. General Issues 
 This chapter will detail the complete research protocol and provide summary reports 
of each experiment. This follows the hypotheses presented earlier and culminates in 
quantitative testing of those hypotheses in Chapter VI. However, the observational methods I 
used during the experiments and subsequent compilation provided a serendipitous 
opportunity to add a considerable body of exploratory work which enriches this 
investigation. Following the presentation of the research protocol I introduce a theoretical 
framework within which the research will be reported and elucidated. Next I review 
important empirical research which conflates cognitive style theory and small group 
behavior. I conclude this chapter with the summary reports of each experiment. I present the 
exploratory qualitative findings in Chapter V. And, finally I combine the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses in Chapter VII in an interpretation of these findings and possible 
implications in various contexts.  
 
2. Implementation 
 2.1 Overview, IRB, and Plan 
 This research was conducted in a professional services firm which has multiple 
offices across several states in the southeast. The firm in question was one that I (principal 
investigator) co-founded over 30 years ago. My initial submittal to the Institutional Review
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 Board proposed to camouflage my involvement to prevent any semblance of coercion during 
solicitation of volunteers for the experiment. During the Institutional Review Board approval 
process the IRB chairman and I discussed the potential ethical dilemma that proposal created. 
Following a lengthy discussion of the culture of the company and its use of other 
psychometric instruments (e.g., MBTI) the chairman of the IRB suggested the only practical 
solution would be for my involvement to be completely visible. Consequently I informed all 
participants of my personal involvement during the solicitation process. I sent an email 
message to all host company employees in any office which had more than eight people (the 
desired number required to comprise a complete testing unit). That email is shown in 
Appendix E and lists “Research Opportunity” in the subject line. The official invitation letter 
shown in Appendix F was attached to the email. The official invitation was sent in late 
August 2009.  
 The original plan for conducting the experiment called for three meetings: 1) an 
introductory meeting during which the subjects would be administered the KAI Inventory 
and supply some additional information, 2) the actual experiment, and 3) a debriefing 
meeting. All the meetings were proposed to be held during the lunch hour at the various 
participating offices. I had proposed that the initial meeting would not be a lunch-provided 
meeting due to its shorter length. However, after initial tepid response to my invitation I 
offered to buy lunch for those participating in the initial meetings as well. The initial meeting 
included a very brief introduction to my work included in a scripted message which set forth 
the plan for all the meetings, including lunch. Because two of my colleagues assisted in the 
experiment I wanted to narrow the possible variation of information provided to the 
volunteers. The introductory scrip is shown in Appendix G and was used during all the initial 
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meetings. The IRB Consent Form is also included in Appendix G. The initial meetings were 
conducted beginning in early September 2009 and concluded on November 16, 2009.  
 
 2.2 Data Compilation and Team Formation 
 Between November 16 and November 30 all subject information was processed for 
the purpose of making team assignments. Each participating office was considered a 
statistical unit for subteam assembly. The KAI total score for each participant was recorded 
and the subjects were rank-ordered from lowest to highest KAI score by office. The median 
was used as a cut point and all subjects with KAI scores below the cut point were assigned to 
the more adaptive group while subjects with KAI scores above the cut point were assigned to 
the more innovative group. A simple random-number generator was used to help make 
random assignment of subteams from the two groups (more adaptive versus more 
innovative). The subteams were then paired with sister subteams; i.e., a more adaptive 
subteam was paired with a more innovative subteam. The two subteams would combine to be 
a testing unit—what I called a “Trial” for this research. I computed the standard deviation of 
the testing unit and, to the extent possible, assembled Trial units with subteams mean KAI 
scores greater than one and one half standard deviations apart. This was my definition of 
“different” subteams from the perspective of mean KAI scores.  
 The Hollow-Square experiment, as I have presented it, calls for four-person subteams, 
one relatively more adaptive and one relatively more innovative. I compiled each subteam of 
four participants. Unfortunately, due to scheduling difficulties there were some absentees on 
the days the trials were conducted in three different offices. That resulted in three trials being 
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conducted with only three-person planning subteams. I will expand more fully on the 
significance of three-person subteams subsequently.  
 
 2.3 De-identification of Subjects and Code Names 
 Because I had proposed to video record the actual experiments, the IRB required that 
I take care to protect the identities of participants. I, therefore, “de-identified” the subjects by 
asking them to assume a given alias during the experiment. In an effort to employ a system 
that would be revealing to the researchers while not having any pejorative meaning to the 
subjects I devised the following code naming convention (note that the terms adaptive and 
innovative relate to the specific measurement of the subjects’ KAI total scores): 
 The relatively more adaptive subteam member code names are:  
  Abe—the most adaptive of the four subteam members 
  Bo 
  Chris 
  Dale—the least adaptive of the four subteam members 
 The relatively more innovative subteam member code names are: 
  Mel—the least innovative of the four subteam members 
  Nat 
  Pat 
  Ray—the most innovative of the four subteam members 
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2.4 Scheduling and Conducting Experiments 
 The actual experiments were conducted beginning on December 1 and were 
concluded on December 18, 2009. Generally the meetings lasted approximately one hour and 
were usually held during the regular lunch period in each office. There were two exceptions 
to the lunch schedule arrangement: Fort Myers Trial T1 was held at 7:00 AM on Dec. 1 and 
Wilmington Trial T1 was held in the late afternoon rather than at lunch due to some 
scheduling conflicts.  
 During the actual experiment the total team (all eight participants) would gather 
briefly and be told they were going to jointly solve a problem. The operations subteam was 
given a Hollow-Square Operating Team Briefing Sheet and would be sent to another room to 
prepare for their then unknown assignment. Pizza was served to the operating subteam during 
the time they were waiting to be summonsed by the planning subteam. There was no 
indication of variation between offices and trials within offices except for the Fort Myers 
Trial T1 where the facilitator reported that the participants were anxious to get going to their 
field assignments. All but one of the participants in the Fort Myers office had to travel by 
truck to their daily assignments. I will comment further during the specific summary reports 
concerning Fort Myers Trial T1.  
 
 2.5 Video Recording of Experiments 
 I video recorded the experimental procedure. All of the experiments were recorded 
with a small digital video recorder called the Flip Video. The Flip Video recorder is ideally 
suited for field application like this one since it is small (approximately 4”x2”x1/2”) and not 
very imposing to the participants. All but one of the trials were conducted with the Flip 
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Video set on a tripod and it appeared that after an initial period of awareness the subjects 
quickly ignored the camera and went about their business of solving the problem. For 11 of 
the 12 trials a full hour (or more) of video was captured. This provided the opportunity to 
record post-experiment comments and/or questions from the participants. The exception to 
that occurred with the first trial which occurred in Fort Myers. The facilitator held the camera 
in her hand thinking that would be less obtrusive and objectionable by the participants. 
Unfortunately that also meant that the facilitator turned the recorder on and off during times 
she felt appropriate and, consequently, I only have a limited record of that trial.  
 
 2.6 Facilitator Variation and Implications 
 I invited two of my long-time colleagues to assist me during the first two meetings 
(the initial information gathering meeting and the experiment meeting). Phyllis Elikai is 
director of human resources and Linda F. Vaughn was a customer services specialist at the 
host firm (Vaughn has retired from the company since the end of 2009). Both were 
certificated by Dr. Kirton after completing his week-long course in England in 2007. And, 
both have been MBTI certified as well. While both of these colleagues were eminently 
qualified to assist in this work I have noticed some variation of facilitation that occurred 
during the experiments.  
 Twelve experiments were conducted over a three-week period in December. Linda 
Vaughn conducted the initial trial in Fort Myers, Florida. Phyllis Elikai conducted two trials 
in Charlotte and two trials in Wilmington, North Carolina. And, I conducted two trials in 
Clearwater, Florida and five trials in Raleigh.  
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 The facilitator’s instructions were relatively vague and, consequently, there were a 
few examples of different interpretations of facilitation which were observed during the 
review of video. I will comment on specific facilitator actions within each of the summary 
reports on trials below.  
 
3. Framing 
 3.1 The Critical Incident Technique 
 I will employ the critical incident technique for reporting, discussing, and concluding 
important findings during the qualitative phase of this research. Flanagan (1954) defined the 
critical incident technique as, “…a set of procedures for collecting direct observations of 
human behavior in such a way as to facilitate their potential usefulness in solving practical 
problems and developing broad psychological principles. The critical incident technique 
outlines procedures for collecting observed incidents having special significance and meeting 
systematically defined criteria” (p.327). It is noteworthy to observe that this work originated 
from the field of psychology and is clearly dependent on effective communications to ascribe 
meaning to events.  
 
 3.2 Critical Incident Technique, History, and Development 
 Flanagan is quite narrow in his definition of “critical,” he asserts, “To be critical, an 
incident must occur in a situation where the purpose or intent of the act seems fairly clear to 
the observer and where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt 
concerning its effects” (p.327). He traced the roots of the technique back to Sir Frances 
Galton in the late Nineteenth Century and more recent developments such as time sampling 
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studies of observed activities, controlled observations tests, and some anecdotal records 
(those “more recent developments” are now roughly 70 years old, hardly recent). The critical 
event technique actually emerged from the Aviation Psychology Program of the United 
States Army Air Forces in World War II. In the summer of 1941 the Aviation Psychology 
Program was created for aiding the selection and evaluation of aircrews.  
 The first studies concerned themselves with failures during training of aviators. Over 
1000 pilots were eliminated from the training program and studies were attempted which 
would help explain the causes. Their findings revealed that the observers used clichés and 
stereotypes that were not particularly helpful. However, there were some helpful 
observations which became the basis for selecting pilot candidates. But, the need for a more 
rigorous procedure for assessing factual incidents was evident from this study. The second 
study, which emphasized factual observations made by competent observers, was performed 
in the winter of 1943-1944. This came from reports on bombing missions and focused on 
those missions which were deemed failures. Again, these reports left critical information out 
and further research and study was called for.  
 During the summer of 1944 a series of studies was conducted on combat leadership in 
the US Army Air Forces. These were the first large-scale systematic studies of their type. 
The study identified specific incidents of both effective and ineffective behaviors with 
respect to specific missions. The researchers asked the combat veterans to, “…report 
incidents observed by them that involved behavior which was especially helpful or 
inadequate in accomplishing the assigned mission” (p.328). Several thousand incidents were 
recorded and analyzed in an effort to make an objective definition of the critical requirements 
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of combat leadership. These several reports became the foundation of the critical incident 
technique.  
 Flanagan and a coauthor conducted the first application of the critical incident 
techniques in an industrial setting under the auspices of the American Institute for Research 
in 1949 (Miller and Flanagan 1950). This research project was to determine the critical job 
requirements for the hourly employees for the Delco-Remy Division of the General Motors 
Corporation. Foremen participated in a committee to develop employee review procedures 
and, in concert with other foremen in the company, collected 2,500 critical incidents in 
interviews. Based on this information, a form was developed for the purpose of recording 
incidents on a daily basis to aid in assessing job performance. Three groups of foremen were 
asked to fill out the form concerning hourly employee performance for a two-week period. 
One group of 24 foremen filled the form out daily. A second group of 24 foremen filled the 
form out at the end of each one-week period. The third group of 24 foremen filled out the 
form at the end of the two week period. The number of critical incidents reported by the three 
groups was surprising: the daily reports yielded 315 critical events; the weekly reports 
yielded 155 critical events, and the two-week report yielded only 63 critical incidents. Miller 
and Flanagan (1950) summarized this to mean that the foremen reporting weekly only 
remembered about 50% of the incidents and the bi-weekly reporting foremen apparently 
forgot roughly 80% of the critical events observed. The thrust of this observation was that the 
delay in observation and recording should be minimized in order to achieve best results. (In 
my research program, as will be further discussed, I avoid some of the problem of selective 
memory by use of video recording of group exercises.) These data were used by the 
researchers to develop tests for selecting employees based on both aptitude and attitude 
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factors. Although the early application of the critical incident technique was geared toward 
finding people who were psychologically compatible with different job types, this has useful 
application in the field of small group decision making, particularly if there is a known goal 
or objective about which the group is deliberating. 
 Flanagan (1954) presented the critical incident technique not as a rigid set of rules 
but, rather, a set of principles which are flexible and should be adapted to the context in 
which the technique is being applied. He emphasized that only simple types of judgments 
should be employed by the observer and that the observer should be competent. Also, the 
communicative acts upon which the observer is rendering judgments should be based on a 
clear statement of the purpose of the activity; i.e., the goal of the deliberation. He opined, “In 
the absence of an adequate theory of human behavior, this step [classification of critical 
incidents] is usually an inductive one and is relatively subjective. Once a classification 
system has been developed for any given type of critical incidents, a fairly satisfactory 
degree of objectivity can be achieved in placing the incidents in the defined categories” 
(p.335) [my comment]. Flanagan called the critical incident technique inductive when 
applied in absence of an adequate theory. The technique is also applicable, but in a deductive 
sense, if a theory of human behavior is employed as in this research.  
 Flanagan (1954) provided five steps in the application of critical incident technique. I 
have briefly listed his proposed steps and followed his words with specific application of this 
technique to my research.  The important elements of the technique are: 
1. Determination of the general aim of the activity. In this research project the general 
aim of the group interaction is for providing solutions to solve the Hollow-Square puzzle 
in a prescribed fashion.  
2. Development of plans and specifications for collecting factual incidents regarding 
the activity. The observers need clear directions as to what they are reporting. Critical 
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events are those communicative acts, both verbal or non-verbal, which represent 
relatively extreme behavior and which are either markedly effective or markedly 
ineffective regarding attainment of the goal—solving the puzzle. Plans and specifications 
for recording information include pertinent information about the persons, place, context, 
and other relevant information as may be available. Each critical incident will have to be 
judged as to its relevance to the goal attainment—both positively and negatively—and to 
its importance in attaining the goal.  
3. Collection of the data. In my research many of the challenges which Flanagan 
warned about are circumvented by virtue of the recording the entire activity by video 
camera. And, I extracted important information from the video recordings which were 
deemed critical incidents. [There are exceptions which will be obvious to the reader 
which I have included for illustrative purposes]. 
4. Analysis of the data. This is to efficiently organize and describe the data so as to be 
easy to extract objective information. Again, this step is made much simpler due to the 
application of video technology. I will report important information on two levels; e.g., 
general communicative content later in this chapter and critical incidents content and 
causal attributes in Chapter V.  
5. Interpretation and reporting of the statement of the requirements of the activity. I will 
finally synthesize the critical incidents that contributed to the team outcome in my final 
chapter and rate aspects of those incidents as to degree of influence on the outcome. 
 
4. Research Interest Redux 
 My research interest focuses on improving group problem-solving outcomes and 
since most important decisions are made in small groups this is quite inclusive as to context 
(Harris and Sherblom 2005). I have posited that judicious application of cognitive style 
theory in selecting group members may contribute directly to improved outcomes. And, I 
have posited that intact groups will out perform ad hoc groups, ceteris paribus. These 
propositions are contained in my hypotheses and the results of hypothesis testing will be 
presented in Chapter VI. But, hypothesis testing is somewhat terse.  However, my methods 
(video recording the proceedings) have afforded me the opportunity to include qualitative 
observations which are beyond my original hypothesis formulation. This additional richness 
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and quality of material can be enhanced by selective additional review of empirical research 
involving cognitive psychology and where cognitive style fits inside that umbrella. Also, 
some additional discussion about small group behavior with respect to cognitive style should 
add depth to the subsequent presentation of group interaction.   
 
5. Cognitive Psychology’s Emergence 
 5.1 Scholarship and Schemas 
 This research program has been based on Kirton’s (1976) Adaption-Innovation theory 
to the exclusion of other work in the field of cognitive psychology. This section will identify 
the major fields of psychology scholarship, discuss reasons for cognitive psychology’s 
relative importance, and discuss two examples of cognitive schema.  
  
 5.2 Four Schools of Scientific Psychology 
 The four major “schools” which dominate scientific psychology are psychoanalysis, 
behaviorism, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. Robins et al. (1999) investigated the 
relative interest in these four schools by developing an indicator of prominence based on 
subject matter analysis in the four flagship journals in each of the four schools, the subject 
matter analysis in dissertations, and the frequency of citations from each of the four schools. 
The study interval was from 1950 to 1997.  
 Journal articles on cognitive psychology have increased by about .39 percentage 
points per year (p<.01) and articles on behavioral psychology have decreased by .13 
percentage points per year (p<.01). While these are not large, they have prevailed over 48 
years and are, therefore, significant. The number of cognitive psychology articles has more 
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than quintupled from 1950 to 1997; from three percent to 17%. Behavioral psychology has 
gone the other direction from an average of six percent of journal articles in 1950 to half that 
amount in 1997. Neuroscience and psychoanalysis trends are much weaker essentially 
suggesting no real change. Both these schools have averaged less than two percent of articles 
in the flagship journals. The striking observation from the graphical presentation is the rate of 
growth in cognitive school articles from the early 1960s to the mid 1970s.  
 Dissertations spawned in each of the four schools show a surprisingly similar trend. 
At the beginning of the study period the behavioral school was responsible for nearly 11% of 
dissertations and cognitive school dissertations accounted for about five percent. Both the 
psychoanalytic and neuroscientific schools accounted for less than one percent. At the end of 
the 48 year study period the cognitive school accounted for about 10% while all three other 
schools converged to approximately one percent of the dissertations. The cognitive school 
increased dramatically between the mid 1960s and the mid 1970s and appears to have 
plateaued at the 10% level.  
 The number of citations per year for each of the four schools revealed similar finding 
with behavioral school dominating the others at the beginning of the study but gradually 
giving way to the cognitive school and since the late 1970s the cognitive school has 
continued to climb while the behavioral school has plateaued at about one-fifth of the number 
of citations for the cognitive school. The psychoanalytic school showed very few citations 
over the entire length of the study. The neuroscientific school grew slightly from about 40 
citations per year to about 50 at the end of the period.  
 These data strongly suggest that cognitive psychology has emerged as the most 
prominent of the four schools, clearly overtaking the behavioral school since the 1970s. The 
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rate of increase in cognitive psychology has been attributed to the 1956 symposium on 
information theory; e.g., Gardner (1985) considered that symposium the birth of the 
cognitive psychology revolution [Gardner’s term]. The rapid rise of electronic data 
processing about which the 1956 symposium was centered has certainly been a revolution, an 
assertion few would argue. The compelling parallel between the emergence of interest in 
cognitive psychology and the computer may well be because of the metaphorical model the 
computer provides for cognitive psychologists; i.e., “Computers provided scientists with a 
new metaphor for conceptualizing how the mind works, one based on information processing 
and associated concepts of storage, retrieval, computational operations” (Robins et al. 
1999:124). I will present two examples of cognitive schemas which demonstrate the 
conceptual connection between how computers work and how the human brain works. 
  
 5.3 Cognitive Schemas 
 Cognitive psychology is concerned about the way humans perceive stimulus 
information, process that information, and respond appropriately. And, since each person 
constructs her own unique perspective of reality through their life journey the definition of 
“appropriately” is subject to wide variation except for rarest of occurrences (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967). This is the principal difference between cognition in humans and 
information processing in computers. The same input data will produce the same output 
findings with computers—consistently. This is hardly so across different people. In fact, it is 
hardly so with the same people at different times of their lives depending on affective states. 
In order to conceptualize these processes cognition scholars have proposed cognitive 
schemas which depict elements of the processes. These elements help narrow the range of 
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study so as to focus on a few enduring individual differences which may be measured in an 
attempt to advance a model of human behavior. 
 Miller (1987) offered an information processing model of cognition for the purpose of 
studying the implication of cognitive style on education. His model is shown in Figure IV-1.  
 Miller acknowledged that his deconstruction of cognition into three parts was 
arbitrary. His three-component classification of human cognition provides a useful 
description for the sub-processes which contribute to the total. Figure IV-2 shows Miller’s 
proposed component breakdown of the three major elements of his model. 
 
Figure IV-1 Miller’s Information Processing Model of Cognition (p.252) 
 
 
 
 I find Miller’s review of the cognitive style literature illuminating and synergistic 
with the earlier work reported from Kirton (1976, 1994, and 2003; and Kirton et al.1991). It 
should be noted at the outset that Miller is a “two-category” system advocate. He quoted 
Nickerson et al. (1985:50) who said, “…the view that there are two qualitatively different 
types of thinking is widely shared. Among the terms used to describe one type are analytic, 
deductive, rigorous, constrained, convergent, formal, and critical. Representative of the terms 
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used to describe the other type are synthetic, inductive, expansive, unconstrained, divergent, 
informal, diffuse, and creative. No doubt the partitioning of thinking into two types involves 
something of an over-simplification but possibly a useful one”.    
 Miller asserted that the cognitive style dimensions shown in Figure IV-2 can be 
subsumed into a superordinate stylistic difference or dichotomy which he called an analytic-
holistic difference. It is useful to discuss the elements shown in Figure IV-2 as they are part 
of the story of cognitive psychology and its subset cognitive style. The following review was 
summarized from Miller (1987). 
 
Figure IV-2 Cognition Components and Attributes 
Cognitive Function What How Cognitive Style Dimensions 
Pattern recognition Part/whole relations Leveling v. Sharpening Perception Attention Selective attention Field Articulation 
 
 
Representation Memory codes Analytic v. Analog 
Organization Conceptual networks Conceptual Complexity Memory 
Retrieval Search strategies Convergent v. Divergent 
 
 
 Classification Serial v. Holistic 
Inductive reasoning Analogical reasoning Tight v. Loose Thought 
 Judgment Actuarial v. Intuitive 
 
 Pattern recognition is a part of the cognitive process called perception. There are two 
main theories about how raw stimuli are compared to data stored in memory: feature analysis 
and prototype matching (Moates and Schumacher 1980). Feature analysis is an analytic 
technique which investigates component parts. Conversely, prototype matching is considered 
much more holistic. Prototype matching involves comparing stored templates in memory 
with external stimuli for recognition and understanding. Miller suggested that these two 
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approaches in processing stimuli appear to be different cognitive styles. With respect to 
perception he asserted that the two style differences leveling v. sharpening and field 
articulation were “individual differences” of pattern recognition and attention respectively.  
 The cognitive style commonly known as leveling-sharpening is similar to the analytic 
and holistic differences in pattern recognition (Gardner et al. 1959; Klein 1970; and 
Santostefano 1978). The favored measure of leveling-sharpening is the Schematizing Test 
which requires subjects to view sequential projections of a series of different size squares 
onto a screen. Levelers appear to lag behind the mental exercise by not recalling the sizes of 
the previous squares and, therefore having difficulty discerning differences. Sharpeners, 
conversely, are keenly attentive to the changing sizes of the sequential images projected and 
do a much better job at keeping up with the changes. Miller (1987) opined that it was 
reasonable to infer that the analytic orientation of the sharpeners could be construed to be a 
preference for feature analysis. On the other hand, levelers were said to be more oriented to 
prefer prototype matching according to Miller.  
 Attention is a basic term to mean the process by which the human focuses on some 
particular stimuli versus others. Anderson (1980) and Glass and Holyoak (1986) identified 
two channels of attention: 1) conscious and 2) subconscious. The conscious level (which 
Miller called the ‘executive’) handles stimuli and sorts the relevant and less relevant storing 
each to an appropriate location in the brain. The executive is an active manager of stimuli 
rendering judgments based on preconditioning. The subconscious (which Miller called 
‘automatic’) is a superficial level of attention but, upon some trigger in the consciousness, the 
executive will be summons into action. Glass and Holyoak (1986) said that a shift of 
attention occurs when automatic signals the executive. These two types of attention could be 
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said to be individual differences where executive attention reflects an ability to focus on 
important tasks at hand while automatic attention could be said to be less able to focus on 
tasks at hand—ignoring what he may assume to be unimportant stimuli.  
 There are two cognitive styles which appear to represent stable individual differences 
vis-à-vis attention. These are “field dependence-independence” (Witkin et al. 1979 and 
Witkin and Goodenough 1981) and “constricted-flexible control” (Gardner et al. 1959). The 
methods used for these measures are tests of ability to disembed items from an organized 
selection which involves distracting cues (e.g., the Rod and Frame test and the Embedded 
Figures test are typically used for this purpose). After additional work in this area of study, 
Gardner et al. (1959) concluded that both these might be included into a concept they termed 
“field articulation” (p.255). High articulators manifest greater ability to analyze or articulate 
stimuli by focusing attention on only the portions of the images which are part of the 
instructions and ignoring the distracting and contradictory cues. Conversely, low articulators 
are more influenced by non-important or non-salient information. Low articulators attempt to 
keep their cognitive ordering of stimuli as simple as possible and only focus on the most 
significant cues (Garner et al. 1959). 
 Individual differences in how information is stored in memory may be viewed as how 
it is “represented, organized, and retrieved” (Miller 1987:256). Representation of information 
stored in memory has commonly been classified as being coded verbally (analytic) and/or 
visually (analogue). Most of the work in cognitive style as it relates to memory coding by 
verbal or visual differences is located in hemispheric specialization research (Bradshaw and 
Nettleton 1983; Ornstein 1972; Springer and Deutsch 1981; and Zenhausern 1979). 
However, in spite of the linkage between hemisphere theory and verbal-visual dichotomy, 
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Bradshaw and Nettleton (1983) suggest that the analytic-holistic descriptor seems more 
fundamental. Miller contends this observation is consistent with his own suggesting, “…that 
verbal codes facilitate analytical processing while analogue codes facilitate holistic 
processing” (p.257). Others have independently found support for Miller’s proposition (see 
e.g., Riding and Anstey 1982; Riding and Ashmore 1980; and Riding and Calvey 1981). 
Riding and his colleagues have found consistently that “verbalizers” (verbal)  are relatively 
slower processing information of a visual nature than are “imagers” (visual) and imagers are 
relatively slower processing verbal information than are verbalizers.  
 The manner in which information is stored in memory may be called organization. 
Tulving (1985) argued for a three-part interconnected/interacting subdivision of permanent 
memory systems that he called “episodic, semantic, and procedural” (p.257). Tulving defined 
this memory system as, “…a set of correlated processes: Processes within a system are more 
closely related to one another than they are to processes outside the system” (p.386). 
Procedural is the foundational level upon which semantic is based. Procedural memory is 
based on stimulus-response learning, chaining, and multiple chains. Tulving called 
procedural memory system anoetic (nonknowing) consciousness. The semantic memory 
system was termed the noetic (knowing) consciousness. It is the system that concerns itself 
with storing information about the internal and external world. Tulving called the objective 
of the noetic consciousness the accumulation of knowledge about the world. Episodic 
memory system is related to the autonoetic consciousness. This means that the individual has 
“self-knowing.” Semantic memory is the Tulving aspect of memory which Miller has taken 
for his schema element memory. 
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 Individual differences in the way information is organized in memory have been 
demonstrated by Chi et al. (1982) and Voss et al. (1983). Chi et al. (1982) conducted 
experiments using experts and novices solving physics problems. There were clear 
differences between the experts and novices along the line that has been called cognitive 
complexity versus cognitive simplicity. Novices performed less well than experts in 
integrating a wide array of physics principles in setting up the problem solution. Novices 
worked on superficial and unconnected facets of the problem whereas experts integrated the 
various problem elements into interconnected categories for the purpose of facilitating a 
solution. Bieri et al. (1966) and Harvey et al. (1961) have called the cognitive complexity-
simplicity dichotomy a fundamental difference between people.  
The concept of accessing stored information from the brain may be called retrieval. 
There are at least two different forms of information encoding which influence brain 
functions. Miller called these styles and said they might be considered individual differences. 
Tulving (1985) considered semantic memory as being composed of multiple conceptual 
networks. Therefore, retrieval may be regarded as a search, “…through the hypothetical 
pathways of the mind” (Howard 1983). Miller called the cognitive style in memory retrieval 
strategies convergence-divergence. The convergence-divergence dichotomy has been used 
for wider application in cognitive psychology. Guilford (1967) views, “…convergent 
retrieval strategies as narrow, deductive, logical, and using sharper search criteria; while 
divergent strategies are broad and associational rather than logical and use vague search 
criteria” (p.260). Kogan (1983) suggested that people who exhibit a marked divergent 
cognitive style tend more toward “ideational fluency and spontaneous flexibility than do 
convergers”.  
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 The third part of Miller’s cognitive schema is thought. This portion of cognitive 
function deals with orchestrating response to selected stimuli. Directed thought may be called 
“reasoning.” Economists consider the case in decision making (or rationality) where 
complete information is known, clear options for choice are understood, and a well ordered 
preference of choices is available. They term this utility maximization and it obviously fails 
to meet practical and reasonable expectations. Decisions made under this set of assumptions 
would be called, deductive reasoning. This is rarely the case in real decision scenarios; e.g., 
this realization gave rise to Simon’s (1947) term satisficing. Conversely, most decisions are 
made with incomplete information, limited time for contemplation, and lack of well ordered 
preference for choice; i.e., the consequence of each choice is rarely known ahead of time. 
Decisions made under these circumstances are called inductive reasoning. Miller said that 
stylistic differences had been experimentally investigated concerning inductive reasoning. He 
identified three types of inductive reasoning subsumed under thought: 1) classification, 2) 
analogical reasoning, and 3) judgment. I will briefly discuss each of the three and connect 
them to cognitive style. 
 Classification is a way information is acquired, considered, and codified with respect 
to learning or decision making processes. Work by Glass and Holyoak (1986) have shown 
individual differences in hypothesis formation and testing. They observed that different kinds 
of hypotheses lead to different ways of categorizing observations. Several researchers have 
worked in this area but there are no commonly accepted terms relating to individual 
differences with respect to classification. Pask (1976) identified two distinctive approaches to 
classification. He called a serialist as one which considers one hypothesis at a time before 
moving to the next. On the other pole, he called a holist as one who considers multiple 
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hypotheses simultaneously. Miller (1987) captures the spirit of Pask’s suggestion, “In both 
sets of research the distinction being made is between an orientation in which the individual 
prefers to move systematically through the task, making sure that the situation is absolutely 
clear before moving on so that there are no loose ends that require later attention and, an 
orientation in which ambiguity is tolerated and solutions to the problem of classification are 
expected to crystallize slowly from a matrix of hypotheses” (p.261). This fits the name serial 
versus holistic in cognitive style regarding classification preferences. 
 Analogical reasoning is the second of three facets or subdivisions within Miller’s 
classificatory system for the cognitive function called thought. It is considered important in 
everyday life and especially in sciences and arts (Holyoak 1984). Sternberg (1977) has 
identified four “necessary stages”: encoding, inferring, mapping, and application. Other 
studies and propositions have been made for this distinction. In particular, there has been 
some discussion about metaphor and its use in science. The logical positivists (analytic style) 
reject the use of metaphor. Miller concluded that there was a stylistic dimension which is 
distinct enough to be considered an individual difference which contrasts a preference for 
“tight, formal, literal analogies with that for loose, informal, deep (metaphoric) analogies” 
(p.262). This is abbreviated as tight versus loose.  
 The third facet of the thought portion of Miller’s cognitive schema is judgment. The 
distinction used for judgment as an individual difference in the cognitive style scholarship 
are that some prefer to judge based on probabilistic estimates of “if-then” decision chains 
while others use a reference point process, basing a decision on known standards. This has 
been called actuarial (logical) versus intuitive (reference point) reasoning.  
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 I am struck by the similarity of terms used in Miller’s proposed cognitive schema and 
the earlier work by Kirton. Kirton also proposed a cognitive schema but his was more 
encompassing than was Miller’s. I have adapted Kirton’s schema into a graphical 
representation following Miller’s approach and will use it to contrast the two. Figure IV-3 
shows my adaptation of Kirton’s schema showing Miller’s influence. 
I should note that Miller (1987) made no attempt to imply that his model could be 
used as a general model to explain human decision making, unlike Kirton (2003). I have 
employed Miller’s (1987) block model to Kirton’s description of cognition. I have placed the 
human actor inside an organization (consistent with my initial proposition this organization is 
any group, committee, company, or other psychologically organizing unity). This 
organization influence on the human I have called climate after Lewin et al. (1939) and 
others. Likewise, I have placed the organization (as indicated by the dashed line surrounding 
the human actor) inside something called culture. Culture is generally considered more 
deeply seated and basic and certainly would influence organizational entities in different 
ways across different parts of the world in different nations (Reichers and Schneider 1990). 
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Figure IV-3 Adaptation of Kirton’s Cognitive Schema 
Cognitive Affect
(Motivation and 
Feeling)
Cognitive Effect
(Style and Level)
Cognitive Resource
Stimulus
(Internal or 
External)
Behavior
(Coping or
Preferred)
Climate
Culture
Opportunity
 
 The external environment provides opportunity for human decision making. In some 
cases the individual proactively creates the opportunity but for the purposes of 
diagrammatically demonstrating a cognitive schema this is a necessary element. Opportunity, 
in order to be perceived, must have stimuli. And, stimuli are the data which the human actor 
process. One important difference between Kirton’s and Miller’s schema is that the latter 
acknowledges cognitive style differences in all three compartments of cognition whereas 
Kirton seems to confine cognitive style into the part of the system he termed cognition effect. 
Kirton, however, acknowledges that all subparts of cognitive function are interrelated but for 
observational purposes it is helpful to consider Miller’s subsystem within each part.  
 I have roughly equated Kirton’s cognitive affect with Miller’s perception. External 
stimuli may be perceived, processed, or ignored. I would suggest that Miller’s deconstruction 
of perception, pattern recognition as defined by the style continuum ‘leveling versus 
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sharpening’ and attention as defined by the style continuum ‘field articulation’ fit reasonably 
into Kirton’s Adaption-Innovation measure. An important component of Kirton’s schema 
which was missing from Miller’s is motivation. Motivation stems from cognitive affect (thus 
emotional content laden) and ranges from very high to nonexistent depending on individual 
needs, wants, values, and opportunity. 
 I have roughly equated Kirton’s cognitive effect with Miller’s thought. In both cases 
this box is the action center and downstream from this point is manifest behavior. Kirton, 
unlike Miller, asserts cognitive effect contains two related but orthogonal parts: cognitive 
style (e.g., KAI Score) and cognitive level (e.g., I.Q.) Others have reported empirical work 
which supports the independence of style and level (see, e.g., Hayes and Allinson 1994 and 
Schroder 1994). Miller argued that thought was characterized by inductive reasoning. He 
offered three facets of inductive reasoning: classification which could be said to be a style of 
serial versus holistic, analogical reasoning which could be said to be a style of tight versus 
loose, and judgment which can be said to be a style of actuarial versus intuitive. These style 
dimensions, as discussed above, are very closely related to descriptive terms contained in 
Kirton’s Adaption-Innovation theory.  
 Another important difference between Kirton’s and Miller’s schema is the concept of 
coping behavior. Kirton argues that behavior consistent with one’s preferred cognitive style 
is natural and easy while required behavior inconsistent with one’s preferred style requires 
coping. It is certainly possible and reasonable to assume people have the capacity for coping 
behavior; however, over a long period of time coping behavior can have an emotionally 
draining effect and induce stress (Kirton 2003). Additionally over long periods of time those 
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individuals required to work well outside their stylistic comfort zone will seek to leave the 
organization (or group) to find comfort (Kirton 1994 and Schneider 1983a).  
 Cognitive resource, as shown in Figure IV-3, contains all the learned information, 
both conscious and subconscious, that the individual has accumulated through his life. It 
clearly equates to Miller’s memory although Tulving’s (1985) ternary classification concept 
may not fit neatly into Kirton’s cognitive resource. In spite of the possible inconsistency with 
Tulving’s notion of semantic memory used by Miller I think it is useful to indicate the 
component parts of Miller’s schema on memory. The three facets of memory include 
representation (how information is coded) whose stylistic measure is analytic versus analog, 
organization (conceptual networks) whose stylistic measure is conceptual complexity, and 
retrieval (search strategies) whose stylistic measure is convergent versus divergent. Again, 
these three different measures of cognitive style fit within Kirton’s Adaption-Innovation 
theory quite well.  
 I have made the effort to depict cognitive schemas and offer some comparative views 
with Kirton and Miller. Both have made contributions and I view Miller’s more elaborate 
breakdown of cognitive styles within subparts of the cognitive function to be theoretically 
consistent with Kirton’s overall theory of human behavior based on Adaption-Innovation 
theory.  
 
6. Other Work in Cognitive Style 
 6.1 General 
 Research in cognitive style has contributed to better understanding of the way style 
contributes to how one perceives and relates to stimuli. There are some revealing reports of 
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empirical studies which can add to understanding of cognitive style. This section will offer a 
review of the confusing number of dimensions of cognitive style. And, it will present 
important findings based on empirical studies which inform and expand my work. 
 
 6.2 Dimensions of Cognitive Style 
 Hayes and Allinson (1994) presented a chart containing 22 dimensions of cognitive 
style and suggested that the field was confusing based on too many people working, “…in 
cheerful disregard of one another” (p.56). In the interest of identifying this scholarship I will 
present the table showing the information as shown in Hayes and Allinson (1994:pp.58-59). 
Hayes and Allinson reviewed the cognitive style scholarship for its application in 
management practice.  
Messick (1984), along with Hayes and Allinson (1994) describe abilities (cognitive 
level) as unipolar; i.e., from a little to a lot where the more you have the better. Conversely, 
cognitive style is viewed as bipolar; i.e., generally non-pejorative where having a stylistic 
preference related to one pole does not mean one has no ability to function in the other pole 
of behavior. Messick differentiates level from style and, like Kirton and others, says they are 
not related. He offered a typology which included four classes: intellective abilities, stylistic 
abilities, cognitive controls, and cognitive styles. And, he identified eight “pure stylistic 
dimensions of cognitive style.” These are all contained in Figure IV-3 but he received 
criticism from Tiedemann (1989) who said it was unclear that these eight dimensions of 
cognitive style even met his own criteria. However, Hayes and Allinson identified Kirton’s  
(1976) measure of cognitive style that satisfies all of Messick’s criteria. I want to call 
attention to the fact that Hayes and Allinson (1994) collaborated to develop their own 
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Table IV-1. Dimensions of Cognitive Style (Hayes and Allinson 1994) 
Dimension Description References 
1. Scanning-focusing* Entails identification of relevant versus irrelevant 
information in attempting to solve a problem 
Schlesinger (1954); 
Bruner et al. (1956) 
[Personality theory] 
 
2. Constricted-flexible 
control* 
Constricted control shows more susceptibility to 
distraction; flexible control is characterized by 
resistance to interference 
 
Klein (1954) 
[Motivation] 
3. Broad-narrow*             
(Category width) 
Preference for broad categories containing many 
items, rather than narrow categories containing 
few items. Broad categorizers tolerate errors of 
inclusion whereas narrow categorizers tolerate 
errors of exclusion 
Pettigrew (1958); 
Fillenbaum (1959); 
Bruner and Tajfel 
(1961); Kogan and 
Wallach (1964) 
[Personality] 
 
4. Analytic-nonanalytic 
conceptualizing* 
Analytic style entails differentiating attributes or 
qualities. Non-analytic style responses may be 
more relational or thematic 
Kagan et al. (1960); 
Messick and Kogan 
(1963); Kagan et al. 
(1963 and 1964) 
 
5. Leveling-
sharpening* 
Individual variations in assimilation in memory. 
The leveler tends to assimilate new stimuli into 
previous categories and to blur memories, while 
the sharpener tends to differentiate new 
information from old, to magnify small differences 
and to exaggerate changes between present and 
past 
 
Gardener et al. (1959);  
Klein (1970) 
6. Field dependent-
independent* 
A global versus analytic way of perceiving. Entails 
the ability to perceive items without being 
influenced by the  background 
 
Witkin (1976); 
Goodenough and 
Oltman (1981);  
7. Impulsivity-
reflectiveness* 
Impulsivity is characterized by quick responses, 
reflectivity by more deliberate, slower responses. 
The impulsive person is quicker but makes more 
errors 
 
Kagan et al. (1964); 
Kagan (1965) 
8. Risk taking-caution* Risking taking is characterized by taking risks 
even when the odds for success are poor. Caution 
is characterized by reluctance to take chances 
except when the probability of success is great.  
 
Kogan and Wallach 
(1964) 
9. Cognitive 
complexity-
simplicity* 
Complexity is the tendency to conceptualize the 
world in a multidimensional way (characterized in 
terms of differentiation, discrimination and/or 
integration). Simplicity is the tendency to 
conceptualize in a unidimensional way 
 
Kelly (1965); Harvey et 
al. (1961); Bieri et al. 
(1966); Driver and 
Mock (1974) ; Streufert 
and Nogami (1989) 
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10. Automization-
restructuring 
Preference for responding to obvious properties of 
simple repetitive tasks versus preference for 
restructuring tasks 
 
Braverman et al. (1964); 
Tiedemann (1989) 
11. Converging-
diverging 
Convergent thinking leads to a single correct 
solution using narrow, logical and deductive 
search criteria whereas divergent thinking is broad 
and open ended, using broad and associational 
rather than logical search criteria 
 
Wallach and Kogan 
(1965); Hudson (1966, 
1968); Smithers and 
Child (1974) 
12. Tolerance for 
incongruous or 
unrealistic 
experiences* 
Individual willingness to accept perceptions which 
vary from the conventional experience. Tolerance 
is characterized by a grater adaption to unusual 
perceptions. Intolerance is revealed by the demand 
for more data before the unusual is accepted 
 
Klein et al. (1962) 
13. Verbalizer-visualizer The extent to which people favor verbal or visual 
strategies when processing information 
 
Paivio (1971); 
Richardson (1977) 
14. Preceptive-
receptive/systematic-
intuitive* 
The inclination to assimilate data into concepts, or 
precepts, previously held (perceptive) versus the 
tendency to take in data in raw form (receptive). 
The inclination to develop clear sequential plans 
(systematic) versus the tendency to develop ideas 
freely from data and to skip from the part to the 
whole (intuitive) 
 
Keen (1973); McKenney 
and Keen (1974) 
15. Serialist-holist Serialists progress in linear fashion through 
learning and problem solving material, taking a 
step by step approach and increasing 
understanding in small increments. Holistics take a 
more global approach and quickly lose sight of 
individual components 
 
Pask and Scott (1972); 
Pask (1976) 
16. Sensing-intuition       
thinking-feeling 
Sensing-intuition reflects a predisposition for 
information gathering (perceiving): Preference for 
realities of experience (sensing) versus inferred 
meanings, possibilities and relationships of 
experience (intuition). Thinking-feeling reflects a 
predisposition for information evaluation 
(judging): Preference for logical order (thinking) 
versus personal values and emotions (feeling) 
 
Myers and Briggs 
(1976) 
17. Splitters-lumpers Splitters deal with reality by splitting it into its 
component parts. They are analytical and obtain 
information through a series of clearly defined 
steps. Lumpers prefer to look for the big picture. 
 
 
Cohen (1967) 
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18. Concrete-abstract/    
active-reflective 
The preference for dealing with tangible objects 
(concrete) versus theoretical concepts (abstract). 
The preference for direct participation (active) 
versus detached observation (reflective) 
 
Kolb (1976, 1984) 
 
19. Adaptors-innovators Adaptors turn to conventional procedures when 
searching for solutions, whereas innovators prefer 
to restructure problems and approach them from 
new angles 
 
Kirton (1976, 1977b) 
20. Literal-analytic/     
poetic-synthetic 
A style which contrasts preference for literal 
analogies which involve close similarity between 
the analogous situation and the situation for which 
a solution is sought with more loose, deep, 
metaphoric analogies 
 
Kogan (1982); Kogan 
(1983) 
21. Logical-reference     
point reasoning 
Logical reasoning involves a preference for a 
systematic approach and an adequate sampling of 
available data, whereas reference point reasoning 
involves a preference for reasoning from a specific 
known case 
 
Rosch (1983) 
22. Reasoning-intuitive/  
active-contemplative 
The preference for developing understanding 
through reasoned argument involving the drawing 
of conclusions from premises (reasoning) versus 
immediate insight without reasoning (intuitive). 
The preference for direct participation (active) 
versus envisaging in the mind what is likely to be 
(contemplative) 
 
Hayes and Allinson 
(1988); Allinson and 
Hayes (1988) 
* Hayes and Allinson (1994) attribute these constructs to Nelson as reproduced by Claxton and Ralston 
(1978).  
 
measure of cognitive style sometime earlier than this work (see e.g., Allinson and Hayes 
1988 and Allinson and Hayes 1990). The fact that they cite Kirton’s work as noteworthy is 
significant since they too are scholars in the same field. Additional observations contributed 
by Hayes and Allinson show that cognitive style can be an important factor in interpersonal 
behavior and communications, as argued earlier by Kirton (1980).  
 Hayes and Allinson (1994) concur with the remarks attributed to Miller earlier that 
the numerous dimensions of cognitive style lend themselves to a two class or a split brain 
typology. They drew from an unpublished dissertation by Wilson (1988) to classify many of 
the dimensions shown above. Table IV-2 shows Wilson’s typology which was based on split-
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brain theory. I would place Kirton’s adaptor under the left brain column and innovator under 
the right brain column. 
 
Table IV-2 Wilson’s Split-Brain Typology 
Left Brain Right Brain 
Field Independent 
Reflective 
Receptive/systematic 
Focuser 
Serialist 
Converger 
Splitter 
Field dependent 
Impulsive 
Perceptive/intuitive 
Scanner 
Holist 
Diverger 
Lumper 
 
Hayes and Allinson (1994) affirm Kirton’s arguments by offering, “Helping people 
understand the implication of their own and others’ cognitive styles can provide a basis for 
team building and individual and group counseling activities designed to foster better 
working relationships” (p.67). I will conclude this discussion about the dimensions which 
may be used to describe cognitive style (as shown in Table IV-2) by suggesting that 
Adaption-Innovation theory is a relatively simple conception, although very theoretically 
sound, which could prove very useful without requiring the need to be well versed on over 20 
different shades of definition and corresponding meaning.  
 
 6.3 Requisite Variety of Cognitive Style in Small Group Performance  
 Small groups are the basic decision unit in governments, organizations, institutions, 
and families. The fact that some small groups perform better than others is uncontested. For 
purposes of discussion in this section I will comment on organizational challenges and link 
empirical research in small group performance with the law of requisite variety. 
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 Organizations exist within an environment of equivocality; consequently small 
groups which gather to solve problems seek unequivocal solutions to equivocal problems 
(Weick 1979). Consistent with the ongoing discussion in this research equivocality is viewed 
differently by people whose cognitive style preferences differ. Weick (1979) offered an 
admonition concerning decision making in equivocal circumstances, “…but it is crucial to 
remember that decision-making in the organizing model means selecting some interpretation 
of the world and some set of extrapolations from that interpretation and then using these 
summaries as constraints on subsequent acting” (p.175).  
 Weick (1979) discussed the concept of requisite variety following the work of Conant 
and Ashby (1970). Quoting Buckley (1968:495) Weick reported that the law of requisite 
variety, “states that the variety within a system must be at least as great as the environmental 
variety against which it is attempting to regulate itself. Put more succinctly, only variety can 
regulate variety.” Weick suggested that it is because of requisite variety that organizations 
are obliged to have sufficient diversity in order to satisfactorily sense the kinds of diversity at 
play in the external environment. Equivocal inputs to organizations are, by definition, vague 
and ambiguous. 
 Weick argued for equivocality as an acknowledged premise in organizations and, 
consequently, the concomitant need for requisite variety. Because people have difficulty 
tolerating equivocal processes the possibility of missing important cues or information that 
might be helpful can occur. Weick suggested that a common mistake for groups of decision-
makers is to shun equivocality which results in interpretations of reality resulting in solving 
the wrong problem. Weick (1979:189) said it well, 
It is their unwillingness to meet equivocality in an equivocal manner that produces 
failure, nonadoption, autism, isolation from reality, psychological costs, and so on. It is 
the unwillingness to disrupt order, ironically, that makes it impossible for the 
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organization to create order. Order consists of data in which equivocality has been 
suppressed, but equivocality can be suppressed only after processes have first registered 
that equivocality. Accurate registering requires the matching of processes to the 
characteristics of their inputs. If people cherish the unequivocal but are unwilling to 
participate in the equivocal, then their survival becomes more problematic.  
  
 The law of requisite variety is assumed as a guiding principle, either explicitly or 
implicitly, for several scholars doing work in the area of cognitive style and small group 
performance (Allinson and Hayes 1996; Armstrong 2000; Armstrong and Priola 2001; Bobic 
et al. 1999; Buffinton et al. 2002; Devine 1999; Jablokow and Booth 2006; Priola et al. 2004; 
and Schroder 1994). Allinson and Hayes (1996) developed a cognitive style index for 
application in professional and managerial groups and accepted the law of requisite variety. 
They also asserted that Kirton’s A-I theory was based on requisite variety. Armstrong (2000) 
studied how cognitive differences impact management education at the graduate level and 
also accepted requisite variety. Bobic et al. (1999) investigated group performance in the 
public sector of state government. Their work was based on A-I theory and they suggested 
that A-I theory may be construed as essentially equivalent to requisite variety theory in that 
both posit the benefit of diversity (variety) over the long term. Buffinton et al. (2002) was 
also based on A-I theory with specific application into undergraduate education. This report 
was on the first application of A-I theory into their educational program which was designed 
to provide students with exposure to a cross-functional educational experience—an implicit 
adoption of the law of requisite variety. Devine (1999) is a small group scholar and he argued 
in favor of diversity or variety as a counter move to guard against Groupthink as originally 
proposed by Janis (1972). Jablokow and Booth (2006) advanced a theory of cognitive gaps 
into group decision processes in an integrated organization model. Priola et al. (2004), also 
working in the area of small group research, made the same argument that Devine offered in 
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support of diversity/variety. And, Schroder (1994) studied managerial competence and style 
to conclude that managers in organizations must exist in sufficient diversity (variety) on the 
cognitive style spectrum so as to offer a wide range of views from which to select during 
problem solving—essentially an argument for requisite variety. 
 I will present five of the studies listed above for the purpose of demonstrating similar 
research methods or concepts in the study of small group performance from the perspective 
of cognitive diversity, or requisite variety. The five studies of interest here include 
Armstrong (2000), Armstrong and Priola (2001), Bobic et al. (1999), Buffinton et al. (2002), 
and Jablokow and Booth (2006). The first two studies are based on Allinson and Hayes 
(1996) Cognitive Style Index, what I believe to be closely congruent with the Kirton KAI 
Inventory. The last three studies employ Kirton’s KAI scores as their measure of cognitive 
style. Also, Jablokow and Booth (2006) posit a problem-solving model that includes both 
cognitive style and cognitive level. Prior to discussing the studies I will compare Allinson 
and Hayes’ Cognitive Style Index and Kirton’s KAI score.  
 I have explicated the Kirton KAI Inventory, its five-point Likert scale, and its general 
nature above. Kirton (2003) considers it applicable in any context and it has been 
successfully used across several cultures and languages, as referenced above. The KAI scale 
ranges from a low of 32 points to a high of 160 points with 96 the scale mean. Allinson and 
Hayes (1996) suggested that Kirton’s measure and others were not as simple to use in 
business environments and, consequently, developed their own instrument called the 
Cognitive Style Index (CSI). The CSI is a 38-question self-reported questionnaire with 
answer choices of true, uncertain, or false, which are recorded as two, one, or zero. This 
means the maximum score is 76, the minimum is zero, and the mean is 38. Allinson and 
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Hayes felt that the three choices helped overcome the tendency of some people to have 
difficulty with five-point or more Likert scales; some people tend to answer toward the 
middle of the options while others tend to answer in extremes.   
 The important comparison I want to make between these two constructs is that the 
CSI defines a measure of cognitive style in concert with the split-brain theories which use the 
descriptive terms analytic and intuitive for the extreme ends of a bipolar continuum. Allinson 
and Hayes (1996) make clear their bias toward a simplifying theory of cognitive style similar 
to the work of Agor (1984). The analytic end of the continuum includes word descriptors like 
deductive, rigorous, constrained, convergent, formal, and critical. On the intuitive end of the 
continuum descriptive words like the following are used: synthetic, inductive, expansive, 
unconstrained, divergent, informal, diffuse, and creative (Nickerson et al. 1985:50). Except 
for the term creative at the end of the Nickerson list of intuitive descriptive words this sounds 
very much like the high innovator as advanced by Kirton. And, the list of terms used for the 
analytic is quite congruent with the terms used to describe the high adaptor. These terms may 
be easily compared by viewing Table I-1 above. I will concur with A-I theory in asserting 
that all people are problem solvers and, therefore, creative. But for that single term the CSI 
should be highly congruent with KAI scores. Certainly the two should be sufficiently close in 
conceptual measurement as to suggest comparable preferable cognitive styles. A complete 
comparative analysis of the two measures of cognitive style is outside the scope of this 
investigation. 
 Armstrong (2000) presented a review of the literature on cognitive style which 
showed significant diversity of opinion as to its definition. In particular, he cited considerable 
work done in the study of left/right brain hemispheric specialization that has been associated 
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with cognitive style differences (Riding and Sadler-Smith 1993). Armstrong had previously 
reviewed the literature and found 54 dimensions about which cognitive style has been 
defined. He suggested that this magnitude of descriptive dimensions may all be subsumed 
into a superordinate dimension as proposed by Allinson and Hayes (1996) and which use the 
descriptive terms intuitive-analytic to define the end points on a bipolar continuum. 
 He defined analytic individuals, in work situations, as compliant, logical and linear 
thinkers, who prefer structured approaches to decision-making and who like systematic 
methods of investigation or step-by-step processes—a description that is very much like 
Kirton’s high adaptor. The intuitive individual, in contrast, “…would tend to be 
nonconformist, their thinking relies on impulsive synthesis and lateral reasoning, they prefer 
rapid, open-ended approaches to decision-making, they rely on random methods of 
exploration and work best on problems favoring a holistic approach” (p.325). Again, this 
description sounds very similar to Kirton’s high innovator. 
 The question that Armstrong posed involves the relationship between cognitive style 
and ability (or what Kirton called ‘level’). The literature is not clear as to this relationship. 
Armstrong asserted that there would be no significant difference between the overall grades 
of students who are either high intuitive or high analytic. However, he added a hypothesis 
which posited better performance for high analytic individuals performing assignments (in 
specific, a research project grade) which demand cognitive style consistent with analytic 
types. And, he added a similar hypothesis for high intuitive types asserting their better 
performance on assignments (in specific, for the business policy and strategy unit grade) 
which lend themselves to high intuitive cognitive styles. He also hypothesized a better grade 
for high analytics in the marketing planning unit. 
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 The research sample came from a university in northern England and was composed 
of 412 students in their final year of a business administration degree. There were 203 
women and 209 men in the sample. Each of the participants was administered the Cognitive 
Style Index (CSI) as developed by Allinson and Hayes (1996) and discussed above. 
 Students’ ability was based on scores from the university. The scoring system 
provided a range of possible scores from zero to 16 points where zero is the worst and 16 is 
the best possible achievement. Independent sample t-tests revealed no significant difference 
between men and women on the test scores, thus the study on cognitive style was deemed to 
be gender neutral. But, female management students were significantly more analytic than 
male students (t=2.71, p<.01). For the purposes of measuring the performance of students 
relatively more analytic versus those relatively more intuitive the cut point of 43 was used as 
a demarcation. This yielded two groups of similar size. However, upon reflection the 
researchers felt that the dichotomized approach to data did not account for the students who 
fell into the mid ranges of scores; i.e., a student scoring 43 points is considered “different” 
from a student scoring 44 points, with respect to cognitive style. The researchers created 
three classes of scores for consideration: CSI scores were defined as 1) low (intuitive) < = 38 
points, 2) medium (integrated) 39 to 48 points, or 3) high (analytic) > = 49 points. These 
were the 33rd and 66th percentile of the sample. This approach followed earlier work by Agor 
(1984) wherein he argued that there are three broad types of management style for making 
decisions. The left brain type relies on linear, sequential, and logical thinking dealing with 
facts. The right brain counterpart relies on feelings over facts and reliance on looking at the 
whole issue during decision making when there is incomplete information. The third style, 
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which Agor called integrated, employs both the left brain and right brain interchangeably as 
the problem to be solved demands.  
 This research showed that analytics scored higher on all the measures than did 
intuitives, a finding that was inconsistent with the initial hypotheses. This was true on the 
dichotomized scores. Also, when using the trichotomized scores (intuitive, integrated, 
analytic), the integrated participants scores were between intuitives and analytics in every 
case. Armstrong also evaluated the university’s method of assessing grades for its students 
and concluded that there was a bias toward skills and tasks favored by high analytics. Thus, 
the skills and talents that high intuitives bring into the business world are not highly valued 
by university but the kinds of things businesses are looking for in higher order managers are 
decidedly more intuitive; e.g., Mintzberg (1989, p.49) reported: 
The key managerial processes are enormously complex and mysterious (to me as a 
researcher, as well as to the managers who carry them out), drawing on the vaguest of 
information and using the least articulated of mental processes. These processes seem to 
be more relational and holistic than ordered and sequential, more intuitive than 
intellectual; they seem, in other words, to be most characteristic of right-brain activity.  
  
Armstrong proceeded to question the congruence between what the university is 
producing and what industry needs. He called for additional research in this area.  
 Armstrong’s (2000) work could be recast as role preferred task and non-role preferred 
task analysis in the same sense that I used for my research method. Using my terminology, 
the student assignments appear to be more role-preferred for analytic oriented students (or, I 
would argue for marked adaptors). Armstrong and Mintzberg argue in favor of more intuitive 
oriented assignments for preparing students for the equivocal environment in which 
businesses operate as posited by Weick (1979). This too is outside the scope of this study but 
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appears to support Kirton’s assertion that there is an innovation bias (if we approximate 
intuitive with innovation).  
 Armstrong and Priola (2001) studied the effect that cognitive style had on task 
performance with self-managed work teams. They had 100 participants which were formed 
into 11 teams. All participants were seniors enrolled in a computing and technology program 
at a university in England. All group members were European except for one Indian. 
Roughly 80% of the participants were male. Ages of participants ranged from 19 to 51 with 
two thirds comprising the 19 to 25 segment.  
 This university program was called the Information Systems Group Project (ISGP) 
and was developed to provide real world experience to students with an emphasis on working 
in small teams. Representatives from industry prepared an invitation to tender for complete 
computer systems similar to the kinds of typical request for proposals that are sent to 
software/hardware companies. Student teams, which had up to 12 members on them and 
included several sub-disciplines, were required to produce a written response to tender 
request. After contract award each team had to carry the project from conception to the 
development of a prototype of software and user manuals. Each team worked as a small 
business with its own bank account. The only constraint was the due date for the project to be 
completed. Each team elected its own leader. And, the duration of each project was roughly 
five months.  
 Each team met weekly over the course of the intensive program period and the 
meetings were videotaped for later data analysis. The specific composition of each team was 
done by academic staff. The researchers used the Allinson and Hayes’ Cognitive Style Index 
(CSI) for determining cognitive style preferences.  
  98
Table IV-3. System of Categories by Bales 
1. Shows solidarity, raises other’s 
status, gives help, reward      
2. Shows tension release, jokes, 
laughs, shows satisfaction     
Social-Emotional 
Area: 
Positive Reactions 
A 
3. Agrees, shows passive 
acceptance, understands, 
concurs, complies 
   
4. Gives suggestion, direction, 
implying autonomy for other   
5. Gives opinion, evaluation, 
analysis, expresses feeling, wish  
Task Areas: 
Attempted Answers B 
6. Gives orientation, information, 
repeats, clarifies, confirms 
7. Asks for orientation, 
information, repetition, 
confirmation 
a 
8. Asks for opinion, evaluation, 
analysis, expression of feeling 
 
b 
Task Areas: 
Questions C 
9. Asks for suggestion, direction, 
possible ways of action 
  
c 
10. Disagrees, shows passive 
rejection, formality, withholds 
help 
   
d 
11. Shows tension, asks for help, 
withdraws out of field 
    
e 
Social-Emotional 
Area: Negative 
Reactions 
D 
12. Shows antagonism, deflates 
other’s status, defends or asserts 
self 
     
f 
Key: 
a. Problems of orientation 
b. Problems of evaluation 
c. Problems of control 
d. Problems of decision 
e. Problems of tension-
management 
f. Problems of integration 
  
This research was conducted using Bales’ (1950a and 1950b and Bales’ et al. 1951) 
interaction process analysis (IPA) to analyze the group interaction. Table IV-3 contains 
Bales’ 12 categories for interaction process analysis. I have modified the original diagram 
used by Bales to help convey his intention about communicative acts being social-emotional 
(positive or negative) or task-oriented (asking or answering questions). Armstrong and Priola 
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(2001) investigated the effect of group composition concerning cognitive style. Aside from 
the fact that they used a different instrument to determine cognitive style this research could 
be viewed as complementary to mine. The interesting difference with Armstrong and Priola 
is that they evaluated group interaction using Bales’ interaction process analysis (IPA) (Bales 
1950a, 1950b, 1970; and Bates et al. 1951). 
 Bales’ IPA is one of the most reliable and recognized methods for evaluating group 
interaction based on both verbal and non-verbal communicative acts. Bales asserted that 
group behavior may be classified into two major categories: 1) social-emotional activities 
and 2) task-related activities. Social-emotional processes, “…occurring in groups are 
concerned with group solidarity and attraction between members and task-oriented processes 
with goal attainment” (Armstrong and Priola 2001; p.290). Individuals are believed to fall 
into one or the other of these two categories. The social-emotional class also divides further 
into positive or negative acts; i.e., individuals are found to have naturally positive or 
naturally negative tendencies. The naturally positive acts would include things toward 
building up the group, being friendly, and agreeable. The naturally negative acts, conversely, 
would tend toward unfriendly acts, disagreeing, and not building up the group. Armstrong 
and Priola said, “These reactions lead to the maintenance or destruction of harmony, 
management of group tensions, integration, disintegration, and so on” (p.290). Task-related 
individuals focus energies on pursuing task goals via a discursive process narrowly focused 
on arriving at a solution. These activities are considered to be emotionally neutral.  
 Note that the Bales IPA is a numerical analysis of communicative acts; i.e., there is 
little subjective evaluation applied to each act aside from whether it is task oriented or social-
emotional and the two breakdowns within those two classes. The IPA technique generally 
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required the researcher to create written transcripts of the dialogue with as many non-verbal 
acts as possible also being recorded. Video recording techniques have ameliorated this 
laborious process and improved the short-term memory problem as earlier discussed in the 
critical incident technique I will employ in this research.  
 Based on the expectations of behavior when considering cognitive style theory and 
Bales IPA classification four hypotheses were posited for testing (p.291): 
H1a: The number of task-oriented acts initiated will be higher for those team members 
whose cognitive styles are analytic compared to those who are intuitive 
H1b: Teams tending toward homogeneity with predominantly analytic team members 
will initiate a higher proportion of task-oriented acts compared to teams with 
predominantly intuitive members 
H2a: The number of social-emotional acts initiated will be higher for those team 
members whose cognitive styles are intuitive compared to those who are analytic. 
H2b: Teams tending toward homogeneity with predominantly intuitive team members 
will initiate a higher proportion of social-emotional acts compared to teams with 
predominantly analytic members.  
  
Bales’ interaction process analysis is a method to evaluate group discourse within a 
predetermined frame of reference for various utterances, both oral and non-verbal. Each act, 
regardless of how small, is recorded. If a communicative act can be observed, it is recorded 
for classification into the IPA system. Bales considered these acts as the most basic unit of 
observation. 
 Armstrong and Priola (2001) found the median CSI scores in their sample of 
participants to be a score of 42, which is four points above the theoretical mean of 38. They 
used 42 as the cut point to separate those relatively more intuitive versus those relatively 
more analytical. (Note that in this system of cognitive style measurement the more intuitive 
are the lower scores and the more analytic are higher scores—opposite of Kirton’s KAI 
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scoring system for adaption and innovation.) Some adjustments had to be introduced to 
account for the differences in team sizes. Since more team leaders were intuitively oriented 
(8/11) some consideration of that was made. 
 Team leaders were significantly more intuitive than other team members t(98)=2.9; 
p<.01. Thus, separate reports were made for outcomes including team leaders and excluding 
team leaders. 
 These data revealed some noteworthy findings, “…the more intuitive the team 
member, the more he or she is likely to contribute to these acts, irrespective of their 
category” (p.298). In every category tested the more intuitive participants initiated more acts. 
The test of hypothesis 1a revealed that analytic participants initiated fewer tasks than 
intuitive participants to a statistically significant degree, t(98)=2.04; p<.05; thus hypothesis 
1a is rejected. Also, the intuitive participants initiated more social-emotional acts than the 
analytic participants, again, by a statistically significant degree, t(98)=3.07, p<.01; this 
supports hypothesis 2a. If my assertion that Kirton’s KAI scores are significantly related to 
the CSI scores these findings are not surprising. The high innovator naturally produces more 
ideas during problem-solving activities and the high adaptor is content to produce what he 
deems a reasonable amount which is considerably less, on average, than the innovator 
(Kirton 1976).  
 As noted above, the data were evaluated without including the team leaders due to the 
fact that they were statistically more intuitive than the other team members. When controlling 
for team leaders the analysis revealed that there was no statistically significant difference 
between task-related acts initiated by more intuitive or more analytic participants, t(87)=1.43, 
p>.05; this lends to the rejection of hypothesis 1a. However, the number of task-related acts 
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initiated by more intuitive participants was substantially higher than for more analytic 
participants, a fact the authors called, “…worthy of note” (p.300). Also, using the 
participants’ scores without the team leaders included, the number of social-emotional acts 
initiated by the intuitive participants was considerably more than the analytic participants by 
a statistically significant degree, t(87)=2.52, p<.05; supporting hypothesis 2a further.  
 The 11 teams were grouped according to three classification schemes: 1) analytic 
homogeneous, 2) intuitive homogeneous, and 3) heterogeneous. There were three 
homogeneous analytic teams, two homogeneous intuitive teams, and six heterogeneous 
teams. The number of task acts, social-emotional acts, and total acts were recorded within 
each team class for the purpose of an analysis of variance between classes. There was a 
statistically significant difference between the number of social-emotional acts between 
classes, F=1.99, df=10, p<.05. There was no statistically significant difference between 
classes for the number of task-oriented acts across the classes, F=.708, df=10, p>.05. These 
tests support rejection of hypothesis 1b. The tests support hypothesis 2b.  
 Armstrong and Priola (2001) cited prior work supporting their own findings and 
concluded, 
…that individuals with a tendency toward an analytic style will be more task oriented, 
preferring structure, less ambiguity, and a more technique-oriented environment, whereas 
individuals with a tendency toward an intuitive style tend to be emotionally expressive, 
relatively friendly, popular, and warm, preferring less structure and more ambiguity. If 
these conceptual relationships between the analytic-intuitive cognitive style and task-
/social-oriented behaviors were to be proven, then it might be argued that instruments 
such as the Allinson-Hayes CSI may prove to be of significant value for organizations 
wishing to compose SMWTs in a more robust and meaningful way (p.304). 
  
 These authors were surprised that homogeneous intuitive teams and intuitive 
individuals were much more likely to initiate more task-oriented behaviors than their 
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counterparts. I see this finding as being consistent with A-I theory with the high innovator 
demonstrating much of the behavioral characteristics as the high intuitive.  
 The generalizability of this study was said to be, perhaps, compromised by the fact 
that it was based on a student sample. This is a criticism other scholars have offered 
concerning using student samples (Keyton 2000). They suggested that a similar study 
conducted within the context of a real work context might lead to overcoming the potential 
bias from a student sample. This is a problem that my research will not face since my 
subjects are inside an organization in which many have significant tenure. The authors 
commented that homogeneity of cognitive style, “…in a team may increase the likelihood of 
satisficing behaviors, whereas heterogeneity reduces these effects but at the risk of increased 
levels of conflict” (Armstrong and Priola 2001:306) (observations also made by Kirton 
(1994) and Lindsey (1985)).  
 Bobic et al. (1999) were interested in the law of requisite variety as it relates to group 
performance and Kirton’s assertion that diversity on teams should produce better outcomes. 
They employed Kirton’s KAI scores as measures of cognitive style. Some organizational 
researchers have argued that requisite variety leads to the Icarus Paradox; that the 
organization’s initial strength becomes the weakness that leads to its downfall (Miller 1990). 
Simply put, the external environment changes more rapidly that the successful organization 
can, thereby leading to failure. 
 Bobic et al.’s (1999) research project was not based on a priori assumptions. Their 
work was originally begun to inform students and managers about themselves so they could 
learn and share their experiences with their groups. They called this formulation method, 
accidental populations. Thus, they called the evidence presented in this work, fragments, and 
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said that the strength of their findings lies in consistency. They observed that all the 
fragments pointed in the same direction. And, they acknowledged the importance that 
triangulation brings to evaluation research for supporting validity of findings.  
 Bobic et al.’s (1999) research process called for each of the middle managers in a 
state government department to be interviewed during a management development program 
and asked to tell autobiographical leadership stories. The interviews lasted from 20 minutes 
to over an hour and were audio taped and transcribed. The researcher reasoned that because 
the interviewees were telling stories in which they were actors they would describe 
themselves in styles which were comfortable to them—consistent with the theory imbedded 
in the KAI Inventory; e.g., recall the instructions to the KAI Inventory reads, “How easy or 
difficult do you find it to present yourself, consistently, over a long period of time as…” 
 Each interviewer had to interpret the stories and make an assessment as to the 
adaption versus innovation degree suggested in the story. There were two coders and each 
worked separately. For each characteristic of adaptor and innovator contained in the KAI 
Inventory the coders allocated one point. The coders then discussed and compared their 
scoring and made adjustments. Initially there was 80% agreement in coding.  
 Kirton (1994) argued that the KAI score is a measure of personality and therefore 
stable over time. Van der Molen (1994) and Clapp (1993) offered supporting evidence. 
Goldsmith (1994) suggested that training programs have no effect on KAI scores, as would 
be expected if one’s A-I proclivity is part of one’s personality. This would suggest that 
training programs intended to teach innovation may be a waste of money by organizations. 
Kirton would suggest that if an organization needed more innovative behavior the 
organization should consider recruiting people with different cognitive styles.  
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 State manager training over the three month period was supposed to encourage risk 
taking and innovation. The intensive three month program was found to not impact KAI 
scores at all. This supports the argument that training cannot change KAI scores, or, better 
put, training cannot change a person’s basic cognitive style. Note that some participants filled 
out KAI Inventories one to three years after the program and their scores remained constant.  
 There were, however, changes in KAI scores noted with black respondents. One to 
three years after the fact the black participants scored as innovatively as their white 
counterparts whereas the initial assessment of black respondents considered them more 
adaptive on average than their white colleagues.  
 During the time of the study a governor change occurred and the new governor 
introduced a different management philosophy. This was more restrictive to the managers 
since the governor’s cabinet members now were subordinate. The KAI scores of the 
managers in the prior governor’s administration were higher than in the new governor’s 
administration. The researchers concluded that the innovative climate which exemplified the 
prior governor’s administration fostered higher KAI scores. Also, by extension, an adaptive 
work place climate will foster a move toward more adaptive KAI scores. Again, this is 
consistent with a number of researchers on Attraction-Selection-Attrition (ASA) theory 
originally advanced by Schneider (1983a). ASA theory posits that over time organizations or 
groups evolve toward isomorphism; i.e., the dominant type in the group will attract and select 
people like them while those unlike the dominant type will seek to leave the organization. 
Bobic et al. (1999) inferred from their findings that, “…to effect change, the organization 
executive should restructure the environment or redesign the job rather than fire employees. 
Sending people to training programs may teach specific work behaviors, but does not appear 
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to generate an innovative orientation” (p.26). Or, put another way, natural adaptors will 
remain naturally adaptive in spite of training to teach innovative thinking. 
 Bobic et al. (1999) said the comments about race and work environment were not part 
of their research assumptions a priori; they credited serendipity to the results. They offered 
two extensions to that information as possible hypotheses which need further testing: 1) A 
member of minority identity group or 2) Working in a controlling environment constitutes 
conditions which depress one’s propensity to innovate.  
 Bobic et al. (1999) planned and conducted a quasi-experiment. A management 
training class was split into three groups with KAI scores being a major variable used for 
selection (also gender and departmental distribution were considered). A relatively more 
adaptive group was assembled, a relatively more innovative group was assembled, and a 
middling group (defined as one in which the members were relatively well distributed about 
the mean of the KAI measure). All three groups were charged with the same task: to 
“develop a proposal for handling the disposal of nonhazardous solid waste for the state.” The 
groups were exposed to speakers who were experts in this field. Participants visited solid-
waste sites and each group invested significant time on this research assignment. The report 
would be presented in both oral and written form to the state’s Department of Health and 
Environment so the assignment was considered quite important by the participants.  
 The participants spent all summer on the assignment. A week before the completion 
period the three solutions were presented to an assembled panel of four domain experts who 
were asked to evaluate the plans on several dimensions using a 1-10 scoring scheme. 
Departure from standard practice was one dimension for innovativeness. Adaptive scores 
would approach the standard practice measure. All the project teams performed as predicted 
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by A-I theory. Using an aggregated mean from the four domain experts the relatively more 
adaptive team scored three points, the relatively more innovative team scored seven points, 
and the middle team scored five points. This supports the validity of the KAI measure. Bobic 
et al. (1999) said, “When innovators get together, the decision will be innovative; when 
adaptors get together, the decision will be adaptive. Also in line with diversity theory, the 
experts evaluated the middle group as offering the best project plan” (pp.27-28). Kirton and 
Hammond (1980) conducted an interesting study which showed extreme adaptors and 
extreme innovators perceived themselves as less self actualized than did more middling KAI 
scores—a fact that may contribute to the better problem solving in this middle group.  
 This work supports Kirton’s hypothesis that heterogeneous teams perform better than 
homogeneous teams of either adaptors or innovators. However, there may be specific 
problems which require a more adaptive solution which might favor adaptors and vice versa 
for innovators. But, ceteris paribus, heterogeneous teams over the long haul are likely to 
solve a wider range of problems than either homogeneous adaptors or homogeneous 
innovators.  
 This work also suggested that workplace climate or minority social status may be 
important factors when assessing the relatively adaptive-innovative nature of an organization. 
Bobic et al. (1999) observed, “KAI can be useful in enhancing innovative problem solutions, 
but an executive’s demonstrated behaviors remain a factor influencing a subordinate’s 
propensity to innovate” (p.28).  
 Support is again provided for using KAI scores among managers of an organization 
as an approach to achieving organizational effectiveness flowing from application of the 
requisite variety principle.  Bobic et al. (1999:29) conclude with a significant corroborative 
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statement concerning my assertion of employing A-I theory in building problem-solving 
groups: 
If the adaption-innovation dimension is significant for supplying needed variety for an 
organization, and if the theory of requisite variety applies to organizations, then (other 
factors being equal) organizations which use managers’ KAI scores for building diverse 
work teams will be more successful than organizations which ignore such information 
about their employees when building teams.  
 
 Buffinton et al. (2002) investigated a summer training program in Bucknell 
University’s Institute for Leadership in Technology and Management (ILTM). A-I theory 
was introduced into the ILTM program beginning in 2001. KAI scores were recorded but 
were not used in team composition. The program, which began in 1991, was originated to 
provide, “…an integrated academic program to address the challenges of technological 
change and the changing global economy” (p26). The program stretches over two summers 
and is designed as an intensive experience for Bucknell students majoring in either 
(chemical, civil, computer, electrical, or mechanical) engineering or in management or 
accounting. The concept is to provide some exposure to a cross-functional educational 
experience. The program includes on-campus course work and off-campus internships for 
participants following their junior year.  
 Students must apply for one of the 20 slots which are available each year. The faculty 
chooses only the most highly motivated juniors in engineering and management each year. 
The program is intentionally designed to push students due to the high expectations that both 
students and faculty have.  
 The students were divided into four teams of five persons each and were assembled to 
maximize diversity vis-à-vis gender, major, and GPA. In the first year KAI scores were 
available for the students but the faculty decided to not include those scores during the 
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assembly of teams. The intent of placing student into diverse groups during this program was 
to force “students to work with others who may have different approaches to problem 
solving” (p.25). The intention of using KAI scores during the evaluation of team 
performance was to investigate if KAI scores can be used to help plan and manage group 
dynamics. The researchers required the students and faculty members to keep journals of 
their work during the program. The researchers kept up with journal entries of students and 
faculty members while considering the KAI scores of each. Buffinton et al.’s results 
indicated that, “…KAI scores help with understanding and appreciating problem-solving 
strategies of others, and predict trouble spots within project teams” (p.25). Their method is 
similar to the critical incidents technique mentioned above that I will employ for this 
research.  
 One of the investigators, Kathryn Jablokow, who is a nationally recognized leader in 
problem-solving pedagogy, administered a day-long workshop on A-I theory and its 
ramifications to problem solving. [Jablokow, as mentioned above, developed and teaches a 
three semester series on problem-solving at Pennsylvania State University’s Great Valley 
School for Graduate Professional Studies based on A-I theory]. Subsequent to the A-I theory 
workshops the students were given instructions to keep a journal of their impressions of their 
experiences during the corporate project work, as mentioned above. In much the same way as 
the critical incident technique can be applied in an inductive manner the faculty identified six 
common major themes throughout all the journals. These were: 
 
1. Structure 
2. Conformity and consensus 
3. Relevance 
4. Conflict 
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5. Other personality factors (non-KAI) 
6. Positive value 
 
Additionally, two other themes considered of some level of importance to these findings 
were evaluation and leadership.  
 It is not surprising that the importance of evaluation would be an important theme 
which was observed in students’ journals, given that students are typically keenly interested 
in grades on performance. These groups of students worked with each other for extended 
periods of time and there were reports of concern over how individuals were perceived based 
on the performance of other students’ behavior.  
 Leadership was considered an important characteristic of the teams which were 
established. In the ILTM program teams were established with no intentional hierarchy. 
Leaders, therefore, may or may not emerge during team development. In one case a leader 
was selected in the first few days of the industrial phase of work. Unfortunately, journal 
entries indicated that the person was a non-factor regarding the team’s performance. One 
student wrote (KAI 83), “It is interesting to note that Student D (KAI 97) does have the 
highest KAI score and is trying to assume the role of leader relatively speaking because our 
group dynamics are such that we don’t have a ‘leader’ and it just works better that way” 
(p.30).  
 In another case the leader role shifted as the nature of the problem changed; i.e., 
initially the tasks were structured (goal setting) to less structured (presentation development). 
Some tension was noted in the journal entries with this team but, ultimately, leaders 
appropriate to the task stepped forward to help with the problem solving. One of these 
students (KAI 78) wrote, “Though we are enrolled in an elite leadership course, it is also 
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important to realize that not all can be leaders at the same time. It is important to be a 
follower as well. I learned more about being a leader by being a follower. I learned that 
adaptors and innovators are great leaders, depending on the situation. A true leader realizes 
this and becomes a follower as the situation changes” (p.30). 
 One key theme that was evident during this study was structure. They found that 
more adaptive participants were more highly frustrated when incomplete information created 
ambiguity. They noted that, “The more adaptive the student (the lower the KAI score), the 
more frustration they expressed with issues such as open-ended project description, 
ambiguous tasks, or the inability to contact a corporate sponsor for clarification” (p.30). As 
expected, the more innovative students were less stressed by ambiguity or change during the 
process. 
 One very salient observation was made concerning resource management—
specifically time management. They found a direct relationship between adaption and more 
stringent time management, including anticipation of the future. A revealing comment was 
made by one of the participants (KAI 78), “I am glad that we are more adaptive as a group. 
At this present time, the team needs more structure and direction rather than ideas. Assigning 
tasks is extremely important due to deadlines” (p.30). More innovative students were 
considerably looser with time management, took fewer notes, and were less sequential in 
their work that the more adaptive groups. The most innovative team, in this study, 
experienced difficulties with staying on task, boredom, and lack of focus, which were 
asserted to be typical with more innovative individuals. When some team members tried to 
contribute discipline they encountered resistance from others. Interestingly, this team’s 
output came together at the last minute.  
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 The theme of conformity and consensus was observed by the researchers. They noted 
a direct relationship between the emphasis on group conformity and adaption. In the more 
adaptive team members’ journal entries tension was evident with respect to, “…moving 
forward together and getting along,” anytime that they perceived that this was not happening 
to their satisfaction (p.31). The researchers also noted a direct relationship between amount 
of independent work and degree of innovativeness. More innovative students were more 
likely to work alone and then bring their work to the group for discussion. One telling 
observation concerning more innovative students was that, “…they were perceived as 
abrasive and even offensive. They were criticized for ‘having their fingers in everything,’ 
‘bringing new ideas in at the end,’ ‘stepping on toes,’ and speaking up too much with 
faculty.” Additionally, and not surprisingly, “The most adaptive members of two teams were 
perceived as offensive because of condescending attitudes and rejecting ideas of others” 
(p.31). 
 The theme of relevance was evident in the students’ journals. In this case the more 
innovative students were the ones who felt their ideas were often ignored or disregarded. The 
most innovative person (KAI 99) of one team said, “My group is starting to form better, but I 
still feel as though I am the person who fits in the least. Sometimes my ideas take longer to 
process and the longevity of this does not comply with the swiftness of my team members” 
(p.31). More adaptive team members interpreted this kind of thinking as being destructive to 
the team. Additionally, the more adaptive team members felt that the more innovative 
members offered ideas which were not helpful or that, “…seemed tangential to project goals 
caused a loss of momentum” (p.31). The more adaptive students reported that the more 
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innovative students were likely to be chaotic with respect to the adaptor’s desired structure 
and process during problem solving.  
 Conflict was a clear theme in the students’ journals. In the case of the ILTM program, 
students sought the approval of their contributions by faculty, peers, and the corporate groups 
with which they worked. Consequently, conflict was noted when students perceived that their 
contributions were not highly valued by any of the constituencies noted. The greatest 
conflicts were said to be due to cognitive style differences in the groups with the most 
adaptive and the most innovative members of teams perceiving the most conflict. For 
example, the most innovative member of one team (KAI 118) said, “Student A (KAI 94) and 
I disagreed several times, and I often felt that he was being condescending. Usually when I 
made a comment or suggestion, he would get defensive and didn’t always listen to what I 
was trying to say. He would try to explain his way of doing things in a way that really 
bothered me at times” (p.31). Following some discussion of this between the two students 
Student A said, “We were arguing the same thing, just from a different perspective” (p.31).  
 The most conflict was recorded in the team with the greatest cognitive gap (defined as 
the largest range between KAI scores on the team). A very revealing comment was recorded 
by one team member in this situation, “For me it just seems emotionally draining when we 
meet as a group because I know we will not only have to tackle our [task] assignment but 
also internal group struggles. Personally, I prefer not to work with Student B because his 
ways of thinking are so different from mine” (p.31). It should be noted that adaptors also 
conflicted with other adaptors in some circumstances. In one case two relatively more 
adaptive team members conflicted over the defined structure of the project.  
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 Buffinton et al. (2002) also acknowledged that other personality differences were 
evident in addition to cognitive style differences. In particular they noted that Jung’s 
psychological types could be identified in some of the journal entries. I will omit any 
discussion of these types as my primary interest is on cognitive style. Other differences were 
noted related to gender and major. Additional psychological differences that were noted 
include self-efficacy, coping mechanisms, and achievement motivation. These too were 
considered to have an influence on the ability of teams to function effectively but will not be 
elaborated.  
 Buffinton et al. (2002) concluded that the application of cognitive style theory to 
group dynamics for individuals working in teams is “appropriate and useful” (p.32). 
However, they acknowledged that more rigorous research is needed. They suggested that 
although this research was conducted with students that similar results could be expected 
with more mature participants, citing work done by Kirton (1999) and Clapp (1993) on the 
stability of cognitive style in adults in longitudinal studies. Essentially, cognitive style does 
not change over time. Thus, behaviors by students as recorded in the various journals during 
this experiment can be expected to be reflective of impressions and behaviors of people more 
senior in their careers. They suggested that one possible difference with more mature people 
is that they have likely developed more advanced coping skills which enable them to deal 
with the diversity which exists in any kind of organized activity. That does not imply that the 
cognitive style differences no longer exist, but rather that the individuals are better at coping 
than when younger. 
 With regard to the Buffinton et al. study I would suggest that their findings may be 
used as empirical evidence which supports many of the stylistic differences A-I theory posits 
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between high adaptors and high innovators. There are some interesting reports in this study 
where students’ journal entries imply behavior seemingly at odds with what Bales would 
have suggested; e.g., one adaptor expressed concern that the high innovator was destructive 
to team formation and spirit. If, as I have suggested, the adaptor is an analytic, task-oriented 
person, it would seem that this expressed concern (social-emotional or intuitive) about team 
building would be a bit dissonant. This may be an example of the Bales’ conception of 
intuitive tapping into another facet of personality than Kirton’s innovator. 
 Jablokow and Booth (2006) suggested a theoretical conception of how differences in 
cognitive style and cognitive level may contribute to outcomes in for-profit, high-
performance product development organizations. They based their work on the premise that 
all for-profit organizations seek competitive advantage in pursuit of profit. According to the 
authors, there are two fundamental factors necessary to achieve the aim of competitive 
advantage (p.313): 
(1) The ability to generate new intellectual property that offers superior value to 
customers 
(2) The ability to capitalize on it quickly 
This is reminiscent of my earlier citation of de Geus (1988) who said, “…that the only 
competitive advantage the company of the future will have is its managers’ ability to learn 
faster than their competitors” (p.74). The ability to generate new intellectual property has an 
implicit need to learn and learn fast (de Geus 1988). Jablokow and Booth (2006) accepted, 
although without explicit declaration, the law of requisite variety and provided a compelling 
conceptual model which I will explain and extend for application in this research. Jablokow 
and Booth were inspired and informed by an ethnographic study reported by Carlile (2002) 
on knowledge boundaries in new product development organizations. Carlile explained the 
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challenges of working and learning across functional boundaries, what Jablokow and Booth 
called the Integrated Organization Model. 
 The Integrated Organization Model (IOM) in a product development manufacturing 
organization assumes that two or more different organizational units with different functional 
problem-solving objectives are tightly integrated. Carlile (2002) identified four business units 
in the product development company he studied: sales/marketing, design engineering, 
manufacturing engineering, and production. The IOM would contain cross-functional teams 
of people working to develop new ideas and products. Carlile’s observations led him to, 
“…describe knowledge as localized, embedded, and invested in practice” (2002:442). The 
essence of this observation is that the knowledge reservoir of each individual is largely 
determined by the organizational subunit within which one works. This makes the issue of 
working across functional boundaries very challenging. I discussed another facet of this 
problem earlier during the presentation of resistance to change in organizations being related 
to the degree to which someone’s power and position make her reticent to relinquish the old 
in order to generate and resolve novelty (Kaufman 1971 and Kirton 2003).  
 Jablokow and Booth (2006) focused their discussion on the important ways people’s 
cognitive differences impact collaborative decision processes inherent in the IOM. They used 
Kirton’s (2003) term cognitive gap to be the psychological processes that arise when 
different problem solvers combine to solve a particular problem. There are two aspects of 
cognitive gap: person-person cognitive gap and person-problem cognitive gap. In addition, 
there are two components of cognitive gap—cognitive style gap and cognitive level gap.  
 Cognitive style has been discussed above in considerable detail and as the previous 
section presented, there are numerous facets of cognitive style that could be considered. I 
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have chosen to use Kirton’s A-I theory and his KAI scores as a single measure of cognitive 
style for this research. His measure is general enough and simple enough to add value 
without complexity. 
 Cognitive level includes both potential and manifest capacities; i.e., one’s potential 
capacity is a measure of how much someone can know based on the strength of the 
machinery, and the manifest capacity is a measure of the knowledge and experience 
accumulation through life (Jablokow and Booth 2006). Carlile (2002) called manifest 
capacity knowledge which is localized, embedded, and invested in practice. Manifest 
capacity also includes formal education, life experiences, family history, and all tacit learning 
which enables a person to solve certain problems but restricts the solution sets to those within 
her localized, embedded, and invested knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1967 and Kirton 
2003).  
 Jablokow and Booth (2006) offered a simple conceptual model in which they 
hypothesized two types of cognitive gaps in a problem-solving model. Figure IV-4 shows 
Problem Solver 1 (PS1), Problem Solver 2 (PS2), and Problem A. Kirton (2003) 
conceptualized the management of diversity with an analogy called Problem A-Problem B. 
Problem A is the question about which people assemble to answer. And, Problem B is the 
problem of managing the diversity of all the problem-solvers. The Jablokow-Booth model 
depicts Problem B as a cognitive gap, G12, which means the gap between PS1 and PS2. In 
addition, this model shows a cognitive gap between person and problem, shown in the figure 
as G1A and G2A. It should be obvious that this is the simplest model which demonstrates the 
Problem A-Problem B analogy. In practical matters there are usually several problem solvers 
assembled to solve a particular problem. I will expand on the issue of number of problem 
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Figure IV-4 Simple Cognitive Gap Model for Problem Solving9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
solvers and measurement of gaps following Jablokow and Booth’s definition of gaps. 
Cognitive gaps are differences between cognitive styles and/or cognitive levels which can be 
present in any of the following (p.324): 
a. A gap between two individuals (i.e., between their respective styles and/or levels); 
b. A gap between an individual and a group (i.e., between the style and/or level of the 
individual and the style mean or aggregate level of the group, respectively); 
c. A gap between two groups (i.e., between their respective style means or aggregate 
levels); or 
d. A gap between an individual or group and the requirements of a particular problem 
(i.e., between the respective styles and/or levels of each).  
 
Jablokow and Booth did not offer any more detailed operationalization of these gaps but 
reminded readers of prior research in cognitive style where KAI differences of 10 points 
                                                 
9 Adapted from Jablokow and Booth (2006:314) 
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between people are noticeable over time (Kirton and McCarthy 1985 and Clapp and de 
Ciantis 1989). KAI gaps between individuals of 20 points or more have been shown to lead 
to more serious problems including distrust, conflict, and job loss (Lindsay 1985 and 
McCarthy 1988). And, with small groups interacting with other small groups, intergroup KAI 
mean scores as little as 5 points difference have been noticed (Kirton 2003; Kirton and 
McCarthy 1985; and Clapp and de Ciantis 1989). I will follow Jablokow and Booth in 
adopting Kirton’s A-I theory for the cognitive gap concerning style. And, since considerable 
attention has already been paid to cognitive style, I abbreviate my discussion on that topic. 
However, I have spent little time on the issue of cognitive level and possible measurements. 
Since Jablokow and Booth introduced the notion of both style and level cognitive gaps, I will 
explore their propositions for due consideration in my research.  
 Recall that Jablokow and Booth (2006) studied the issue of cognitive gaps within the 
context of the IOM. They note the potential for group polarization in the IOM and posit that 
it, “…may be due in part to differences in manifest cognitive level (perceived as ‘high in my 
job, low in yours’), such as: which training completed, which degree attained, which 
technical skills mastered, etc” (p.328). While they drew from Kirton’s A-I theory in their 
discussion of cognitive style, they employed Carlile’s (2002) conception of knowledge in 
their discussion of cognitive level. Because of the direct application of Carlile’s concepts into 
my subsequent presentation I will sketch important elements of his work. 
 Carlile (2002) also studied product development organizations and cross-functional 
business units, although he did not call his conception an IOM. Rather, he termed the 
different units “communities” and was concerned how knowledge (novel ideas) emerges and 
crosses functional boundaries. His work is silent on cognitive style or cognitive level—
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explicitly.  However, it is quite clear that his interest is in useful knowledge in an applied 
setting. This is a significant aspect of manifest capacity—or level in the Jablokow-Booth 
model.  
 Carlile (2002) views, “…knowledge as localized, embedded, and invested in the 
particular objects and ends of a given function to frame the consequences of moving 
knowledge across boundaries” (p.443).  He offered how boundaries have been understood in 
prior research and noted that knowledge, “…is both a barrier to and a source of 
innovation”—a notion that parallels Kirton’s “paradox of structure” (p.442). Carlile 
discussed two popular approaches to knowledge boundaries and suggested his own 
improvement for understanding how knowledge moves across those boundaries.  
   The syntactic approach to knowledge boundaries originated with Shannon and 
Weaver’s (1949) mathematical theory of communications. They were pioneers during the 
infancy of electronic digital processing when science had not yet fully developed the 
systems’ concepts to enable computers to efficiently and reliably share information across 
man-machine boundaries. Today, the commonly used example of syntax is simply the 
combinations of zeros and ones contained in computer machine language—so called binary 
language. As a result of effective syntax, computers receive input information and process it 
the same way every time. Interestingly, systems theorists mentioned in my earlier discussion 
of requisite variety considered the boundary between the environment and an organization as 
a problem that information processing (syntax) could aid (see, e.g., Buckley 1958 and Conant 
and Ashby 1970).  
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) produced their well-known differentiation and 
integration model based on the developments in systems theory and syntax described above. 
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They measured differences across organization units based on the degree of uncertainty that 
tasks could be predictably completed. They compiled this across the different units and 
looked at the differences of predictability (differentiation) at the unit boundaries. They then 
considered the issue of integration (boundary-crossing knowledge) as a simple problem of 
“matching differences” at the boundaries of each unit. While Lawrence and Lorsch provided 
useful guidance for understanding boundary knowledge, Carlile found, “…that novelty does 
not arise from differences in degree of uncertainty but, more problematically, differences in 
kinds of knowledge required for the task” (p.444). Thus, he called on another approach.  
 The semantic approach is necessary for all those cases in which a common syntax or 
language has any room for interpretation—meaning any time people are involved. The 
collaborative model (like Jablokow and Booth’s IOM) requires people to communicate 
effectively to successfully work together. However, as I have argued above each person has a 
unique language (syntax) with which she communicates and it is filled with socially 
constructed reality which shapes and shades meaning of words and phrases (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967 and Searle 1995). The semantic approach to knowledge at the boundaries 
recognizes both “differences in degrees” and “differences in kind” (Carlile 2002:444). The 
latter difference derives from the nature of knowledge creation; i.e., localized, embedded, 
and invested in a particular domain. The nuance of the semantic approach is to accept the 
epistemological differences of knowledge. Carlile (2002) expanded on this thought, “By 
paying attention to the challenges of ‘conveyed meaning’ and the possible different 
interpretations by individuals, they recognize that individual, context-specific aspects of 
creating and transferring knowledge must be taken into consideration, and like others pay 
particular attention to the tacit nature of knowledge” (p.444). The semantic approach accepts 
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differences as expected during knowledge transfer at the boundaries and recognizes 
dependencies across those boundaries. It does not, however, deal with the consequences that 
different kinds of knowledge might generate. That takes the third approach to knowledge 
boundaries and it is the one proposed by Carlile (2002). 
 The pragmatic approach illuminates the things that are both dependent and different 
across functional boundaries and their concomitant consequences. Again, the nature of my 
knowledge versus your knowledge is important, “…interactions across practices are not 
inconsequential; the knowledge that people accumulate and use is often ‘at stake.’ They are 
reluctant to change their hard-won outcomes because it is costly to change their knowledge 
and skills” (Carlile 2002:445). The pragmatic approach accepts the need for a process of 
transforming existing knowledge based on conditions of difference, dependence, and novelty 
all present at the boundaries.  
 Carlile (2002) applied the pragmatic approach in his study of a product development 
organization which operated in a fashion similar to the IOM discussed above. He developed a 
two-class framework to compare how knowledge was structured in an applied setting. Within 
a particular practice unit he focused on the objects and ends used. He defined objects as, 
“…the collection of artifacts that individuals work with—the numbers, blueprints, faxes, 
parts, tools, and machines that individuals create, measure, or manipulate.” “Ends,” he 
continued, “…are outcomes that demonstrate success in creating, measuring, or manipulating 
objects—a signed sales contract, ordering prototype parts, an assembly process certification, 
or a batch of high-quality parts off the production line” (p.446). He observed that collecting 
information about knowledge in practical settings was difficult. And, he viewed surveys or 
self reports as too unreliable to count on. Therefore, he observed individuals in actual 
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practice while focusing on the objects (defined above) they routinely use and the ends they 
seek (also defined above). In this manner, he reasoned that he could record sufficient 
information about objects and ends as to discuss dependencies and differences within the 
development of successful products.  
 Calling himself an ethnographer, he said the challenge was to collect a large 
collection of observations and to condense them into something understandable. His method 
for that was to write summaries of interactions which demonstrate the application of 
knowledge in action with his subjects. I mention this method challenge because it is one that 
I faced and I have used his approach with my research project.  
 Carlile (2002) adapted Star’s (1989) four categories of boundary objects to identify 
acts of knowledge in action in his study. Boundary objects, “…work to establish a shared 
context that ‘sits in the middle’” and thereby fosters cross-boundary knowledge exchange 
(a.k.a. learning) (Star 1989:47). Carlile’s adaption yielded three classes of boundary objects 
(p.451): 1) repositories are shared databases or storehouses of information whose labels or 
definitions are accepted and mutually understood across functional boundaries; 2) 
standardized forms and methods provide a common language and structure that has shared 
meaning across functional boundaries; and 3) objects, models, and maps comprise the 
artifacts that enable transformative knowledge. Objects or models include any depiction of a 
specific finite goal such that the differences and dependencies across functional boundaries 
can be understood. Maps of boundaries are any depictions of boundary-forming knowledge 
which helps expose the cross-functional dependencies. 
 Carlile discussed “effective” boundary objects as those which provide a shared syntax 
for communicating, that provide a semantic process which illuminates the differences and 
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dependencies, and a pragmatic process through which cross-functional groups can, “…jointly 
transform their knowledge” (p.452).  
 Lastly, Carlile (2002) circled back to the Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) work on 
“integrating devices” and used his findings as an improvement over the earlier work. He 
defined “integrating devices” for each of the three approaches to boundary knowledge. In the 
syntactical approach, the integrating device is the shared repositories of knowledge and the 
processing of that knowledge across boundaries. In the semantic approach, the integrating 
device includes a process by which information is translated across boundaries such that 
differences and dependencies are learned. And, in the pragmatic approach, the integrating 
device is the recognition by cross-functional groups that in order to create new knowledge 
old knowledge must be changed, which Carlile called transformative knowledge.  
 Carlile’s (2002) exposition about boundary objects and how they may foster cross- 
functional group collaboration provides me with a framework within which I can elaborate 
concerning the implications about cognitive gaps, in general, and cognitive level gaps, in 
specific. I next turn to Jablokow and Booth’s (2006) formulation about cognitive gaps and 
extend that to work within my research. 
 Jablokow and Booth’s proposition about four parts of cognitive gap has intuitive 
appeal. Few would argue that gaps exist in both cognitive style and cognitive level. And, few 
would argue that those gaps have an influence in problem solving. But, the measurement of 
both style and level creates challenges. As I demonstrated earlier, there are about two dozen 
concepts of cognitive style. And, I would suggest that each has some utility, depending on 
the specific problem under consideration. Cognitive level, as discussed at length in the 
Carlile research above, has several facets as well. In order to usefully employ the concepts 
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proposed by Jablokow and Booth in my research, I must first examine the collected data and 
make a determination as to what to use and how to use it.  
 I collected a considerable amount of information about the participants in my research 
program. Also, I constructed several additional variables to simulate the group effects. For 
my exploration of what to use and how to use that data, I began with the following variables: 
 Age 
 Gender 
 Education 
 Average Education (for each subteam) 
 Cumulative Education (for each subteam) 
 Tenure 
 Other Experience 
 Job Status 
 KAI Score 
 Role (planner or operator) 
 Total Experience (=tenure + other experience) 
 Map versus Written Directions Preference 
 
I conducted a factor analysis of all the variables shown except Gender and Map. (I will later 
discuss the lack of statistical significance between both Gender and Map with successful 
solutions to the experiment.) The first analysis suggested three factors which were 
distinctive: F1(TotExp, Age, Tenure, and JobStat); F2(Cumed, Aveed, Educ); and F3(KAI). 
However, upon closer consideration I judged that the second factor contained individual 
measures and team measures which inflate its importance level. Consequently, I reran the 
factor analysis eliminating the aggregated subteam educational factors and only used the 
individual educational characteristics, educ. That analysis produced a two-factor model with 
F1(TotExp, Age, Tenure, JobStat) and F2(KAI). Education loaded lightly on both factors 
(F1, .002 and F2, .003) and showed near the origin in the component plot in rotated space. 
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Based on those observations I concluded that, in the context of my experimental program, 
education was not a significant variable for the evaluation of gap analysis. Consequently, I 
conducted a third factor analysis using five variables which seemed to be significantly related 
to the work at hand. Figure IV-5 shows the factor loadings for cognitive style and cognitive 
level which I will employ for this research report.  
Figure IV-5 Factor Loadings for Level and Style a 
Variable Factor 1 Cognitive Level 
Factor 2 
Cognitive Style 
 
Total Experience 
Age 
Tenure 
Job Status 
KAI Score 
 
.950 
.935 
.622 
.432 
 
 
 
-.118 
 
.999 
a This is a rotated Principal Component Analysis using the covariance matrix and the Varimax Rotation 
with Kaiser Normalization. These two factors explain 89.2% of the variance. 
 
 I am adopting Carlile’s (2002) knowledge in practice which is evidenced by the four 
factors loading on Factor 1—which I have called Cognitive Level. Clearly, this is a proxy for 
level as level is multi-dimensional. But, with respect to the knowledge reservoir and with 
respect to the Problem A which this experiment examined, the items included in Factor 1 are 
reasonable. 
 The two items loading, one positively and one negatively, on Factor 2 caused me 
some problem. Since the major focus of my research project is about Kirton’s A-I theory and 
how KAI scores may be a significant indicator of cognitive style preferences, I substituted 
the actual KAI scores (standardized Z-scores for KAI) in lieu of the scores shown in Figure 
IV-5. This was due to my desire to keep the Cognitive Style factor as unadulterated as 
possible. I conducted a bivariate correlation analysis to check the accuracy of this change. I 
  127
found that the KAI Z-scores correlated r=.999, p<.01 (2-tailed test) with Factor 2 shown in 
Figure IV-5. This was sufficiently close to the tabulated factor score such that I could retain 
KAI as an independent measure of cognitive style without introducing other effects.  
 I have included supporting quantitative information on the factor analysis described 
above in Appendix H as follows. Table H-1 is the Correlation Matrix for the principal 
components. Logically, as total experience rises one’s corresponding age rises as well r=.794, 
p<.001 (1-tailed test). There was a more modest positive correlation between tenure and age, 
r=.485, p<.001 (1-tailed test). And, job status was modestly correlated with age r=.334, 
p<.001 (1-tailed test). Importantly, KAI was not significantly correlated with any of the other 
variables, as expected. I mention these specific correlations due to my decision to use this 
facet of cognitive level as a proxy to some unknown true level measure. The context of this 
study was in a consulting engineering firm which employs relatively well-educated people. 
The daily tasks of these people include considerable work in puzzle solving of all types. 
Therefore, vis-à-vis the exercise which was used for this experiment, I considered the relative 
time spent inside the company and outside the company doing similar work to be reasonably 
indicative of the specific accumulated problem-solving capacity, hence level, of the subjects.  
 Table H-2 shows the Communalities for the factor analysis. Table H-3 contains the 
Total Variance Explained. Note that this two-factor solution accounts for 89.2% of the total 
variance. Figure H-1 is the Scree Plot and Figure H-2 shows the Component Plot in Rotated 
Space. Tables H-4, H-5, and H-6 complete the supporting quantitative reports for the factor 
analysis discussed above.  
 Recall Jablokow and Booth’s (2006) proposition about the four components of 
cognitive gap vis-à-vis their problem-solving model shown in Figure IV-4. I will restate each 
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of the four parts and develop a process for tabulating each value. For purposes of brevity I 
will use the term Level and Style to mean Cognitive Level factor score and KAI Z-scores, 
respectively.  
 The first component of cognitive gap is Part A: a gap between two individuals and 
their respective styles and levels. The Jablokow-Booth model shown is the elemental 
condition; i.e., any fewer problem solvers would rend the model moot. Unfortunately, most 
problem-solving groups have more than two problem solvers and the manner in which gaps 
are recorded is an unsettled topic. For example, when several people band together to form a 
decision-making unit (sometimes called team), there are other interactions that occur: 
individuals do not interact in a one-on-one arrangement. Rather, there are combinations of 
“pairs” which individuals interact with that should be considered. In a rare mathematical 
approach to the question of group interactions from classical organization theory, Graicunas 
(1937) advanced a formulaic definition to the issue of communication within groups. I realize 
that communication, strictly speaking, is not a gap, but for purposes of discussion it provides 
a useful example.  For a group with a leader, the following formula applied: )1
2
2( 
n
n ; 
where n is the number of subordinates reporting to a superior. This formula yields the 
number of communication interactions to which the superior must attend. Graicunas did not 
adequately specify the nature of that interaction. This concept can inform our analysis of 
cognitive gaps.  He identified three types of interaction: 1) direct single relationships; 2) 
cross-relationships; and 3) direct group relationships. Graicunas asserted that “if the number 
of subordinates reporting to a superior is n, then the number of the first type of relationships 
is n; the second type, those involving interactions between any two subordinates is n(n-1); 
the third type, those involving interactions between the superior and various subsets of 
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subordinates, can be found by  )1
2
2( 
n
n . The total of these three types is the potential 
number of relationships of a superior” (Massie 1965:398). Classical theorists accepted 
Graicunas’ theoretical proposition with no empirical support. It is significant to note that the 
number of interactions gets quite large beyond just a few levels. For example, the number of 
interactions increases as follows: 
If n=3 subordinates, total number of interactions=18. 
If n=4 subordinates, total number of interactions=44. 
If n=5 subordinates, total number of interactions=100. 
If n=6 subordinates, total number of interactions=222. 
 
In the cognitive gap analysis for my research program, there are no “bosses” or “superiors” 
per se. This leads me to reject the full formula as inappropriate since there are no superiors. 
The cross relationships in his formula are given by n(n-1) which, for my case, three-person 
groups would be 3(3-1) = 6 and four-person groups 4(4-1) = 12. There is evidence that within 
small groups of decision-makers there are subgroups which form and combine forces to 
wield greater influence. After considering this possibility I concluded that, in my research, 
the randomization of subteam formation combined with the relatively brief period of the 
actual exercise eliminated the possible formation of “cliques” which would have necessitated 
the n(n-1) formulation shown above. Thus, I have only used the first type of interaction 
measure that Graicunas called “direct single relationships.”  
 My initial examination of cognitive gap will be assuming an additive relationship of 
gaps. In the following analysis, PS1 stands for “Problem Solver 1” (etc.) following the 
notation in the Jablokow-Booth model. The analysis is as follows for the three-person 
groups: PS1, PS2, and PS3, and four-person groups PS1, PS2, PS3, and PS4.  Note the term 
“Abs” shown in the equations below indicates absolute value in Microsoft Excel© syntax. 
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The following are the person-person cognitive gaps in Gap Part A: 
 Gap Part A:  (P=3) =Abs (PS1 – PS2) + Abs (PS1 – PS3) + Abs (PS2 – PS3) 
 Gap Part A:  (P=4) = Abs (PS1 – PS2) + Abs (PS1 – PS3) + Abs (PS1 – PS4) + Abs 
(PS2 – PS3) + Abs (PS2 – PS4) + Abs (PS3 – PS4).  
This aggregated gap will be recorded for each subteam (N=24).  My assumption concerning 
using absolute values of differences was based on my desire to record the aggregation of total 
cognitive gaps and avoid potential algebraic cancellations of values; i.e., the sum of the gaps 
matters. 
 The second component of cognitive gap in the Jablokow-Booth model is Gap Part B, 
which they define as the gap between the individual and the group—this is tabulated by first 
finding the mean score for each subteam and then doing a variation analysis of each team 
member versus the mean score. I will abbreviate the subteam mean score by STM and use 
the prior number scheme for this measure.  These are also considered person-person 
cognitive gaps. 
 Gap Part B: (P=3) = Abs (STM – PS1) + Abs (STM – PS2) + Abs (STM – PS3) 
 Gap Part B: (P=4) = Abs (STM – PS1) + Abs (STM – PS2) + Abs (STM – PS3) + 
Abs (STM – PS4).  
I have used the same logic as before in the use of absolute values of the differences. This 
aggregated gap will be recorded for each subteam.  
 The third component of cognitive gap in the Jablokow-Booth model is Gap Part C, 
which they define as the gap between two groups that will be measured as differences 
between the subteams’ mean scores. These also considered person-person cognitive gap: 
 Gap Part C: = Abs (STM1 – STM2) 
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For the purpose of combining all elements of the gap analysis, I have again used absolute 
values of the subteam gaps.  
 The fourth component of cognitive gap in the Jablokow-Booth model is Gap Part D, 
which they define as the gap between an individual and the group and the requirements of a 
particular problem. This will require an assumption of two aspects of the problem: 1) an 
estimate of the relative adaptive-innovative (style) optimum of the problem versus the 
population style mean and 2) an estimate of the relative degree of difficulty of the problem 
versus the population level mean. Strictly speaking there are three problems which could, 
perhaps, be assigned an optimum problem style (OPS) and a problem degree of difficulty 
(PDD): 
1. The planners’ defined task of developing a method to instruct the operators how to 
solve the puzzle and to instruct the operators within the prescribed time. This was 
characterized as relatively more adaptive, in cognitive style, by Hammerschmidt 
(1996)—which I extended to mean that the problem itself was adaptive and, 
consequently, I assigned it an OPS of one standard deviation below the cognitive 
style mean. Likewise, I judged that this PDD was at the cognitive level mean for this 
problem and this population of problem solvers.  
2. The operators initially defined task as shown on the Hollow-Square Operating-Team 
Briefing Sheet. This task is really just an organizing period for the operators to think 
about solving some as yet unknown task. Since it is relatively open-ended I could 
make an argument that this is relatively more innovative in style. After observing this 
portion of the task and discussing this with the operators in post-test periods I 
concluded that this task was, for all practical purposes, a red herring. Consequently I 
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did not consider this as a separate cognitive level and cognitive style which needed to 
be defined and used in the tabulations of gaps. 
3. The actual operators’ task of solving the puzzle, given the solution technique 
developed by the planner subteam. All instructions by the planners, if necessary and 
sufficient to enable the operators to solve the puzzle, must be narrowly focused on 
only one correct solution, must be time constrained, and must follow the prescribed 
rules in the material the planners worked from. These instructions must therefore be, 
in a word, adaptive. Thus, I would call the task the operators must complete relatively 
more adaptive. And, faute de mieux, I would make the assignment to be the same as 
the planners’ initial problem, one standard deviation below the style mean. As for the 
PDD, I would also make the same assignment as for the planners’ task; i.e., the mean 
of the cognitive level for the population following the same logic as for style. Given 
the degree of subjectivity in making these assumptions I judge them as reasonably 
simplifying for this research.  
 
 In my sample (N=88), the mean and standard deviation of KAI scores are 94.43 and 
14.29, respectively. Recall that I substituted KAI Z-scores for the KAI Principal Component 
factor found in the analysis; thus, the KAI Z-score mean = 0 and standard deviation is 1. 
Based on the discussion of the three problem facets above, I will assume the relative 
adaptive-innovative optimum is one standard deviation below my sample mean, or 94.43 – 
14.29 = 80.14, which by definition of Z-scores is conveniently -1.00. Thus, I will use this 
score for evaluating the cognitive style gaps between the OPS and the styles of both the 
problem solvers and the subteams’ means. 
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 As stated above I have pegged the PDD to be the cognitive level mean for this 
problem and this population of problem solvers. Again, since I have standardized the level 
variable and the mean of those scores is zero, I will assert that the PDD for this problem is 
zero for use in this analysis. For the raw score tabulation the mean cognitive level score is 
66.26 for all the subjects. 
 Earlier I operationalized the person-person cognitive gaps using absolute values of 
differences between persons and person-subteam means. As I contemplated person-problem 
cognitive gaps I concluded that a different approach to operationalization was called for. First 
the person-person cognitive gaps highlight the interpersonal dynamics of group problem-
solving activity. Large gaps potentially create communication problems and can lead to 
distrust and poor collaboration. I developed the approach using absolute values based on the 
fact that I wanted to magnify the degree of gaps, believing that there is some unknown 
optimum degree of person-person cognitive gap, both style and level, in the pursuit of 
solutions to problems. And, I noticed that the mathematical expressions were cancelling, and 
therefore, minimizing the degree of gaps in the groups. Thus, I used absolute values for the 
person-person cognitive gaps, both level and style.   
 Concerning the person-problem cognitive gaps I first approached this considering 
cognitive level gap between the problem and the person. Arguably a positive gap is better 
than a negative gap vis-à-vis solving the problem. Put another way, having more cognitive 
level (knowledge is local, embedded, and invested in the particular objects) than the 
presumed PDD is better than having less. Consequently, the operationalization of the person-
problem cognitive gap led me to assert an algebraically additive relationship of cognitive 
level gaps from the PDD. For example, if the PDD is pegged at 5 and there are three persons 
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whose cognitive levels are 10 each, that means there are positive 15 points ((10-5) x 3 = 15) 
of cognitive gap—which I believe to be indicative of abundance of cognitive level with 
respect to solving the problem under consideration. However, if there are three persons 
whose cognitive levels are 1 each for the same problem, this yields a negative cognitive gap 
of -12 points ((1-5) x 3 = -12) of cognitive gap—which I believe to be indicative of shortage 
of cognitive level with respect to solving the problem under consideration. Had I employed 
the same logic as with the person-person cognitive gaps (i.e., using the absolute values of 
gaps) these two groups of people would have registered very nearly the same cognitive level 
gap for the teams; i.e., 15 points and 12 points, respectively. Since the operationalization of 
person-problem gap required the assignment of some presumed optimum cognitive level for 
the problem, it logically follows that the different person-problem gaps should be 
algebraically additive.  
 I used similar logic to assert an algebraically additive relationship between person-
problem cognitive style gaps. Granted, style is bipolar where more is not necessarily better. 
But, with respect to OPS it is logical that if a problem is pegged at optimal cognitive problem 
style of 96, then having too many problem solvers with style scores of 130 might lead to 
problems and having too many people with style scores of 60 might also lead to problems. 
Treating the cognitive style scores as algebraically additive would allow for some degree of 
balance between high adaptors and high innovators balanced around the OPS. For example, 
if a problem OPS was 90 and there were four problem solvers on the team with style scores 
PS1=60, PS2=70, PS3=130, and PS4=100, this would yield the following cognitive style gap 
with respect to the problem: 60 – 90=-30; 70-90=-20; 130-90=+40; and 100-90=+10. In total 
the person-problem cognitive style gap would yield: -30 -20 + 40 + 10 = 0; an aggregate of 
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zero gap of cognitive style between the team of problem solvers and the problem. I have 
assumed that person-person cognitive style gaps cover group dynamics and interpersonal 
style conflict. I have assumed that the same type of conflict does not occur between the 
person and problem. Hence, a person-problem cognitive style gap of zero (based on the 
tabulation shown) is better than a person-problem style gap of either +X or –X.  
 I will use the following analysis with style variable for three-person subteams and 
OPS= -1.00: 
 Style Gap Part D (P=3)  = (PS1 – (-1)) + (PS2 – (-1)) + (PS3 – (-1)) + (STM – (-1)) 
 This reduces to: 
 Style Gap Part D (P=3)  = (PS1 +1) + (PS2 +1) + (PS3 +1) + (STM +1), or 
 Style Gap Part D (P=3)  = (PS1 + PS2 + PS3 + STM) + 4 
For the four-person subteams and OPS: 
 Style Gap Part D (P=4)  = (PS1 – (-1)) + (PS2 – (-1)) + (PS3 – (-1)) + (PS4 – (-1)) + 
(STM – (-1))  
 This reduces to: 
 Style Gap Part D (P=4)  = (PS1 +1) + (PS2 +1) + (PS3 +1) + (PS4 +1) + (STM +1), 
or 
 Gap Part D (P=4)  = (PS1 + PS2 + PS3 + PS4 + STM) + 5 
 
 The level gap for Part D requires an estimation of the degree of difficulty of the 
problem. The puzzle used in this experiment has been considered of moderate difficulty and, 
consequently I will assume it to equate to the level proxy variable mean score; i.e., zero.  
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 Level Gap Part D (P=3)= (PS1 - PDD) + (PS2 - PDD) + (PS3 - PDD) + (STM - 
PDD), or with PDD=0 
 This reduces to: 
 Level Gap Part D (P=3)= PS1 + PS2 + PS3 + STM 
For the four-person subteams and PDD: 
 Level Gap Part D (P=4)=  (PS1 - PDD) + (PS2 - PDD) + (PS3 – PDD) + (PS4 - PDD) 
+ (STM - PDD), and with PDD=0 
 This reduces to: 
 Level Gap Part D (P=4)= PS1 + PS2 + PS3 + PS4 + STM   
 
 Because I plan to examine the cognitive gap analysis also based on raw scores, I must 
calculate these expressions. Recall the assumption that the OPS was one standard deviation 
below the mean. In my case that is 1 s.d.=14.3 KAI points. Thus, 94.43 – 14.29 = 80.14 
points is the presumed KAI optimum for the problem solver. That means that the style gap 
for Part D is as follows:  
 Style Gap Part D: (P=3)= (PS1-80.14) + (PS2-80.14) + (PS3 – 80.14)  + (STM – 
80.14) 
 This reduces to: 
 Style Gap Part D: (P=3)= PS1+ PS2 + PS3 + PS4 + STM -320.56 
For the four-person case 
 Style Gap Part D: (P=4)= (PS1-80.14) + (PS2-80.14) + (PS3 – 80.14) + (PS4 – 80.14) 
+ (STM – 80.14) 
 This reduces to: 
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 Gap Part D: (P=4)  = PS1 + PS2 + PS3 + PS4 + STM – 400.7 
 
 I will use the following analysis with level variable for the raw score tabulations.  
For three-person subteams with PDD = 66.26 (mean of all subjects). 
 Level Gap Part D (P=3)= (PS1 - PDD) + (PS2 - PDD) + (PS3 - PDD) + (STM - 
PDD), or with PDD= 66.26 
 This reduces to: 
 Level Gap Part D (P=3)= PS1 + PS2 + PS3 + STM - 265.04 
For the four-person subteams and OPS: 
 Level Gap Part D (P=4)=  (PS1 - PDD) + (PS2 - PDD) + (PS3 – PDD) + (PS4 - PDD) 
+ (STM - PDD), and with PDD=66.26 
 This reduces to: 
 Level Gap Part D (P=4)= PS1 + PS2 + PS3 + PS4 + STM – 331.3 
 
 The person-person cognitive gaps are measured as absolute values. The person-
problem cognitive gaps will be sign sensitive since they are measured either above or below 
an assumed style and level for the problem.  
 As mentioned earlier, the formulation of cognitive gap measurements and 
aggregations have assumed a simple algebraic difference approach to tabulation, which I 
have called the additive model. For exploratory evaluation of how my findings fit the model, 
I also developed a multiplicative relationship between persons. And, since the relatively 
small numbers which are produced in a factor analysis are frequently fractions less than one, 
I have also done a square-root analysis of the multiplicative output. I did perform the same 
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analysis using the raw scores for making a comparison. This explorative work was based on 
the fact that I had no a priori expectations about the degree to which gap should have 
impacted the results. I developed the following four models and conducted difference of 
means tests to assess the degree to which the assumed model represented the experimental 
outcomes.  
 1) Additive Model (Level Factor Scores & KAI Z-scores) 
 2) Multiplicative Model (Level Factor Scores & KAI Z-scores) 
 3) Square Root Model (Level Factor Scores & KAI Z-scores) 
 4) Raw Scores Model (Level = Educ + TotExp + Tenure + JobStat and KAI) 
 
The difference of means tests factored for successful trials were conducted on the seven 
different measures as shown in Figure IV-6. The Gap A, etc., shown in the table refer to the 
gap parts indicated above in the Jablokow-Booth model.  
I developed the four models as defined above and conducted rigorous comparison 
between the four and found that there were no statistically significant differences of means, 
really, for all four. And, since the multiplicative model and the square-root model were 
derivatives of the factor model, they tended to obfuscate the information further. I therefore 
dropped those two from the analysis and chose, instead, to report the cognitive gaps based on 
the factor scores as described above and on raw scores. In my subsequent discussion I have 
reported those and comment as appropriate. (I revisited this topic in Chapter VII during the 
discussion of my findings and the implications.) 
Figure IV-6 is the template with which I will report cognitive gaps for each trial. Note 
each report will contain a row for the Additive Model (Add Model) and Raw Scores Model 
(Raw Model). Within each of those there are two additional subcategories: cognitive level 
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(level) and cognitive style (style). And within those two categories I report on the planner 
subteam (Pl) and the operator subteam (Op). 
 
Figure IV-6 Cognitive Gap Computation Template 
 Role Subteam Gap Aa 
Subteam 
Gap Bb 
Team 
Gap Cc 
Subteam 
Gap Dd 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+Be 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+Df 
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+Dg 
Op 1.95 1.11 0.16 -2.66 3.06 0.41 Level 
Pl 2.07 1.24 . -2.02 3.32 1.30 
Op 3.92 2.38 1.17 1.08 6.30 7.38 M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 0.56 0.33 . 5.75 0.89 6.63 
17.04 
a Person-person cognitive gap within subteams (gap between individuals) 
b Person-person cognitive gap within subteams (gap between individuals and subteam mean) 
c Person-person cognitive gap between subteams (gap between subteam means) 
d Person-problem cognitive gap within subteams (gap between individuals) 
e Person-person cognitive gap subteam total 
f Person-person AND person-problem cognitive gap for subteams 
g Person-person AND person-problem cognitive gap for total team 
   
 
 
7. Adaptation of the Critical Incident Technique and the Jablokow-Booth Gap Model 
 I developed a video analysis log for each trial which provided a structure for defining 
communicative acts during the deliberations of the planners and the operators. The video 
analysis log contained a column for idea/comment, time start, length, and description. During 
the first video review I recorded brief descriptions of communication which occurred during 
the discussions and gave them a time tag. Where unusual observations occurred I made 
special notes; e.g., where a person did not speak or contribute for considerable time or where 
the operations group barged in prior to the time they were supposed to. Following the initial 
viewing and compilation of video analysis log I made notes on the table about more critical 
incidents by asterisks at the specific time tag. This step enabled me to narrow the field of 
review for subsequent video reviews.  
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 The next step in the process serendipitously became my adaptation of the critical 
incident technique. Prior to the exercise I committed to presenting a feedback educational 
session with all the participants of the experiment. After viewing the video it was clear that 
12 hours of video recording was too voluminous for a reasonable feedback period. In fact, it 
was very clear that major contributions to success or failure during the problem solving 
exercise could be condensed into relatively small time segments. Thus, I embarked on 
creating an action movie which captured the critical incidents of decision making for the 
planners and operators. The planners’ deliberations were typically reduced to roughly three 
minutes of critical incidents while the operators’ deliberations were captured in about two 
minutes of critical incidents. My technique consisted of editing the film to convey critical 
communicative acts. I included some dialogue and non-verbal acts which may be considered 
non-critical for the purpose of conveying emotional and interpersonal relationships where 
they were judged to add richness to the final video. The final edited trial video clips were 
ultimately put together to make a movie report of the exercises. Lastly, the serendipity 
occurred when I realized that the dialogue in the final edited trial video clips was, in fact, 
critical incidents after the fashion of Flanagan (1954).  In a few cases I included some 
additional dialogue in this written report that does not appear in the video simply because of 
the difficulty to convey the emotional tension adequately with abbreviated reports of the 
deliberations of planners and operators. 
 My careful reporting of critical incidents was intended to be replicable by other 
researchers viewing the same material. I am confident that any other trained observers would 
judge the same incidents as critical and, consequently, arrive at the same conclusions that I 
have regarding assigning meaning to communicative acts.  
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 I have included information related to the Jablokow-Booth gap analysis model as 
discussed above. The Jablokow-Booth gap analysis model includes both style gap and level 
gap in its formulation. I have included both in my analysis however the central focus of my 
work has been on cognitive style and the extension into cognitive level is considerably more 
speculative than the discussion concerning cognitive style. In spite of the relatively 
superficial inclusion of cognitive level into this discussion I suggest that it does bring value 
to the conversation and raises new questions and possible avenues for additional research.  
 In the following sections of this chapter I will report on each of the 12 trials using the 
same presentation format. Each will begin with a table of information which reports on the 
subjects in the particular trial. That table will be followed by a companion table that contains 
the various combinations of cognitive gaps which will be used for additional qualitative 
evaluation. I will report the critical incidents, as discussed above, for the planning subteam 
and the operations subteam in turn. I will report on the ability of the team to solve the puzzle 
in the allotted time. In Section 7.1 I will elaborate on different parts of the table of 
information. These elaborations will be applicable to subsequent trial descriptions.  
  
 7.1 Fort Myers: FM-T1 
 This was the first trial and was conducted by Linda Vaughn in Fort Myers, Florida on 
December 1, 2009. All the participants arrived at 7:00 AM to participate and Vaughn 
provided breakfast snacks for them. When Vaughn asked the participants about video 
recording one dropped out—an option that was provided orally and in writing to all 
participants. Unfortunately one of the other volunteers was absent which meant there were 
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only six participants for the team—two subteams of three each. Table IV-4 displays the 
information about participants and aggregated team statistics.  
 Note that FM-T1 is a non-role preferred trial where the relatively more innovative 
subteam plays the planner’s role. Due to last minute changes which Vaughn had to deal with 
the code names were not assigned as the original plan called for. Thus, the code names were 
miss-assigned for the operators. Strictly speaking that has no meaning except as it relates to 
my reporting any specific behavior or comments made by one of the participants. To the 
extent that is significant I will address it.  
 In Table IV-4 I have recorded gender with the initials M or F. These were recoded as 
male = 1 and female = 0 when put into the SSPS format. On the pre-experiment 
questionnaire education was reported as high school, college, tech school, BS, MS, PhD or 
JD. I coded these as 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, or 21, respectively, to reflect the approximate number 
of years each educational level represented. Tenure meant for the host company and Other 
(experience) was for similar work with other companies. Total experience was recorded as 
Tot Exp. Map refers to an individual’s preference when needing driving directions. 
The choices provided on the questionnaire were written (W) or map (M). Some 
people answered the question with “both” and when that occurred I selected written (W) for 
that case. This was used as an indication of an individual’s latent graphical and/or 
geometrical intelligence. Job Status was recorded for each individual. The Supplemental 
Questionnaire which participants filled out during the initial session asked for subjects to list 
their titles. I created a hierarchical scale for each of three divisions within this company 
which reflects the relative position of each participant relative to others. I also estimated an 
interdivisional hierarchical assignment of the job status positions for use in cognitive gap 
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analysis tabulations. I have shown the Job Status Key in Table IV-5. Table IV-4 contains 
both individual and team information. Factor scores for Style (KAI) and Level are shown 
below the raw scores in the chart. Also, subteam means for both Style and Level are shown. 
These were the data used in the tabulation of cognitive gaps as shown in Table IV-4A below. 
 
Table IV-4. Trial: FM-T1 
Role Operators Planners 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 27 49 30 - 41 25 40 - 
Gender M F M - M M M - 
Ed 12 12 13 - 16 13 12 - 
Tenure 3 5 1 - .2 4.5 4.5 - 
Other Exp 0 0 0 - 15 1.5 13 - 
 Tot Exp  3 5 14 - 15.2 6 7.5 - 
Map W W M - M M M - 
95 67 91 - 99 100 103 - Style (KAI)a .04 -1.92 -.31  .32 .39 .60  
Job Status b S2 2 
C1 
2  
S1 
1 
- S4 
4 
S3 
3 
S3 
3 
- 
35 61 50  60.4 38.5 65  Level c -1.22 -.24 -.53  -.09 -1.13 -.29  
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
Mean Style 84.3 -.73 
100.7 
.44 
Mean Level 48.67 -.66 
54.63 
-.5 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom 
numbers are interval scores. 
c Level Status proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job 
Status. Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual 
Factor Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
 
The original plan called for the paired subteams to have mean KAI scores which were 
more than 1.5 standard deviations (S.D.) apart. In this case the total S.D. was 13.2 and, 
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therefore, the desired difference between subteam mean KAI scores was 19.8. The difference 
between subteam mean KAI scores was only 16.3.  
 
Table IV-4A.  Cognitive Gaps: Trial FM-T1 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap Aa 
Subteam 
Gap Bb 
Team 
Gap Cc 
Subteam 
Gap Dd 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+Be 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+Df 
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+Dg 
Op 1.95 1.11 0.16 -2.66 3.06 0.41 Level Pl 2.07 1.24 . -2.02 3.32 1.30 
Op 3.92 2.38 1.17 1.08 6.30 7.38 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 0.56 0.33 . 5.75 0.89 6.63 
17.04 
Op 52.00 27.33 5.97 -70.37 79.33 8.96 Level 
Pl 53.00 32.27  -46.51 85.27 38.76 
Op 56.00 34.00 16.67 15.44 90.00 105.44 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 8.00 4.67  82.11 12.67 94.77 
270.57 
a Person-person cognitive gap within subteams (gap between individuals) 
b Person-person cognitive gap within subteams (gap between individuals and subteam mean) 
c Person-person cognitive gap between subteams (gap between subteam means) 
d Person-problem cognitive gap within subteams (gap between individuals) 
e Person-person cognitive gap subteam total 
f Person-person AND person-problem cognitive gap for subteams 
g Person-person AND person-problem cognitive gap for total team 
   
 
The relative job status determination as shown in Table IV-5 required some degree of 
subjectivity. It does, however, reflect perceived differences across divisional lines.  
In reporting the following discourse I will, from time to time, indicate the factor score of the 
speaker on both the Level and Style as follows; e.g., Nat (-1.13, .39). The first factor is the 
Level score and the second is the Style score. 
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 Table IV-5.  Job Status Key a 
Surveying Domain Engineering Domain Corporate Domain Job Status 
S1-Rodman/clerical 
S2-I-man 
S3-Party chief 
S4-Project manager 
S5-Survey manager 
S6-Survey executive 
E1-Clerical/CAD 
E2-Engineer intern 
E3-Professional engineer 
E4-Project manager 
E5-Group manager 
E6-Engineering executive 
 
C1-Clerical 
C2-Professional 
 
 
C3-Manager 
 
 
 
C4-Corporate executive 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
a Surveying and Engineering Domain items S1, E1 through 6 have comparable Job Status numbers.  
Corporate Domain items rank higher as indicated 
  
 Trial FM-T1 was conducted in a conference room with two of the participants on one 
 
side of a table and one on the other. The table was relatively narrow and it appeared to be 
relatively cluttered during the assignment. Nat held a pen and appeared to be writing 
instructions during the entire planning period. Nat asked, “So we have enough pieces 
between all of us to assemble the key sheet, is that correct?” And before the facilitator could 
answer he continued, “So, can we combine all our pieces together right now?” The facilitator 
answered, “Everything you need is on the instructions.” Nat said, “All right” and continued 
reading the instructions. Nat also said, “Half the battle is just finding out what pieces we’ve 
got.” One of the unplanned situations that became evident in this trial was the problem with 
the instructions being written for four people. As Nat continued reading he could be heard 
reading, “Each of you has an envelope containing four cardboard pieces…” When the 
exercise was run with only three planners there was no modification of the instructions and 
no evidence of facilitator pointing out the nuance that occurs when only three planners are 
working. It is interesting that Nat (-1.13, .39) was more than one standard deviation below 
the problem degree of difficulty discussed above (PDD), which was assumed to be zero or 
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the mean of the factor score for Level. Nat dominated the conversation and appeared to 
control the decision process with his writing of instructions. 
 All three planners appeared to read through the instructions taking turns to mention 
something aloud. They clearly fixated on different aspects of the instructions for example; 
Nat admonished the other participants with, “Don’t touch my pieces” four times during the 
exercise period. It appeared that Pat never quite comprehended that part of the instruction 
prohibition.  
 I cannot be certain that there was substantive confusion over the number of pieces the 
three-person planning subteam had to deal with. However, Nat found another puzzle piece in 
his envelope after about five minutes of work and he asked Mel if he had more pieces. Mel 
looked and surprisingly said yes, “I’ll be damn.” He had two more puzzle pieces. This 
occurred well into the planning period. During this time Nat was writing the name of which 
planner had which puzzle pieces on the Hollow Square Key Sheet. This process consumed 
much of the planning period.  
 Mel (-.09, .32) [whose Level score was closest to the PDD] offered a solution to their 
task about 10 minutes into the planning period, “We could put the three together side by side 
together like they should look.” But, Pat commented, “We can’t assemble the puzzle” and 
that comment seemed to stop Mel from pursuing that solution concept. Pat and Nat carried on 
a dialogue about their task and how might they tell the operations subteam to assemble the 
puzzle. They displayed uncertainty as to what they could give the operations subteam. At one 
point Pat asked, “We can’t write on anything…we cannot give them anything with paper 
written on it?” The facilitator replies, “Everything you can and can’t do is on that sheet of 
paper.” All the planners laughed and Nat said, “Read the paper.” However, clearly the 
  147
consensus of the planners by this time was that they could not provide any written 
instructions or graphical sketches to the operations subteam. Pat concluded that their task was 
to, “Plan to tell them how to put it together.”  
 Much of the remainder of the planners’ time was spent with Nat attempting to write 
instructions for the operations subteam. It appeared that the planners convinced themselves 
that they could not show even the “pattern sheet” which is a drawing of a square with a 
square opening in its center. Nat’s written instructions (which are only going to be given 
orally) included a sentence that says, “All the pieces can be arranged to create a square with a 
small square one-sixth its size in the center.” Mel offered, “You can draw it too to show,” but 
Pat said, “No, we need to verbally tell them…” This seemed to settle that line of reasoning. 
Shortly after that Pat received a cell phone call that he took and said, “Can I call you back?”  
 As the planners’ time limit grew close they did not appear to be aware of their 
deadline. For example, Pat was trying to help describe how the various pieces could go 
together and touched Nat’s puzzle piece. Nat replied, “What did you not understand abut 
don’t touch my pieces!” Pat replied, “Why?” as if he had not read the instructions at all. Nat 
replied, “I don’t care, I’m just saying its right here in the instructions.”  
 The relatively inconsequential discourse continued with Nat writing what he thought 
were instructions which, apparently, he was going to orally give to the operating subteam. As 
this dialogue continued Pat reinforced the belief that this planning subteam had established, 
“We can reiterate to them…they’re not going to see what you are writing.” The facilitator 
called out, “It’s been 20 minutes” and the planners groaned, “Oh man…” Finally, the 
facilitator said, “You’ve got three minutes, you need to get them in here and give them some 
instructions.” Pat looked at the facilitator and said, “Now we do?” and the facilitator said, 
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“Yes.” Simultaneous with this discourse Nat said, “Oh my goodness” in apparent surprise. 
Pat arose and left the room to retrieve the operations subteam. Note that the facilitator was 
not supposed to intervene with the planners’ process to the degree she did in this instance. 
Strictly speaking the facilitator should have let the planners use their entire 25 minutes as 
they saw fit and call time at the 25 minute mark. Following that time the planners would not 
be permitted to provide any further instructions to the operating subteam.  
 There was no video record of the explanation period where the planners read their 
copious instructions to the operators. The facilitator wrote that the instructions were 
confusing and unclear to the operating subteam. The video record of the operating subteam 
showed the participants beginning the exercise by putting all the pieces in the center of the 
table and beginning a random movement of pieces in a vain attempt to assemble a puzzle that 
they were uncertain as to how it looked. The facilitator called time shortly after 20 minutes 
and asked, “Would you like for me to show you how it looks?” The operating team was 
frustrated and answered, “Yes.” Trial FM-T1 ended in the team not solving the puzzle.  
 Recall the cognitive gap analysis depicted in Table IV-4A above. I have conducted 
difference of means tests for each of the seven cases shown in this table. In all cases, the tests 
failed to rise to statistical significance. The quantitative results of those tests are shown in 
Table H-7 through Table H-20 found in Appendix H. Tables H-7 through H-13 are for the 
additive model using factor scores and Tables H-14 through H-20 are for the additive model 
using raw scores.  
 In the Ft Myers T-1 trial most of the video recorded was on the planners’ deliberation. 
The person-person cognitive gaps (A+B), again the numbers are ordered by level followed by 
style, for trial FT-T1 are (3.32, 0.89). Cognitive style and cognitive level combine in some 
  149
unknown way to impact decision-making outcomes. Thus, it is reasonable to combine 
subteam person-person gaps with person-problem cognitive gaps to reveal the total cognitive 
gap within a subteam (A+B+D). The subteam total cognitive gap for FM-T1 was (1.3, 6.63). 
In a separate analysis I calculated the mean scores of successful planning subteams for both 
Level and Gap. I found those mean scores for Level and Style to be (9.41, 11.54) 
considerably different from the FM-T1 results.  
 The operator subteam for FM-T1 was a non-factor in the solution of the puzzle given 
the poor quality of their instructions. I should note that the person-person cognitive gap for 
the operator subteam was (3.06, 6.3). The person-person and person-problem cognitive gap 
for the operator subteam was (0.41, 7.38).  
 The total cognitive gap for trial FM-T1 was 17.04 (A+B+C+D). Note this combines 
both Level and Style into a single factor to be indicative of some interactive effect. The mean 
total cognitive gap score for successful trials was 41.76, considerably greater than the FM-T1 
score.  
 
 7.2 Clearwater CW-T1 
 I administered trial CW-T1 on Dec 17, 2009 during the regular lunch period. Note 
that CW-T1 was a role-preferred trial; i.e., the relatively more adaptive subteam played the 
planning role. Owing to a subject’s absence on the day of the trial I switched some team 
members around to make sure there were four planners since by this time I had become 
aware of the more critical nature of the planning team in comparison to the operating team. 
Table IV-6 contains the vital information about the individual participants and their team 
characteristics. Note that the difference in mean KAI scores between subteams was only 11.3 
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points, only slightly more than the standard deviation of KAI scores for all seven members of 
trial CW-T1. This is below the desired difference of 1.5 S.D. as earlier mentioned.  
 The video camera was positioned in one end of a room on a tripod and was turned on 
prior to the time the participants entered the room. No one appeared to notice or care about 
the video and it was not mentioned during the entire exercise. Tables were arranged to 
provide ample working space. And, participants were positioned in one of four spots around 
the table in order to maximize the camera shot in an unobtrusive way.  
 After I distributed the four envelopes to the planners they spent several minutes 
reading over the Planning Team Briefing Sheet before anyone spoke. They first got puzzle 
pieces on the table. Finally, Chris asked to no one in general, “Is there any reason we can’t 
write out the instructions and give it to the team?” To which Bo responded, “As I see it that is 
the only way we could do it.” The planners continue for some time arranging their pieces and 
talking about how to write instructions. Of the four planners I should note that Chris (1.06, 
0.11) was considerably more senior in both age and job status than his subteam. 
 Dale (-0.69, 0.11) appeared to have an eureka10 moment when she asked, “Oh, can we 
write down who has what…” And Chris interrupted with, “Yes.” Dale went on to say, 
“Okay, we do a drawing and put our names in the puzzle shapes.” By the comment do a 
drawing Dale was referring to sketching the puzzle piece shapes on the Pattern Sheet. The 
planners discussed this and concluded that there was nothing that prevents them from 
sketching the puzzle shapes on the pattern sheet. The planners continued getting puzzle 
pieces identified and laid on the table in some orientation like they would appear in the 
completed puzzle. Dale seemed to be missing a piece and looked in her envelope to discover 
                                                 
10 I use this term to convey when a participant sees a solution or a part of a solution to their task. In the section 
above on Problem Solving, Creativity, Level, and Style the term “ah ha” moment was used to describe the same 
concept. 
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another piece—roughly 13 minutes into the allotted time period. Chris suggested that they 
name the puzzle pieces Abe 1, Bo 1, Chris 1, Dale 1, etc. and said, “And then we can write a 
descriptive legend…”  
 
Table IV-6. Trial: CW-T1 
Role Planners Operators 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 27 45 48 38 47 47 48 - 
Gender M M M F M M M - 
Ed 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 - 
Tenure 0.4 3.5 23 3.5 4 9 5 - 
Other Exp 0 13 3 0 24 22 23 - 
 Tot Exp  .4 16.5 26 2.5 28 31 28 - 
Map W W M M M M M - 
73 87 96 96 96 101 101 - Style (KAI)a -1.50 -.52 .11 .11 .11 .46 .46 - 
E2 E4 E6 C2 E5 E5 E4 - Job Status b 2 4 6 3 5 5 4 - 
29.8 69 103 48 84 92 85 - Level c -1.46 .15 1.06 -.69 .79 1.03 .87 - 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
88.0 99.3 Mean Style -.45 .34 
62.5 87.0 Mean Level -.24 .90 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom 
numbers are interval scores. 
c Level Status proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job 
Status. Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual 
Factor Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
 
 
 Dale ripped the Pattern Sheet from the stapled sheets and said she was going to trace 
the key sheet on the pattern sheet to which Chris said, “yes.” As Dale began tracing the 
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puzzle shapes onto the Pattern Sheet Chris said, “They don’t have to be that accurate…” to 
which Dale replied, “Well, you know, I like to do things perfect!” 
 Abe (-1.46, -1.5), who had been the least communicative in terms of times spoken, 
asked, “So I guess while we’re doing that shouldn’t one of us go and tell them what…I guess 
part of this time is we have to go instruct them on what to do…” Chris asked, “We’ve got to 
go instruct them and they come back in here?” Chris looked toward the facilitator for any 
visual cue that he has made a correct interpretation of the instructions. The facilitator was 
busily writing and did not make any eye contact which might convey a message. Abe said, 
“Yea, I think that’s it…” The planners concluded that they would leave written instructions 
and they were going to go brief the operating team. Chris and Abe rose to leave the room to 
go instruct the operating team and as they were leaving Dale said, “Just remember to tell 
them what our names are…” to which Chris replied, “I’m going to give them a map telling 
them where we were sitting…” A few minutes passed while Dale continued to refine her 
sketch of the puzzle pieces on the Pattern Sheet and to write notes about which group to start 
with, etc. Bo (0.15, -0.52) began gathering materials up and said, “We probably need to take 
this stuff with us so we don’t break the rules.”  
 The three-person operating subteam came in and quickly reviewed the Pattern Sheet 
key that was left. They reviewed the instructions and organized themselves with Pat and Nat 
telling which pieces went where and Mel took the pieces and assembled them. Mel (0.79, 
0.11) expressed concern that they make sure they accurately assemble the puzzle asked, “Am 
I allowed to write on these,” [the puzzle pieces] and answered his own question with, 
“There’s no limitations, right?” The operations subteam very quickly assembled the puzzle. 
Trial CW-T1 was successful.  
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 Table IV-6A contains all the person-person cognitive gaps and person-problem 
cognitive gap tabulations.  The planner subteam provided excellent instructions for the 
operating team. In this case the planner subteam gaps (A+B) were (11.79, 7.7). Both scores 
were above the mean scores of successful trials (9.19, 6.51) by a relatively small amount.  
 
Table IV-6A.  Cognitive Gaps: Trial CW-T1 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 0.47 0.26 . 3.59 0.73 4.32 Level Pl 8.41 3.37 1.13 -1.18 11.79 10.61 
Op 0.70 0.47 . 5.37 1.17 6.54 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 5.46 2.24 0.79 2.75 7.70 10.45 
33.84 
Op 16.00 10.00  82.96 26.00 108.96 Level 
Pl 240.60 94.20 24.55 -19.05 334.80 315.75 
Op 10.00 6.67  76.77 16.67 93.44 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 78.00 32.00 11.33 39.30 110.00 149.30 
703.33 
 
 
The subteam total gap (A+B+D) was (10.61, 10.45) as compared to the successful planner 
subteam means of (9.41, 11.53), very nearly the same scores for both level and style. And, 
the total team cognitive gap was (33.84) versus the mean successful scores of (41.77). This 
indicates less cognitive gap, in total, than the mean successful outcomes.  
 Interestingly, the operator subteam gaps for this trial were somewhat less pronounced 
than for the planner subteam; i.e., person-person (A+B) gap (0.73, 1.17) and person-person 
with person-problem (A+B+D) gap (4.32, 6.54). The operator subteam exhibited no conflict 
during their solution as they had assigned a team leader prior to coming into the room for 
solving the puzzle.  
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 7.3 Clearwater CW-T2 
 I conducted trial CW-T2 on Dec 18, 2009 beginning at 11:30 AM due to a schedule 
conflict with one of the participants. Unfortunately, by starting prior to noon one of the 
subjects was unable to participate as he was driving from another office. Fortunately that 
participant was scheduled to be on the operations subteam and, therefore it was less 
consequential. Note that CW-T2 was a non-role preferred trial with relatively more 
innovative subteam playing the planners’ role. This trial was one of two where the entire 
planning subteam was female. See Table IV-7 for the vital information of participants and 
aggregated scores. Since the mean KAI scores for samples of female population in the US 
are 91 points it is worth noting that this all female planning subteam had a mean KAI score 
of 105.3, considerably higher than the population mean. 
 It was not known that one of the operating subteam would be unable to participate 
when the exercise began, consequently the pre-arranged code names resulted in Abe being 
unused.  
 This trial, like CW-T1, was administered in a conference room with ample table 
space and good orientation for the camera shot. Like with CW-T1, I turned the video 
recorder on prior to the time the participants entered the room. This seemed to work well in 
de-emphasizing the camera’s presence.  
 The planners were relatively talkative during their deliberation period, reading some 
of the instructions aloud and commenting on the meaning of various things. They discussed 
where their pieces went in the puzzle. Planner Nat (0.46, 0.88) appeared to take over the 
reading of the instructions and was clearly more dominant in the formative stages of the 
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planners’ deliberation. The planners spent nearly 10 minutes discussing where their pieces 
went in the puzzle and approaching the problem by quadrants.  
 After about 12 minutes Ray (0.38, 1.86) began to examine the rules more closely. She 
said, “We can show them the pattern sheet.” Nat continued to discuss how they would 
instruct the operating subteam to assemble the puzzle pieces to look like the pattern sheet. Pat 
 
 Table IV-7. Trial: CW-T2 
Role Operators Planners 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age - 35 42 59 29 44 40 54 
Gender - M M M F F F F 
Ed - 16 14 18 16 13 17 14 
Tenure - 2 2 14 4.5 3 6 0.2 
Other Exp - 0 20 23 1.6 20 0 11 
 Tot Exp  - 2 22 37 6 23 6 11 
Map - M M M W M M W 
- 92 95 99 100 107 109 121 Style (KAI)a - -.17 .04 .32 .39 .88 1.02 1.86 
- C2 E1 E3 E2 C2 E3 E1 Job Status b - 3 1 3 2 3 3 1 
- 42 67 113 41.6 73 55 66.4 Level c - -.94 .26 1.98 -.95 .46 -.41 .38 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
95.3 109.2 Mean Style .06 1.04 
74.0 59.0 Mean Level .40 -.13 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom 
numbers are interval scores. 
c Level Status proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job 
Status. Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual 
Factor Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
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 (-0.41, 1.02) pulled the Pattern Sheet from the stapled materials and laid it in front of her and 
appeared to have an eureka moment. She said, “If that’s the case can you put them [the 
puzzle pieces] on there [the pattern sheet]?” As Pat paused to move some papers from in 
front of her Ray almost simultaneously said, “Can you put them on there?” Pat began laying 
her puzzle pieces on the Pattern Sheet in the correct orientation. Ray looked toward the 
facilitator clearly looking for a visual clue about breaking the rules and, receiving none  
asked, “Would that be wrong?” and Nat replied, “No it’s not if we each put them on there.” 
The others pulled their Pattern Sheets loose and did likewise. Ray said, “It’s nothing exciting 
about it but it does give a good depiction and if you use the center square to come off of…” 
to which Nat interjected, “Yea, that’s exactly what I’m doing too.” After all the planners 
placed their pieces on their individual Pattern Sheets Nat said, “There we go, look at that; its 
funny you can see how the puzzle goes together now.” Nat chuckled and said, “Oh we’re 
good,” to which the relatively quiet Mel (-0.95, 0.39) responded, “Well, maybe.” The 
planners had the solution at roughly 14 minutes into the 25 minute planning period. In fact 
one mentioned, “I think we’re done.”  
 The planners used a considerable amount of time discussing who might instruct the 
operating subteam to assemble the puzzle. It was evident that they had no notion that they 
should go retrieve the operations team to provide them instructions. The planners sat for 
several minutes after they selected Mel to be the instructor. Suddenly, the operating subteam 
opened the door and asked, “Is it time?” about three minutes before the 25 minute planning 
period elapsed. All the planners turned to the facilitator for a visual cue. The facilitator 
shrugged as if to say “whatever.” Nat then turned to the operators still at the door and replied, 
“We’re ready.”  
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 The operators entered and Nat said, “Hello Bo, Chris, and Dale, how are you?” Mel 
asked “Do we need to wait for the fourth—or the eighth?” And, Bo replied, “It looks like 
he’s not going to be here soon.” Following that, Mel began the oral instructions, “Okay, we 
have a puzzle for ya’ll to put together. Its going to make a hollow square pattern like you see 
here.” “We have mapped out where our pieces pretty much go on our own pieces of paper 
and they’re all facing the same orientation so you should be able to see where  I have my 
square here…” I interrupted at this point with “Okay, time—its 25 minutes, now the planning 
team can provide no more instructions…” At this time the planning subteam left the room to 
have their lunch. As they were leaving Nat said, “I thought we had 10 minutes…”  
 The operations subteam took their place at the table and Dale (1.98, 0.32) said, “They 
are placed deliberately where they are so we should be aware of that.” Bo (-0.94, -0.17) 
suggested, “You take one [set of pieces] and place it in, and take the next and place it in, and 
take the next and place it in, and then the last piece and place it in.” The operators viewed the 
puzzle pieces for a while before they ever touched any piece. Finally they began assembling 
the puzzle and quickly completed the task. Trial CW-T2 was successful.  
 Table IV-7A shows the cognitive gaps for this trial. For the planner subteam person-
person gaps (A+B) are (7.22, 6.19) as compared to the other successful planners subteam 
scores of (9.19, 6.5). The Style is right on the mean but the Level component is somewhat 
lower in this instance. The total planner subteam gap (A+B+D) is (6.57, 16.38) as compared 
to the successful planner mean scores of (9.41, 11.54). And the total team cognitive gap 
(A+B+C+D) is 40.43 as compared to the total team mean of 41.77.  
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Table IV-7A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial CW-T2 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 5.65 2.97 0.53 1.61 8.61 10.23 Level Pl 5.02 2.20 . -0.65 7.22 6.57 
Op 0.98 0.51 0.97 4.25 1.49 5.75 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 4.55 1.64 . 10.19 6.19 16.38 
40.43 
Op 142.00 78.00 15.00 30.96 220.00 250.96 Level 
Pl 105.60 42.80  -36.30 148.40 112.10 
Op 14.00 7.33 13.92 60.77 21.33 82.11 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 65.00 23.50  145.55 88.50 234.05 
708.13 
 
 
 
 7.4 Wilmington WIL-T1 
 Wilmington trial WIL-T1 was conducted at noon on Dec 17, 2009 by research 
assistant Phyllis Elikai. Note that WIL-T1 was a role-preferred trial with relatively more 
adaptive subteam playing the planners’ role and the more innovative subteam playing the 
operators’ role. See Table IV-8 for vital information about team members. This trial was 
conducted in a conference room with ample table space. The video camera was mounted on a 
tripod and was started prior to the entry of the participants so as to minimize disruption 
potentially caused by the camera.  
 This planning session began with Abe and Dale reading and commenting on the 
instructions. At an early point Dale (2.12, -0.52) read aloud the statement that says after 25 
minutes the planners can give no further instructions and interprets that as, “We can’t tell 
them anything.” For over six minutes Bo quietly read the instructions during which time Abe 
(-0.02, -1.01) and Dale discussed back and forth the various rules and prohibitions. Finally, 
after 6:50 minutes had elapsed Bo (1.99, -0.66) asked, “Did everybody keep the back of their 
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nametags?” He obviously had had an eureka moment. Bo then asked Chris to lightly outline a 
square on the backing sheet from the nametags they put on when they entered the room. That 
was because Chris had a puzzle piece which was a square the size Bo needed for his solution 
suggestion. Bo then folded the small paper and created a 2 inch square—the size of the center 
opening in the hollow square. As the others sat and watched Bo create the small square he 
said, “So do it for everybody, everybody needs one of these squares.” Abe replied in an 
inquisitive voice, “Everybody needs one of those squares…really?” Bo continued with his 
work of folding paper and creating the small squares. While Abe and Dale continued to make 
comments which have little contribution Bo said, “So then, you take the square [the template 
piece just created] and set it in the middle in front of you and then assemble your pieces 
around that square where they fit in the  pattern. “My pieces go just like this and my other 
piece touches it just like this.” 
Chris (0.05, -0.59) began to use her puzzle piece as the center template and Bo said, 
“You got to get your square, you can’t use that square.” Chris then began to fold paper from 
the back of her nametag as Bo instructed. Dale struggled to get her pieces arranged and said, 
“Mine don’t fit at all,” to which Bo replied, “Yea they do.” Bo then looked at Dale’s pieces  
and told her where they go spread around the center template square. Bo continued to show 
the other planners where their puzzle pieces went with respect to the center square. Bo finally 
said, “We need to give them instructions,” to which Abe replied, “I thought we couldn’t talk 
at all.” Bo said, “It says we are to give them instructions, and number two above says instruct 
the operating team how to implement your plan.” Abe said, “Then we can’t talk.” She then 
said, “Are we sure we have all the pieces in the right place?” Bo then pauses, raises his right 
index finger and said, “A key is, [pointing to the top of his puzzle pieces] this is the top.” 
  160
Table IV-8. Trial: WIL-T1 
Role Planners Operators 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 57 58 43 63 28 33 54 48 
Gender F M F F F M F M 
Ed 14 18 12 14 16 12 16 16 
Tenure 2 31 2 18 4 10 13 23 
Other Exp 0 4 15 20 0 1 7 0 
 Tot Exp  2 35 17 38 4 11 20 23 
Map W M W W M M M M 
80 85 86 87 98 99 104 106 Style (KAI)a -1.01 -.66 -.59 -.52 .25 .32 .67 .81 
C1 C4 C1 C1 E2 S2 E4 C3 Job Status b 2 10 2 2 2 2 4 6 
63 134 64 121 38 57 91 100 Level c -.02 1.99 .05 2.12 -1.01 -.47 .92 .97 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
84.5 101.8 Mean Style -.70 .51 
95.5 71.5 Mean Level 1.04 .08 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom are 
interval scores. 
c Level Status proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job 
Status. Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual 
Factor Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
 
Finally Bo suggested that all four puzzle groups be oriented the same way so it would be 
easier for the operating team to assemble the puzzle. Bo took charge in directing how that 
should be done for the other participants. As that was completed the operating subteam 
entered the room without having been sent for.  
 Bo stood and explained to the operating subteam how all the puzzle pieces should be 
assembled. He explained that the square in the center is a representation of the center hollow 
square hole. The operating subteam asked very few questions and quickly began moving the 
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puzzle pieces into one spot. After a few minutes the operating subteam had the puzzle 
assembled. It was positioned near one side of the table on which the work has been done. 
Operating subteam member Nat (-0.47, 0.32) said, “But he said it had to be put in the 
middle.” [In this trial the planning subteam stayed in the room and could be partly seen in the 
camera shot. Planner Bo could be seen shaking his head ‘no’ as he heard Nat’s comment.] 
Operating member Pat said, “He did?” “Okay.” Then the operating subteam moved the 
assembled puzzle to the center of the table. Operator Ray (0.97, 0.81) picked up the stack of 
square templates that were in the center of the puzzle. Nat said, “I don’t think those were 
supposed to be in there because the end result has a hole in the middle.” Pat said, “But he 
said those symbolize the hole.” Operator Ray hesitated with the small template pieces 
obviously unsure of what to do and said, “I’m sure it has something to do with our apparent 
lack of attention to minor detail like whether the pieces of paper should be stacked on top of 
each other which I thought they were.” As Ray wavered between putting the template pieces 
back in or leaving them out Mel said, “He said they represent the hole.” As Ray reached his 
hand out one more time to put the template pieces back in the center Nat said, “I’d leave it 
empty.” Ray stood up and said, “Darn, one last detail we can’t figure out…” to which 
everyone laughs. They Ray said, “Should we have asked some questions before we jumped 
right in to the activity?” The operators attempted to ask some additional question about 
leaving the square template piece in but they cannot ask additional questions since they had 
begun the assembly. While the debate about the template took several minutes in the end the 
puzzle was correctly assembled. Trial WIL-T1 was successful.  
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Table IV-8A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial WIL-T1 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 7.60 3.46 . 0.40 11.05 11.45 Level Pl 8.38 4.09 0.96 5.19 12.47 17.66 
Op 2.03 0.91 . 7.56 2.94 10.50 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 1.54 0.63 1.21 1.52 2.17 3.69 
45.47 
Op 220.00 96.00  26.20 316.00 342.20 Level 
Pl 270.00 128.00 24.00 146.20 398.00 544.20 
Op 29.00 13.00  108.05 42.00 150.05 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 22.00 9.00 17.25 21.80 31.00 52.80 
1130.50 
 
 
Table IV-8A contains all the cognitive gap tabulations for WIL-T1. The planner subteam 
people-people cognitive gap (A+B) was (12.47, 2.17) as compared to the successful planner 
subteam scores of (9.18, 6.51). The total planner subteam cognitive gap (A+B+D) was 
(17.66, 3.69) as compared to the successful planner subteam of (9.41, 11.54). The team total 
cognitive gap (A+B+C+D) was 45.47 as compared to the total sample of 41.77.  
 
 7.5 Wilmington WIL-T2 
 Trial WIL-T2 was conducted on Dec 17, 2009 at 4:00 PM due to some schedule 
problems. Research assistant Phyllis Elikai conducted this trial. This was a role-preferred 
trial with the more adaptive subteam playing the planners role and the more innovative 
subteam playing the operators role. Vital information about this trial is shown in Table IV-9. 
A last minute schedule conflict eliminated one of the planners so the planning team had only 
three members. As it turned out all three planners were female. Like WIL-T1 this trial was 
held in a conference room with ample space.  
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 The planners discussed assembling their pieces in a group such that they could be 
easily put together by the operating subteam. They worked to understand where all their 
pieces go in the puzzle. At roughly the six minute lapsed time mark, one of the operators 
(Ray (-0.85, 1.23)) appeared and knocked on the conference room door. The facilitator 
quickly went to the door and told her to go away [the facilitator should not have intervened in 
this situation]. The planners continued working and seemed oblivious as to the operators’ 
attempt to enter the room. Abe (1.00, -1.64) suggested putting the pieces closer together and 
moving around the table so the pieces would “still be in front of us.” There was some 
discussion about an assumption that they have to stay in their assigned seats. The three 
planners gathered close on one side of the table and placed their pieces relatively close 
together but still seemed baffled as to how to instruct the operators about what they need to 
do.  
Bo (0.57, -0.87) suggested, “What if we write on here [meaning the pattern sheet] and 
put Abe, Bo, etc?” The others did not voice support for that idea. Dale (1.04, -0.10) seemed 
fixated on sliding the groups of pieces together in some fashion. Bo sketched on the pattern 
sheet—presumably the shape of the puzzle pieces. At approximately the 21 minute lapsed 
time mark the entire operations subteam entered the room (uninvited) and walked beside the 
table. (This time the facilitator said nothing, as appropriate).  The planners did not 
acknowledge the operators and the operators walked back out of the room after less than a 
minute. Finally, at approximately the 25 minute mark the operators again barged in the door 
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Table IV-9. Trial: WIL-T2 
Role Planners Operators 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 50 51 - 52 23 39 27 29 
Gender F F - F M F F F 
Ed 16 16 - 12 12 12 12 18 
Tenure 15 16 - 18 2 4 4 5 
Other Exp 13 0 - 6 3 15 5 2 
 Tot Exp  28 16 - 24 5 19 9 7 
Map W M - W M W W M 
71 82 - 93 98 105 108 112 Style (KAI)a -1.64 -.87  -.10 .25 .74 .95 1.23 
C2 C2 - E1 S1 S1 C1 E3 Job Status b 3 3 - 1 1 1 2 3 
99 86 - 95 31 63 42 44 Level c 1.00 .57 - 1.04 -1.31 .07 -.89 -.85 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
82 105.8 Mean Style -.87 .79 
92.3 45.0 Mean Level .87 -.75 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom are 
interval scores. 
c Level Status proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job 
Status. Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual 
Factor Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
 
and Dale, who is in the middle of telling the other planners how they might tell the operators 
how to assemble the puzzle, turned to the operators, held her left index finger up and said, 
“Give us a second…” But as she is saying this the facilitator said, “Your time is up.” Dale 
and Abe, who were standing near one another at this time, both replied with “Okay.” But, 
Abe, looked down at the instructions sheet said, “We can’t give them any more instructions.” 
And, the facilitator said, “Okay, your time is up.” The facilitator said you guys need to get 
your stuff up. Abe asked, “Are we out of here?” The facilitator gave the planners the 
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opportunity to stay and observe the operators. Bo asked two times during the shuffle of 
moving away from the table, “Did you say I couldn’t leave anything?” The facilitator 
answered, “Your time is up.” Bo interpreted that reply to mean no and, consequently, did not 
leave the sketch or any written instructions.  
 After several moments of getting settled into their seats operator Ray asked, “So what 
are our instructions?” All the operators looked inquisitively toward the facilitator during 
these first moments. After another awkward silence Nat (0.07, 0.74) said, “Well it appears 
that we have to assemble this puzzle into one puzzle.” As Nat finished that comment Ray 
picked up a puzzle piece from one of the piles and began attempting to solve the puzzle. Nat 
continued to say, “Let’s start to try to piece the puzzle together…right?” But the other 
operators seemed to ignore her. Ray turned to the operators and asked, “Did anyone leave 
any instructions?” and the planners who were still in the room giggled but did not speak. Mel 
(-1.31, 0.25) said, “We have the responsibility of carrying out a task but we don’t know what 
the task is…according to the instructions given by your planning team.” He goes on to say, 
“Who is the planning team.” The planning team, visible partially in the background of the 
video shot, held their hands up and said, “That would be us.” Mel then said, “Oh hey 
planning team, do you have instructions?” After a few moments pass and the planning team 
remained silent Nat said, “What are our instructions?” The facilitator said, “They can’t give 
you any more instructions, their time is up.”  
 Ray said, “What does it say, a hollow square, maybe it’s a hollow square…let’s put 
together a hollow square,” and commenced to move puzzle pieces closer together. As Ray 
was working with puzzle pieces Mel said, “So we were supposed to come in here and ask for 
instructions before the time was up?” to which Pat said, in a quizzical voice, “But we did 
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that…I did that.” The remainder of the operators’ time was spent in a futile effort to assemble 
the hollow square. Wilmington trial WIL-T2 was unsuccessful.   
 Table IV-9A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial WIL-T2 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 4.17 1.63 . -3.73 5.80 2.07 Level Pl 0.93 0.60 1.62 3.49 1.53 5.02 
Op 3.15 1.19 . 8.96 4.34 13.30 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 3.08 1.54 1.66 0.52 4.62 5.14 
28.81 
Op 98.00 36.00  -106.30 134.00 27.70 Level 
Pl 20.00 12.67 47.33 104.29 32.67 136.96 
Op 45.00 17.00  128.05 62.00 190.05 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 44.00 22.00 23.75 7.44 66.00 73.44 
499.23 
 
 
 Table IV-9A contains the cognitive gap tabulations for WIL-T2. The planner subteam 
person-person cognitive gaps (A+B) are (1.53, 4.62) compared to the successful planner 
subteams scores (9.19, 6.51). The planner total subteam person-person and person-problem 
cognitive gaps (A+B+C) are (5.02, 5.14) compared with the successful subteams (9.41, 
11.54). And, the total team cognitive gap (A+B+C+D) is 28.81 as compared to successful 
teams of 41.77.  
 
7.6 Charlotte CHL-T1 
 Trial CHL-T1 was conducted on Dec 15, 2009 at noon and administered by research 
assistant Phyllis Elikai. This was a role-preferred trial with relatively more adaptive subteam 
playing the planners’ role and the relatively more innovative subteam playing the operators’ 
role. Some last minute changes occurred due to absences caused by illness and client 
meetings. These resulted in a three person planning subteam and a three person operations 
  167
subteam. The trial took place in a conference room with the video camera mounted on a 
tripod. The camera was turned on prior to the start of the exercise and seemed to have no 
effect on the participants. See Table IV-10 for vital information about the team members and 
aggregated scores.  Note that the difference between mean KAI subscores is 18.3 points or 
slightly more than 1.5 standard deviations. Note also that the planners’ average tenure was 
relatively low.  
 The three-person planning subteam began by quietly reading the instructions prior to 
getting the puzzle pieces out. They proceed to assemble their puzzle pieces in front of them 
in an orientation like they would appear in the final puzzle. Dale and Abe discussed 
the manner in which they may instruct the operators. Dale (-0.34, -0.17) said, “It says tell but 
it doesn’t say it absolutely has to be verbal.” The planners continued to tell each other how 
they might inform the operators to assemble the puzzle. They discussed a counterclockwise 
approach in which pieces are logically put into the puzzle. Abe (-0.29, 01.36) said, “When 
they come in we can have our pieces all lined up and in order and this is the base…” Abe 
also said, “So when we’re ready for them to come in we set it up so [he points to other 
participants’ puzzle piles] one, two...we need to insert that piece [again he points to another 
puzzle pile] in there, and we’ll have them in a line right here. You need to follow it 
around…starting here and proceeding counterclockwise.” It appeared that the planners 
visually understood what needed to be done but they did not write any instructions or make 
any sketches for the operators. Abe said, “But we can show them the pattern sheet.” Abe 
asked, “Okay, are you ready?” to which Dale replied, “Yes.” At that time Abe rose from his 
chair and went to retrieve the operations subteam. This was at approximately the 16:51 
minute lapsed time mark. 
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Table IV-10. Trial: CHL-T1 
Role Planners Operators 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 42  25 47 25 37  32 
Gender M  M F M M  M 
Ed 16  16 16 16 13  18 
Tenure 2  2.5 3 3 12.2  2 
Other Exp 9  1 0 5 0  7 
 Tot Exp  11  3.5 3 8.5 12  9 
Map M  M F M M  M 
75  89 92 100 100  111 Style (KAI)a -1.36  -.38 -.17 .39 .39  1.16 
E4  E3 S5 S1 S1  E3 Job Status b 4  3 5 1 1  3 
59  34 58 38 62  46 Level c -.29  -1.31 -.34 -1.04 -.21  -.69 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
85.3 103.7 Mean Style -.64 .65 
50.3 48.8 Mean Level -.65 -.64 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom are 
interval scores. 
c Level Status proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job 
Status. Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual 
Factor Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
 
 After the operating subteam got into the room Abe began, “What you’re tasked to do 
is to create a hollow square…okay…out of the 16 figures…okay, and if you start with this 
shape [Abe pointed to the partially assembled puzzle group in front of him], specifically this 
rectangle and work around counterclockwise back to the top and you follow the order of 
these shapes [Abe continued to point with his index finger to various puzzle pieces arranged 
on the table] it will form that hollow square. As soon as Abe finished this last remark Ray    
(-0.69, 1.16) asked, “What are the dimensions?” to which Dale replied, “That is irrelevant” 
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while some minor chuckles occurred, Ray said, “I think it is relevant.” Abe said, “All sides 
are equal” and Ray said, “So it is a square.” Ray asked, “So, you want us to start here [he 
pointed to the largest group of puzzle pieces] and work…with what…just anything?” Abe 
and Dale are casually answering the questions posed by Ray. Dale restated Abe’s comments, 
“If you start here [he made a hand gesture toward the largest group of puzzle pieces] and 
work your way down and look at the shapes that are needed…” Abe also offered, “And they 
are essentially in somewhat of an order.” At that time the other two operators, both of whom 
had thus far been quiet, positioned themselves closer to the table. At that time Dale said, 
“Now once ya’ll start we can’t talk to you.” Operator Nat (-0.21,0.39) in an effort to be funny 
said, “Zip” and made a hand gesture across his lips as to suggest the planners needed to shut 
up.  
 Very shortly the operators began moving the puzzle pieces into the large group. The 
first three pieces appear to fit as the planners had said but when they were moved over one of 
the triangles was too big for the space provided. This appeared to disrupt the thought flow. 
The operators continued as best they could with their memory of the instructions. The 
planners had provided no written or graphical instructions and ultimately the operators ran 
out of time before the puzzle was assembled. Charlotte trial CH-T1 was unsuccessful.  
 Table IV-10A contains the cognitive gap tabulations for the CH-T1 trial. The planner 
subteam person-person cognitive gaps (A+B) are (3.36, 3.83) as compared to the successful 
trials (9.19, 6.51). The planner subteam total person-person and person-problem cognitive 
gaps (A+B+D) are (0.76, 5.28) compared to the successful subteams scores (9.41, 11.54). 
Lastly, the total team cognitive gap (A+B+C+D) is 16.44 as compared to the successful 
team’s gap of 41.77.  
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Table IV-10A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial CHL-T1 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 1.66 0.87 . -2.57 2.53 -0.04 Level Pl 2.04 1.32 0.01 -2.60 3.36 0.76 
Op 1.54 1.03 . 6.59 2.57 9.15 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 2.38 1.45 1.28 1.45 3.83 5.28 
16.44 
Op 48.80 27.20  -69.84 76.00 6.16 Level 
Pl 50.00 32.67 1.53 -63.71 82.67 18.96 
Op 22.00 14.67  94.11 36.67 130.77 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 34.00 20.67 18.33 20.77 54.67 75.44 
251.20 
 
 
 7.7 Charlotte CHL-T2 
 Trial CHL-T2 was conducted on Dec 14, 2009 at 12:30 PM and was administered by 
research assistant Phyllis Elikai. This was a role-preferred trial with relatively more adaptive 
subteam playing the planners’ role and the relatively more innovative subteam playing the 
operators’ role. One last minute change occurred due to an absence. There was no material 
change in the subteam make-up as a result of the change. The trial took place in a conference 
room with the video camera mounted on a tripod. The camera was turned on prior to the start 
of the exercise and seemed to have no effect on the participants. Table IV-11 contains vital 
information about trial CHL-T2. 
 Note that the difference between subteam mean KAI scores was slightly more than 
1.5 standard deviations of the total group KAI scores. Note also that this was a full eight 
person group. 
This trial began with the planners reading for over two minutes without any dialogue. 
Chris (-1.36, -0.10) asked, “When do they come back in” at the nearly three minute mark and 
Abe (-0.82,-1.36) replied, “After 25 minutes.” After another few minutes Chris observed that 
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the pattern sheet might be sketched on. He said, “That’s not a key sheet, but we can make a 
key sheet that will tell them how to do it.” Chris persisted, “Can we just draw out how to do 
it and give it to them?” Bo (-1.05,-0.66) asked, “Is that cheating?” and Abe added, “I think 
that’s cheating.” Abe was clearly uneasy with what she thought was a violation of the rules. 
Bo held the pattern sheet up toward Abe and said, “This is gonna be their key sheet” to which  
Table IV-11. Trial: CHL-T2 
Role Planners Operators 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 31 31 25 32 39 26 34 30 
Gender F F M M M M M M 
Ed 13 13 16 13 16 13 16 16 
Tenure 2.5 3.5 2 4.5 5 3.5 9 2 
Other Exp 7.5 0 .3 6 8 3.5 0 7 
 Tot Exp  10 3.5 2.3 10.5 13 7 9 9 
Map M W M M M M M W 
75 85 93 71 99 99 103 110 Style (KAI)a -1.36 -.66 -.10 -1.64 .32 .32 .60 1.09 
S1 C1 E3 S4 S4 E3 E3 E3 Job Status b 1 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 
44.5 40 32.3 51 61 39.5 55 44 Level c -.82 -1.05 -1.36 -.73 -.19 -1.06 -.51 -.78 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
81 102.8 Mean Style -.94 .58 
42 49.9 Mean Level -.99 -.64 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom are 
interval scores. 
c Level Status proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job 
Status. Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual 
Factor Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
 
Abe replied, “Are you sure,” and Bo said, “Maybe.” The question of sketching the key sheet 
on the pattern sheet obviously created a moral dilemma for Abe. She continued working on 
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how to instruct the operators to assemble the puzzle based on the location of where different 
chairs were setting.  
In spite of Abe’s evidenced objection to doing any kind of sketch of the puzzle shapes 
on the pattern sheet, Bo persisted, “So what would be wrong with tracing it, wouldn’t that be 
their instructions?” [She looked at Abe and directed her question to her. after which she 
laughed uncertainly…] Chris also laughed and said, “I think so…” Abe, to whom the 
previous question was addressed did not respond but continued with her work on some kind 
of sequential instructions for assembling the puzzle. Several minutes passed with Abe writing 
instructions and finally Bo said in a moderately frustrated voice, “This is the pattern sheet, 
not the key sheet” to which Chris replied, “I know.” Chris continued, “It doesn’t say they 
can’t see the pattern sheet.” Dale (-0.73,-1.64) who had been relatively quiet until then, and 
Bo simultaneously say, “Why don’t we trace it…” Bo [after she began tracing the shapes of 
the puzzle into the pattern sheet] said, “I’ll trace it” as she laughed softly, then said “I’ll be 
the bad one.” Abe watched Bo sketch the puzzle shapes on the pattern sheet smiled and said, 
“I don’t know, I kinda think if she’s making another key SHEET…” to which Bo interjected, 
“But this is the pattern…this is the hollow square pattern sheet.” Abe responded, “Right…?” 
And Bo shot back, “That’s not the key sheet.” 
 Abe continued her effort to write some instructions to the operators which would tell 
them which group of puzzle pieces to start with and how to proceed. Chris assisted her in 
formulating some basic instructions. Abe offered, relatively light heartedly, “And we’ve got 
Becky’s cheat sheet just in case.” [Note that Abe used Bo’s real name in the video here.] Bo, 
who is busily sketching on the pattern sheet, and Chris say, “Yea” in unison and Abe giggled 
as if they had done something wrong. Shortly after that the facilitator said, “Your 25 minutes 
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is up…” and the planners leave the room without having provided any oral instructions to the 
operating subteam.  
 The operating subteam entered the room and sat around the table. Mel (-0.19,0.32) 
picked up one of the larger triangle pieces from his group of puzzle pieces and held it up with 
one hand and thumped it like a football to the operator sitting across the table from him. They 
all laughed. A couple of minutes went by with the operators looking first at each other and 
then all looked directly at the facilitator. The facilitator said, “I’m not going to tell you 
anything.” Pat (-0.51,0.60) said, “Oh you are waiting…” and Mel looked around near his end 
of the table and found the written instructions that Abe had worked on during the planning 
session. Mel pulled the instructions closer to him and said, almost matter of factly, “Okay, 
here’s our objective. Combine all twelve puzzle pieces into a hollow square pattern…or 
sheet…or pattern sheet.” Ray (-0.78,1.09), looked startled and said, “Where did you get that 
from?” And, Mel replied, “This was left on the table…” Mel continued reading, 
“Directions…have each team member sit in one of four chairs, beginning with seat closest to 
Andy’s door, closest to TV, and on side of exit door—that is one set.” Mel reiterated, “Okay, 
have each team member sit in one of four chairs…” Over the next few minutes the operating 
subteam members, other than Mel who continued sitting in his seat and reading the 
instructions Abe had prepared, moved up and out of the camera shot to far corners of the 
room as if on a scavenger hunt. Finally the planners came back to the table. Mel also spotted 
the sketched pattern sheet (also called Bo’s cheat sheet) and said, “Okay, here are some 
answers we can use.” When they all gathered back around the table Mel continued reading 
the instructions about seating arrangements and Pat (-0.51,0.60) began piecing the puzzle 
together based on the sketches shown on the pattern sheet. Ray and Nat have sat and listened 
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to Mel reading and re-reading the seating instructions. Finally, Ray asked Mel, “What does 
any of that got to do with solving this puzzle?” Mel replied, “It’s telling us who needs to do it 
first…that is set one…” Pat, who had been assembling the puzzle based on the sketch of the 
puzzle pieces on the pattern sheet, said, “Well I started…” Mel continued reading for a 
moment and looked at his cell phone and said, “I’m sorry guys, I’ve got to take this.” He 
answered his cell and began a conversation with a client about some expense vouchers sent 
on a recent invoice. From this point forward Mel talked on the cell phone and made no 
further contributions to the subteam. 
 Pat continued to put the puzzle pieces together with Ray and Nat helping to put pieces 
in place. Pat commented, “Not exactly like that…” due to a solid square being located in a 
spot that is supposed to have two triangles making up the square. Nat (-1.06,0.32) said, “Take 
that square out,” and switched locations of the two triangles and the square. Nat, Pat, and Ray 
solved the puzzle while Mel continued his telephone conversation. Trial Charlotte CHL-T2 
was successful. 
 Table IV-11A contains the tabulated cognitive gap information for CH-T2 trial.  
Table IV-11A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial CHL-T2 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 2.85 1.12 . -3.18 3.97 0.79 Level Pl 2.12 0.86 0.35 -4.94 2.98 -1.96 
Op 2.59 1.05 . 7.91 3.64 11.55 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 5.32 2.24 1.52 0.30 7.56 7.86 
20.11 
Op 75.50 32.50  -81.93 108.00 26.08 Level 
Pl 60.60 23.20 7.93 -121.55 83.80 -37.75 
Op 37.00 15.00  113.05 52.00 165.05 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 76.00 32.00 21.75 4.30 108.00 112.30 
295.35 
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The planner subteam person-person cognitive gaps (A+B) are (2.98, 7.56) as compared to the 
successful subteams mean score of (9.19, 6.51). The planner subteam total cognitive gaps 
(A+B+D) are (9.41, 11.54). And, the total team cognitive gap is 20.11 versus the successful 
trials mean score of 41.77. 
 
 7.8 Raleigh RAL-T1 
 I administered Trial RAL-T1 on Dec 8, 2009 at noon. This was a non role-preferred 
trial with relatively more innovative subteam playing the planners’ role and the relatively 
more adaptive subteam playing the operators’ role. One last minute change occurred due to 
an absence. In this case one of the planners was absent and I moved the most innovative of 
the adaptive group to the innovative-planners subteam. The trial took place in a conference 
room with the video camera mounted on a tripod. The camera was turned on prior to the start 
of the exercise and seemed to have no effect on the participants. Table IV-12 contains vital 
information about trial RAL-T1. 
 Note that the difference between mean KAI scores for subteams was slightly more 
than 1.5 standard deviations. Owing to the last minute change of participants there was a 30 
point range of KAI scores within the planning subteam.  
 After a relatively quiet time during which the planners reviewed the instructions they 
began generally discussing the placement of their individual pieces in the puzzle. For the 
initial period Mel (1.34, -0.45) took the vocal lead pointing out where everyone’s puzzle 
pieces were located in the puzzle. Mel wrote the planner’s code name on the puzzle key sheet 
so that he knew who had which pieces and where they were located. Ray (0.76, 1.65) placed 
one of his puzzle pieces beside Nat’s piece to compare the size of the pieces as Mel and Pat 
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continued a directionless discussion about how they were going to tell the operating team to 
complete the puzzle. Pat said, “We can’t give them any further instructions once they start,” 
to which Mel added, “Once they start…”  
 Mel suggested grouping the pieces together, “With A, B, C, and D…if that makes 
sense” while moving his hands to suggest sequential groupings of puzzle pieces. Pat 
appeared to not register that suggestion and offered another direction. He said, “Let’s think 
about if we were to say…for example if we gave them a starting piece and we’ll have to  
Table IV-12. Trial: RAL-T1 
Role Operators Planners 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 58 43 48 - 53 30 44 45 
Gender M M F - M F M M 
Ed 16 16 14 - 16 16 16 18 
Tenure 19 2.5 2.5 - 18 3 4 4 
Other Exp 18 21 25 - 12 4.5 20 23 
 Tot Exp  37 23.5 27.5 - 30 7.5 24 27 
Map M M W - M M W W 
76 79 82 - 88 98 108 118 Style (KAI)a -1.23 -1.08 -.87 - -.45 .25 .94 1.65 
E4 E5 C3 - E5 E3 E5 C4 Job Status b 4 5 6 - 5 3 5 10 
118 74 84 - 106 43.5 77 86 Level c 1.84 .33 .74 - 1.34 -.87 .53 .76 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
79 103 Mean Style -1.08 .60 
92 78 Mean Level .97 .44 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom are 
interval scores. 
c Level Status proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job 
Status. Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual 
Factor Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
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describe very carefully what they were going to create…and we say the pieces that are 
together stay together.” Nat (-0.87, 0.25) replied in support of Pat’s comment, “Yea, that’s 
good.” Pat continued, “This is your bottom left corner…” and Mel broke into the discussion 
and said, “I would put the pieces of the puzzle together just the way the puzzle is put 
together, lay them out exactly like that” using hand gestures for emphasis. As Mel was 
completing his statement Nat said, “They should be standing on that end of the table” and 
gestured toward the far end of the table, obviously understanding that all the groups of puzzle 
pieces needed to be oriented the same or otherwise be quite confusing.  
 Three of the planners rose and grouped themselves near the end of the table while Pat 
continued sitting in his chair. Ray had been relatively quiet until this time and he began 
suggesting placements for the individual pieces. He began, “Let’s all get on one side of the 
table.” The solution concept that the group had generally followed was to arrange each 
persons’ puzzle pieces in front of where the person sat or stood in four rows of four. The first 
row was the top row meaning the four pieces in the puzzle which were at or near the top. Pat 
(0.53, 0.94), who had been watching and listening, said, “But they are not going to be able to 
see that.” And Mel agreed, “They are not going to be able to see that because they are not in 
order…” The planners continued moving pieces around and created four rows of puzzle 
pieces but they were not equally numbered with puzzle pieces. One row had several pieces 
and another row had fewer. They had settled on placing the pieces which were near the top 
on the top row, the pieces just below the top in the second row, etc. Considerably late in the 
exercise Pat said, “So we better think about how we are going to give them instructions.” 
After several moments of silence all three of the other planners begin talking about how all 
the pieces go together—again. The additional discussion produced no written plan or sketch 
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to present to the operating team. After 25 minutes I called time and directed the planners to 
go to the next room for their lunch. Mel said, “I thought we were supposed to give them 
instructions,” to which I replied, “You’ve got 25 minutes to do that, your time is up.” Both 
Mel and Pat make exasperated sighs and as Pat is walking out he said, “We didn’t write 
anything down.”  
 The operating subteam entered and sat on the end of the table where all the puzzle 
pieces were positioned. They sat their pizza down on the table in the midst of the puzzle 
pieces. Abe (1.84, -1.23) said, “We are to create a hollow square.” Bo (0.33, -1.08) said, “We 
are waiting on directions from others?” And, Abe said, “Well we will receive no further 
directions so that is the directions…to make a hollow square. “So whether we use all the 
pieces or not, it really doesn’t matter because we haven’t been told…” After their initial 
frustrated comments the operators made a futile attempt to assemble the puzzle. But with 
nothing to go on they did not succeed. Trial RAL-T1 was unsuccessful. 
 Table IV-12A contains the tabulated cognitive gaps for trial RAL-T1.  
Table IV-12A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial RAL-T1 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 3.02 1.74 0.53 3.88 4.76 8.64 Level Pl 6.88 2.63 . 2.20 9.50 11.71 
Op 0.84 0.42 1.68 -0.32 1.26 0.94 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 7.00 2.80 . 8.00 9.80 17.80 
41.29 
Op 88.00 52.00 13.88 102.96 140.00 242.96 Level 
Pl 196.50 71.50  59.33 268.00 327.33 
Op 12.00 6.00 24.00 320.00 18.00 338.00 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 100.00 40.00  114.30 140.00 254.30 
1200.46 
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The planner subteam person-person cognitive gaps (A+B) are (9.5, 9.8) as compared to the 
successful planner subteam mean scores of (9.18, 6.51). The planner subteam person-person 
and person-problem cognitive gaps (A+B+D) are (11.71, 17.8) as compared to the successful 
planner subteam scores of (9.41, 11.54). The total team person-person and person-problem 
cognitive gap score is 41.29 versus the mean scores for successful trials at 41.77, remarkably 
close for this to be a failed trial.  
 
 7.9 Raleigh RAL-T2 
 I administered Trial RAL-T2 on Dec 14, 2009 at noon. This was a role-preferred trial 
with relatively more adaptive subteam playing the planners’ role and the relatively more 
innovative subteam playing the operators’ role. The trial took place in a conference room 
with the video camera mounted on a tripod. The camera was turned on prior to the start of the 
exercise and seemed to have no effect on the participants. Table IV-13 contains vital 
information about trial RAL-T2. The difference between subteam mean KAI scores was over 
1.5 standard deviations. The range of planners subteam KAI scores was less than 20 points.  
 This trial began with discussion about where the various puzzle pieces should go and 
which person had which pieces. Abe (-0.61, -1.92) was very quiet early during the reading of 
the instructions. Each person arranged his or her pieces in front of them like they were 
supposed to be arranged in the puzzle. They discussed how to explain the objective to the 
operators. Dale (-1.27, -0.73) asked, “Do we have to put the puzzle pieces back in the 
envelope?” Abe said, “It doesn’t say how long we have to instruct them” and someone said, 
“How about a written plan?” They then debated the fact that the instructions do not prohibit a 
written plan.  
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Table IV-13. Trial: RAL-T2 
Role Planners Operators 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 32 44 37 27 60 43 28 28 
Gender M M M F F M M M 
Ed 13 14 16 18 16 16 16 18 
Tenure 11 17 4 1 .9 14 3 3.5 
Other Exp 0 4 3.5 2.5 25 0 4 2 
 Tot Exp  11 21 7.5 3.5 25.9 14 7 5.5 
Map W M W W W W M M 
67 70 82 84 95 100 107 115 Style (KAI)a -1.92 -1.71 -.87 -.73 .04 .39 .87 1.44 
C3 E1 E3 C2 C1 E4 E2 E2 Job Status b 6 1 3 3 2 4 2 2 
60 83 51.5 34.5 88.8 75 40 39 Level c -.61 .45 -.61 -1.27 1.21 .17 -.95 -.98 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
75.8 104.3 Mean Style -1.31 .69 
57.3 60.7 Mean Level -.51 -.14 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom are 
interval scores. 
c Level proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job Status. 
Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual Factor 
Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
  
 At 14:20 minutes into the exercise Abe appeared to have an idea. He suggested, “We 
can’t show them the key, but…” at which time Chris (-0.61, -0.87) interrupted and said, “We 
can show them the pattern sheet.” Abe went on, “But we could also un-staple these things 
and put a piece on each side of our puzzle…framing it.” Dale said, that’s a good idea…and 
you could even use your envelope…” Abe said, “Right, as the fourth piece. “And, so they 
would have a good picture or view of what it…” Chris, who had been staring intently at Abe 
  181
during this exchange said, “Say that again…” and Abe reiterated his concept of creating a 
perimeter template which would frame the puzzle.  
 Chris said, “I say we show them the pattern sheet as well.” Also one of the four 
pieces of paper that would be used to frame the puzzle happened to be the key sheet. Chris 
said, “We can write on the paper, don’t turn over.” By this time Abe is busily writing 
instructions for the operating team with other planners offering several suggestions for 
necessary or helpful information to be included in the directions. Chris had an idea about 
using the pattern sheet for a graphical instructions sheet. He said, “Like re-create the key 
sheet but just show them our pieces…you know what I mean? “Like, if I draw my pieces in 
here [he pointed to the pattern sheet]…would that be showing them?” Dale said, “Yea…I 
think that would be showing them the key…” They all laughed and Abe, paused from writing 
his instructions for the operating team said, “Yea, I did wonder that.”  
 Chris, however, persisted in pushing the question of key sheet and asked, “Bo, do you 
think that would be giving them the key sheet if in your pattern sheet just draw out where 
your pieces go?” To which Bo (0.45, -1.71) quickly replied, “Yes…” and Chris said, “You 
do, okay.” But Bo continued with the thought and said, “Just your pieces?” And, Chris said, 
“Yes…so you are not giving them the whole key sheet, you’re just giving them part of 
it…your pieces.” Bo said, “It doesn’t say that though…” And, Chris said, “Exactly, it said 
don’t show them the key sheet…the key sheet is the entire thing…” Chris lifts one of the key 
sheets from its place on the table and holds it face up for emphasis. Bo, now an accomplice in 
this interpretation said, “Yea, we can sketch our pieces.” Chris still was not convinced that 
the sketch idea was legal and turned and asked me, “Mike, would you tell us if it was 
cheating?” to which I replied, “Everything you need to know is on the instruction sheet.” 
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After which all the planners laughed and Chris said, “He’s got the same response to 
everything.” All the planners completed their sketches of their pieces on their pattern sheets 
while Abe completed the instructions. I called time after 25 minutes and instructed them to 
go to the next room and told them that they had no more time to provide oral instructions to 
the operators. As the planners rose to leave the room Abe said, amidst laughter, “Okay, I’m 
glad I wrote down some instructions.”  
 The operations team entered the room and took their places around the table. Nat 
(0.17, 0.39) happened to take the seat in which Abe had sat and, therefore, had the 
instructions in front of him. He began reading, “The goal is to take the pieces for forming a 
square with an empty small square centered in the middle.” He asked the other operators, 
“Do you see this picture here?” And, Ray (-0.98, 1.44)  said, “Okay…” Nat continued, “All 
the pieces are oriented and positioned properly…” The operators had little trouble following 
the very precise instructions which included a specific order of which puzzle groups went 
into the base puzzle first. In addition, the operators had the sketches of the puzzle pieces on 
the pattern sheets. The operators quickly assembled the puzzle. Trial RAL-T2 was 
successful.  
 Table IV-13A contains the tabulated cognitive gaps for RAL-T2.  The planner 
subteam person-person cognitive gaps (A+B) are (7.09, 6.44) compared to the successful 
trials mean scores of (9.19, 6.51). The planner subteam person-person and person-problem 
cognitive gaps are (4.55, 4.9) compared to the successful trials mean scores of (9.41, 11.54). 
And, the total team cognitive gap (A+B+C+D) is 37.13 versus the successful teams mean 
scores of (41.77).  
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 Table IV-13A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial RAL-T2 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 7.68 3.31 . -0.69 10.99 10.31 Level Pl 5.16 1.92 0.37 -2.54 7.09 4.55 
Op 4.69 1.89 . 8.44 6.58 15.01 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 4.41 2.03 1.99 -1.54 6.44 4.90 
37.13 
Op 184.40 84.80  -27.80 269.20 241.40 Level 
Pl 154.00 57.00 3.45 -45.05 211.00 165.95 
Op 67.00 27.00  120.55 94.00 214.55 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 63.00 29.00 28.50 -21.95 92.00 70.05 
723.90 
 
 
 The planner subteam person-person cognitive gaps (A+B) are (7.09, 6.44) compared 
to the successful trials mean scores of (9.19, 6.51). The planner subteam person-person and 
person-problem cognitive gaps are (4.55, 4.9) compared to the successful trials mean scores 
of (9.41, 11.54). And, the total team cognitive gap (A+B+C+D) is 37.13 versus the 
successful teams mean scores of (41.77).  
  
 7.10 Raleigh RAL-T3 
 I administered Trial RAL-T3 on Dec 10, 2009 at noon. This was a non role-preferred 
trial with relatively more innovative subteam playing the planners’ role and the relatively 
more adaptive subteam playing the operators’ role. The trial took place in a training room 
with the video camera mounted on a tripod. The camera was turned on prior to the start of the 
exercise and seemed to have no effect on the participants. Table IV-14 contains vital 
information about trial RAL-T3. The difference between subteam mean KAI scores was over 
1.5 standard deviations. The range of planners subteam KAI scores was less than 20 points.  
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 This trial began with nearly eight minutes of discussion about who has which puzzle 
pieces and how they are oriented. Nat (1.71, 0.11) suggested a “key-stone” concept at about 
the 3:00 minute mark but the idea floated off to no avail. They discussed a clockwise rotation 
of assembling the puzzle. They discussed quadrants. They started numbering the puzzle 
pieces in a counterclockwise fashion with Ray (0.79, 1.51) marking the pieces on her key 
sheet. 
 Pat (-0.05, 0.74) suggested grouping the pieces into four piles and using the dial of a 
clock as a key with which to provide instructions. The nature of instructions had not yet been 
discussed. Nat offered another idea or variation on the concept of instructing the operators to 
assemble the puzzle in a circular fashion. Mel (1.69, 0.04) picked up the pattern sheet and 
said, “The pattern sheet, I’m gonna start at 12-o’clock…they’ll have to physically have to 
figure out how does that…” Ray began agreeing with Mel before he finished talking and 
said, “Okay, okay, let’s do that…line ‘em up…yea, we’re all on the same side.” Ray gathered 
her pieces and began moving to the other side of the table and said, “Why not, let’s try it and 
see if we can do it…” Pat remained seated on the left side of the table while the other three 
gathered on the right side and lined all 16 puzzle pieces up in the order which they planned to 
instruct the operators to assemble the puzzle. Ray had previously written the code names and 
a number one through four on the key sheet. During the time they were lining all 16 pieces 
up on one side of the table Ray was calling out the next piece name, e.g., Mel #3, etc. After 
the puzzle pieces were lined up Mel turned and asked how much time was left and I 
responded that they had about five minutes. Mel then made a “time-out” gesture and very 
softly asked, “Why couldn’t you just space them around so…” He made hand gestures 
indicating how the pieces would be positioned in a sort of exploded arrangement so that the 
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 Table IV-14. Trial: RAL-T3 
Role Operators Planners 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 57 48 25 34 49 64 40 53 
Gender M M M F M M M F 
Ed 13 18 16 18 14 14 16 16 
Tenure 18.5 1.5 2.5 4 13 2.5 4 5 
Other Exp 19.5 23 0 2 30 30 11 15 
 Tot Exp  38 24.5 2.5 6 43 32.5 15 20 
Map M M W M M M M M 
63 84 86 87 95 96 105 116 Style (KAI)a -2.19 -.73 -.59 -.52 .04 .11 .74 1.51 
S4 E4 E4 E3 S6 C2 S4 E4 Job Status b 4 4 4 3 6 3 4 4 
117.5 78 34 47 111 102 63 82 Level c 1.78 .59 -1.36 -.79 1.69 1.71 -.05 .79 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
80 103 Mean Style -1.01 .60 
69 89.5 Mean Level .06 1.03 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom are 
interval scores. 
c Level proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job Status. 
Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual Factor 
Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
 
operators would only have to push the pieces in to make the puzzle. As Mel was suggesting 
that Pat voiced his agreement saying, “We have all that table…those two tables to do that…” 
Ray listened and said, “All you have to do is just push them together…okay, yes…go right 
ahead…absolutely.” As Ray and Mel began moving the puzzle pieces into the exploded 
position Nat reminded them, “We can’t touch each others’ pieces…” All the planners moved 
pieces around with lots of touching violations. Ray appeared to circumvent that problem in 
her mind by using her pen to actually touch pieces that were not hers. After all the pieces 
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were in position Mel said, “They are not touching, they are in front of everybody, and now 
we can simply instruct them to make that…” [He held up the pattern sheet as he spoke.] The 
planners pause and Mel said, “That’s a lot easier…” to which everyone laughed. Mel asked 
to no one in general, “Have we broken rules? I don’t know.” As the planning team stood 
around the table the operations team barged in uninvited.  
 Mel began instructions, “Your task is to assemble these puzzle pieces in this hollow 
square pattern sheet…the part in the middle ends up empty, its hollow…so these pieces will 
go together to make that pattern. Mel and Ray exchanged ideas and laughed. At that point I 
called time and sent the planners out of the room.  
 The operators quickly moved into position around the puzzle and moved the pieces 
into place with little trouble. They took some time after the puzzle pieces were put together 
worrying about tightness of fit and wondering if they had missed something. In the end, the 
operators were successful. Trial RAL-T3 was successful. 
   
Table IV-14A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial RAL-T3 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 10.82 4.53 0.98 0.28 15.35 15.63 Level Pl 6.19 2.66 . 5.17 8.86 14.03 
Op 5.18 2.38 1.61 -0.05 7.56 7.51 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 5.04 2.10 . 8.00 7.14 15.14 
54.89 
Op 281.50 114.50 20.38 14.33 396.00 410.33 Level 
Pl 164.00 68.00  116.20 232.00 348.20 
Op 74.00 34.00 23.00 -0.70 108.00 107.30 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 72.00 30.00  114.30 102.00 216.30 
1125.50 
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Table IV-14A contains the tabulated cognitive gaps for trial RAL-T3. The planner 
subteam person-person gaps (A+B) are (8.86, 7.14) compared to the successful planner 
subteams scores of (9.19, 6.51). The planner subteam person-person and person-problem 
cognitive gaps (A+B+D) are (14.03, 15.14) as compared to the other successful planner 
subteam scores of (9.41, 11.54). And, the total team person-person and person-problem 
cognitive gap is 54.89 as compared to the other successful planner subteam mean score of 
41.77.  
 
 7.11 Raleigh RAL-T4 
 I administered Trial RAL-T4 on Dec 7, 2009 at noon. This was a non role-preferred 
trial with relatively more innovative subteam playing the planners’ role and the relatively 
more adaptive subteam playing the operators’ role. The trial took place in a conference room 
with the video camera mounted on a tripod. The camera was turned on prior to the start of the 
exercise and seemed to have no effect on the participants. Table IV-15 contains vital 
information about trial RAL-T4. The difference between subteam mean KAI scores was well 
over 1.5 standard deviations. The range of planners subteam KAI scores exceeded 20 points.  
 This planning group discussed whether or not the puzzle pieces would be left on the 
table for the operations subteam and concluded they would. They discussed who had which 
pieces of the puzzle. At roughly 3:40 minutes into the trial period Ray (1.56, 2.63) quietly 
began to fold and tear a piece of paper that would become a center template. He explained 
that everyone should have one and orient their pieces around the template as they should be 
oriented in the total puzzle. There was considerable discussion about the correct orientation 
of the puzzle pieces since the planners were sitting on opposite sides of the table. Finally, 
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Ray suggested that the template [hole] could be the orientation and they wrote an orientation 
on the piece of paper that they made for the template.  
 Ray asked if the instructions could be written or oral and the planners concluded that 
they should do a written plan. Pat (-1.01, 2.21) began writing instructions at that point. One 
asked about reproducing the key sheet and labeling their pieces as to whose went where. Ray 
asked, “Is that working the margins?” Nat (0.82, 1.37) suggested that Pat read over what she  
 
Table IV-15. Trial: RAL-T4 
Role Operators Planners 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 37 42 57 36 27 48 27 53 
Gender M M M M M M F M 
Ed 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Tenure 4.5 8 21 6 1.8 2 3 18 
Other Exp 7 9 10 3 5 25 2 13 
 Tot Exp  11.5 17 31 9 6.75 27 5 31 
Map M M M M M M W M 
73 78 91 98 108 114 126 132 Style (KAI)a -1.50 -1.15 -.24 .25 .95 1.37 2.21 2.63 
E3 E3 E4 S4 E3 E3 C2 E6 Job Status b 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 6 
56 70 113 55 38.5 80 38 108 Level c -.46 .08 1.62 -.49 -1.02 .82 -1.01 1.56 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
85 120 Mean Style -.66 1.79 
73.5 66.1 Mean Level .19 .09 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom are 
interval scores. 
c Level proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job Status. 
Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual Factor 
Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
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had written to make sure everything was covered. Ray said, “I don’t know how much time 
we have” and picked up the instruction sheet and started reading. After a few moments he 
looked at his watch and said, “We need to call them in right now…it says during a period of 
25 minutes you are to do the following…that includes the instructions…” Ray then exited to 
retrieve the operators.  
 After the operators were in the room Ray began, “This is a puzzle…a hollow square 
and otherwise it’s just a square. “There are four pieces at each station. “All of these are 
correct, location wise, if you are standing like you are now with your back to the window 
facing that way.” Mel (-1.02, 0.95) added, “And we have written directions too.” Abe (-0.46, 
-1.50) asked, “And it has got to fit inside that” [he pointed to the pattern sheet that Pat held 
up.] to which all the planners answered at once “No.” The planners offered different 
comments or directions sometimes interpreting others. Operator Chris (1.62, -0.24)  asked, 
“Can we ask questions…can we take notes real quick before we start our task?” to which Ray 
replied, “Right quick, we only have a couple minutes left in our 25 minutes.” Chris said to 
the other operators, “I suggest everybody diagram…we’ve got four people…” Abe asked, 
“It’s being kept just like this, right?” Ray answered, “You’ll need to put them 
together…we’re going to leave.” Finally, Abe asked, “What’s the end state?” and “Does it 
have to be in a particular location?” Pat and Ray answered no. The planners’ time has lapsed 
and they leave the room.  
 The operators take every precaution about moving the puzzle pieces prematurely. 
They discussed how the pieces go together. Three of the operators begin discussing how 
simple it looked and appeared to be ready to move pieces around on the table. Chris said, 
“Make notes before you move them.” After that, Abe pulled out his cell phone and began 
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taking photographs of the four sets of puzzle pieces. As Abe took pictures Chris picked up 
the written instructions and began reading. Following the reading of the instructions the 
operators quickly assembled the puzzle. Trial RAL-T4 is successful.  
 Table IV-15A contains cognitive gap tabulations for trial RAL-T4.  
The planner subteam person-person cognitive gaps (A+B) are (13.97, 8.4) compared to the 
mean scores of successful planner subteam of (9.19, 6.51). The planner subteam person-
person and person problem cognitive gaps (A+B+D) are (14.42, 22.34) compared to all 
successful planner subteam trials of (9.41, 11.54). And, the total team cognitive gap is 60.50 
as compared to the mean score of all successful teams of 41.77. 
Table IV-15A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial RAL-T4 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 6.87 2.87 0.10 0.93 9.74 10.67 
Level Pl 9.56 4.41 . 0.44 13.97 14.42 
Op 6.16 2.66 2.45 1.70 8.82 10.52 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 5.88 2.52 . 13.95 8.40 22.34 
60.50 
Op 188.00 79.00 7.38 36.20 267.00 303.20 Level 
Pl 251.50 111.50  -0.68 363.00 362.33 
Op 88.00 38.00 35.00 24.30 126.00 150.30 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 84.00 36.00  199.30 120.00 319.30 
1177.50 
 
 
 
7.12 Raleigh RAL-T5 
 I administered Trial RAL-T5 on Dec 11, 2009 at noon. This was a non role-preferred 
trial with relatively more innovative subteam playing the planners’ role and the relatively 
more adaptive subteam playing the operators’ role. The trial took place in a training room 
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with the video camera mounted on a tripod. The camera was turned on prior to the start of the 
exercise and seemed to have no effect on the participants. Table IV-16 contains vital 
information about trial RAL-T5. The difference between subteam mean KAI scores was over 
1.5 standard deviations. The range of planners subteam KAI scores was less than 20 points.  
 This trial commenced with the planners discussing the puzzle pieces they had and 
how they could fit together. Ray (1.9, 1.65), focused on the rules and said, “We have to keep 
our pieces in front of us.” The group spent considerable time talking about triangles and how 
they would be arranged. They discussed quadrants and approaching the puzzle from a  
Table IV-16. Trial: RAL-T5 
Role Operators Planners 
Subteam Relatively More Adaptive Relatively More Innovative 
Code Name Abe Bo Chris Dale Mel Nat Pat Ray 
Individual 
Attributes 
        
Age 61 49 46 36 29 28 25 63 
Gender M M M F M F M M 
Ed 18 21 16 16 16 16 18 21 
Tenure 3.5 1.5 8 4 1.5 3.5 3 5 
Other Exp 31 1.5 15 3 5 2.5 0 32 
 Tot Exp  34.5 3 23 7 6.5 6 3 35 
Map M M M M M W M M 
72 81 83 84 100 101 107 118 Style (KAI)a -1.57 -.94 -.80 -.73 .39 .45 .88 1.65 
E4 C2 S5 E3 E3 E1 E2 E3 Job Status b 4 3 5 3 3 1 2 3 
103 56.5 82 50 40 38.5 33 106 Level c 1.59 -.32 .54 -.67 -.98 -1.01 -1.26 1.90 
Subteam  
Attributes 
  
-1.01 .84 Mean Style 80 106.5 
72.9 54.4 Mean Level .28 -.34 
a Style Proxy is KAI scores-Tot number is raw score and bottom number is standardized KAI Z-score 
b Job Status numbers are taken from Table IV-5. Top numbers are Domain Specific Scores and bottom are 
interval scores. 
c Level proxy is based on Factor Analysis which loaded Age, Tenure, Total Experience, and Job Status. 
Top number is Age + Tenure + Total Experience + Job Status. The bottom number is the actual Factor 
Score produced in a Principal Components Analysis 
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quadrant perspective but Ray said, “They are not really quadrants.” They appeared to go 
down a path of instruction for four quadrants where they would start with a base. Pat (-1.26, 
0.88) said, “I think first is to identify what their task is…” Pat, a few minutes later, asked, 
“How long do we have to instruct…” Ray offered, “I think we need to have AN instructor 
rather than everybody yelling…” 
 Pat, who had been reading the instruction sheet during the last few moments read 
aloud and commented, “We may not show the key sheet to the operating team…” Ray and 
Mel replied “Alright” in unison. Pat continued while looking at Ray, “Alright…If we sketch 
a schematic on the back of the instruction sheet that is not the key sheet.” Ray utters an 
audible sigh and says, “That may be stretching it…” At that point Pat and the others appear 
to let that idea pass but after a few minutes Pat again addressed Ray and said, “Would you 
think that is allowable?” Ray said, in a matter of fact tone, “You’re showing them.” Nat       
(-1.01, 0.45), supporting Pat’s idea said, “The instructions say you may not show the key 
sheet…I say we go for it.” She continued, “It does not say anywhere that you cannot draw 
out…” Ray said, “That seems to be stretching it but I think that is a generational difference.” 
After a few minutes of minor debate Ray offered, “It doesn’t say you can’t sketch stuff, but 
to me that’s kinda pushing it.” Pat again addressed Ray and asked, “So we’re going to call 
that cheating?” and Ray said, “I would…but I come from a different generation…” After a 
few moments Ray’s words appeared to sink in and Pat said, “Okay, we’ll call that cheating 
then.” At this point the discussion returns to the four groups of puzzle pieces and general 
discussion about how the operating subteam could assemble the pieces. 
 The operations subteam barged in about two minutes before the planners’ time 
expired. The four operators gathered at the far end of the table and the planners gathered at 
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the near end. Planner Pat began giving oral instructions about how the operating team should 
assemble the puzzle. Pat asked, “Operations team, first we would like to know what your task 
is?” Chris (0.54, -0.80) responded, “To satisfy the needs of the planning group.” After that 
Pat asked the operators to gather near the puzzle pieces on the table. He then said, “We are 
gonna start with Bo” [pointing at one of the members] “moving his shapes…” At that point I 
called time and sent the planning group to another room. The planners did not show the 
operating team the hollow square pattern sheet. At the time I stopped the instructions there 
had been little substantive information given.  
 The planners left the room and the operators began discussing a hollow square. It was 
clear that they did not have any idea as to what the hollow square looked like. Because they 
had not been instructed that the puzzle pieces were arranged in a pattern and they could be 
brought together the operators did not realize they should not move the pieces apart from 
each other. Unfortunately they quickly moved pieces around and lost any chance of ever 
solving the puzzle. Trial RAL-T5 was unsuccessful.  
 Table IV-16A contains cognitive gap tabulations for trial RAL-T5. The planner 
subteam person-person cognitive gaps (A+B) are (13.98, 5.88) as compared to the successful 
planner subteam cognitive gaps of (9.19, 6.51). The planner subteam person-person and 
person-problem cognitive gaps (A+B+D) are (12.29, 15.10) compared to the successful 
planner cognitive gaps of (9.41, 11.54). And, the total team cognitive gap score is 45.82 as 
compared to the successful total team score of 41.77, no substantive difference.  
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Table IV-16A    Cognitive Gaps: Trial RAL-T5 
(Gap Model Comparison) 
 Role Subteam Gap A 
Subteam 
Gap B 
Team 
Gap C 
Subteam 
Gap D 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B 
Subteam 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total  
Team  
Gap= 
A+B+C+D 
Op 7.66 3.14 0.62 1.42 10.80 12.22 Level Pl 9.51 4.47 . -1.69 13.98 12.29 
Op 2.66 1.12 1.85 -0.05 3.78 3.73 A
dd
 
M
od
el
 
Style Pl 4.20 1.68 . 9.22 5.88 15.10 
45.82 
Op 184.50 78.50 18.50 33.08 263.00 296.08 Level 
Pl 220.50 103.25  -59.43 323.75 264.33 
Op 38.00 16.00 26.50 -0.70 54.00 53.30 R
aw
 
M
od
el
 
Style 
Pl 60.00 24.00  131.80 84.00 215.80 
874.50 
 
 
8. Critical Evaluation 
 This chapter has chronicled the research process, introduced a technique for analyzing 
the communicative interaction of the groups, offered additional theoretical and empirical 
work illuminating this type of study, and reported the critical communicative acts of the trials 
without attempt at explication. I have also developed and explained the concept of cognitive 
gaps and shown both cognitive level and cognitive style gaps for each of the trials. The next 
two chapters will include evaluation of qualitative and quantitative findings respectively. The 
final chapter will present implications of this work and recommendations for application and 
future research.  
  
CHAPTER V  QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
  
1. Overview 
 There are two classes of trials which will be reported on in this chapter: 1) successful 
trials and 2) unsuccessful trials. Successful trials were the ones in which the planners and 
operators collaborated to assemble the hollow-square puzzle within the prescribed time. 
Conversely, unsuccessful trials were ones in which the planners and operators failed to 
assemble the puzzle in the prescribed time. The initial focus of this work was on the 
interaction of high adaptors and high innovators collaborating to solve a non-trivial problem. 
In the previous chapter I have extended that focus to include some consideration of cognitive 
level along with cognitive style.  
 There were some observed difficulties in communication based on problem-solving 
styles between some planner and some operator groups. However, in most cases the planner 
groups were largely responsible for the failed trials to a much greater degree than were the 
operators. In the way this exercise played out, the planners’ role emerged as the more 
challenging and more critical of the two role types. For example, in all five unsuccessful 
trials the planners failed to present a coherent solution concept to the operators. 
Consequently, the operators had almost no chance to solve the puzzle. There were 16 pieces 
to the puzzle. Mathematically, there are 16-factorial (16!) combinations in which the puzzle 
pieces might be arranged and absent a reasonable set of instructions from the planners, 
failure was virtually a certainty.  
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This chapter will extend the critical incident technique adaptation I introduced in the 
previous chapter by aggregating individual incidents into defined behaviors and their 
consequences with respect to either positive or negative contribution toward the solution of 
the puzzle. To each behavior and consequence I have assigned causal attributions based on 
two aspects of observed behavior: 1) cognitive style and 2) knowledge-in-action. Cognitive 
style is based on Kirton’s A-I theory and its terminology consistent with my earlier 
discussion for consistency. Knowledge-in-action is drawn from Carlile’s formulation of how 
knowledge is localized, embedded, and invested and the processes by which it crosses 
boundaries. The manifestations of Carlile’s knowledge-in-action are one of three levels of 
communicative action and I will use those as a proxy for cognitive level and the degree to 
which they contribute to solving the puzzle. 
 Drawing from Carlile’s (2002) work on boundary objects discussed in the previous 
chapter I will examine the critical incidents with respect to the three facets of knowledge 
boundaries to the extent one was evident in a critical incident. Recall that there are three 
hierarchical types of knowledge boundaries: syntactical, semantic, and pragmatic. For my 
purposes I call these words, meaning, and understanding. The implication of this is that for 
the lower level, words, a language is needed and used for outgoing communication. This is 
independent of the hearer. An example of how words can be spoken to no avail of problem 
solving is when someone speaks and her words go unacknowledged. The next level, 
meaning, implies that some words have been uttered, a listener has received them, and there 
is an interpretation of the words spoken. This enables a two-way dialogue. However, this 
does not insure intersubjectivity.  Considerable exchange of words and clarification of 
meanings further enables possible mutual understanding. This is obviously a prerequisite for 
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the final stage, understanding. At this highest level, understanding implies knowing 
something after a communicative transaction that was unknown (or not believed) prior to the 
transaction. This highest stage may more accurately be called synergizing. In Carlile’s terms, 
only synergizing can lead to transformational knowledge. I will apply these categories to the 
observed critical incidents for the purpose of determining where important contributions to 
the outcome occurred during the exercise. Those contributions could be negative (restricting 
new knowledge) or they might be synergistic (enabling new knowledge). Of course the 
domain in which Carlile proposed his knowledge boundary conceptualization was an applied 
new product development. In that case new knowledge often truly requires major paradigm 
shifts for cross functional teams to reach synergy. I would argue, however, that even in more 
modest knowledge-in-action situations such as the Hollow-Square puzzle in this research, 
significant examples of boundary problems will be prevalent. Thus, carrying forth the 
Jablokow-Booth model concepts from the previous chapter in which I discussed gaps in 
cognitive style and cognitive level, I will offer some observations about the facets of 
boundary spanning mechanisms which impacted these outcomes, either positively or 
negatively.  
 The knowledge domain for this exercise is that contained in the instructions for the 
exercise. They include one page of written instructions which specify things the planners can 
and cannot do. Also, a puzzle pattern sheet and a separate puzzle solution sheet are included 
in the knowledge domain. The boundary for this problem is a strict prohibition against 
showing the puzzle solution sheet to the operators or assembling the total puzzle. Anything 
short of those is not strictly forbidden. For example, showing the pattern sheet is acceptable. 
And, there is no prohibition against sketching the puzzle piece shapes in the pattern sheet. A 
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synergistic boundary spanning group would be one that explored the boundaries; e.g., what 
can we do and what can we specifically not do? Examples of exchanges which remain at the 
lowest level (talking) are those in which a subject speaks and no one makes a constructive 
reply. Another example is when a subject speaks and another participant rejects his comment 
immediately without further reflection. This is a negative example of the second level or 
meaning; i.e., the responder cuts off further exploration by the original speaker by virtue of 
his/her assertive refutation of the initial suggestion.   
 
2. Classification Scheme for Critical Incidents Consequences  
 The critical incident technique is often used to assign classes or categories to major 
groups of critical incidents during the review of the small group dialogue, an example of 
which was presented by the Buffinton et al. (2002) research above. Recall that in the 
Buffinton et al. work journals of participants were reviewed for important impressions 
(critical incidents) and classified based on number of instances of particular types of journal 
entries. This could be said to be an inductive use of the technique. In my case I have 
identified a classification scheme based in Kirton’s A-I theory and Carlile’s (2002) 
knowledge-in-action concepts and will apply them to the critical incident technique in a 
deductive fashion.  
 In the previous chapter I presented my suggested depiction of cognitive schema as 
viewed through the lens of A-I theory (See Figure IV-3). Also, I expanded on Carlile’s 
conceptualization of how information crosses boundaries for the purpose of collaborating 
across knowledge domains. I will use Kirton’s schema of cognitive functioning and combine 
Carlile’s heuristic of knowledge transfer for ascribing causation to manifest style or manifest 
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level. In the case of cognitive style I will draw from Kirton’s behavior descriptions shown 
earlier in Table I-1. The terms I will employ in the cognitive style classification will be as 
follows (See Table I-1, p.15): 
1. Manifest cognitive style traits common to adaptors include: precision, reliability, efficiency, 
prudence, discipline, conformity, problem resolver, tried and true solutions, improvement, 
safe, dependable, maybe too focused, impervious to boredom, domain authority, risk averse, 
rule-keeper, group cohesion, high self doubt, and compliant. 
2. Manifest cognitive style traits common to innovators include: undisciplined, disregard to 
details, different, probes novelty, outside box, problem finder, irreverent, impractical, 
shocking, ends justify means, disregard for means, abrasive, dissonant, low self doubt, 
proliferates ideas, tangential, and challenges status quo.  
  
 In the case of cognitive level I will use terms discussed above to identify three levels 
of communicative intelligence and knowledge transfer which I will use as a proxy for 
cognitive level: 
1. Words-(syntax) basic declarative statements which have no measurable impact. 
2. Meanings-(semantic) declarative and interrogative statements which explore the boundary of 
the problem. 
3. Synergy-(pragmatic)-objects, models, and maps which are created through discourse which 
enable learning and transformative knowledge. 
 
The first two manifestations of cognitive level have the possibility of both positive and 
negative valence; i.e., they could contribute positively to synergy or, conversely, they could 
block learning and synergy. In the subsequent presentation of critical incidents and their 
classification I will enumerate valence as positive (+) or negative (-) to indicate the nature of 
those acts. Also, I will discuss particular positive or negative contributions to cognitive level 
as necessary to illuminate the quality of problem-solving observed. 
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 Again, referring to Figure IV-3, the cognitive style and cognitive level shown there 
interact with cognitive resource. In the Kirton schema cognitive resource is the sum total of 
accumulated knowledge and skills which enable and support cognitive style and cognitive 
level. Kirton used cognitive level as the power of the CPU, not the size of the hard drive—to 
employ a computer analogy. In the sense that I am using cognitive level in the subsequent 
discussion I am adopting the Carlile (2002) definition of manifest capacity as knowledge that 
is localized, embedded, and invested in a practice area. The application of Carlile’s terms 
requires some blurring of Kirton’s schema. But, for the purposes of this presentation the 
cognitive level variable is much more speculative than is the cognitive style variable. 
However, the manifest level shown below has useful application in problem solving as will 
be shown.  
 Where other aspects of Kirton’s schema come into play which are outside the two 
classes of cognitive functioning I will make suitable footnotes for their identification. 
 
3. Unsuccessful Trials 
 There were five unsuccessful trials during this research program. There were three 
unsuccessful trials with non preferred roles assigned to planners and there were two 
unsuccessful trials with preferred roles assigned to planners. The only particular 
characteristic worthy of note for the unsuccessful trials was that all three of the three-person 
planners’ subteam failed.  
 Hare (2003) opined that groups sometimes outperform individuals during puzzle 
solving activity by virtue of the fact that the group has more people working on the problem. 
In my case where the three-person planning subteams were all unsuccessful I could make the 
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argument that, ceteris paribus, the three-person subteam was only 75% capacity to the full 
four person subteam. Hare (2003:132) offered, “When groups are compared with individuals 
on the same task, groups are generally found to be better than the average individual but 
seldom better than the best.” Thus, the larger the group the more likely it will contain a 
person with skills beneficial to the problem. I will return to the three-person planning 
subteam performance discussion in the final chapter of this report.  
 The following presentation includes tables of observations of behaviors, consequence 
of the behavior, and a causal attribution of the behavior based on the classificatory scheme 
presented above. Some additional discussion will be included as appropriate.  
  
 3.1 Fort Myers FM-T1 
 Critical consequential behaviors observed during the Fort Myers Trial FM-T1 are 
shown in Table V-1. It is noteworthy that FM-T1 had a three-person planners’ subteam. 
Recall from the earlier presentation of trial summaries that this was a non role preferred trial.  
 This trial was administered by one of my research associates and was the first trial 
run during this experiment. Consequently, there were a couple of instances of facilitation 
variation that were not present in subsequent trials. Specifically, the facilitator told the group 
that they only had three minutes left and they should get the operators in and tell them 
something. This did not affect the outcome. 
 I noted two classes of behaviors in the presentation table and have extended that same 
format into all the subsequent tables which contain critical incidents and their classifications. 
First, manifest style refers to the observed behaviors which demonstrate aspects of problem-
solving style represented by the critical incident indicated. As mentioned above, those 
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manifest styles are described in terms used in Kirton’s typology of adaptive-innovative 
behaviors found in Table I-1 above and as presented earlier in this chapter. Second, manifest 
level refers to the observed behaviors which are indicative of the qualitative value of 
communicative acts pursuant to knowledge transfer. It should be clear that both style and 
level are inextricably linked in the way I am measuring them for this study. That is, I am 
making both style and level inferences from some of the same utterances. However, the 
commonly held view today is that cognitive style and cognitive level are independent (Kirton 
2003 and Jablokow and Booth 2006). I would argue that the “independent” level refers to the 
power of the CPU (or capacity) versus to the knowledge-in-action which is local, embedded, 
and invested and is observed by boundary objects as discussed herein. The latter cognitive 
level combines cognitive resource, and cognitive affect. That version of cognitive level 
influences and impacts cognitive style, hence is not totally independent in this situation.  
 In trial FM-T1 the three planners were modestly innovative. They were reported to be 
somewhat distracted by the fact that they were scheduled to depart the office for their field 
assignment as soon as their exercise was complete. Also, the planners were relatively similar 
in relative job status. I have footnoted the significance of both those items in the table of 
critical incidents for consideration. 
The facilitator of this trial noted that this group appeared to be relatively lackadaisical 
toward their task. And, I noted that this planner group appeared to be weak in 
graphical/spatial resource, a trait I ascribed to the planners’ disregard for details.  
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Table V-1   Trial: FM-T1. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Poor effort to 
grasp instructions e 
Repeated requests for interpretations about 
instructions with more stringent 
assumptions being made that necessary 
undisciplined words(-) 
Casual conversation unrelated 
to task 
Waste of valuable time and not carrying fair 
share of mental workload undisciplined - 
Poor comprehension of written 
and oral communication 
Repeated questions to the facilitator which 
all received the same unhelpful answer 
disregard to 
details meaning (-) 
Poor work space organization 
Table space was too small to enable 
planners to adequately spread out puzzle 
and grasp problem 
disregard for 
means - 
Taking a phone call during 
activity 
Distraction of others and demonstrated 
relative disregard of others working dissonant  - 
Suggestions receive poor/no 
support 
Valuable suggestion about how to arrange 
pieces went for naught due to false 
interpretation of instructions 
low self 
doubt words (-) 
Leaderless collective decision 
process f 
Failure to converge ideas or understandings 
for the benefit of all undisciplined words (-) 
Relative lack of intensity e 
Most of time was expended talking about 
how to help operators solve problem but not 
doing so 
probes 
novelty meaning (-) 
Failure to grasp appropriate 
boundaries of instructions 
Group failed to produce understandable 
instructions for operators 
disregard to 
details meaning (-) 
Poor graphical/spatial dexterity  
Inability to conceive an instruction 
approach which could be understood by the 
operators 
disregard to 
details meaning (-) 
Miscommunication with 
operators during instruction 
period 
Operators were left with no written or 
graphical instructions and little ability to 
complete the puzzle 
undisciplined words (-) 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations made 
of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: Cognitive 
Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors and 
innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
e The facilitator observed that the subjects were impatient to get to their field assignments and displayed low 
motivation. 
f All three planners had similar Relative Job Status which seemed to work against convergence of ideas 
 
  
 The words or phrases used to classify a critical incident (observed behavior and its 
consequence) as to its manifest style relate to typical behaviors along the adaption-innovation 
bipolar continuum. Words used to classify manifest level should be considered in 
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conjunction with the stylistic description. In the case of the first critical incident the planners 
asked what they could do and were told to read the answer sheet. The words they used did 
not build toward rising to a new knowledge level. I consequently indicated a negative 
valence (-) to describe unconstructive facets of cognitive level. Because multiple questions 
were asked to the facilitator and to which the same reply was always given (everything you 
need to know is on the instructions) I deemed that series of interchanges to be indicative of a 
lower cognitive level, as indicated by the lowest level of communicative act or boundary 
object (words) with a negative valence. My view is that there was no substantive meaning 
acquired by the words spoken, hence the negative valence. In a later query planner Pat asked 
yet another question about writing instructions for the operators in which he interpreted the 
response much more severely than he should have; I scored this as meaning (-) to imply some 
level of understand was achieved during the discourse but, unfortunately, it was non-
constructive. One critical incident which could have changed this outcome involved a 
suggestion by planner Mel when he said they could place the three puzzle groups side by side 
so as to provide a clue to the puzzle for the operators. This was dismissively rejected by 
planner Pat who displayed low self doubt in his assertion that, “We can’t assemble the 
puzzle,” as if the suggestion implied that. I considered that an indication of a low manifest 
level in action; i.e., words (-).  
The critical consequential behaviors for the operators’ subteam in this trial are 
relatively moot since the facilitator did not video the actual instructions that the planners 
gave to the operators. Consequently, it was difficult to assess the quality of communication 
that occurred there. However, the operators were recorded during their deliberations. They 
were slow to move but made a critical error by the suggestion of pushing the three groups 
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together and mixing the pieces up. Due to the poor quality of instructions received by the 
operators it was virtually impossible for them to have assembled the puzzle.  
 
 3.2 Wilmington WIL-T2 
 Critical consequential behaviors for the Wilmington Trial WIL-T2 are shown below 
in Table V-2. This trial also had a three-person planning subteam. This was a role preferred 
trial. The planners in this case were relatively more adaptive.  
 This planner group had a KAI mean score of only 82 points, a moderately adaptive 
team. However, the KAI scores ranged from 72 to 93 points, a significant 21 points. KAI 
score differences of over 10 points can contribute to difficulty in communication and 
differences of over 15 points can lead to serious communication and trust difficulties. 
Challenges in group problem solving when significant diversity is present were demonstrated 
in this trial. In addition to the style challenge, this group had three planners who are at the 
same relative hierarchical level in the organization. In addition to the problem of relative job 
status, this planner group was relatively long tenured in the organization (14, 18, and 12 
years). This fact coupled with the relative job status worked to suppress anyone’s willingness 
to step up to assume the leader role.  
 In the initial critical incidents listed in Table V-2 it was interesting to note that these 
three planners read considerable more prohibitions and restrictions into the instructions sheet 
than were actually there. In this case I can see how the style, which I called compliant and 
which might also reflect significant risk-aversion, clouded the meaning of information 
conveyed by the instructions. Additionally, I recorded a critical incident at the end of the 
planner deliberations where they left no instructions either written or oral for the operators. I 
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Table V-2   Trial: WIL-T2. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Poor effectiveness in reading 
instructions 
Did not build a collective understanding 
of rules compliant meaning (-) 
Laser focus on a single 
solution concept Missed other possible solution techniques too focused - 
Ignoring good suggestion 
about sketching pieces on 
pattern sheet 
Idea went unused  safe meaning (-) 
Lack of assertiveness by idea 
creator Idea went unused 
high self 
doubt - 
Poor listening by members Non-convergent collaboration problem resolver words (-) 
Lack of confidence by idea 
creator 
Failed to leave sketch that would have 
been a valuable instruction tool for the 
operators 
high self 
doubt meaning (-) 
Leaderless collective decision 
process 
Failure to converge ideas or 
understandings for the benefit of all 
makes goals 
of means words (-) 
Failure to establish boundaries Did not push enough to the limits of rules risk averse - 
Failure to comprehend 
boundaries of instructions 
Group failed to communicate to operators 
even when operators barged in two times 
makes goals 
of means meaning (-) 
Poor graphical/spatial 
dexterity  
Inability to conceive an understandable 
instruction approach  too focused - 
Perceived prohibitions vastly 
exceeded actual instructions 
Neither written nor graphical instructions 
was prepared safe meaning (-) 
Operators knocked on door 
and asked to come in Planners ignored them too focused words (-) 
Operators entered room while 
planners were working 
Planners ignored them again and 
operators left with no information 
makes goals 
of means - 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
  
attributed this to a safe style since the planners did not venture to push the instructions 
envelope. Hence, in both these cases I scored manifest level as meaning (-) to indicate 
meaning was conveyed (or understood) but in an inappropriate way.  
 This planner subteam displayed classic high adapter (style) behavior in its laser focus 
on a single solution. The two more vocal planners (this too was a three-person planner 
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subteam) appeared to fixate on the only logical approach being creation of three groupings of 
puzzle pieces which would enable the operators to solve the puzzle. There was little dialogue 
pertaining to this aspect of the work so I did not ascribe a manifest level for this critical 
incident. The dominant dyad in this planner group failed to hear (comprehend) planner Bo 
who suggested marking on the pattern sheet to provide a key for the operators. The dominant 
dyad did not acknowledge planner Bo’s idea. And, planner Bo displayed considerable self 
doubt in ceasing further argument. I judged the initial missed communication as words (-) to 
imply there was no indication that the dominant dyad even heard let alone understood the 
suggestion. Also, I ascribed a manifest level of meaning (-) for planner Bo who failed to 
make the dominant dyad understand the idea.  
 The dialogue reported in the previous chapter recounts interesting interaction between 
the relatively more innovative operations subteam and the relatively more adaptive planning 
subteam. I noted a critical incident when, very early during the planners’ deliberations, one 
member of the operating subteam knocked on the door. The facilitator quickly went to the 
door and sent the operators away—inappropriately. Interestingly, the planners seemed to be 
oblivious to the incident. I considered the manifest style attribute too focused, a potential 
pitfall for higher adaptors. Additionally, I noted a second critical incident in which the 
operators actually entered the room and stood beside the table. The planners did not 
acknowledge the operators’ presence and after about 90 seconds the operators left again. This 
time the facilitator said nothing. I called this manifest style attribute makes goals of means.  
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3.3 Charlotte CHL-T1 
 This trial was similar to WIL-T2 in that the three planners were at roughly the same 
hierarchical level in the organization. However, unlike WIL-T2, these three planners were 
relatively low tenured. Being relatively adaptive (KAI mean 85), these planners displayed 
little assertiveness in pushing each other to find the best solution, a common trait of adaptors 
who prefer to maintain group cohesion and cooperation. Thus, as A-I theory would predict, 
they were very polite to each other. This planner group viewed the instructions as particularly 
restrictive and, consequently, prepared no written or graphical instructions. I called this 
manifest style attribute compliant in that they dutifully read the instructions but seemed to 
have little grasp of the meaning, hence I considered the manifest level words (-). 
Like the trial WIL-T2, this planner subteam quickly fixated on creating groupings of 
puzzle pieces and telling the operators how to assemble the puzzle based on those three 
groups. I called this manifest style too focused and assigned manifest level meaning (-).  The 
relative equality in tenure and relative job status may have contributed to the critical incident 
I called tentative leadership. This relates to the compliant nature I mentioned in the first 
critical incident but I have ascribed the style attribute to be rule keeper and the level attribute 
meaning (-). 
This planner subteam mistakenly imputed considerably more prohibitions into the 
instructions sheet than were actually there. I ascribed this manifest style attribute to 
conformity and the corresponding level attribute words (-).  
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Table V-3   Trial: CHL-T1. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Poor effectiveness in reading 
instructions 
Did not build a collective understanding 
of rules compliant words (-) 
Laser focus on a single 
solution concept Missed other possible solution techniques too focused meaning (-) 
Tentative leadership No challenges to collective assumptions and suggestions rule keeper meaning (-) 
Poor graphical/spatial 
dexterity  
Inability to conceive an understandable 
instruction approach  too focused meaning (-) 
Perceived prohibitions vastly 
exceeded actual instructions 
Neither written nor graphical instructions 
was prepared conformity words (-) 
Ineffective and incomplete 
communication with operators 
Operators jumped in too quickly and the 
possibility of further assistance was lost 
disregard to 
details meaning (-) 
Failure to establish boundaries 
Did not push enough to the limits of rules 
and therefore limited the form of 
instruction 
rule keeper words (-) 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
 
One of the critical incidents which contributed significantly to the failure of this trial 
was the planners’ instructions to the operators. This was a puzzling observation given the 
relatively adaptive nature of the planners subteam. Clearly the planners thought they had an 
understandable solution prepared. But, the mental images they held were not effectively 
conveyed. This is a good example of an attempt at objects, models, and maps in 
communicating boundary spanning knowledge in Carlile’s terms. However, the planners 
failed to write or sketch anything for the operators. Thus, when the operators began their 
work there was no additional communication possible. I attributed the style attribute as 
disregard to details, a trait usually associated with more innovative styles. Also, I attributed 
the level attribute as meaning (-).  If the operating subteam had not started their work so 
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quickly perhaps the planners could have orally depicted the solution so that the operators 
might have been successful. It was not certain, however, that with more instruction time the 
planners would have been successful in informing the operators. But, when the operators 
began their work they moved the first set of pieces together as the planners had instructed 
and found one piece was slightly too large, unbeknownst by the planners. This surprise 
resulted in the operators essentially regrouping and pursuing unsuccessful solution paths. 
Unfortunately the operators could not ask further questions once they began assembling the 
puzzle, a point they apparently did not consider before they began, an example of the 
innovative style of the operator subteam. 
 
 3.4 Raleigh RAL-T1 
 Critical consequential behaviors for trial RAL-T1 are shown in Table V-4 below. 
This was a non role preferred trial. On the day of trial there was an absence in the original 
randomly selected planners subteam. I rearranged the teams such that the least adaptive 
member of the operations subteam was moved to the planners subteam. The mean KAI score 
was 103 points, slightly innovative. However, the range of scores increased by 10 points due 
to the last minute change; i.e., from 88 to 118 points. Additionally, this group had three 
alpha-type males who were also relatively highly ranked in the organization.  
 Behaviors within this trial were indicative of those predicted by A-I theory. The three 
alpha-type males serve in leadership roles in the organization, but in different divisions. 
Consequently, when one would appear to be taking charge the others would push in a 
different direction. Unfortunately none of the solution paths was effective in reaching a 
successful solution. 
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Table V-4   Trial: RAL-T1. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Poor effectiveness in reading 
instructions 
Did not build a collective understanding 
of rules 
disregard to 
details words (-) 
Too many ideas and too little 
agreement 
No single idea was developed enough to 
provide adequate instructions 
proliferates 
ideas words (-) 
Large number of ideas but 
narrowly focused 
Only concept involved placing piles on 
table and instructing about procedure 
proliferates 
ideas meaning (-) 
Relatively casual approach Planners lacked intensity as if they would easily solve problem irreverent words (-) 
Three alpha-types dominated 
discussion but no one led 
Large blocks of time were consumed 
discussing one concept after another dissonant words (-) 
Leaderless collective decision 
process 
Failure to converge ideas or 
understandings for the benefit of all 
probes 
novelty meaning (-) 
Failure to comprehend 
boundaries of instructions 
Planners missed all possible forms of 
instruction except oral 
disregard to 
details words (-) 
Poor graphical/spatial 
dexterity  
Inability to conceive an understandable 
instruction approach  
proliferates 
ideas meaning (-) 
Complete failure to 
understand schedule 
requirements 
Planners used all available time in 
discussion and left none for instructing 
operators 
undisciplined words (-) 
Operators tried to assemble 
the puzzle without assistance 
Operators moved the puzzle pieces 
together and failed to solve conformity words (-) 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
 
 The planners in trial RAL-T1 never seemed to grasp the instructions in spite of their 
relative collective intellect. I called a critical incident their poor effectiveness in reading the 
instructions which resulted in no collective understanding of the problem boundaries and 
requirements. I ascribed the manifest style disregard to details, a surprising observation for 
at least one of the planners (Planner Mel KAI 88 is well known for his attention to detail). 
And I ascribed the manifest level words (-) since many words were spoken but there was 
little observable shared meaning that made a positive contribution to the problem. This was 
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particularly evident between planner Mel (KAI 88) and planner Ray (KAI 118), as a 30 point 
KAI score difference would predict.  
 I identified three critical incidents which were caused by the relative high innovative 
trait of proliferation of ideas. Interestingly, the ideas all centered on different combinations of 
the same solution approach; i.e., arranging the puzzle pieces in some kind of systematic 
orientation which would make the solution obvious. I ascribed the manifest level for these as 
words (-) once and meaning (-) twice. The two incidents during which some degree of 
meaning was attained involved the planners’ agreement of a spatial arrangement of the 
pieces. While agreement was reached, the planners were unable to push to a solution of how 
to instruct the operators to use their spatial arrangement, thus I scored a negative valence. 
 Two other critical incidents in this trial occurred as a direct result of cognitive style 
gaps, both of which had to do with understanding the details of the instructions. I classified 
the manifest styles for these two as disregard to details and undisciplined, both classic 
behaviors for more innovative people. And, I ascribed the manifest level words (-) for these 
since it seemed that words were spoken but not really understood. 
 I identified only one critical incident for the operators during the solution period. In 
this trial the planners ran out of time prior to writing any instructions for the operators or 
prior to providing any oral instructions to the operators. Consequently, the operators had little 
chance of successfully solving the puzzle. The planners had left the puzzle pieces grouped 
across the table but the operators, not knowing the intention of the planners, pulled the pieces 
together in a random grouping and made an effort to solve the puzzle. I ascribed the manifest 
style for this incident as conformity. The operators knew the name of the exercise was the 
Hollow Square and, consequently attempted assemble a hollow square but with no success. 
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The three-person operations team exhibited some degree of frustration concerning the 
position that the planning subteam had put them in. The operators made several comments 
which I ascribed to manifest level as words (-) but they really contributed no help toward 
solving the puzzle.  
   
 3.5 Raleigh RAL-T5 
 Critical consequential behaviors for trial RAL-T5 are shown in Table V-5 below. 
This was a non role preferred trial. The planners were moderately innovative, KAI mean of 
106.5. The range of KAI scores varied only 20 points but there were other factors at play in 
this trial which appeared to influence the outcome.  
 Planner Ray was a 63 year old retired college professor. Coincidentally, he was one 
of the professors for planner Pat. However there was a considerable age difference. In fact, 
the average age of Mel, Nat, and Pat was 27.3, roughly 35 years junior to planner Ray. When 
the idea of sketching the puzzle shapes on the pattern sheet arose Ray called it cheating and 
said it was a generational thing. This dampened any additional pursuit of that solution idea 
and the group was unsuccessful. In Table V-5 above I attributed the cause of that moral 
dilemma to dissonant which is a result of abrasive behavior, whether intentional or not. 
Clearly an emotional edge was created by Ray’s comment and with his relatively senior 
status of both age and education the other members made little effective rebuttal and 
contribution. I ascribed the manifest level attribute meaning (-) since clearly a shared 
meaning occurred vis-à-vis the moral dilemma. Unfortunately planner Ray perceived his  
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Table V-5   Trial: RAL-T5. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Poor effectiveness in reading 
instructions 
Did not build a collective understanding 
of rules 
disregard to 
details words (-) 
Many ideas and suggestion Little convergence on a workable method to instruct operators 
proliferates 
ideas words (-) 
Pushed to limits of rules but 
was overruled by alpha-type 
planner 
A moral dilemma was raised which 
prevented the idea from being used dissonant meaning (-) 
Lack of confidence by idea 
creator 
Idea went unused due to excessive 
influence by one planner abrasive meaning (-) 
Relatively casual approach 
Time nearly expired but operators barged 
in only to receive very poor and 
incomplete instructions 
disregard to 
details words (-) 
Two alpha-types dominated 
discussion but no one led 
Failure to converge ideas or 
understandings for the benefit of all 
problem 
finder meaning (-) 
Poor graphical/spatial 
dexterity  
Inability to conceive an understandable 
instruction approach  
disregard to 
details words (-) 
Perceived prohibitions vastly 
exceeded actual instructions 
Neither written nor graphical instructions 
was prepared 
disregard to 
details meaning (-) 
Operators tried to solve puzzle 
without a visual guide 
Operators abandoned the marginal oral 
instructions too quickly 
resolving 
problems meaning (-) 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
 
remarks as objective opinion and the other three planners perceived his remarks as negative 
judgment. Other critical incidents occurred which are noted in Table V-5 which contributed 
to the overall outcome. However, the moral dilemma which played out in this group proved 
to be the dominant critical incident which influenced the outcome. 
 The operators barged into the room prior to being summonsed. Their roughly two 
minutes of oral instructions left them with a marginal understanding of the intention of the 
planners. The planners, as noted in the critical incident concerning perceived prohibitions 
vastly exceeding actual rules, left no written or drawing information for the operators. This 
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was an important observation leading to the next critical incident involving the operators in 
which they tried to solve the puzzle without a visual guide. The operators came close to 
solving the puzzle based on limited instructions but because one of the triangle pieces was in 
the wrong location they abandoned the solution and started from scratch. I ascribed the 
valiant effort by the operators to the manifest style attribute resolving problems, a classic 
adaptor behavior. I ascribed the communication that occurred between the operators to the 
manifest level attribute meaning (-) to indicate the fact that some shared understanding 
occurred but not constructive.  
 
4. Successful Trials: Critical Observations 
 There were seven successful trials in this experimental program. Behaviors observed 
during these trials were revealing in terms of group interaction and good decision processes. 
There were instances of behaviors which A-I theory would predict and some surprising 
deviations. Also, in contrast to the manifest level observations made in the unsuccessful trials 
there were many more synergistic examples in the successful trials, not unexpectedly.  I will 
note both manifest style attributes and manifest level attributes in tables similar to those used 
with the unsuccessful trials. Again, I will classify critical consequential behaviors with the 
same scheme introduced above. And, I will comment on some of the more instructional or 
outstanding examples of manifest style and manifest level. 
  
 4.1 Clearwater CW-T1 
 Critical consequential behaviors for the Clearwater trial CW-T1 are shown in Table 
V-6. This trial consisted of a four-person planner subteam. This was a role preferred trial. 
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These planners had a KAI mean score of 88 points, slightly adaptive. The range of KAI 
scores, however, was 23 points. The range of KAI scores could have resulted in 
communication and style difficulties but none was observed. A contributing factor to the 
relative harmony in such a diverse group can be attributed to the natural hierarchy that this 
group enjoyed. A 23 year veteran who is also a high ranking leader in the company was 
accompanied by a fairly high ranking professional and two lower ranking professionals. This 
group’s problem-solving behavior exemplifies successful group behavior. The group made 
ample plans and instructions for their operating team and the operating team successfully 
completed the puzzle in a few minutes.  
Table V-6   Trial: CW-T1. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Thorough reading of 
instructions 
Quickly developed and resolved 
questions precision synergy 
Natural group leader probed 
the boundaries of the problem 
A safe condition was created for pushing 
ideas 
domain 
authority meaning (+) 
A near-boundary idea was 
floated and the natural leader 
quickly affirmed it 
A solution concept was developed  
rarely 
challenges 
rules 
meaning (+) 
All planners made suggestions 
supporting the solution 
No communication problems which 
diverted creative energy—convergent 
solution 
dependable synergy 
Group determined that they 
must go instruct the operators 
Operators had necessary and sufficient 
instructions efficiency meaning (+) 
Group divided itself into 
sketchers and instructors Wise allocation of resources discipline synergy 
Clearing of table before 
operators return over concern 
of rule breaking 
Demonstrated concern about right and 
wrong rule keeper meaning (+) 
Operators assumed they could 
write on the puzzle pieces 
Operators were able to easily solve the 
puzzle and keep up with the pieces which 
were placed 
takes control synergy 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
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 For illustrative purposes I will discuss a few of the critical incidents which were most 
important to the successful execution of this trial. Firstly, I observed the planners thoroughly 
reading and discussing the instructions, a manifest style attribute I called precision. The 
discourse in which the planners engaged included both questions and answers. They probed 
the boundaries of the problem and affirmed other’s opinions, a manifest level attribute I 
called synergy. Similar to the hierarchical conception of Carlile’s three knowledge 
boundaries and processes, this served as both the syntactical (a language structure was 
hammered out by the planners) and the semantic (shared meaning in which differences and 
dependencies were illuminated) were achieved. I ascribed this to manifest level attribute 
meaning (+).  
 A second critical incident which proved important was the natural group leader 
emergence and his subsequent probing the boundary of instructions. I noted the consequence 
of this as making the other planners feel comfortable in their ideation, a manifest style 
attribute I called domain authority. The corresponding manifest level attribute was meaning 
(+) as the planners collectively developed constructive interpretation of the instructions in 
such a way as to lead toward the successful solution of the puzzle.  
 The last critical incident observed during the planners’ deliberation involved the idea 
in which planner Dale suggested sketching the puzzle shapes on the back of the pattern sheet. 
Such an idea had been rejected by other trials but the natural leader, as mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, supported the idea thereby allowing it to fully blossom into the solution 
concept. I ascribed this manifest style attribute as rarely challenges rules unless assured of 
strong support which the natural team leader provided. The manifest level attribute was 
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called meaning (+) as the planner group achieved shared understanding about their solution 
following this exchange of questions and answers.  
 I noted the operators’ critical incident concerning their assumption of “there are no 
rules” and writing on the puzzle pieces. Consequently the operators were able to keep up 
with the pieces as they placed them and solve the puzzle quickly. This operators’ subteam 
was very slightly innovative and demonstrated that in their behavior concerning the question 
of writing on the puzzle pieces, a manifest style attribute I called takes control. They worked 
well together in discussing how to solve the puzzle and make it fit exactly correctly. I 
ascribed a manifest level attribute of synergy to this operators subteam activity. The operators 
displayed some adaptive tendencies in their meticulous assembly of the puzzle, perhaps 
because of their modest KAI score (mean 99.3).  
  
 4.2 Clearwater CW-T2 
 Critical consequential behaviors for the Clearwater trial CW-T2 are shown in Table 
V-7. This was a four person planning subteam. The planners had a mean KAI score of 105.3 
points, moderately innovative. The range of KAI scores, however, was 21 points. This was a 
non role preferred trial. This trial was one of two all-female planning subteams. Since this 
was an all-female group the mean KAI score of 105.3 means this was somewhat more 
innovative in natural problem solving preferences than had it been composed of all men—
population samples in the US indicate mean KAI scores for women are about 91 points—
nearly one standard deviation below the mean score for this planning group. 
 These planners read parts of the instructions aloud as if they might better understand 
if they heard the words spoken. I reported this critical incident as all members orally  
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Table V-7   Trial: CW-T2. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Casual reading of instructions Developed a partial understanding of boundary 
disregard to 
details meaning (+) 
All members orally 
contributed Group quickly began working together 
probes 
novelty synergy 
A creative idea was suggested 
and the members debated its 
appropriateness 
A solution concept was developed  outside box synergy 
All planners made suggestions 
supporting the solution 
No communication problems which 
diverted creative energy—convergent 
solution 
confident synergy 
Planners discussed who would 
be best able to communicate 
with operators 
An engineer was selected since the 
operators were all engineers 
problem 
finder meaning (+) 
Planners sit and idly chat after 
finding a solution 
Planners did not prepare a written plan 
and were lucky to have time for oral 
instructions to operators 
disregard to 
details meaning (-) 
Planners provided oral 
instructions to operators 
Operators had just sufficient instructions 
to complete the task undisciplined meaning (+) 
Operators carefully considered 
their task prior to beginning 
The four keys were kept undisturbed 
prior to the total assembly precision synergy 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
 
contributed. I ascribed this manifest style to the attribute probes novelty. Also, the collective 
dialogue when ensued during this time was an example of manifest level that I termed 
synergy. This occurrence was the foundation for the next critical incident, which I called a 
creative idea suggested. Based on the novel idea, which I termed the manifest style attribute 
outside box a solution was formulated. The planners contributed oral support and 
encouragement for this novel solution thereby demonstrating the manifest level attribute 
synergy.  
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 A less positive critical incident occurred after planners conceived the solution. They 
sat idly and chatted for several minutes, apparently unaware of their responsibility to 
summons the operators and instruct them on how to assemble the puzzle. I called the 
manifest style attribute in this instance disregard to details, a common pitfall for innovators. 
The planners had developed some sense of understanding about the rules unfortunately they 
were incomplete. I viewed the manifest level attribute meaning (-) in this case. 
 I noted a critical incident involving planners barging into the room early. I ascribed a 
manifest style attribute of conformity to the operators in consideration of their zeal to be 
productive. There was no particular manifest level displayed in this but the operators’ effort 
saved the planners from self-destructing. Had the planners sat another two or three minutes 
they would have been unable to provide oral instruction to the operators. And there was no 
indication that the planners were going to act to retrieve the operators. After the operators 
entered the room there was an awkward moment before the designated planner provided 
relatively complete instructions.  
 I observed a critical incident involving the operators during their portion of the 
exercise. The operators were very careful to not move all the pieces around but to take 
considerable time prior to moving even the first piece. I considered the manifest style 
attribute in this instance to be precision. And, the manifest level attribute was synergy. In this 
case the operators were very helpful to solving the puzzle, in spite of the relatively simple 
solution concept.  
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 4.3 Charlotte CHL-T2 
 Critical consequential behaviors for the Charlotte trial CHL-T2 are shown in Table V-
8. This was a four person planning subteam and was role preferred. The planners had a mean 
KAI score of 81 points, medium adaptive. The range of KAI scores, however, was 22 points 
slightly over the prescription of 20 points. The planners were similar in hierarchical position 
within the company. I should note that the metric used as a proxy for cognitive level, as 
shown earlier in Table IV-11 was -0.99, or about one standard deviation below the mean of 
the factor scores. I will comment on a few of the critical incidents for illumination beyond 
what is presented in the chart.  
 This trial demonstrated two parallel solution concepts, one successful and one 
unsuccessful. The high adaptor who wrestled with a moral dilemma as to the ability of her 
team to present a sketch of the puzzle pieces pursued a completely different solution. She 
wrote a lengthy description of how the operators might assemble the four groups of puzzle 
pieces by sliding them together in a certain sequence. I cited this occurrence as a critical 
incident as moral issues with solution by the most adaptive of the planners. I ascribed this 
manifest style to rule keeper, a common challenge for high adaptors. The corresponding 
manifest level attribute was meaning (-) as I inferred that the planner had understood 
instructions but, unfortunately, incorrectly or more restrictively than necessary.  
 The other planners, whom I will call a triad, worked together to draw the puzzle 
pieces on the pattern sheet, an option that they were free to pursue. I should note that this 
solution technique was a boundary edge solution, implying that it required pushing the rules 
to the limit. In this case I cited two critical incidents involving this boundary edge work by 
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Table V-8   Trial: CHL-T2. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Casual reading of instructions Developed a partial understanding of boundary 
disregard to 
details meaning (-) 
All members orally 
contributed Group quickly began working together efficiency meaning (+) 
Three members supported a 
boundary pushing idea A solution concept was determined 
rarely 
challenges 
rules 
meaning (+) 
Most adaptive planner 
displays moral issues with 
solution 
Pursues an independent solution concept rule keeper meaning (-) 
Boundary pushing planners 
persist argument of legitimacy Objector acquiesces but with some doubt 
challenged 
rules 
cautiously 
synergy 
Operators received no oral 
instructions from planners 
Operator took control with misleading 
instructions 
low self 
doubt words (-) 
Controlling operator took 
phone call 
Other operators found sketch solution and 
solved puzzle 
challenge 
status quo synergy  
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
 
the triad: first the triad supporting the boundary pushing idea and  second the triad argues for 
legitimacy of solution. I ascribed the manifest style attribute in both cases to be challenge 
rules rarely. Adaptors only challenge rules when they have strong support, which they 
received from the triad. Note that they had considerable argument with the planner with the 
moral dilemma concerning the appropriateness of that solution. I ascribed a manifest level 
attribute of synergy for both these critical incidents as they demonstrate dialogue and probing 
the limits of a question.  
 Due to the planner subteam using all the 25 minute period deliberating there was no 
time left for instructions to the operators. I noted a critical incident for the operators that they 
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received no oral instructions. As a result the operators took seats at the table and ultimately 
found the instructions written by the moral dilemma planner which were no help. I noted that 
one operator began to read these instructions and dominated the operators’ activity. I called 
this manifest style to be low self doubt, particularly for the dominating operator. I ascribed 
the manifest level attribute to words (-) to capture the fact that while words were spoken they 
contributed nothing positive toward the solution. 
 I noted another critical incident when the dominating operator took a cell phone call 
and, thereby, was not able to continue reading the meaningless instructions. It was during 
that cell phone call that the other operators found the sketch solution produced by the triad 
and commenced to solve the puzzle immediately. This manifest style was a challenge to 
status quo (of the dominating operator and his written instructions) and I called the 
corresponding manifest level attribute synergy. 
 
 4.4 Wilmington WIL-T1 
 Critical consequential behaviors for the Wilmington trial WIL-T1 are shown in Table 
V-9. This was a four person planning subteam and was role preferred. The planners had a 
mean KAI score of 84.5 points, medium adaptive. The range of KAI scores was only 7 
points, therefore they were quite similar in preferred cognitive style. One of the planners was 
the co-founder of the organization and was significantly separated from the other planners 
hierarchically. The proxy for cognitive level factor score was about one standard deviation 
above the mean.  
 I have cited the creative idea solution by planner Bo as a critical incident. Its 
consequence was the ending of debate and random conversation about how to solve the 
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problem. I ascribe the manifest style to domain authority and the corresponding manifest 
level attribute to meaning (+) for this incident. The second, but related, critical incident 
concerning the selection of the solution was the extensive explanation that planner Bo 
provided for the other planners. Several questions were asked and it was clear that the other 
planners did not immediately catch on to the idea until much exchange. The outcome of this 
extensive explanation was shared understanding. I ascribed the manifest style attribute 
compliant to capture the behavior of the adaptive planning team. I also ascribed the manifest 
level attribute synergy for the collective exchange and learning that was evidenced at this 
trial. Planner Bo was individually responsible for conceiving the solution concept for this 
trial, helping the other planners understand it, preparing the puzzle pieces, and instructing 
Table V-9   Trial: WIL-T1. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Thorough reading of 
instructions 
Developed a solid understanding of 
boundary precision meaning (+) 
One planner conceived 
creative idea after 
considerable thought  
A very good solution ended debate about 
different alternatives 
domain 
authority meaning (+) 
Senior executive led the 
planners to understand his 
solution 
Other planners soon understood and 
contributed compliant synergy 
Senior executive observed that 
orientation of groups needed 
attention 
Simplified the ultimate instructions for 
the operators 
problem 
resolver synergy 
Planners allocated time to 
fully inform operators how to 
solve puzzle 
Operators had adequate instructions for 
solution efficiency meaning (+) 
Operators asked few questions 
prior to beginning task 
Some confusion occurred as a result of 
misperceptions about final location of 
puzzle 
disregard to 
details words (-) 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
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the operators as to the proper assembly. This is a good example of when subject-matter 
expertise and managerial position combine for a positive outcome.  
 Because of the excellent solution instructions prepared and delivered to the operators 
there were few incidents which rise to a level of criticality in the operators’ deliberations. 
However, one critical event was noted involving the placement of the puzzle after its 
assembly. I noted that the operators asked few questions prior to beginning assembly. That 
resulted in some confusion as to where the assembled puzzle should be placed on the table. I 
ascribed the manifest style attribute for this incident to disregard to details. I ascribed the 
manifest level attribute for this case to be meaning (-). Clearly words were spoken and heard 
by the different operators. But also it was clear that there were different interpretations of 
those words.  
 Another example, also not reported as a critical incident but descriptive of typical 
innovator behaviors, occurred with respect to the small square templates that were in the 
center of the puzzle. One of the operators understood the instructions to say leave the small 
paper squares in place in the completed puzzle and some heard otherwise. As this operations’ 
subteam was relatively more innovative it was in keeping with expected behaviors that one of 
them asked, “…do you think we should have asked more questions before we jumped right 
in,” a comment which revealed the operators’ innovative problem solving style. This was a 
successful trial.  
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 4.5 Raleigh RAL-T2 
 Critical consequential behaviors for the Raleigh trial RAL-T2 are shown in Table V-
10. This was a four person planning subteam and was role preferred. The planners had a 
mean KAI score of 75.8 points, or about 1.3 standard deviations below the mean.  The 
planners’ range of KAI scores was 17 points. The planners’ relative job status did not appear 
to influence any outcome. The operators KAI raw score mean was 104, or +0.69 factor score. 
The cognitive level proxy was -0.51 for the planners and -0.14 for the operators. 
 This planning subteam actually presented two different but completely sufficient 
solutions. While they were a relatively high adaptor group they did not limit their idea 
generation to just one. In addition, the second idea was sufficiently close to the instruction 
boundary that they wrestled with the appropriateness of the approach for creative idea 
number two.  
In spite of considerable study of the instructions the planners missed their 
responsibility to fetch the operators and provide them instructions. Fortunately for this 
planning group they provided abundant written and graphical instructions for the operators so 
no additional oral instructions were necessary. I will briefly expand on several of the noted 
critical incidents and corresponding cognitive styles and levels. 
Planner Abe (KAI 67) conceived solution concept number one and was considered a 
critical incident. This solution was explained with great detail by planner Abe and it strictly 
fit well within the bounds of the instructions. I considered this incident to demonstrate 
manifest style as compliant, as would be expected by a relatively high adaptor. The adaptor 
was successful in explaining his solution to the other planners. I ascribed the manifest level 
attribute meaning (+) in this incident.  
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Table V-10   Trial: RAL-T2. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Relatively thorough  reading 
of instructions 
Developed a partial understanding of 
boundary precision meaning (-) 
All members orally 
contributed Group quickly began working together 
group 
cohesion words (+) 
Creative idea number one 
offered by a member A solution concept was determined compliant meaning (+) 
Detailed written instructions 
were developed for idea 
number one 
Solution was sufficient by itself conformity synergy 
Creative idea number two was 
advanced and supported by 
others 
Another solution concept was determined probes novelty synergy 
Other three planners worked 
on second creative idea 
A second solution concept was fully 
developed 
rule 
challenge 
support 
synergy 
Only written and graphical 
instructions were provided for 
operators 
Operators looked for instructions prior to 
moving puzzle pieces 
discover 
problem meaning (+) 
Operator called the north 
arrows “nerdy” 
Demonstrated disregard of Planner’s 
means of communication irreverent meaning (+) 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
 
The other planners understood solution one but were unsatisfied as to its sufficiency. 
Thus, the other three planners, a triad, developed a creative idea that I dubbed creative idea 
number two and identified it as a critical incident. I ascribed their manifest style as probes 
novelty, a behavior that is more usually descriptive of innovators. I ascribed their manifest 
level as synergy; clearly the triad worked hard to provide this second solution.  
Another critical incident related to creative solution number two had to do with 
building a consensus as to the propriety of solution number two. This considerable dialogue 
demonstrated how ideas opened minds and how minds were changed during the discourse. I 
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ascribed the manifest style attribute rule challenge support.. As mentioned above, adaptors 
require strong support for decisions that are near the boundary. Also, I ascribed the manifest 
level attribute as synergy, a good example of how dialogue enabled learning.   
Due to the major mistake by the planners on the time requirements the operators were 
not given any oral instructions. I noted a critical incident where only written and graphical 
instructions were provided for operators. The consequence of that was the operators had to 
figure out what they were tasked to do with only written and graphical material. The 
relatively more innovative operators exhibited surprising restraint as they approached the 
problem and carefully read over the detailed instructions that planner Abe had prepared while 
the planner triad was creating its second solution. I ascribed this manifest style as discover 
problem to capture the operators’ behavior upon entering the room. Also, the operators had 
constructive dialogue that built consensus as to what they needed to do. I ascribed the 
manifest level as meaning (+) to capture the obvious shared understanding.  
I identified an interesting but not necessarily critical incident involving an operator 
calling part of the planners’ written instructions nerdy. The comment demonstrated a relative 
distain of the planners’ means of communication. This was a manifest style I called 
irreverent, a behavior typical of innovators. Interestingly, this comment was made by 
operator Ray (KAI 115) and the written instructions in question were produced by planner 
Abe (KAI 67). This represents a KAI range of nearly 50 points and explains the wide 
variation such cognitive style differences exhibit. In spite of the fact that the nerdy comment 
was somewhat derisive, it was humorous and contributed to the understanding of what the 
planners were trying to convey. Thus, I ascribed a manifest level attribute meaning (+) to this 
incident.  
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 Although the dialogue shown in the previous chapter did not report it I was puzzled 
by the relatively high adaptive planner group missing the time constraints. During the post 
exercise discussion I asked the planners why they did not retrieve the operators and provide 
them oral instructions. Planner Abe (KAI 67) said, “Well…you’re everybody’s boss and 
when you send somebody away to a room I expect they will stay there until you send for 
them back.” This is an example of unwitting influence during administration of experiments 
that should be considered for future experiments. In spite of the problems with the prescribed 
time, Trial RAL-T2 was successful.  
 
 4.6 Raleigh RAL-T3 
 Critical consequential behaviors for the Raleigh trial RAL-T3 are shown in Table V-
11. This was a four person planning subteam and was non role preferred. The planners had a 
mean KAI score of 106.7 points, slightly innovative. The range of planner KAI scores was 21 
points. The range of KAI mean scores between the planners and the operators was 27 points. 
Relative job status did not appear to influence the outcome. The level proxy for the planner 
subteam was about one standard deviation above the mean. The level proxy for the operators 
was right at the mean factor score.  
 The planners for this trial pushed the limits of the instructions more than any other 
group. They moved quickly from one concept to another with no hesitation, an attribute that I 
ascribe to the relative innovativeness of the group. The female member of the group had a 
KAI score of 116 making her considerably innovative. She was quite vocal during the 
discussion and was quick to say, “Yes, let’s do it…” for almost any suggestion that was 
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made. I will elaborate on a few of the critical incidents depicted in Table V-11 to illuminate 
both manifest styles and manifest levels observed. 
Table V-11   Trial: RAL-T3. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Relatively casual  reading of 
instructions 
Developed a partial understanding of 
boundary 
disregard to 
details words (+) 
All members orally 
contributed Group quickly began working together 
proliferates 
ideas words (+) 
Idea offered by a member Group rallied behind  problem finder meaning (+) 
Alternative idea offered by a 
member Group changes almost immediately 
proliferates 
ideas synergy 
Brief oral instructions were 
provided to operators 
Due to simple solution planners provided, 
limited oral instructions were sufficient undisciplined meaning (+) 
Operators very cautious about 
apparent solution 
It took longer for the operators to 
assemble the puzzle that expected compliant - 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
 
 One incident that proved critical was the relatively casual reading of the instructions. 
The consequence of that was only a partial understanding of the instructions. The obvious 
manifest level attribute was disregard to details, a common trait of innovators. There were 
considerable words spoken during the reading of the instructions. However there was scant 
evidence of meaningful understanding. I will ascribe manifest level as words (+) to give the 
planners credit for comprehending a few of the rules, not that they rigidly adhered to them.  
 I noted two examples of planners collaborating with new ideas. I ascribed this 
manifest style to proliferates ideas as would be expected with an innovative planner subteam. 
The first occasion of that I deemed to be superficial in manifest level and classified it words 
(+) for similar reasons I mentioned with the causal reading of instructions above. The second 
  231
occasion of manifest style being proliferates ideas included a more constructive dialogue 
which resulted in the successful solution. Thus, I ascribed a manifest level attribute synergy 
for this incident.  
 This planner subteam missed the time constraints imposed by the instructions as 
might be expected by innovators. I called the brief oral instructions to the operators a critical 
incident. The consequence of those oral instructions resulted in the operators being able to 
solve the puzzle. The fact of the limited time remaining for the oral instructions (actually the 
operators barged into the room about three minutes before the planners’ time lapsed) led me 
to ascribe this manifest style undisciplined in consideration of the planners’ obliviousness to 
the time constraints. I did, however ascribe manifest level as meaning (+) by virtue that 
sufficient instructions were conveyed to enable the operators to solve the puzzle.   
 Except for the prohibition against touching other’s pieces the planners seemed 
relatively oblivious to the rules. Their final solution idea, the exploded puzzle, was simple 
enough that the operators could easily assemble the puzzle. 
 The operators were very cautious about the apparent solution, which I cited as a 
critical incident. The consequence of that was the operators took considerably longer to solve 
the puzzle than would have otherwise been expected. I ascribed the operators’ manifest style 
as compliant to capture the very concerted effort by the operator to complete the puzzle 
correctly. I ascribed the dialogue that transpired during the operators’ deliberations as 
manifest level meaning (+).  
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4.7 Raleigh RAL-T4 
 Critical consequential behaviors for the Raleigh trial RAL-T4 are shown in Table V-
12. This was a four person planning subteam and was non role preferred. The planners had a 
mean KAI score of 120 points or about 1.8 standard deviations above the mean; i.e., 
somewhat innovative. Conversely, the operators mean KAI score was 85 points or about 0.7 
standard deviations below the mean. The range of planners’ KAI scores was 24 points. The 
most innovative of the four planners was also the most senior in terms of relative job status. 
This trial was almost a carbon copy of the Wilmington WIL-T1 trial except for role 
reversal; i.e., this one was a non role preferred planning team and a non role preferred 
operating team. The interesting difference was the WIL-T1 planners’ mean KAI score was 
84.5 versus RAL-T4 whose planners’ mean KAI score was 120. This difference would 
suggest considerable difference in problem-solving style. As it turned out, a senior executive 
in RAL-T4 had the same idea that a senior executive in WIL-T1 had—making a center 2-
inch square template around which to position all the puzzle pieces. The other three planners 
for RAL-T4 contributed more to the solution than those for WIL-T1; e.g., one of the 
younger, less tenured planners raised the point about the orientation of the puzzle pieces. 
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Table V-12   Trial: RAL-T4. Group Decision-Process Effects and Causes a 
Cognitive 
 Causal Attribution b Observed Behavior Consequence 
Manifest 
Style c 
Manifest 
Level d 
Thorough reading of 
instructions 
Developed a solid understanding of 
boundary precision synergy 
One planner conceived 
creative idea after reading 
instructions 
A very good solution ended debate about 
different alternatives 
probes 
novelty synergy 
Senior executive led the 
planners to understand his 
solution 
Other planners soon understood and 
contributed confident meaning (+) 
Planners observed that 
orientation of groups needed 
attention 
Simplified the ultimate instructions for 
the operators 
problem 
finder synergy 
Planners had  time to fully 
inform operators how to solve 
puzzle 
Operators had ample time to query 
Planners efficiency synergy 
Operators asked important 
boundary-seeking questions 
Operators did not begin until puzzle piece 
locations were documented prudence synergy 
Operators questioned each 
puzzle piece move prior to the 
move 
Abundance of caution resulted in flawless 
solution in relatively short time period discipline synergy 
a The examples of behaviors and their consequences are based on the most significant of the observations 
made of the recorded experiments following the critical incidents technique.  
b The classification scheme used in the causal attribution of  behavior is divided into two categories: 
Cognitive Style from Kirton’s A-I theory and Cognitive Level using Carlile’s boundary-spanning objects.  
c The itemized traits in cognitive style come from the abbreviated list of behavior descriptions of adaptors 
and innovators shown in Table I-1 above. 
d The valence indications (-) and (+) indicate the directional impact of the communicative act 
 
Some differences in overall implementation of the planners’ task were evident and were as 
predicted by A-I theory. I will elaborate on a few of the critical incidents defined in Table V-
12 to help illustrate the manifest style and manifest level demonstrated in this trial.  
 The initial critical incident which bears reporting was a thorough reading of the 
instructions. The obvious consequence of that was the development of a relatively solid 
understanding of the problem boundaries. I ascribed this manifest style as precision. And, I 
ascribed the corresponding manifest level as synergy. The dialogue which accompanied this 
portion of the deliberations was constructive and demonstrated the building of common 
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understanding. I should note that it was uncharacteristic of a relatively high innovative 
planner subteam to demonstrate such adaptive traits in this instance.  
 The second critical incident worth noting concerned the conception of a creative 
solution by the senior planner. As mentioned, this was the same solution that was observed in 
the WIL-T1 trial. This solution was developed by planner Ray during which time the other 
planners were debating different approaches. The consequence of Ray’s idea ended 
discussion about the different alternatives to a solution. I ascribed a manifest style attribute 
probes novelty to capture the ideation which this trial exhibited. And, I ascribed a manifest 
level synergy to capture the fact that all the planners participated in making Ray’s solution be 
successful. This is a great example of the fact that all people are creative but with different 
styles and different levels. Recall planner Bo in WIL-T1 who conceived the same solution. 
Bo’s KAI score was 85 and his level factor score was 1.99. In contrast, for trial RAL-T4, 
planner Ray conceived the same solution and his KAI score was 132 or 47 points more 
innovative that Bo’s. Ray’s level factor score was 1.56, a comparable score to Bo’s.   
 Another critical incident that warranted attention was the planners taking time to fully 
inform the operators about solving the puzzle. The consequence was that the operators had 
ample time to solve the puzzle. What was not mentioned in this particular description was the 
fact that after the planners determined their solution technique they sat for quite a while until 
they realized that they had to also bring the operators back into the room and inform them 
how to assemble the puzzle during the 25 minute time limit. This was discovered about 20 
minutes into the process and to the credit of the planners they brought the operators in and 
explained their task. I ascribed the manifest style as efficiency in spite of the relative 
haphazard nature of the decision process. However, I would suggest that this innovative 
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planner subteam was relatively tangential or non-linear in its approach, a trait common with 
high innovators. Also, I ascribed the manifest level as synergy since the planners successfully 
agreed to the necessary actions within the prescribed time limit.  
 A critical incident associated with the operators involved the important boundary-
seeking questions the operators asked of the planners before they began solving the puzzle. 
The consequence of that query was that the operators documented all the puzzle piece 
locations prior to the commencement of solution. Since the operators were high adaptors this 
behavior was expected. I ascribed the manifest style as prudence, a common characteristic of 
adaptors. I ascribed the manifest level attribute synergy to reflect the fact that all the 
operators participated actively in asking questions and making careful decisions before 
acting. One example of the relatively extreme degree of adaptive behavior the operators 
exhibited was in the operators’ action to photograph the location of the puzzle pieces prior to 
any movement of pieces. This was, perhaps, the most extreme example of adaptive behavior 
during these experiments.  
 
5. Summation 
 I have coalesced fragments of critical incidents reported in the previous chapter into 
larger units of meaningful consequential behavior as presented in this chapter. By so doing I 
am confident that this method would produce substantially similar findings if performed by 
other trained observers. This is a necessary perquisite for any scientific endeavor to be 
considered valid. In spite of my effort to make objective observations concerning critical 
incidents this process includes considerable subjectivity, a fact I readily admit. 
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 The following chapter reports quantitative findings and, consequently, is decidedly 
objective. In the last chapter I will blend the two sets of findings for fuller understanding of 
the implications of this research program. 
  
CHAPTER VI  QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 
 
1. Overview 
 This research was conducted in a professional services organization and participants 
were employees of the organization. I called the small groups formed for the experiment 
intact groups. This contrasts with the prior research which, in both cases, was set in a 
university context. Hammerschmidt’s (1996) work was with mid-career managers who were 
participating in a leadership training program. For the most part these people were unfamiliar 
with each other and groups which were assembled with them were classified as ad hoc. 
Similarly, Scott (2007) conducted her experiment with undergraduate students who had no 
prior working relationship and likewise those groups which were formed for Scott’s 
experiment were deemed ad hoc. A fundamental premise of my hypotheses is the integrative 
effect that an organization (institution) has for its participants. That integrating effect may be 
observed by the graphical depiction of cognitive schema occurring within an organization (or 
institution) as shown in Figure IV-3. The five boxes inside the dotted line represent an 
individual decision maker. Inside the dotted line note the term climate. This follows the early 
work of Lewin et al. (1939) and significant later work led by Schneider (1975, 1983a+b, 
1983b, 1987, and 1990) and others. That led me to hypothesize better decision outcomes 
from intact groups versus ad hoc groups, ceteris paribus. This chapter will report significant 
quantitative findings from this research and from the comparative research, will summarize 
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the hypothesis testing, and will present other findings from information recorded during this 
research.  
 The hypothesis testing which follows was formulated as a comparative analysis with 
other similar work. All of the prior work was focused only on cognitive style and was silent 
on cognitive level. Additionally, the cognitive style differences which were previously 
analyzed were not based on the Jablokow-Booth cognitive gap theory introduced and 
extended in Chapter IV.   
 
2. Quantitative Findings 
 The results of my experiments considering cognitive style are shown in tabular form 
in Table VI-1. I have discussed some of the issues related to KAI scores and other 
differences previously. The format used in Table VI-1 is chosen based on the comparative 
studies that I will use for hypothesis testing. Note that the three bottom rows of information 
 
Table VI-1. Creed Findings 
Team Category Description KAI mean s.d. Success Proportion Successes/Trials 
Adaptive Planners 
Innovative Operators Role Preferred 92.99 1.96 
67% 
4/6 
Innovative Planners 
Adaptive Operators  
Non Role 
Preferred 95.93 5.43 
50% 
3/6 
Total Mixed 94.46 4.18 58% 7/12 
Adaptive Planners 
Innovative Operators 
(Trimmed) 
Role Preferred 91.67 1.58 100% 4/4 
Innovative Planners 
Adaptive Operators  
(Trimmed) 
Non Role 
Preferred 96.65 5.74 
60% 
3/5 
Total  
(Trimmed) Mixed 94.78 5.11 
78% 
7/9 
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contained the term “trimmed.” This is based on considerable evidence that the three, three-
person planning subteams in my research should be removed from the analysis.  
 I conducted two series of tests to evaluate the impact of the three three-person 
planning subteams on the outcomes in my experimental field work. As it turned out, all three 
of the three-person planning subteams failed to produce sufficient guidance for their 
operations subteams to solve the puzzle. On an individual level, the number of planners was 
a statistically significant indicator of likelihood of success in solving the puzzle.  These 
results are shown in Appendix Table I-1 Person Success Dependence on Number of Planners. 
Supporting information is shown in associated tables marked Table I-1A, Table I-1B, and 
Table I-1C. This resulted in χ2=38.48, p<.001 (1-tailed test), N-88 in the predicted direction. 
However, the trials were by team and, consequently, it could be argued that N should be 
12—the actual number of trials conducted during this experiment. I also conducted an 
analysis of team success based on the number of planners and found that even with the 
reduced number of subjects the number of planners was a statistically significant indicator of 
likelihood of success in solving the puzzle. These results are shown in Appendix Table I-2, 
Table I-2A, Table I-2B, and Table I-2C. This resulted in χ2=5.6, p<.05 (1-tailed test), N-12 in 
the predicted direction. I would also mention the suggestions by Hare (2003) concerning the 
probability the increased number of people participating in a problem solving activity will 
provide someone who is skilled at the problem type.  
 I presented the issues relating to three-person planning teams first so as to highlight 
the possible impact on my findings. However, during the subsequent presentation I will 
present my quantitative findings for both the full (N=12) and trimmed (N=9) trials. I will 
only deviate from that approach with the presentation of a binary logistic regression model 
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following presentation of hypothesis test results. In that case I only included the nine four-
person planning teams in the model.   
 I will compare my findings with similar findings from previous research. The earlier 
previous research was conducted by Hammerschmidt (1996) in the early 1990s. 
Hammerschmidt’s research is presented in Appendix Table I-3 Hammerschmidt Findings. 
While I have discussed some of Hammerschmidt’s research protocol earlier I think it would 
be worthwhile to recall some of the significant aspects of his work here.  
 Hammerschmidt asserted that the planner role in the Hollow Square Experiment is 
more adaptive in style and, therefore, would be more compatible with planners who are more 
adaptive. Conversely, he suggested that the operator role is less restrictive and, therefore, 
more compatible with operators who are more innovative. He called the conditions where 
participants are assigned roles in their KAI comfort zone, role preferred and the case where 
participants are assigned roles outside their KAI comfort zone, non role preferred. 
Hammerschmidt also assembled his research teams based on having similar KAI mean scores 
(range < 15.7 points) and dissimilar KAI mean scores (range > 15.7 points). Note that the 
Category 5 was random selection. For the first 50 trials the teams were assembled with no 
forethought concerning KAI scores. Although Hammerschmidt did not report his total 
findings as a unit of measure, I added it (Category 6) for purposes which will become 
apparent.  
 Referring to Appendix Table I-3 the most successful category for Hammerschmidt’s 
work was Category 2 with relatively adaptive planners assembled with dissimilar sister 
subteams (defined as the KAI mean score ranged > 15.7 points between subteams). Owing to 
small number of trials in my research program I did not differentiate between ranges of sister 
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subteam KAI mean scores during my experiment. I should also comment on 
Hammerschmidt’s use of the term σ for the standard deviation of the various groups. He 
made no mention of populations versus samples in the report of his research so I recorded his 
findings exactly as he published it. I would assume that the factor shown is, in fact, the 
sample standard deviation and should appropriately be shown as “s”.  
 Scott’s (2007) findings are shown in Appendix Table I-4 Scott Findings. Scott’s 
research interest was about the degree to which knowledge about one’s problem solving style 
would influence his/her behavior during a problem solving exercise. She assembled all her 
teams with each total team having a KAI mean score near the theoretical mean. She arranged 
the total teams into two groups, those with similar approaches (defined as the range of team 
KAI mean scores < 15 points) and those with dissimilar approaches (defined as the range of 
team KAI mean scores > 15 points). Scott’s experimental group was exposed to a one-hour 
lecture on KAI theory and style preferences while her control group did not get the education 
on KAI. Notice that the standard deviation (s.d.) of the dissimilar approach teams was much 
larger than the similar approach groups, as should be expected. Also notice that Scott, unlike 
Hammerschmidt, had relatively balanced teams centered on the midrange of KAI scores. She 
did not record the mean KAI scores of the subteams and, therefore, subteam performance 
cannot be included in my hypothesis testing concerning intact teams outperforming ad hoc 
teams even in non role preferred task situations. Scott, like Hammerschmidt, did not report 
her findings in aggregate. I computed that for purposes of discussing total findings. For the 
purposes of establishing a clear record of information which will be included in my 
comparative analysis and hypothesis testing I have consolidated all three research findings 
into Table VI-2 Experiment Comparative Results.  
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3. Research Objectives and Hypothesis Testing 
 Earlier I indicated that my essential interest is in helping improve group problem 
solving. I proposed three hypotheses with which to answer my research questions. I will 
address each in turn. 
  
3.1 Hypothesis Testing Method 
 The results of all three research programs are reported in terms of the percentage of 
successful trials relative to the total trials; i.e., a proportion. My test parameter will be the 
difference between two independent proportions. If proportions are indicated by p, then my 
test statistic is shown by the quantity p1 – p2. This results in the following formulation for 
hypothesis testing in this research program: 
 The null hypothesis is: H0: p1 – p2 = 0;    
 The test hypothesis is: H1: p1 – p2 >0.   
It is assumed that all three sets of findings are population samples. I will employ a procedure 
for comparing population proportions which Kachigan (1986) proposed. And, for purposes of 
outlining the test procedure employed here I will summarize the main points.  
 The only known about the populations (ad hoc groups versus intact groups) are the 
sample data. Kachigan suggested using a weighted average of the sample proportions which 
are from two populations, represented by the proportion p1 and p2. The sample estimates p^ 
are assumed and are the values recorded from the trials in the two experiments which are 
being used for comparison. The weighted average of p^ is as follows: 
   
21
2211
nn
pnpnpw 
 .  
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Table VI-2. Experiment Comparative Results 
Team Category Task Preferences Success Proportion Successes/Trials 
Hammerschmidt Cat 1 & 2  
(H1)  
N=33 
Subteam Role 
Preferred Tasks  
84.8% 
28/33 
Hammerschmidt Cat 3 & 4 
(H2) 
N=36 
Subteam Non Role 
Preferred Tasks 
63.8% 
23/36 
Hammerschmidt Cat 5 
(H3) 
N=50 
Unknown 52% 26/50 
Hammerschmidt All Cat 
(H4) 
N=119 
Mixed 64.7% 77/119 
Scott 
All Cat (S1) 
N=40 
Mixed 65% 26/40 
Creed 
Cat 1 (C1) 
N=6 
Subteam Role 
Preferred Tasks  
67% 
4/6 
Creed 
Cat 2 (C2) 
N=6 
Subteam Non Role 
Preferred Tasks 
50% 
3/6 
Creed 
All Cat (C3) 
N=12 
Mixed 7/12 58% 
Creed 
Cat 1’ (C4) 
N=4 
Subteam Role 
Preferred Tasks  
100% 
4/4 
Creed 
Cat 2’ (C5) 
N=5 
Subteam Non Role 
Preferred Tasks 
60% 
3/5 
Creed 
All Cat’ (C6) 
N=9 
Mixed 78% 7/9 
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It logically follows that qw is (1-pw ). This is used in the following tabulation to estimate the 
standard error of the difference: 
 


 
21
11
21 nn
qps wwpp  
The null hypothesis, in my research, says ad hoc groups and intact groups are not statistically 
different; i.e., 021  pp . Thus, using a student’s t distribution due to small sample size, the 
formula for testing the difference of proportions is: 
   
21 ^^
2121 )()^^(
pps
ppppt

 . 
Additionally, under the assumption that the populations are not statistically different11, then 
p1 – p2 = 0, and for the null hypothesis the t-test becomes: 
   
21
)^^( 21
pps
ppt

 . 
This will be approximately normally distributed if values of ^,^,^,^ 22221111 qnpnqnpn  all 
exceed five (Kachigan 1986:183).  
 The hypothesis test information is contained in Table VI-3. The companion table 
showing the formula for development of the standard error of the difference between 
proportions in identical populations is shown in Appendix Table I-5.  
                                                 
11 I have assumed that for the problem under consideration (the Hollow Square Puzzle) the three populations 
considered in this work are not statistically different. The problem requires little more than a basic 
understanding of geometric forms and high school reading comprehension. Lack of supplemental information 
on the Hammerschmidt population and the Scott population limit the ability to further defend the assumption 
concerning no statistical differences.  
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Table VI-3 Difference Between Two Independent Proportions 
Comparison 
Categories 
N1 
N2 
Solve1 
Solve2 
Not Solve1 
Not Solve2 
pw qw 
21
)^^( 21
pps
ppt

   p  
(1‐tailed) 
H4 v. C3 12 119 
7 
77 
5 
42 0.6412 0.3588 -0.4387
a >.05 
H1 v. C2b 6 33 
3 
28 
3 
5 0.7949 0.2051 -1.9446 <.05 
H1 v. C5b 5 33 
3 
28 
2 
5 0.8158 0.1842 -1.3357 >.05 
H4 v. C6b 9 119 
7 
77 
2 
42 0.6562 0.3437 -0.7961 >.05 
S1 v. C3 12 40 
7 
26 
5 
14 0.6346 0.3654 -0.4206 >.05 
a. The negative signs in the t-test column reflect the hypothesis that intact groups will out perform ad hoc 
groups. 
b. The prescription concerning approximate normality was violated in this case.  
 
  
 3.2 Hypothesis H1 
 Hypothesis H1 says intact groups will perform better at problem solving than ad hoc 
groups, ceteris paribus. Since this hypothesis offered no specification as to the nature of role 
preference among the planners or operators I will use the total results as presented in Table 
VI-2 and shown as Hammerschmidt’s H4 and Scott S1 (both of which were ad hoc groups) 
against Creed C3 (intact groups).  
 Hammerschmidt’s H4 contains all 119 trials and are mixed in terms of role preferred 
tasks. Creed’s C3 is also mixed and contains all 12 trials.  The t-test value shown in Table 
VI-3 (H4 versus C3) was below statistical significance and, hence the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. Thus, there is no statistically significant difference between Hammerschmidt’s 
ad hoc groups and Creed’s intact groups in executing the hollow square experiment 
according to these findings. However, the prescription in which ^,^,^,^ 22221111 qnpnqnpn  
are all required to exceed five is marginally violated in this test (i.e., 7.0, 5.0, 77.0, and 42.0).  
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 Recall my earlier discussion concerning the significance of the three-person planning 
teams in my research. I included “trimmed” findings whereby I eliminated the three three-
person planning teams from the data set and tabulated t-tests for comparison using those data. 
These data are reported in Table VI-2 as Creed C6. The t-test value shown in Table IV-3 is 
below statistical significance. Even with the trimmed data we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no statistical difference between the intact groups’ and ad hoc groups’ 
performance. These findings are tempered by the requirements that 
^,^,^,^ 22221111 qnpnqnpn  are all required to exceed five are grossly violated (i.e., 7.0, 2.0, 
77.0, and 42.0) and therefore of questionable validity. 
 Scott’s S1 contained 40 trials, all of which were mixed in a fashion not reported. 
Again, I use Creed’s C3 for the comparison. The t-test value shown in Table VI-3 (S1 versus 
C3) was below statistical significance therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There 
is no statistical difference between Scott’s ad hoc groups’ performance and Creed’s intact 
groups’ performance according to these data. Again, the requirements that  
^,^,^,^ 22221111 qnpnqnpn   are all required to exceed five are modestly violated in this test 
(i.e., 7.0, 5.0, 26.0 and 14.0).  
 In summary, the tests performed during my research failed to support Hypothesis H1, 
that intact groups will out perform ad hoc groups. 
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3.3 Hypothesis H2 
 Hypothesis H2 says intact groups will perform better at problem solving even when 
performing non role preferred tasks in comparison to ad hoc groups performing role 
preferred tasks, for limited periods of time. Creed’s C2, N=6, contains results from subteams 
performing non role preferred tasks. I will test that against Hammerschmidt’s H1, N=33. 
Since Scott did not investigate role preference in her work there is no test available here. The 
t-test shown in Table VI-3 (H1 versus C2) is statistically significant at the p<.05 level, 
however in the opposite direction from my hypothesis. According to these data ad hoc groups 
doing role preferred tasks out perform intact groups in non role preferred tasks. Note the 
small sample size for the Creed trials (N=6). This significantly violates the requirement for 
approximate normal distribution given by   ^,^,^,^ 22221111 qnpnqnpn  (i.e., 3.0, 3.0, 28.0, and 
5.0). Therefore, I would consider this a suspect finding.  
 I included “trimmed” findings whereby I eliminated the three three-person planning 
teams from the data set and tabulated t-tests for comparison using those data. Again, 
hypothesis H2 holds that intact groups in non role preferred tasks will out perform ad hoc 
groups in role preferred tasks for a short period of time. The t-test shown in Table VI-3 (H1 
versus C5) is below statistical significance. Thus, even with the trimmed data set for C5 I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis. In addition, the small number contributes to a significant 
violation of the assumptions required for an approximately normal distribution given by 
^,^,^,^ 22221111 qnpnqnpn  (i.e., 3.0, 2.0, 28.0, and 5.0). Therefore, I would also consider this 
a suspect finding. 
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3.4 Hypothesis H3 
 Hypothesis H3 asserts that the degree of congruence between formal organization and 
informal organization may be approximated by the degree to which intact groups out perform 
ad hoc groups on the same tasks. Since the trials comprising my research did not support the 
assertions about intact groups versus ad hoc groups this hypothesis is logically rejected. 
However, the prior theoretical and empirical work upon which this hypothesis was based 
may provide some explication concerning my specification of critical variables; i.e., intact 
groups.  
 
 3.5 Additional Quantitative Findings 
 My research program included two important items: 1) supplemental information as 
shown in Appendix C and, 2) a post exercise attitudinal survey shown in Appendix D. The 
information stemming from those items gave me access to some information which 
Hammerschmidt (1996) and Scott (2007) did not report in their findings. The absence of 
reporting does not mean the data do not exist but rather that it is not available for 
comparative analysis. I will discuss the supplemental information and its contribution to 
understanding the outcomes. Important items from that information will be used to develop a 
binary logistic regression model which provides some interpretation of my research findings. 
Finally, I will present the attitudinal survey information. 
 
 3.6 Supplemental Information 
 The Supplemental Information form shown in Appendix C and the KAI Inventory 
form asked for several pieces of demographic information which proved useful in evaluating 
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behaviors and outcomes. I used those data earlier in Chapter IV in my development of factors 
for use in my adaptation of the Jablokow-Booth cognitive gap model. In this presentation I 
will evaluate those data with respect to their individual and collective contribution to 
successful problem solving. This is yet another application of the same data in my effort to 
understand different outcomes and causative factors. In the following evaluation of those 
data I will comment on each item collected from participants with respect to a priori 
thinking. Each of these items has little meaning standing alone. A major view of this research 
is that people interact during problem solving exercises in relation to others so their 
individual characteristics only matter in a comparative and interactive way. The Jablokow-
Booth gap model is based on this interactivity between problem solvers. I will come back to 
the gap model later. For this consideration I was more interested in simple individual 
differences and aggregated team differences.  
 I recorded subject’s age, education, tenure inside this organization, and tenure with 
other similar firms. I believed, a priori, that these factors would combine to make the teams 
with the highest combination of education and tenure inside this organization more likely to 
successfully guide their teams toward a correct solution of the puzzle. The subject’s age 
generally should be positively related to tenure; i.e., the more tenure one has the older one is, 
ceteris paribus. Tenure outside this organization could also be an important variable which 
could have an influence on the other team members depending on how that outside tenure is 
viewed by the participants.  
 I conducted one way analysis of variance tests with these four variables comparing 
participants who successfully solved the puzzle (solve) and those who were not successful 
(fail). These variables are presented in tabular form in Appendix Table I-6.  Information 
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shown in Appendix Table I-7 shows that education failed the homogeneity of variances 
assumption at the p<.001 level and tenure was relatively close (p<.10) to violating the 
homogeneity of variance criterion. A more robust difference of means test will therefore be 
employed for those two variables. Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests are robust to different 
variances and produce a test statistic similar to the F-test. Appendix Table I-7A indicates that 
neither of the means of education nor tenure is statistically different in the categories solve 
versus fail. See Appendix Table I-8 for difference of means tests for individual participants. 
Note that both education and tenure are shown in Appendix Table I-8 although their statistics 
were calculated using the more robust test. The significance numbers are similar between the 
two tests. In Appendix Table I-8, none of the F-tests rises to statistical significance at the 
p<.05 level. Recall that these are individual measurements placed into two categories, solve 
and fail. I next present some possible interaction and/or group variables for consideration.  
 Because teams solve problems rather than individuals it is appropriate to evaluate 
some combinations of group statistics. I considered both average team statistics and 
cumulative team statistics during this investigation. I termed these variables constructed 
variables. I evaluated average education and cumulative education by team (N=12). Note that 
in both cases these data were tabulated for the planners subteam only. As I said above, 
planners’ subteams were significantly more responsible for either successful or unsuccessful 
trials, based on empirical observations in this research. Hence, I considered the make-up of 
their respective teams for this analysis. Again, I conducted one way analysis of variance on 
these variables and the descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix Table I-9. Appendix 
Table I-10 indicates that the equality of variance assumption is violated for variable 
cumulative education planners. I therefore conducted a robust test of equality of means for 
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cumulative education planners as shown in Appendix Table I-10A. Appendix Table I-11 
shows difference of means tests for average education planners is not statistically significant 
in solving the puzzle based on simply evaluating the team; i.e., N=12. Likewise, Appendix 
Table I-10A shows that cumulative education planners is not statistically significant for the 
N=12 case.  
 I also considered the variables average education teams, average education planners, 
and cumulative education planners in the sense of multilevel modeling and, therefore, 
tabulated their impact for the full N=88 data set. Appendix Table I-12 shows descriptive 
statistics for those variables. Appendix Table I-13 shows the Levene test which indicates the 
equality of variances assumption between groups is violated for all three variables. Another 
test was performed for the condition of unequal variances and is shown in Appendix Table I-
13A.  Appendix Table I-14 shows the difference of means tests based on assumption of equal 
variances. Of course this is suspect since the variances are unequal. However, for purposes of 
contrasting, both the robust tests shown in Appendix Table I-13A and the tests shown in 
Appendix Table I-14 indicate an insignificant statistical difference between the two groups. I 
have retained these variables in the discussion on a priori grounds that they should have an 
important effect on the functioning of the teams.  
 I considered possible interaction variables including the following tenure X 
education, tenure X average education, tenure X cumulative education, total experience 
(summation of in-firm tenure and outside tenure), and education X total experience.  
 These variables were evaluated by one way analysis of variance based on successful 
versus unsuccessful trials. Table I-15 shows descriptive statistics for those variables. These 
are a mixture of individual and group characteristics applied to individuals, N=88. The 
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Levene tests shown in Appendix Table I-16 indicate tenure X education, tenure X average 
education and tenure X cumulative education violate the equality of variance assumption. I 
conducted robust tests of these three variables and found them to be not statistically different 
as shown in Appendix Table I-16A. Also, the difference-of-means tests for these five 
variables are shown in Appendix Table I-17.  None of these variables indicates statistically 
significant differences between means for successful versus unsuccessful groups.  
 The primary individual differences used for the comparative portion of this research 
was KAI scores. It, therefore, is appropriate that one way analysis of variance was conducted 
with these data. Appendix Table I-18 displays KAI Scores Descriptive Statistics for the 
primary and its three factor scores. The Levene tests shown in Appendix Table I-19 reveal 
that the homogeneity of variance assumption was not violated by these data. And Appendix 
Table I-20 indicates there is no statistically significant difference between individuals 
participating in successful versus unsuccessful trials, according to individual KAI scores. 
(Although I have not reported the output in the Appendix, I evaluated the same information 
using team as the unit of measurement (N=12) and obtained the same result. I will return to 
the question of KAI scores and their predictive ability during problem solving activity later.  
 There were two categorical variables recorded during this research, gender and a 
control variable (map). During the formulation of this research I wanted to provide some 
means of assessing whether some people have a greater natural cognitive talent for graphical 
(puzzle) problem solving. I asked the question:   
 Please select the answer that best describes your preference: When I am driving to a location that I 
 am unfamiliar with I prefer: 
           _____Written directions 
          _____A map 
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There were several responses with both options checked. During the recording of these data 
when someone checked both options I only recorded written directions. I wanted to evaluate 
whether either of these was statistically significant in regards to successfully solving the 
puzzle.  
 I created a joint frequency distribution of map preference and solve puzzle to 
determine if there were statistically significant associations between individuals who 
preferred maps with people who solved the puzzle. I found that there was no statistical 
difference between successful and unsuccessful individuals with respect to map preference. 
This is shown in Appendix Table I-21 and companion Appendix Table I-21A and Appendix 
Table I-21B.  
 I created a joint frequency distribution with gender and solve in order to determine if 
there were statistically significant associations between genders regarding successfully 
solving the puzzle. I found no statistically significant associations between genders on 
solving the puzzle. This information is shown in Appendix Table I-22 and companion 
Appendix Table I-22A and Appendix Table I-22B.  
 While there were no a priori assertions regarding the topic, I was interested in gender 
differences on map preference versus written directions. I created a joint frequency 
distribution of gender and map preferences as shown in Appendix Table I-23 and found a 
statistically significant difference between men and women on this consideration, χ2=13.65, 
p<.001 (2-tailed test). Appendix Table I-23A and Appendix Table I-23B show the supporting 
tests of statistical differences. I will comment further on this finding later.  
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3.7 Model Building 
 The variables described in the previous pages were studied with respect to their 
potential to contribute to a predictive model for successfully solving the hollow-square 
puzzle. The dependent variable in this case happens to be dichotomous or binary; i.e., either 
solve (=1) or fail (=0). Binary logistic regression is a statistical method which enables the 
researcher to construct an appropriate model given the nature of the dependent variable. 
There were 12 trials in five offices involving 88 participants in this research program. I view 
this as a multilevel model with a binary dependent variable. Multilevel analysis can be used 
to evaluate both individual statistics and groups statistics; e.g., students across an entire 
school district and schools within that district. The students are “nested” within specific 
schools and, hence, multilevel modeling can help understand the effect a school has on 
student performance (Bickle 2007). The present research is similar; i.e., teams impact 
individuals and consequently I am employing both individual statistics and group (or team) 
statistics to simulate multilevel modeling. The relatively small sample size (at a team level 
N=12) makes it difficult to produce highly reliable estimates. I will conflate both group 
effects and individual effects to produce a regression model. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the number of planners proved to be statistically significant in predicting the 
outcome (success versus failure). I have, therefore held the number of planners to be four, 
thereby controlling for the three-three person planning subteams.  
 The basic logistic model I have developed is: 
  OthExpTenureAveedCSolve  .  
Note this is shown in word form and not exponential form for discussion purposes. The 
variable Aveed is average education of the team and is a group effect that I apply to all 88 
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subjects as an indicator of the group effect of each team. Tenure and OthExp are individual 
measures and, along with Aveed should be a strong indicator of successful outcomes. (Recall 
from the early work in cognitive gap analysis Tenure and OthExp are primary components of 
the cognitive level variable). The three items shown in the regression model were three of the 
four a priori variables I expected to have an impact on group problem solving. The fourth, 
KAI scores, had no material effect in any combination that I explored and, consequently, I 
omitted it from the final model.  
 The logistic regression model discussed above is shown in Table VI-4 below. I have 
reproduced the full logistic regression report including all the significance testing routines in 
Appendix I. The model output begins with Appendix Table I-24 and shows a classification 
table for the model without the variables; i.e., only a constant. In SPSS terms this is shown as 
“Block 0,” and I have retained that nomenclature for presentation purposes.  
 Average education (Aveed) is shown to be statistically significant at the p<.001 level 
in Table VI-4. The finding shows that the odds of solving the puzzle decreases by .144 for 
each additional year of average education on the team. Note that both Tenure and Othexp are 
 
Table VI-4. Binary Logistic Regression Model a 
95.0% C.I. for 
EXP(B)   
  
B 
  
S.E. 
  
Wald 
  
df 
  
Sig. 
  
Exp(B) 
  Lower Upper 
Aveed -1.936 .528 13.472 1 .000 .144 .051 .406 
Tenure .004 .065 .004 1 .947 1.004 .884 1.141 
 Othexp -.074 .041 3.283 1 .070 .929 .857 1.006 
Constant 33.614 8.963 14.064 1 .000    
a Dependent Variable, Succeed=1, Fail=0 
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shown to be not statistically significant. And, both have 95% confidence intervals that 
contain one. That means these factors may either increase the odds of solving the puzzle or 
decrease the odds—an unacceptable range of conclusions for making substantive 
interpretation. However, when these variables are removed from the regression model its 
predictive capability as shown by the Hosmer and Lemeshow Test reduces to an insignificant 
level, thereby suggesting a poor goodness of fit. I have, therefore, kept these variables in the 
full model since they were part of my a priori theory of problem solving for intact groups.  
 Appendix Table I-24 is a classification table of observations showing the number of 
individuals who solved or failed to solve the puzzle. This is Block 0 in SSPS terminology 
and means the model sets all the variable coefficients to zero. Appendix Table I-24A 
indicates Wald statistic is significant at the p<.001 level. This means that the null hypothesis 
should be rejected and the proposed variables are statistically significant. Appendix Table I-
24B shows statistical significance of the variables not in the equation for Block 0. I added all 
three independent variables at one time. Appendix Table I-24C shows significance tests for 
the model with all three independent variables added at once. The model is statistically 
significant at the p<.001 level. Appendix Table I-24D can be thought of as pseudo R-squared 
terms analogous to R2 in ordinary least squares linear regression models. Nagelkerke R 
Square shows that the model accounts for about 51% of the variance. The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Test procedure is shown in Appendix Table I-24E and Appendix Table I-24F. In 
Appendix Table I-24E the significance level indicates that the model adequately fits the 
observed data. In this test the desirable significance value is p>.05. The classification table 
shown in Appendix Table I-24G indicates that the model predicts 94% of the successful 
individuals and 60% of the unsuccessful individuals in solving the puzzle.  
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 3.8 Post Exercise Attitudinal Survey 
 After each experiment was complete I asked participants to fill out a Post Exercise 
Impressions survey.  The survey is shown in Appendix D. It contains seven questions and 
was designed to see if participants on successful teams felt differently than participants on 
unsuccessful teams concerning several points of interest. Because question seven was 
misunderstood by many participants and because of omissions in this topical area I have 
elected to not present that information. With each of the six questions remaining I will 
present findings from a joint frequency distribution in order to discuss the goodness of fit of 
expected frequencies and observed frequencies. The expected frequencies in each column 
should follow the same trend as the marginal totals. This is the null hypothesis and rejection 
of the null hypothesis requires a chi-squared to be significant at the p<.05 level. I will report 
on the χ2-statistic and corroborating tests for each of the six questions. 
 Question one asked, “Rate how you felt about performing your task role for this 
problem.” I expected participants who solved the puzzle to be more favorable toward their 
task than participants who failed to solve the puzzle as a general rule.  Appendix Table I-25 
and companion Appendix Tables I-25A and B contain all the pertinent information on the 
joint frequency distribution for question one. The results showed participants who were 
successful in solving the puzzle were considerably more favorable toward their task role 
(97% favorable) than those who failed to solve the puzzle (65% unfavorable). I am 
classifying participants who scored either comfortable or very comfortable as favorable and 
those who scored either very frustrated or slightly frustrated as unfavorable. There are 
statistically significant differences between these two classes (χ2 = 45.04, df=3, p<.001, (2-
sided)).  
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 Question two asked, “Rate how well your subteam communicated about the 
problem.” Appendix Table I-26 and companion Appendix Tables I-26A and B show the joint 
frequency distribution for this question and the variable solve. I expected this question to be 
highly correlated with success versus failure; i.e., a higher portion of failures would rate their 
subteams unfavorably and a higher portion of successful teams would rate their subteams 
favorably. I underestimated the degree to which individuals who were on unsuccessful teams 
would rate their subteams favorably. In fact, approximately 85% of participants who were 
unsuccessful rated their subteam favorably (defined as good or excellent on the 
questionnaire). While the unsuccessful participants rated their subteams surprisingly high, 
100% of the successful subteams rated their subteam favorably. Regarding question two, 
there are statistically significant differences between the two classes, solve and fail (χ2 = 
36.55, df=3, p<.001, (2-sided)).  
 Question three asked, “Rate how well your sister subteam communicated with your 
subteam.” Appendix Table I-27 and companion Appendix Tables I-27A and B show the joint 
frequency distribution for question two and solve. I expected there to be a high correlation 
between unsuccessful subteams and unfavorable replies on this question. This was 
considerably more in line with my a priori expectations than was question two. The number 
of unfavorable responses was consistent with my expectations as approximately 79% of 
unsuccessful participants responded unfavorably (defined as bad or poor). Conversely, nearly 
90% of the successful participants responded favorably (defined as good or excellent). 
Question three shows that there are statistically significant differences between the two 
classes, solve and fail (χ2 = 47.65, df=3, p<.001, (2-sided)).  
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 Question four asked, “Rate the amount of time provided for this problem.” Appendix 
Table I-28 and companion Appendix Tables I-28A and B show the joint frequency 
distribution. I expected the favorable and unfavorable responses to mimic successful and 
unsuccessful participants respectively. Surprisingly, nearly 68% of the unsuccessful 
participants responded to this question favorably (defined as about right or way too much). 
An even larger portion, 93%, of successful participants answered this positively. Even with 
the unexpectedly large portion of unsuccessful participants answering favorably, there are 
still statistically significant differences between the two classes, solve and fail (χ2 = 15.01, 
df=3, p<.01, (2-sided)). Note that this statistical significance is somewhat less pronounced 
than the first three questions at p<.01 versus p<.001. 
 Question number five asked, “Rate your subteam’s performance in solving this 
problem.” Appendix Table I-29 and companion Appendix Tables I-29A and B show the joint 
frequency distribution for question five and solve. As with all the questions, I presumed that 
successful participants would reply favorably (defined as helped a little or great help) and 
unsuccessful participants would reply unfavorably (defined as no help at all or not very 
helpful). The unsuccessful participants surprisingly responded favorably in 88% of the cases. 
Successful participants not surprisingly responded favorably in 100% of the cases. Again, 
even with the unexpectedly large portion of unsuccessful participants answering favorably, 
there are still statistically significant differences between the two classes, solve and fail (χ2 = 
36.59, df=3, p<.001, (2-sided)).  
 Question number six asked, “Rate your sister subteam’s performance in solving this 
problem.” Appendix Table I-30 and companion Appendix Tables I-30A and B show the joint 
frequency distribution for question six and solve. My basic expectation for this was like all 
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the others; i.e., unsuccessful participants would answer unfavorably (defined as no help at all 
or not very helpful) and successful participants would answer favorably (defined as helped a 
little or great help). Approximately 59% of the unsuccessful participants answered 
unfavorably to this question. And, about 95% of successful participants answered favorably. 
I was surprised that over 40% of the unsuccessful participants answered favorably to this 
question about sister subteam. Regarding question six, there are statistically significant 
differences between the two classes, solve and fail (χ2 = 45.82, df=3, p<.001, (2-sided)). 
  
 3.9 Cognitive Gap Analysis 
 I developed the Jablokow-Booth cognitive gap model in Chapter IV and reported 
findings concerning differences of means testing on four concepts of the gap model. And, I 
presented a table of cognitive gaps and various combinations which were subsequently 
presented along with the trial descriptions. In an interest to bring those data together into one 
location I have consolidated all the cognitive gap data into Appendix Table I-31. One 
additional piece of information I felt worthy of recording was the aggregated cognitive level 
information. Recalling the discussion from Chapter IV there were no statistically significant 
differences between successful and unsuccessful trials based on the cognitive gap model with 
its several combinations of gaps.  
 I conducted difference of means tests for successful trials based on aggregated 
cognitive level using the factor scores shown in Appendix Table I-31. While the differences 
were not statistically significant at the p<.05 level they were, however worth reporting as a 
basis for future exploration and further theorizing about the Jablokow-Booth cognitive gap 
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model. Appendix Table I-32 shows the results of that difference of means test F=3.25 and 
p=0.101, just beyond the level of statistical significance.  
 I was also interested in combinations of cognitive level and cognitive style that might 
be meaningful in helping predict successful problem solving outcomes. Thus, I analyzed the 
difference of means for cognitive level interacting with cognitive style. For this analysis I 
used factor scores discussed at length in Chapter IV. Again, this analysis indicated that the 
successful trials were not statistically different from unsuccessful trials. But again, the scores 
were encouraging in terms of suggestive of a possible line of reasoning supporting future 
research, F=2.003 and p=.187.  
 There are no known empirical research data in which the Jablokow-Booth cognitive 
gap model was previously tested. I believe the formulation I have introduce in Chapter IV 
constitutes the initial effort to operationalize cognitive gaps in pursuit of understanding how 
both cognitive style and cognitive level gaps work to foster better problem solving outcomes. 
Due to paucity of prior work I am unable to argue a priori assumptions. However, as I said 
earlier, the concept of cognitive gaps involving humans collaborating to solve problems is 
intuitively appealing and should ultimately lead to helpful insights for future researchers and 
practitioners.  
  
3.10 Summary of Quantitative Findings 
 I have presented the quantitative findings from the hollow square experiments in this 
chapter. Also, I have presented some theoretical work developed in Chapter IV for the 
purpose of collecting all important quantitative data in this chapter. In the next chapter I will 
combine the qualitative and quantitative findings for the purpose of illuminating significant 
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implications of this research and will conclude by discussing my original research interests 
and how these findings may lead to better small group problem solving in any context. 
  
CHAPTER VII  IMPLICATIONS 
 
1. Overview 
 In the previous two chapters I have reported qualitative findings and quantitative 
findings respectively with only modest elaboration as to the meaning of findings. This 
chapter will firstly bring those two parallel analyses together for the purpose of explication of 
the findings and, in particular, discussion of results which differ from a priori expectations. I 
will spend considerable time discussing the issue of intact groups since that proved to be 
critical in my assumptions during hypothesis building. Secondly I will discuss the planning 
profession and the extent to which cognitive style theory specifically and cognitive gap 
theory generally might beneficially add theoretical framework and definitional structure that 
could be useful. Lastly, I will conclude with a discussion of unplanned findings and 
recommendations for future research on this topic. 
 
2. Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Findings 
 The quantitative findings pertaining to hypothesis testing presented in Chapter VI can 
be fairly simply summarized. In essence, this research project provided insufficient evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis that problem-solving ability of ad hoc groups and intact groups is 
not statistically different. Note that the hypotheses were limited to only cognitive style as 
there has been no comparative work in cognitive level to enable such an analysis.  I 
hypothesized that not only would intact groups outperform ad hoc groups, non role preferred 
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intact groups would outperform role preferred ad hoc groups, for short periods of time, again 
based solely on cognitive style. And, I drew from the earliest recorded empirical work on 
work-group functioning inside organizational frameworks to assert some measurement 
concept for informal versus formal organization (Roethlisberger and Dixon 1939). However, 
in the famous Hawthorne Works experiments reported by Roethlisberger and Dixon the units 
of analysis were actual standing work units; i.e., they worked every day in close proximity 
with each other performing sometimes interrelated tasks. That has an important distinction in 
the realm of small group research. There is a considerable difference between small groups 
that work together on a daily basis and small groups that are assembled to solve a problem on 
a one-off basis, such as that explored in this research.  
 The definition I proposed for intact groups was inadequate by absence of a 
specification for the degree of integration necessary for intact groups to perform like teams 
vis-à-vis problem solving. Tuckman (1965) and Fisher (1970) discussed this issue in their 
work on team development resulting in their formulation of four distinct stages of team 
development: 1) form, 2) storm, 3) norm, and 4) perform. Carlile’s (2002) concept of how 
knowledge boundaries are transcended also is informative in this discussion. And, I 
employed his terminology to describe how processes integrate knowledge across boundaries 
from words (syntax), to meaning (semantic), to synergy (pragmatic). Carlile was less 
concerned in the temporal aspect of integration than he was the knowledge transfer across 
boundaries. His view of knowledge as being local, embedded, and invested in practice is 
useful for illuminating the obstacles which must be overcome when cross functional groups 
assemble to solve problems. Or, in the context of my research, this helps explain the 
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difference between ad hoc groups and intact groups and why my definition of intact groups is 
problematic. 
 McGrath (1991) offered a theory of groups which illuminates the issue of task group 
integration further. He suggested that four modes of activity could be identified in executing 
a group task. More recently Hare (2003) compared McGrath’s suggested modes with similar 
arguments by Parsons (1961) and his own. For the purpose of identifying specific problems 
within my specification for intact groups I will reproduce the Hare comparisons in Table VII-
1. Also, I will add Carlile’s (2002) work as it has application. 
 My interest in McGrath’s theory of groups is on the temporal development of the 
component parts of a task execution. This is the area about which my hypotheses were 
inadequately informed. In his model of group task execution McGrath offered four modes. I 
will comment briefly on each of these vis-à-vis my research program and execution of the 
hollow square puzzle by my experimental subjects. 
  
Table VII-1 Components of Group Task Execution 
McGrath Parsons  Hare 
Mode I: Inception and acceptance   
of a project goal choice meaning 
Mode II: Solution of technical 
issues means choice resources 
Mode III: Resolution of conflict, 
that is, of political issues policy choice integration 
Mode IV: Execution of the 
performance requirements of the 
project 
goal attainment goal attainment 
  
 McGrath’s Mode I is the manner in which a group takes ownership of a task. A group 
member might suggest a particular problem to tackle; a higher authority may assign the 
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group an assignment; or the group’s normal daily activity may enable it to engage on a 
project or task. Mode I includes some basic understanding of the goals and preliminary 
thinking about possible performance strategies. Parsons called this stage goals choice. And, 
Hare termed this meaning, by which he meant the cognitive understanding group members 
share about the task. McGrath’s development of group theory assumes such groups are, 
“…intact social systems that engage in multiple, interdependent functions on multiple, 
concurrent projects while partially nested within and loosely coupled to surrounding 
systems” (Hare 2003:130). Carlile’s (2002) propositions about integrating artifacts which 
enable knowledge to be productively used across internal organizational boundaries or silos 
do not fit McGrath’s assumption of intact groups shown in the quote above. The key 
difference, “…is multiple, interdependent functions on multiple concurrent projects…” 
Carlile’s notion of knowledge-in-action which is acquired in practice and which is local, 
embedded, and invested is considerably less intact than McGrath’s notion.  
 The subjects who participated in my research worked for the same company but 
seldom worked within the same small group on a daily basis. McGrath’s assertion about the 
interdependent nature of such group members would almost certainly be violated by the 
make-up of the subteams which comprised the planners and operators in this research. This is 
particularly true given the fact that I randomly selected and assembled the subteams for the 
experiment. My research participants would, however, fit the definition of cross functional 
groups which have many different knowledge domains and local, embedded, and invested 
knowledge repositories.  
 Mode II of McGrath’s production task for groups is concerned with technical problem 
solving and the most appropriate means with which to approach and solve the project. Mode 
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II is concerned with the means of execution. He noted that this area has received the most 
attention with studies of problem solving or decision making in groups. But, importantly, the 
other modes have usually been relatively ignored during research on problem solving when 
studying this topic. McGrath posits that the inception of projects (Mode I) is considered a 
given; i.e., a superior assigns something and the group responds. Thus there is little research 
interest in that area of small group project execution. The resolution of conflict (Mode III) 
and execution (Mode IV) are considered relatively minor issues because the means of 
solution are so very important-in the realm of technical problem-solving. Parsons called this 
mode or stage means choice and Hare called it resources. The question here is how will the 
project or problem be executed? 
   
Table VII-2 Successful Trials Solution Techniques 
Trial Solution Technique Description 
CW-T1 
CHL-T2 Pattern Sheet Key Sketch Planners sketched puzzle shapes onto the pattern sheet 
WIL-T1 
RAL-T4 Center Square Keystone 
Planners assembled individual pieces around a center 
square keystone and instructed operators to combine into 
one puzzle 
RAL-T2 Window Pane Framing Key 
Planners framed the entire puzzle in front of each place 
and located each set of puzzle pieces inside at correct 
locations 
CW-T2 Puzzle Pieces on Pattern Sheet Planners placed each group of puzzle pieces onto the pattern sheet thereby showing how pieces fit together 
RAL-T3 Exploded Puzzle Pieces Planners placed puzzle pieces in a slightly exploded arrangement which could be easily visualized 
  
Mode II in my research consisted of several different approaches to solving the 
puzzle. For purposes of identifying the Mode II “means of execution” see Table VII-2 for the 
solution techniques used in this research. The discussion which ensued within each 
successful trial was about how the suggested technique might work. The solutions identified 
  268
in Table VII-2 are the consequences of synergistic combinations of meaningful(+) words(+) 
shared among the subteam solving the puzzle. These are Carlile’s (2002) boundary spanning 
objects which contribute to transformative knowledge. These are the means which enabled 
the ends (solution) of the Hollow Square puzzle exercise.  
 McGrath called Mode III of the production function the political conflict resolution 
mode. It is the time during which conflicting values and interests arise in the group. Parsons 
called this mode the policy choice and Hare called it integration. Study in this area of group 
research has mostly been in jury deliberations and negotiations according to McGrath. I have 
adopted Hare’s term, integration to describe the desirable outcome of this mode of group 
behavior. This term is similar in this context to the way the same term was used by Follett 
(1924) nearly 90 years ago. Recall that Simon (1947) argued about a values-facts dichotomy; 
i.e., a given set of facts may be established based on a given set of values but not the other 
way around. It was coincidental that Carlile (2002) also used the term integrating to describe 
the process that the three facets of knowledge transfer subsume. I will use the term as the 
melding of different ideas into a common understanding sufficient to adopt a solution to the 
problem at hand. 
 In my research the values question arose in different interpretations of the 
instructions. Two experimental groups found great moral difficulty in approach based on 
individual perceptions of right and wrong regarding interpretation of the instructions. One 
experimental group (RAL-T5) failed to overcome this moral dilemma and was unsuccessful 
in solving the puzzle; i.e., failed to integrate into a common understanding sufficient to adopt 
a solution. Another experimental group (CHL-T2) had three of the four planning subteam 
members agree to one set of values interpretation while one member rejected that concept as 
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improper. This case did not achieve integration in total but in sufficient amount to overcome 
the lone dissenter and be successful.  
 McGrath’s Mode IV includes the execution activity. This includes the attainment of 
the goal in question, the same terms used by both Parsons and Hare. McGrath argued that it 
should be quantifiable in terms of quantity, quality, and, perhaps, speed of execution. In my 
research case Mode IV was successful solution of the puzzle. However, I could also judge 
each experimental trial on the speed of execution, the quality of execution with respect to 
how rigidly the group followed the rules versus bended the rules, and other more elemental 
artifacts; e.g., Bales (1950) used the interaction process analysis to evaluate each utterance, 
oral or non-verbal, to classify communicative acts and to infer a cognitive style orientation.  
 In defining components of group task execution I want to highlight the fact that there 
is a temporal aspect of group formation which was ignored in my hypothesis development. 
Each of the stages or modes of group task performance requires some amount of real time in 
order for the group to integrate sufficiently to successfully solve any but the simplest of 
problems. My erroneous assumption that in terms of problem-solving groups, people who 
worked within the same organization are effectively intact groups is clearly inaccurate. In 
fact, even Carlile’s (2002) propositions are based on the differences in knowledge (local, 
embedded, and invested) within the same organization but within different organizational 
units. This means that individual differences (e.g., cognitive gaps—both style and level) of 
members in small groups are real variables that only time and group developmental processes 
can overcome. Carlile (2002) specifically acknowledged that the pragmatic process involves 
an acceptance by the group that in order for transformative knowledge to occur some of the 
old knowledge must be changed. Clearly, this is a time based problem.    
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 I want to recall the Jablokow-Booth problem-solving model shown in Figure IV-4. 
The cognitive gaps depicted in that model reflect some of Kirton’s thinking on the Problem 
A-Problem B analogy discussed above. Consider the person-person cognitive gap (both level 
and style) and the person-problem cognitive gap (both level and style) shown in the model. 
Then consider that most problem-solving groups are much larger than two people and the 
magnitude of the integration challenge becomes apparent. This should be considered in light 
of McGrath’s four modes of production. At each of the four modes of production each group 
member (PS1, PS2, etc.) perceives, interprets, and reacts uniquely to the challenges (stimuli) 
of that stage. Problem A occurs during Mode I—and is interpreted somewhat differently by 
each person (i.e., exactly what is the problem to be solved?). Without a standing group 
decision-making process at the disposal of the group the Problem A can take some time to 
resolve. Of course, it takes time because of Problem B—the diversity within the group. That 
diversity in newly formed problem-solving groups (in spite of the fact that they may already 
know one another) requires some process of integration which is in both Mode II and Mode 
III. Mode III, in fact, should precede Mode II if there are potential value system conflicts 
which must be resolved as exemplified in my research findings. Suffice it to say my use of 
the term intact groups was not accurately specified and resulted in my inability to reject the 
null hypothesis that ad hoc groups are not statistically different from intact groups. 
 I will follow my mea culpa with the observation that my research methods produced 
important qualitative findings that should illuminate group problem-solving behavior when 
considering the impact of cognitive style differences among group members, which was my 
principal focus in this research. Additionally, owing to some theoretical work by Jablokow 
and Booth (2006) and some empirical work by Carlile (2002) I was able to expand the 
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discussion beyond simple differences in cognitive style to include the consideration of 
cognitive gaps in both style and level. In addition, I have proposed an operationalization of 
the Jablokow-Booth cognitive gap model for consideration and have included those 
considerations with my empirical findings.  
 Table VII-3 shows the consequences of cognitive level gaps and cognitive style gaps 
as viewed through both qualitative and quantitative information. This table contains 
information from the prior three chapters put in a format to simplify the review. The notation 
concerning role-preferred teams implies the planner role is performed by relatively more 
adaptive subteams. This is shown by an asterisk by the trial code number. Those trials that 
are not indicated mean they were non-role preferred subteam activities. The aggregate level 
scores, total level gap scores, and total style gap scores come from earlier tabulations but 
were aggregated into Appendix Table I-31. For clarity I will reiterate the components of 
Total Level Gap and Total Style Gap. They are the cognitive gap parts A + B + D for level 
and style as noted. Cognitive gap A is the person-person gap discussed at length in Chapter 
IV. Gap B is the person-person to team mean score gap. And gap D is the person-problem 
gap. All these gaps have both a level and a style component as shown in Appendix Table I-
31. But for simplicity purposes in this presentation I have condensed some of the scores for 
clarity.  
 The Style KAI scores are mean KAI Z-scores for each subteam. While the planning 
subteams were most responsible for unsuccessful trials the operators also exhibited behaviors 
that were important to this research. I have classified causes and effects of specific behaviors 
(critical incidents) in Chapter V for all 12 trials based on cognitive level and cognitive style. 
In Table VII-3 I have condensed those opinions into two major categories: Cognitive 
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Integrating Influence and Cognitive Disintegrating Influence. The terms, integrating and 
disintegrating,  
Table VII-3. Consequences of Cognitive Level and Style 
Cognitive 
Integrating 
Influence e  
Cognitive 
Disintegrating 
Influence e Trial Rolea Aggr. Level b 
Mean 
Style c 
Total 
Level 
Gap d 
Total 
Style 
Gap d 
Level Style Level Style 
Op -1.99 -0.73 0.41 7.38   2 3 FM-T1 Pl -1.51 0.44 1.3 6.63   1 4 
Op 2.69 0.34 4.32 6.54 4 4   CW-T1* Pl -0.94 -0.45 10.61 10.45 5 2   
Op 1.21 0.06 10.23 5.75 3 2   CW-T2 Pl -0.52 1.04 6.57 16.38 4 5   
Op 0.32 0.51 11.45 10.5 3 4   WIL-T1* Pl 4.15 -0.70 17.66 3.69 5 1   
Op -2.98 0.79 2.07 13.3   3 5 WIL-T2* Pl 2.62 -0.87 5.02 5.14   2 1 
Op -1.93 0.65 -0.04 9.15   2 4 CHL-T1* Pl -1.95 -0.64 0.76 5.28   2 1 
Op -2.54 0.58 0.79 11.55 2 4   CHL-T2* Pl -3.95 -0.94 -1.96 7.86 3 2   
Op 2.91 -1.08 8.64 0.94   3 2 RAL-T1 Pl 1.76 0.60 11.71 17.8   1 5 
Op -0.55 0.69 10.31 15.01 4 4   RAL-T2* Pl -2.03 -1.31 4.55 4.9 3 1   
Op 0.22 -1.01 15.63 7.51 3 2   RAL-T3 Pl 4.14 0.60 14.03 15.14 3 5   
Op 0.75 -0.66 10.67 10.52 4 1   RAL-T4 Pl 0.35 1.79 14.42 22.34 5 4   
Op 1.14 -1.01 12.22 3.73   3 2 RAL-T5 
Pl -1.35 0.84 12.29 15.1   2 5 
a Subteams are noted as Operators (Op) and Planners (Pl). Role preferred teams have an asterisk by the 
trial name. 
b Aggregate (Aggr) level is summation of subteam level factor scores. 
c Mean Style is KAI Z-scores averaged for each subteam 
d Total gaps are summations of subteam person-person gap (A+B) and person-problem gaps (D) for 
level and style as indicated 
e Cognitive integrating influences are separated into two classes, Level and Style. 
The categories for Level include: Five point Likert scale: 1=zero constructive knowledge transferred 
to 5=transformative knowledge transferred (relating to Carlile’s boundary spanning knowledge) 
The categories for Style include:  Five point Likert scale: 1=extreme adaptor behavior, 2=distinctive 
adaptor behavior; 3=middling style; 4=distinctive innovator behavior; 5=extreme innovator behavior 
 
derive from the discussion above on modes of group task execution, by the suggested terms 
used by Hare (2003) and Follett (1924), and by Carlile’s (2002) work on knowledge 
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boundaries and integrating devices. As indicated there are cognitive level factors and 
cognitive style factors which work in combination to affect team outcomes. I have devised a 
five-point Likert scale to grade the relative contribution of each of these. The footnotes to 
Table VII-3 explain the scoring concept.   
 I examined a number of different combinations of cognitive gaps in an effort to 
determine which scores appeared to correlate with empirical observations. Some of the 
combinations examined include the following equations and corresponding difference of 
means tests results factored for successful trial: 
 (7.1) Level ABD x Style ABD x Aggregate Level; F=1.107, p=.318 
 (7.2) Level AB x Style AB + Level D x Style D;  F=4.066, p=.056 
 (7.3) Level AB x Style AB x Level D x Style D;  F=0.412, p=.535 
 (7.4) (Level ABD x Style ABD)2      F=0.936, p=.344 
 (7.5) Ln (Abs(Level ABD x Style ABD));    F=6.688, p=.017 
 (7.6) Ln (Abs(Level ABD)) x Ln (Style ABD);  F=5.871, p=.024  
 (7.7)  Total Gap ABCD;     F=2.261, p=.164 
In combinations shown in equations 7.1 through 7.6 all 24 subteams were included in the 
analysis. In combination shown in equation 7.7 the between-subteam gap is already factored 
into the quantity under analysis. Based on this sensitivity analysis of the data in consideration 
of the actual empirical evidence it appears that the combinations shown in equations 7.2, 7.5, 
and 7.6 are most reflective of the actual observations. However, in spite of the considerable 
degree of statistical significance that the natural log transformations yield (p=.017 and 
p=.024), I would suggest that equation 7.2 would be better used since the combinations can 
be conceptually understood and not obfuscated by the natural log transformation. I recognize 
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that the combination shown in equation 7.2 has marginal statistical significance (p=.056) 
however, for the small sample size it is close enough to provide a degree of confidence in the 
process. Note that the cognitive gap C, discussed above, appeared to diminish the statistical 
significance of the gap combinations. It appeared above in equation 7.7 (p=.164). Based on 
these data I have focused the cognitive gaps shown in Table VII-3 on gaps A+B+D.  
 If the binary logistic model I proposed in Chapter VI can predict about 50% of the 
successful trials then adding the information concerning cognitive influences on both level 
and style contained in Table VII-3 should increase the ability to predict positive outcomes to 
a much higher level. In the following sections I will comment on the information shown in 
Table VII-3 in order to illuminate the findings. I will begin with the unsuccessful trials.  
 
 2.1 Unsuccessful Trials 
 There were five unsuccessful trials during this research program. For emphasis I have 
highlighted them in Table VII-3. Three of the five unsuccessful trials consisted of three-
person planning teams; i.e., FM-T1, WIL-T2, and CHL-T1. I have evaluated each subteam 
from the perspective of cognitive disintegrating influence on both level and style dimensions.  
There are two cases of role preferred teams and three cases of non role preferred teams. The 
case where I identify affect conflict as a disintegrating influence was also non role preferred. 
I will comment on each of the unsuccessful trials in an effort to find causative combinations 
of cognitive functioning that contributed to the outcomes. 
 Before specific discussion of the unsuccessful trials I want to reprise discussion of 
three-person planning subteams. Hare (2003) surveyed the literature on small group research 
and discussed the question of group versus individual performance (p.132): 
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The productivity of a group tends to be less than that of the same number of individuals if 
no division of labor is required, if there are problems of control, of if the group develops 
a norm against high productivity. When groups do appear to be better than individuals, 
part of the group effect (especially for tasks requiring low levels of creativity) is simply 
that of having a larger number of persons to remember facts, identify objects, or produce 
ideas. Many tasks are of an “eureka” type, whereby as soon as one person solves the 
problem, the other members adopt the solution. For these tasks, having a group increases 
the probability of having one skilled problem solver. This is especially true for puzzles 
for which the correct answer is obvious once one person discovers it. 
 
The collective cognitive capacity, what I called aggregated level, of the three three-person 
planner subteams as shown in Table VII-3 contain two of the lowest scores of the 12 trials 
(these trials include FM-T1, WIL-T2, and CHL-T1).  It could be argued that the low 
aggregated level of these experimental groups was responsible for their performance. 
Observe, however that WIL-T2 had an aggregated level of 2.62, considerably larger than the 
other three person teams. This certainly calls to question the adequacy of the cognitive level 
measure. However, I think Hare’s comments above provide a simple and reasonable 
explanation; e.g., the probability that a good puzzle solver is on a four-person planner 
subteam versus a three-person planner subteam is 4/3=1.33; thus, a 33% increase in 
probability of having someone skilled in solving puzzles. I will present the other findings and 
comments related to the three-person planning subteams but the Hare observations are 
significant. 
 Two of the three-person planning groups were role preferred, WIL-T2 and CHL-T1. 
As it turned out they were both assembled with little variation in relative job status. And, 
they were both relatively adaptive groups, with mean style12 scores of -0.87 and -0.64. Both 
planner subteams had college educated members and their aggregated cognitive levels13 were 
2.62 and -1.93, a considerable gap. Note also that the second lowest aggregated level score 
for planner subteams were for the three-person planner subteam of FM-T1, -1.51. Since the 
                                                 
12 Style scores shown are standardized KAI Z-scores 
13 Level scores shown are aggregates of subteams based on standardized level factor scores 
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WIL-T2 trial had aggregated cognitive level scores near the highest of the planner subteams 
it is difficult to attribute the failure simply to aggregated level scores. Clearly there is some 
other factor which exacerbated the WIL-T2 trial which I will explore below. 
 In review of the critical incidents and causal attribution shown in tables in Chapter V 
above I have developed a scoring system to for the aggregated behaviors as shown in Table 
VII-3. Based on the extreme fixation on a single narrow solution concept of planner 
subteams WIL-T2 and CHL-T1 I scored them with the following level and style (level, 
style): WIL-T2 (2,1) and CHL-T1 (2,1). In both cases the planner subteams demonstrated 
marked adaptor cognitive styles in seizing upon only one solution and missing the myriad of 
options that they could have employed. I considered the manifest cognitive levels for both 
groups near the low end of my scale, in spite of the fact that trial WIL-T2 was one of the 
higher aggregated level scores for planner subteams. Missed opportunities for something 
different and relative non-constructive dialogue contributed to the low score of manifest 
level. As indicated above in my argument about how level and style combine to affect 
problem-solving performance, I attribute the unsuccessful performance primarily to cognitive 
style and secondarily with cognitive level, but interactively. A contributing factor in both 
WIL-T2 and CHL-T1 included the relatively small variance in relative job status in the 
planner subteams. The total level gaps and total style gaps shown in Table VII-3 do not 
particularly illuminate the relative job status influence observed in trials WIL-T2 (5.02, 5.14) 
and CHL-T1 (0.76, 5.28). It was surprising that the relatively adaptive planners would miss 
some of the details about the time limits. Also, since the range of relative job status of the 
planners was small and since they were adaptive and therefore careful to not offend others in 
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the group, little challenge and exploration occurred. Recalling Hare’s (2003) observations, 
both these trials could have benefited by the addition of another “thinker.”  
 The other unsuccessful three-person planner subteam trial was FM-T1. This planner 
subteam, as mentioned above, had the second lowest aggregated level score of all the planner 
subteams (-1.51). Again, having only three members contributes to this low score. There 
were some factors which combined to make this trial different, however, from the first two 
three-person planner subteams I discussed above. This planner subteam was mildly 
innovative (0.44) and the total level gap was only 1.3. The total style gap was 6.63. Based on 
the quality of the dialogue I scored the cognitive disintegrating influence (1, 4). The level 
score of (1) reflects the lack of any constructive or additive meaning and understanding that 
occurred between the planners during the exercise. The style score of 4 indicated some 
degree of observable innovative behavior but insufficient alone to be called the causative 
factor. The lack of variance in relative job status was also a contributing factor, like the first 
two unsuccessful trials mentioned above. In the end I attribute the unsuccessful performance 
for trial FM-T1 to low cognitive level primarily with significant interaction with cognitive 
innovative style. 
 Two other unsuccessful trials were identified under the disintegrating influence 
category. They were both non role preferred teams, meaning the planner subteams were 
relatively more innovative than the operator subteams. These teams both displayed some of 
the same group decision-making problems that the role preferred subteams displayed but in 
marked innovative ways, as A-I theory asserts. There were some differences as to the relative 
make-up of these two subteams that are worth reporting.  
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 The planner subteam for RAL-T1 had significant aggregated level (1.76) and 
somewhat innovative style (0.60). The planners included three very high ranking executives 
within the organization, but in different divisions. The three high ranking executives 
demonstrated dominating personalities with no one giving way for others to lead (which I 
earlier termed “alpha-types”). They clearly had not previously functioned together in 
problem solving activities. Consequently this fact combined with the relative innovative 
nature of the subteam contributed to their failure to produce a plan for their operating team. 
This planner subteam’s cognitive gap score was indicative of the observed difficulty in 
building a coherent solution strategy, level and style gaps (11.71, 17.8). They had too many 
ideas which were undeveloped and they ran out of time. It is worth noting that due to a last 
minute absence and some changing of personnel on the subteam assignments, there was a 30 
point range of KAI scores on this planner subteam. Mel (KAI 88) and Ray (KAI 118) were 
two of the three alpha-types who dominated the conversation. They did not converge toward 
a solution but seemed to silently reject the other’s suggestion by offering a new idea 
following the other’s idea. I scored the disintegrating influence as (1, 5) to indicate that, in 
spite of the relatively high aggregated level, this group demonstrated the lowest degree of 
constructive problem-solving level. However, I attribute that demonstrated poor level 
performance on the cognitive style gaps as indicated. Again, it is clear that cognitive level 
and cognitive style are interactive. Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say unfettered 
extreme cognitive styles exacerbate decision making processes in spite of cognitive levels. 
Since each of the three alpha-types refused to integrate his ideas with the other three they 
collectively performed quite poorly, certainly well below their individual capabilities. This 
trial was a vivid demonstration of failure based on the group’s collective cognitive style. 
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 The last unsuccessful trial for discussion was RAL-T5. It was similar to trial RAL-T1 
in that the cognitive gaps were large (12.29, 15.1). This trial had a planner subteam 
aggregated level score of -1.35, considerably lower than RAL-T1. It was somewhat more 
innovative as its mean style was 0.84. This trial contained an interesting conflict that I 
attributed to cognitive affect (see Figure IV-3). A moral dilemma arose concerning the 
propriety of sketching the puzzle pieces on the back of the pattern sheet. I used the term 
affect conflict to capture this interaction after Devine (1999), which I discussed earlier. 
Cognitive affect conflict is directed toward others and causes emotional upheaval which 
clouds rational thought. In the sense it is used here I would deem it unintentional. Yet, it was 
sufficient to shut down thinking and exploration of the boundaries of the problems. The 
senior member of this four person planning subteam characterized a suggested solution 
concept as “cheating” when asked. He continued by saying, “That seems to be stretching it 
but I think that is a generational thing.” He made another comment about pushing the limits 
of rules and attributed that to a generational difference. It was clear that this had a negative 
effect on creativity of the group since he implied the junior members were morally loose with 
the rules. Certainly this group’s combined style contributed to its failure but the largest single 
communicative act was the insinuation that pushing the boundaries was cheating. While there 
was only a medium range of relative job status there was no one superior to the senior 
member in a position to keep the creative thought process open. [Subsequent to this trial I 
asked the participant code-named Ray as to why he viewed the sketch suggestion so 
negatively. He was a contrast; i.e., he was the oldest of his group and was the most 
innovative (KAI score of 118) yet he seemed most riveted to the rules—as he interpreted 
them. He was a former college professor, now retired professor emeritus. He answered my 
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comment by saying that his profession was about following rules of conduct. If you want to 
get published you had to strictly adhere to tight prescription of rules.] 
 I placed the dialogue concerning the moral dilemma into the cognitive style category 
for evaluation. In this case I scored the planner subteam on disintegrating influence (2, 5). 
Clearly the demonstrated cognitive styles at work in this trial were examples of innovative 
behavior. Ray’s insensitive remarks are directly related to his innovative, albeit conflicted, 
personality. I scored the cognitive level for this trial as 2 for the fact that the three other 
planners on this subteam actually conceived the notion of sketching a solution and argued its 
merit. But in the end this, like RAL-T1, unsuccessful trial was caused by high innovative 
style coupled loosely with lower cognitive level.  
 
 2.2 Successful Trials 
 There were seven successful trials during this research project as shown in Table VII-
2 and Table VII-3. There were five different solution techniques as shown in Figure VII-2. 
As mentioned, for the successful trials I have defined a category of effects called cognitive 
integrating influence. Like with the unsuccessful trials I have included a cognitive level and 
cognitive style influence score for consideration. In the case of successful trials I will briefly 
present information about the trials based on the five unique solution techniques shown in 
Table VII-2. And following those presentations I will add some closing remarks about 
categories of solution techniques. 
 The solution technique called pattern sheet key sketch was employed by trial CW-T1 
and CHL-T2. These two teams were considerably different as their planner subteams 
aggregated level scores were -0.94 and -3.95 respectively. Their cognitive styles were 
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considerably closer at -0.45 and -0.94 respectively. The two trials diverged from there. Trial 
CW-T1 had total level and total style gaps of (10.61, 10.45) while CHL-T2 had gaps of        
(-1.96, 7.86). As discussed above, the trial CW-T1 demonstrated excellent integrating 
devices and I consequently scored their manifest level and style (5, 2). This planner subteam 
built an understanding systematically and ultimately provided an excellent set of instructions 
for the operating subteam. Their modestly low level score did not appear to impede their 
decision processes. Their mean style (-0.45) appeared to be near the optimum in terms of 
solving this problem. An important factor that these scores fail to highlight was the range of 
relative job status which this team enjoyed. From a high ranking long tenured executive to a 
relatively low ranking newer staff person this planner subteam exemplified job status 
diversity. That diversity contributed to the relatively low aggregated level score (based on the 
proxy used for level). However, the relative job status of the planners appeared to blend 
optimally for this trial including the emergence of a natural leader14.  
 The approach to solution for CHL-T2 was much less rational than CW-T1 and 
ultimately required some degree of luck for the solution to be successful. Like the 
unsuccessful trial RAL-T5 this planner subteam encountered a moral dilemma with one of 
the planners concerning the propriety of sketching the puzzle pieces on the pattern sheet. 
Unlike RAL-T5 this subteam’s other three planners were sufficiently integrated that they 
employed the sketch solution in spite of vigorous resistance by planner Abe. I scored the 
level and style for CHL-T2 (3, 2). A middling degree of integration occurred in cognitive 
level as the three planners combined to offer a sketch solution. But, the dissenting planner 
                                                 
14 I have used this term without intending to imbue it with undue connotation; i.e., I do not mean to imply that 
the person referenced somehow was born with some innate abilities which mark them as leaders through life. 
Rather, these persons had higher domain knowledge, higher executive ranking, and greater seniority than their 
teammates. Those characteristics contributed to a visible acquiescence by the other teammates to the natural 
leader. These people were the best equipped problem solvers given the problem and the context. 
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wrote a lengthy set of instructions which were confusing and, potentially, could have resulted 
in the operators not solving the puzzle. The operators were important in this trial to a greater 
degree than in some based on the fact that had they not discarded the written instructions and 
used the sketch they likely would not have been successful. The fact that the operators in this 
instance were somewhat innovative was helpful in this successful trial.  
 In summary, the pattern sheet key sketch solution trials consisted of one planner 
subteam which functioned about as well as could be expected and one that was very lucky in 
the outcome. I would attribute the differences in these two executions to the combination of 
cognitive aggregated level and cognitive level and style gaps. The excellent execution of 
CW-T1 had cognitive level gap of 10.61 and an aggregated level of -0.94 while the lucky 
outcome CHL-T2 had a small cognitive level gap of -1.96 and an aggregated level of -3.95. 
These were significant differences and when combined with the range of relative job status 
discussed above for CW-T1 provides explanation for the observed differences in behavior 
during the exercise.  
 The second solution technique recorded in Table VII-2 was the center square 
keystone. Two teams employed this technique and, interestingly, one was role preferred and 
one was not. The aggregated levels of WIL-T1 and RAL-T4 are 4.15 and 0.35 respectively. 
Their mean style scores were quite different, however, -0.70 versus 1.79—nearly two 
standard deviations apart! There were such significant differences in the total cognitive gaps 
that I will report them separately.  
 The planner subteam for WIL-T1 had cognitive level and style gaps of 17.66 and 
3.69. The level gap was considerable while the style gap was minor. The relatively small 
style gap meant all the planners were near the same KAI score. In spite of the relatively small 
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style gap there was some spirited discussion during this solution. Based on the thorough 
integration of all the planners in WIL-T1 into the solution concept I scored the integrating 
factors as (5, 1). This means they demonstrated the highest cognitive level score available 
based on their collective knowledge forming and decision processes. I also scored them as 
extreme adaptor based on their approach and the absolute integrity of the solution; i.e., there 
can be no question as to the propriety of this solution technique. As mentioned earlier, this 
was largely a result of one planner who conceived the solution, persuaded the other planners 
of its merit, and instructed the operators how to solve the puzzle. This individual emerged as 
a natural leader, in a similar fashion as the CW-T1 trial.  
 The planner subteam for RAL-T4 had cognitive level and style gaps of 14.42 and 
22.34 respectively. They, like WIL-T1 and CW-T1, had a natural leader which proved very 
valuable in its performance. Unlike WIL-T1 this planner subteam was high on the innovative 
scale at 1.79. The natural leader in this case conceived the exact solution technique as did 
WIL-T1, a surprising fact given the considerable difference between cognitive style of the 
two groups and the two individuals that came up with the solutions. There were considerably 
large cognitive level and style gaps for this trial (14.42, 22.34). Such large style gaps were 
instrumental in unsuccessful trials for RAL-T1 and RAL-T5, as reported above. However, in 
this case the natural leader gently guided the planners to his solution technique without the 
kind of unfettered conflict exhibited in the other two trials mentioned. I scored this planner 
cognitive level and style as (5, 4). They demonstrated the highest degree of cognitive 
integrating devices in their deliberations and also behaved in a marked innovative style 
although not the extreme degree. In this case the operating subteam was also very effective in 
completing its work. I scored the operating subteam’s cognitive level and style as (4, 1).  
  284
 The third unique solution technique was the window pane framing key employed by 
the planner subteam for RAL-T2. This solution was very similar to the center square 
keystone discussed above but, obviously, with an outside key rather than an inside one. This 
role preferred planner subteam actually completed two solutions but I am basing this 
comment on the window pane framing solution since it was unique. There was little relative 
difference in job status among the planners. The planners aggregated level was -2.03 and 
mean style -1.31. The cognitive gaps in level and style were modest (4.55, 4.9). And, this 
relatively small cognitive gap could be observed during their deliberations as there was little 
conflict. I scored the planners integrating level and style as (3, 1). The middling cognitive 
level score was based on the fact that in spite of the planners’ creative work they failed to 
understand the time constraints of the problem. They worked well to understand all other 
aspects but missed one critical element—the requirement of instructing the operators within 
the 25 minute time limit.  
 In the case of RAL-T2 the operators played an important role as well. Since the 
planners had no time left to provide oral instructions the operators could have been 
unsuccessful had they been careless in their approach. But, the operators appeared to be quite 
cautious in their approach and, fortunately, found the written instructions which were left 
prior to moving any of the puzzle pieces around. The operators mean style was 0.69 and I 
scored their cognitive integrating level and style as (4, 4). They did a good job of talking 
through the exercise to enable the trial to be successful.  
 The next solution technique to be reported is the puzzle pieces on the pattern sheet. 
This trial was CW-T2 and was a good example of cognitive style dominating the exercise. 
The planner subteam’s aggregated level score was -0.52. Its mean style score was 1.04. 
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However, the cognitive gaps were considerably more extreme in level and style (6.57, 16.38). 
The cognitive style gap was evident during the execution of the puzzle in that the solution 
technique was obviously an eureka moment; i.e., a bright idea. And following that good idea 
the planners sat with no apparent intention of retrieving the operators for the instruction 
period. This was classic innovator behavior.  
 This trial benefited by its operator subteam being punctual in coming back into the 
room where the planners were working. The operators came in about three minutes before 
the 25 minute period had expired and, fortunately, the planners had the opportunity to 
provide oral instructions as to how to bring all four sets of puzzle pieces together in one 
location.  
 I scored the planners’ subteam integrating cognitive level and style as (4, 5) in this 
case. The effective and constructive dialogue demonstrated a relatively high level while the 
group’s cognitive style was clearly extremely innovative. It was also important that the 
operators subteam had a relatively high aggregated level 1.21 and I scored their integrating 
cognitive level and style (3, 2). While this trial was successful, the planners’ problem-solving 
process was decidedly innovative and, consequently, hard to replicate. Yes, they were 
successful, but it required a good deal of luck. 
 The last solution technique was the exploded puzzle pieces, which was done by RAL-
T3. The planners in this trial pushed the limits of the rules to the boundary and beyond. 
Interestingly, this planner subteam had the one of the highest aggregated level scores of all 
the planner subteams (4.14). They were only mildly innovative as their mean style score was 
(0.60). Their total cognitive gaps for level and style were (14.03, 15.14). The style gap was in 
evidence during the planners’ deliberations. They had numerous ideas and quickly 
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abandoned one idea and moved to another just as quick. Their final solution required some 
degree of stretching of the rules concerning keeping the puzzle pieces in front of each 
member. But they found creative ways to rationalize around the apparent restrictions. In 
terms of cognitive integrating level and style I scored the planners’ subteam (3, 5). The 
middling score for manifest cognitive level was based on the random approach to solving the 
problem and the haphazard discussion that ensued. In spite of the relatively high aggregated 
cognitive level score they had considerable cognitive gap conflict (including both level and 
style) and were fortunate to converge on a solution just before the time expired. By virtue of 
their simple solution the operators were not challenged much. But, had the planners let the 
time totally expire the operators may have not been as successful as they were.  
 In the preceding discussion I have employed the cognitive integrating influences as 
cognitive level and cognitive style in a relatively generic sense. I want to aggregate those into 
broader categories of integrating influences based on this research. There were three 
distinctive categories of integrating influence which I deemed critical to the successful 
solution of this problem. I will briefly discuss each of the three types and other factors which 
bear on their successful execution. This will be repetitive of some of the information listed 
above, but from a different perspective and, therefore, worthwhile. 
 The first planners integrating influence I identified I will call natural leader. As it 
turned out there were three cases where the range of relative job status was classified as 
large. And in all three cases one member of the planner subteam played a dominant role in 
guiding the subteam to a successful solution concept. Two of these cases were role preferred 
and one was non role preferred.  
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 The planner subteam for CW-T1 was relatively more adaptive hence role preferred 
(KAI mean score 88) and consisted of four planners one of whom was a senior executive 
with the company. He was joined by another senior project manager, a computer 
programmer, and a graphic designer. In terms of decision-making process this was probably 
the ideal example. The senior executive’s KAI score was 96. Several ideas were verbalized 
some of which pushed the boundary lines of the instructions. This was surprising at first 
since this planning subteam was relatively more adaptive. However, the mean score of 88 
points is just slightly adaptive and the defacto team leader had a score of 96 making this team 
capable of a wide range of behavior, as evidenced by their boundary-pushing dialogue. The 
natural leader happened also to have closely read the instructions and provided answers 
which were unchallenged. This natural leader engaged the other members of the planners 
subteam and listened intently to everyone’s ideas. This team recognized its responsibility to 
instruct the operators subteam within the 25 minute time limit and did so quite effectively. I 
would characterize this subteam as relatively well “formed” using Tuckman’s term and 
integrated using Carlile’s term. The solution concept consisted of both written and oral 
instructions and allowed time for the operators to ask questions. This could easily be 
identified as an adaptive planner solution based on the planner’s attention to detail. While 
these people do not work together daily, they were clearly significantly more integrated than 
some other trials. This was an ideal example of the degree of integration I assumed with my 
hypotheses concerning intact groups versus ad hoc groups. I should comment on the group 
dynamics which occurred in the brief moments that this planning subteam spent together and 
why I attributed the integrating influence to natural leader. There was, in fact, a clear and 
implicitly understood role hierarchy as the group came together. Chris (KAI 96) is a 23 year 
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company veteran and regional manager superior to the other three members. Bo (KAI 87) is a 
five-year senior project manager used to taking direction from Chris and known for his 
critical thinking skills. Dale (KAI 96) is a graphic designer whose degree was in fine arts and 
who works in marketing and proposal development. She works with Chris and Bo routinely 
supporting their needs regarding proposal creation. Abe (KAI 73) is the junior of the group 
and is a computer programmer. He was the least communicative of the group but picked up 
on the specific time limitations shown in the instructions. Chris’ role as defacto leader and 
his ability to probe the boundaries of the problem were critical to this team’s success. 
However, the other participants made valuable contributions consistent with the role and 
relative hierarchical positions they hold in the organization. 
 The other role preferred relatively adaptive planner subteam was WIL-T1. The 
natural leader in this trial (Bo, KAI 85) was very dominant in assuming control after 
considerable time studying the instructions. He happened to be joined on this subteam by 
three relatively junior members as regards range of relative job status. His personal mastery 
of the problem and ability to influence the other planners was necessary and sufficient to 
conceive a successful solution concept and instruct the operators. Examples of adaptive 
cognitive style were present in the formulation of the concept and the instructions to the 
operators. This planner subteam did not provide any written instructions for the operators. 
The thoroughness of their instructions negated the need for written instructions. In this case 
the natural leader single handedly solved the problem and his subteam members made little 
contribution to the outcome. I would characterize this as an example of Hare’s comment 
above about “an eureka type” solution by one member and the other members quickly 
adopting the solution. While this was a successful trial, it did not represent a team formation 
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as effectively as the CW-T1 trial. Bo is a high ranking executive in the organization and, 
consequently, the other planners quickly ceded authority to him. It was fortuitous that Bo 
also had sufficient domain knowledge to find a solution for the puzzle. His integrating 
influence was based on his perceived knowledge by his teammates and relative rank in the 
organization to which the other planners gave heed. 
 The third and final successful trial in which a natural leader was the dominant 
integrating influence was RAL-T4. This trial was a relatively innovative non role preferred 
planner subteam. Its KAI mean score was 120, somewhat innovative. Interestingly the 
natural leader on this planner subteam conceived the exact solution concept as the natural 
leader in the WIL-T1 trial—in spite of the fact that the natural leader in WIL-T1 had a KAI 
score of 85 versus the natural leader on RAL-T4 who had a KAI score of 132. Also 
interesting was the fact that there was large range of relative job status on this planner 
subteam. While the natural leader conceived the solution to the problem, he engaged the 
other planners in the process and, consequently, this subteam more closely approximated the 
CW-T1 exemplar of an intact problem solving unit. Like CW-T1, RAL-T4 had a senior 
executive with considerable tenure; Ray (KAI 132) was a 19 year veteran with the 
organization. He was assisted by Mel (KAI 108, 2 year tenure) and Nat (KAI 114, 2 year 
tenure), both of whom were professional engineers and proven problem solvers. Pat (KAI 
126, 3 year tenure) is a marketing researcher who collaborated freely with the others during 
the deliberations and who has regular interaction with Bo and Nat in her regular job. None of 
the participants works for each other directly. But, there was an implicit role hierarchy in this 
planning subteam which needed little time to develop. As indicated, I have used the term 
natural leader to describe the integrating effect observed during the experiment. That term 
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probably does not fully explicate the complicated preconceived ideas of self and others that 
had an impact on the planners’ subteam in this trial.  
 I have identified three cases of integrating influence being defined as combined 
resource. Two of the cases were role preferred (CHL-T2 and RAL-T2) and one case was non 
role preferred (CW-T2). I want to elaborate on the term combined resource. In the sense of 
Carlile’s (2002) knowledge being local, embedded, and invested, I have considered combined 
resource as the sum of all knowledge and skills accumulated throughout life. This term 
comes from Kirton’s schema as shown in Figure IV-3. Cognitive resource is a term that is 
related to the proxy I developed for cognitive level. Recall that my definition of cognitive 
level includes components of age, tenure, total experience, and job status. Certainly this is a 
proxy for some unknown total cognitive level. This is the reservoir which feeds both 
cognitive effect and cognitive affect (recall my conceptualized depiction of cognitive schema 
shown in Figure IV-3). The expanded term combined resource is used to mean the planners 
worked well to help collectively solve the problem. As it turned out, two of the trials were 
role preferred (relatively adaptive planning subteams) while one was non role preferred 
(relatively innovative planning subteams). I viewed the dominant integrating influence as the 
combined resource for these trials. For sake of summarizing some key observations I will 
mention each of these three cases. 
 Trial CHL-T2 was a role preferred case (relatively more adaptive KAI mean 81). 
Owing to last minute personnel changes code name Dale was assigned to someone with the 
lowest KAI score (71) even though my protocol called for him to be code-named differently. 
Dale (KAI 71, 4 year tenure) and Chris (KAI 93, 2 year tenure) were of relatively equal 
hierarchical level in the organization and both were male. Abe (KAI 75, 2 year tenure) and 
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Bo (KAI 85, 3 year tenure) were the primary antagonists during the discourse as indicated 
above. Both are women and are at relatively equal positions in the company. In this case Abe 
had difficulty accepting the suggestions about sketching the puzzle key on the pattern sheet, a 
problem she did not overcome throughout the 25 minute problem period. The other three 
participants, however, were able to successfully prepare a sketch suitable for the operating 
subteam to solve the problem. Had those three planners yielded to Abe’s objections this 
would not have been a successful trial. These planners work in rather close proximity to each 
other and while they have little direct responsibility over one another they brought implicit 
role hierarchies for themselves and the other participants. This was borne out in the free and 
easy way they communicated and explored boundaries of possible solutions. Ultimately, the 
consensus that was reached by three of the four was sufficient to reach a successful 
conclusion. I considered this an example of combined resource. 
 The second example of combined resource was trial CW-T2. This trial consisted of 
four women in a non role preferred planning subteam. All the KAI scores were innovative 
ranging from 100 to 121 points. The planners explored several ideas and one (KAI 109) had 
an eureka moment when she suggested the notion of placing the puzzle pieces on the puzzle 
pattern sheet for orientation purposes. All members offered ideas and contributed. This is an 
example of combined resource. However, it was not considered an exemplar of good 
problem solving in that it was not process oriented; i.e., it would be difficult to replicate this 
in another setting.  
 The trial RAL-T2 was one of the best examples of collaborative problem solving by a 
group. This was a relatively adaptive planning subteam (KAI mean 76). It consisted of 
middle level staff members representing the IT group, engineering, and marketing staff. Abe 
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(KAI 67, 11 year tenure) and Bo (KAI 70, 17 year tenure) were the senior participants. Chris 
(KAI 82, 4 year tenure) is an engineer and Dale (KAI 84, 1 year tenure) is a marketing 
coordinator. Abe, in his company role as an IT manager, is well known to all and well 
respected. Abe is a high adaptor with only about 5% of the general population more adaptive. 
Abe’s contribution, as mentioned earlier, was to conceive the notion of a window pane 
framing for each participant to place his puzzle pieces inside. He also wrote detailed 
instructions for completing the puzzle. While Abe was guiding the others with his solution 
Chris and Dale began a dialogue about sketching their individual puzzle shapes on their 
individual pattern sheets to supplement the other instructions. While they fretted over the 
appropriateness of this solution concept, in the end, they concluded that it was not “showing 
the puzzle key sheet” by sketching the individual puzzle pieces on each person’s pattern 
sheet. In spite of the acute attention to solving the problem with two completely sufficient 
solutions, this group failed to understand the 25 minute time during which they must devise 
an instruction and tell the operators. Even without having an opportunity to orally 
communicate with the operators’ subteam this planners’ subteam left sufficient instructions 
for a successful solution.  
 The final trial, RAL-T3, was a non role preferred relatively innovative planner 
subteam (KAI mean 107) which I have characterized the solution concept as combined style. 
Ray (KAI 116, 5 year tenure) was the most vocal and assertive of this planner subgroup. The 
other very vocal and assertive member was Mel (KAI 95, 13 year tenure). Nat (KAI 96, 2 
year tenure) and Pat (KAI 105, 4 year tenure) passively contributed but were clearly 
subservient to the other two. This planner subteam was perhaps the most egregious in terms 
of pushing the limits to the problem instructions. They demonstrated marked innovator 
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tendencies regarding ideation, offering numerous solutions but following through with few. 
They had little comprehension of the time constraints and but for the fact that the operator 
subteam barged in on the planners there would have been no instructions given. However, 
this planner subteam had conceived a creative solution of placing the pieces in an exploded 
arrangement so that with only limited explanation the operators could easily assemble the 
puzzle. This team, more than any other, displayed little regard for the rules and easily moved 
pieces of the puzzle around anywhere on the table that they felt they needed to. This more so 
than any other trial was an example of combined style contributing to the outcome. While it 
was successful in that the operator subteam did assemble the puzzle it would not be 
considered an exemplar of a good problem solving team, as mentioned above. 
  
 2.3 Intact Groups versus Teams 
 Intact groups are not necessarily teams, vis-à-vis problem-solving capability, as 
discussed in some detail above. It is clear by the quantitative results presented here that 
successful problem solving groups need some degree of integration or else they would 
perform at no better rate than ad hoc groups. And, it is clear that just belonging to the same 
organization (institution, committee, or association) provides insufficient integrating 
influence to produce a fully functional problem-solving team. This is a significant finding 
when considering how organizations are frequently operated today. It is not uncommon for 
companies to be organized around projects and project teams. People in these firms may 
serve on several different project teams at the same time. And, members of project teams are 
not integrated into the teams to the same degree depending on team tenure, relative job 
status, subject-matter knowledge, seniority, style, level, resource, and motivation. There is 
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not one single factor which supersedes all others when building teams for any problem-
solving purpose. However, it is quite significant that all five unsuccessful cases shown in 
Table VII-3 show disintegrating influences in cognitive level and cognitive style with 
extreme scores in one or both of those dimensions. Additionally, cognitive gaps, both level 
and style, proved to be indicative of challenges unless mitigated by natural leaders. I would 
argue that all of the five failures featured cognitive style based failures with interacting 
effects from cognitive level.  
 This research placed relatively higher adapters in subteams and relatively higher 
innovators in subteams. The planner subteams were, by design, relatively homogeneous in 
problem solving style. The homogeneity of unsuccessful planner subteams appeared to 
exacerbate the style based decisions of participants while successful planner subteams were 
able to overcome “groupthink” (Janis 1972).  
 Cognitive style is a significant contributor to interpersonal communications and 
behavior during group decision processes. Similarly cognitive level15 is an important 
consideration with group problem-solving exercises. Awareness of others’ preferred 
cognitive style and consciousness of our own preferred cognitive style can be helpful in 
group processes. Similarly put, awareness of cognitive gaps as argued by Jablokow and 
Booth (2006) enable thinking at a higher plateau within groups. However, with respect to 
cognitive style, as Scott (2007) observed during her research, a one hour lecture on A-I 
theory and KAI scores alone were insufficient to help ad hoc groups improve problem 
solving using the hollow square experiment. I would recommend that, in addition to typical 
team-building exercises to integrate groups, an experiential training activity based on KAI 
                                                 
15 I used this term in the sense of Carlile’s (2002) definition of knowledge as being local, embedded, and 
invested in practice.  
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style would be very useful and bring to consciousness the natural tendencies of our individual 
problem-solving style preferences. Similarly, cognitive level gaps (as I have used the term) 
could be illuminated by rational processes that create shared knowledge of a local, 
embedded, and invested nature for all participants.  
  
 2.4 Concluding Observations on Quantitative and Qualitative Results 
 I would assert that for reasonably integrated intact groups as exemplified by the two 
categories of integrating influence 1) natural leader and 2) combined resource my 
hypotheses H1 and H2 would meet my original a priori expectations. Few would argue that 
well integrated teams of people are more successful than ad hoc groups. The fact that this 
research process showed no statistically significant difference was due to improper definition 
of intact groups, not flawed hypotheses. What this work has highlighted is the potentially 
powerful impact of cognitive styles among people assembled to solve problems. Likewise, it 
highlights the manner in which cognitive level interacts with cognitive style to either 
exacerbate or mitigate the problem-solving ability of the group. Like others have suggested, 
cognitive style theory can be put to good use in the area of team composition, conflict 
management, counseling, and team building if skillfully employed (see e.g., Hayes and 
Allinson 1994; Kirton 1980 and 1994; and Lindsay 1985). Additionally, cognitive gap theory 
might also inform team building and as more empirical work is done it too may enhance the 
use and understanding of cognitive style theory. 
 I would not, however, reassert hypothesis number three concerning degree of 
congruence between formal and informal organization. That subject is beyond the scope of 
what this research method was able to explore. However, this research program was able to 
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isolate and amplify individual cognitive styles and individual cognitive levels manifested 
during group problem-solving exercises. And, by video recording the group deliberations 
with the benefit of previously recorded information about each participant (including the KAI 
scores) this research process has provided theory based explanations for individual and group 
behaviors, a needed contribution to small group problem-solving research. Also, this research 
has elaborated and extended some recent work which combines cognitive style theory and 
cognitive level theory into a concept called cognitive gap theory which is promising in the 
study of group development or integration. This was recently highlighted by an article 
appearing in Small Group Research by Arrow et al. (2004) on the temporal development on 
groups. They reviewed the extant literature with emphasis on the extent to which theory has 
guided empirical research on small groups and provide compelling summary thoughts (p.99): 
Some areas, such as group development, are rich in models but need more theoretical 
integration. We need a metaframework that incorporates multiple paths of development 
and seeks to identify the factors that predispose groups toward one part or another—or 
that can shift a group from one part to another. Models that apply to different time scales 
or types of activity—group development, decision development, group learning, 
performance spirals, and structuration and microlevel action cycles in conversation—
could also benefit from better integration, so that we  have a better sense of the ways in 
which temporal patterns evident at different time scales mesh with or disrupt one another.  
 
Arrow et al. (2004) called for more theory-based empirical research on the development of 
small groups and said existing empirical research was, “…mixed and often confusing results 
across many domains of small group research” (p.100). My research regarding small group 
problem solving was grounded in the theory of cognitive psychology with special emphasis 
on cognitive style theory and some speculative work on cognitive level theory. Although the 
temporal issue of group development was outside the scope of this work I submit that this 
theory based analysis of group problem solving can provide useful educational and 
developmental benefits to community based groups, organizations, institutions, and other 
associations which operate with small groups comprising the primary decision units.  
  297
3. Applications in a Planning Context 
 In the introductory section of Chapter I in this research report I posited planning as a 
group learning process. I will conclude this exposition reaffirming that contention and 
expanding it based on these findings. Public boards, commissions, or committees are 
routinely assembled for making democratic decisions. The range of solutions for those 
decisions is limited by the members; e.g., in this research some participants read severe 
prohibitions into the rules while others pushed right to the limits of the rules. There were 
wide variations in those interpretations. Cognitive gaps were evident in both level and style 
as suggested by Jablokow and Booth (2006). Kirton’s paradox of structure resurfaced as an 
important fact that is better understood by experience than by oratory or composition. Recall 
that the paradox of structure is premised on the fact that all people are different and 
see/internalize/interpret the world in ways unique to them. Carlile (2002) called these 
different kinds of knowledge local, embedded, and invested in practice. This was expanded 
significantly in Chapter IV with a review of the literature on cognitive style theory and an 
introduction of cognitive gap theory which added a variable for cognitive level. I introduced 
a model of problem solving which illuminates cognitive gap theory and makes the paradox of 
structure clear. Recall that the paradox of structure also bears on the Problem A-Problem B 
phenomena; i.e., Problem A is the initial problem the group is assembled to solve and 
Problem B is the problem arising because everyone has differing views as to the nature of the 
problem and the breadth of possible solutions, hence the paradox of structure.  
 The KAI scores which range from high adapter to high innovator with the average 
centering around 96 provide a vocabulary which can add value to public discourse. Society 
cries out for great innovation when, often, what is needed is greater effort at adaptive 
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solutions. Of course, all these solutions are judged by different people as too much or too 
little depending on their natural cognitive styles. Similarly, when groups are assembled for 
problem-solving exercises there are wide variations in knowledge, as evidenced in the Carlile 
work in cross functional product development companies. The localness, embeddedness, and 
investedness of individual knowledge must be considered when groups are problem solving.  
 Cognitive style theory does not make anyone more or less amenable to accepting 
change. It does, however, bring to the surface the real fact that change is also perceived by 
different people in very different degrees. Cognitive gap theory also helps illuminate that 
fact. These conscious realizations can be useful when dealing with complex value-laden 
problems in public agencies (certainly this realization also has utility in private sector 
organizations).  
 My primary research objective was to determine how and if group problem-solving 
outcomes may be improved by judicious selection of group members based on cognitive 
style preference. Based on some theoretical work in cognitive gap theory I extended this into 
cognitive level considerations as well.  I am satisfied that this empirical work showed the 
potential impact, both negative and positive, of cognitive styles and cognitive levels 
manifested during collaborative problem-solving exercises. It, unfortunately, did not offer a 
panacea for grouping people based on KAI scores to solve problems. That is outside the 
scope of what is possible in this research. What is clear is that cognitive style has an 
identifiable influence on collaborative functioning of small groups and when combined with 
cognitive level can provide helpful insight to foster better problem solving. The highly 
homogeneous make-up of the cases in this research should provide useful guidance for those 
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who regularly work with groups of people, either within the organization or within the 
community.  
 Cognitive psychology may seem only distantly connected to the planning profession. 
However, Lynch’s (1960) The Image of the City was fundamentally grounded in cognitive 
psychology and has been considered one of the most influential books on planning in the last 
100 years (Hodder 2009). Lynch realized that the images people perceive of city buildings, 
streets, monuments, and other elements are subjective interpretations, “The environment 
suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer—with great adaptability and in the light 
of his own purposes—selects, organizes, and endows with meaning what he sees” (p.6). This 
was an acknowledgement of how man interacts with external stimuli via a process scholars 
call cognitive psychology. Lynch, of course was interested in the physical environment or 
what he termed the “…external agent in the interaction which produces the environmental 
image” (p.7). His work did not concern itself with individual differences, the focus of 
psychology, as he acknowledged that his independent variable was the physical environment. 
Rather, he built a vocabulary (paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks) for 
communication which has helped city planning professionals shape more useful and positive 
physical environments for two generations.  
 Lynch’s work, however impactful it was at the time, was focused on the simple part 
of city and regional planning—physical plans. The profession was soon to be challenged to 
concern itself more with wicked problems than with problems of city form (Davidoff 1965). I 
referred to this in the opening paragraph of this exposition by suggesting the planning 
profession changed from an emphasis on product (plan) to an emphasis on process 
(democratically determined decisions). It is interesting that Lynch used cognitive psychology 
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as a means to help planners better understand the impact of physical environments while I 
propose the use of cognitive psychology as a means to help planners better facilitate 
democratically determined decisions. In either case, cognitive psychology is a means, not an 
end.  
 My research interest is about how cognitive processes work to help people 
successfully function in a world of subjective reality. This work also suggests some 
vocabulary not for artifacts in the physical environment but, rather, language for qualifying 
observations in that environment. Relatively more adaptive solutions versus relatively more 
innovative solutions are rarely objectively defined since there is no omniscient narrator who 
is absolutely objective. Planners, however, can and should aspire to understand the nature of 
solutions in a variety of contexts so as to understand where those solutions fall on the 
adaptive-innovative scale, and the local, embedded, and invested nature of knowledge in that 
context. The paradox of structure also provides a useful concept with which to view 
problems which arise in planning domains. The Jablokow-Booth problem solving model can 
be useful when conceptualizing problem-solving exercises as a rich extension of the paradox 
of structure.  The presumed norms and standards within which all problems are housed are at 
once limiting to future possibilities and enabling for solutions within them. And, anyone who 
has dealt with groups of people during any kind of decision seeking process knows, 
intuitively, the power and truth of the Problem A-Problem B analogy. Recall from Figure IV-
3 that the human actor-decision maker exists within some kind of organizational or 
institutional climate which influences him in some way. Climate and the human exist within 
a larger culture which influences both. Opportunities exist which the human must scan, select 
for further processing, and/or dismiss. And based on motive and opportunity the human may 
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take action to interact with the external world in either preferred or coping styles of behavior. 
While simple in concept, this offers a useful framework with which to view and approach 
problems in any context.  
 
4. Adaption and Innovation in 100 Years of Planning  
 Since its inception in 1909 the planning profession has been engaged in a struggle 
between forces pushing for substantial and profound innovative change versus forces which 
argue for incremental and prudent adaptive change. Frederick Law Olmstead, Jr., and 
Benjamin C. Marsh led the two opposing views at the inaugural National Conference on City 
Planning (NCCP) which was held May 21-22, 1909 in Washington, D.C. Marsh was a social 
reformer who advocated for a strong governmental activism in dealing with injustices he felt 
were the result of a ruling power elite. Olmstead, on the other hand, pushed the emerging 
profession to be concerned with technical aspects of planning cities and felt the social 
injustice agenda was outside the bounds of the professional planners’ domain (Birch and 
Silver 2009). With respect to cognitive style theory these represent an innovative position 
(Marsh’s) and an adaptive position (Olmstead) based on the then prevailing norms. It is 
interesting to consider a few significant events over the last 100 years which had an 
interesting effect on the planning profession and the way that profession has been perceived. 
 Olmstead, who is considered the father of city and regional planning, led the 
profession in promoting technically sound comprehensive plans as an objective. Like 
Lindblom’s (1959) disjointed incrementalism, adaptive change builds off the known and is 
unlikely to create major societal change. Unfortunately, innovative change risks the other 
extreme.  
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 Following the 1949 and 1954 Federal Housing Acts and the 1956 Federal Aid 
Highway Act planners were at the epicenter of societal change that they were helping create 
but which they likely did not fully understand. By any measure this was innovative change to 
the extreme. Some consider planners’ work at that time destructive to communities, 
facilitating sprawl, and contributing to racial animosity after which an anti-planning view 
emerged across many regions of the country. Jacobs and Paulsen (2009) commented on the 
changing views of planners following their mid-century experience with massive innovative 
change, “…planners today seem far more comfortable interpreting the role of planning 
through the anti-authoritarian, anti-expert, anti-modern and pro-community, pro-poor, pro-
environment criticism of planning that emerged from responses to urban renewal and 
interstate highways” (p.138). These are but some of the things that led Davidoff (1965) to 
introduce an expanded role for planners which included, “…the need to rectify racial and 
social injustices.” The planner as advocate for the underclass has emerged as an enduring 
theme since the 1960s. In the language of cognitive psychology, adaptive change leads to 
furthering the interests of the power elite at the expense of the powerless. These and other 
issues provided sufficient motivation for planning scholar Forester (1989) to assert a role for 
the “progressive planner” which included, “…information control, misinformation, and 
distorted communications…” in his polemic Planning in the Face of Power (p.27). Clearly 
the paradigm of city planning has changed rather significantly since 1909 and, surprisingly, 
in some quarters it is closer to Marsh’s social activism position than Olmstead’s technical 
expert. Consider Marsh’s opening remarks at the inaugural NCCP meeting, “Much of the 
planning that has heretofore been suggested in the United States has been a bonus to real 
estate and corporation interests, without regard to the welfare of the citizens” (Peterson 
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2009:127). I think Marsh would applaud Forester’s (1989) assertion 80 years later about the 
duty of the professional progressive planner to balance the power pendulum,  
In a world of severe inequalities, planning strategies that treat all parties ‘equally’ end up 
ironically reproducing the very inequalities with which they began. Nowhere is this 
paradox of ‘equal opportunity’ more obvious and poignant than in apparently democratic, 
participatory planning processes—in which initial inequalities of time resources, 
expertise and information threaten to render the actual democratic character of these 
processes problematic, if not altogether illusory” (p.9).  
 
It is interesting to consider that Forester’s suggestion today seems relatively benign while 
Marsh’s similar thoughts in 1909 were considered rather radical. This is an example of the 
way paradigms may evolve over time.  
 There have been other paradigm shifts of significant magnitude over the past 100 
years which have influenced planners and planning. Consider, for example, the substantially 
racially segregated society that existed in 1909 versus the condition today where the United 
States has its first African American president. Consider the fact that in 1909 women in the 
US were not allowed to vote. Both these changes required conflict and major shifts in public 
opinion. These were innovative changes in the strictest sense. Both required federal action to 
achieve the change; i.e., one change required the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and one required the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
 What lessons might planners take from the profound changes which have occurred in 
American society over the past 100 years in light of the findings presented in this research 
project? Due to the highly focused nature of this research, albeit theoretically based, I must 
limit my suggested lessons to the individual actor within the context of her job. The common 
denominator to all contemporary planning activity is the interaction planners have with their 
constituents. Thus, I will limit my comments to the elemental level of planner’s activity. The 
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following items are general observations and recommendations for planners based on this 
research: 
 People have distinctive problem-solving styles which may be viewed as falling on a 
bipolar continuum from highly adaptive to highly innovative as defined above. The 
extreme cases of either can be a major source of conflict during consensus seeking 
activities. Modest variation of cognitive styles can contribute to more thoughtful and 
wide ranging ideation. A keen awareness of one’s own preferred problem solving style 
will enable the planner to understand some sources of conflict and to develop techniques 
to reduce them. 
 All people are problem solvers and therefore creative but with different styles and 
with different levels. Adaptive creative solutions are just as effective as innovative 
solutions, depending on the dimensions and demands of the problems to be solved. Other 
individual differences may be more or less manifest during problem solving; e.g., 
extroversion-introversion.  
 Knowledge is local, embedded, and invested in practice. This interacts with cognitive 
style to exacerbate the variety of views and perceptions of problems and opportunities.  
 Considerable variation in interpretation of information during any type of group 
processes can be expected based on cognitive style, cognitive level, and cognitive 
resource, not to mention individual motivation of participants.  
 Be cognizant of the powerful role of facilitator or leader in group processes (natural 
leader). People interpret words and non-verbal behaviors subjectively in ways that can be 
vastly different from the intent. Repeat important messages or instructions in multiple 
ways using different terms.  
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 Standing organizations or committees have climates which influence group behaviors 
and may conduce to integrate or segregate participants due to knowledge being local, 
embedded, and invested in practice of those organizations. 
 There are no unbiased participants in any organization or committee activity. Bias is 
part of the life experience of every person and can be a subconsciously powerful inertia 
during decision seeking processes.  
 Community planning processes are substantially composed of ad hoc members who 
have widely varying motives for participation, not to mention all the differences 
discussed above. 
 
 In addition to the general recommendations for planners in the eight bullet items 
shown above, what insights might this research provide to planning directors; i.e., to the 
people who must manage city planners and city planning processes? There are three major 
observations which surfaced during this research program that can be educational for 
planning directors: 1) variety versus isomorphism, 2) ambiguity versus certainty and 3) the 
cognitive gap challenge. 
 The fundamental premise upon which cognitive style theory is based is the law of 
requisite variety as elaborated earlier. Recall that the law asserts that an organization or 
system must be at least as diverse as the external environment against which the organization 
must regulate itself. Planning directors must run an organization; albeit a planning 
organization, it is, in fact, an organization exhibiting all the attributes of any type of formal 
organization but for the profit motive (Downs 1967). Planning directors, by definition, run 
bureaucratic organizations which are not driven by profit but by serving the public weal. 
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And, planning directors are keenly interested in surrounding themselves with competent 
planners who understand zoning issues, development codes, building codes, transportation 
issues, public involvement processes, and a host of other critical knowledge bases 
(knowledge being local, embedded, and invested in practice following Carlile (2002)). 
Usually employers (and planning directors are no exception) advertise for and recruit staff 
members who have the greatest depth of knowledge as sketched above. And, usually 
employers select and employ people much like themselves as Schneider et al. (1995) asserted 
in their work on the attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) framework. This process can lead to 
what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) called isomorphism, which is simply a condition where 
the entire organization is composed of very similar people. Kirton and de Ciantis (1994) 
studied this tendency with a focus on cognitive style as measured by the KAI instrument. 
They concluded that such isomorphism tendencies based on cognitive style will ultimately 
make an organization relative homogeneous and will make it relatively inhospitable to people 
who are significantly outside the cognitive style climate mean based on KAI scores. This 
runs counter to the law of requisite variety upon which much of my work was based, which 
suggests that such situations may lead to skewed (either toward the adaptive or the innovative 
end of the scale) or suboptimal decision-making processes. 
 There were some clear examples of highly homogeneous planning subteams which 
failed to provide a coherent solution concept to their operations’ subteams. The trials for FM-
T1, WIL-T2, and CHL-T1 demonstrated the effect of relatively narrow variation in both 
cognitive style and cognitive level. Absent a team leader on the planning subteam the 
relatively isomorphic planning subteams failed to achieve even a semblance of solution for 
their operations’ subteams. What does this have to do with planning directors and their 
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planning departments? First I would suggest that planning directors should understand their 
own problem-solving style preferences as indicated by A-I theory and, specifically, by the 
KAI psychometric instrument, because that probably heavily influenced the cognitive style 
climate of the staff they have assembled. Secondly, I would suggest that planning directors 
should have the KAI inventory administered for all their staff members. While the cognitive 
styles amongst the staff members might vary considerably, the cognitive levels (knowledge is 
local, embedded, and invested in practice) are not likely to vary largely. These things 
combine to make the problem-solving capacity challenging for such isomorphic planning 
departments. Like the examples of planning subteams which were homogeneous and non-
differentiated hierarchically, such small groups inside planning departments may struggle to 
find optimal solutions. Such challenges may be ameliorated by adding a designated team 
leader with some cognitive style or cognitive level differences or by specifying a problem-
solving process which ensures some exploration of the boundaries of possible solutions. The 
problem-solving process mentioned here gives rise to the second educational benefit of this 
work for planning directors.  
 Planning directors are charged with a host of managerial tasks in order to meet the 
demands of local municipal governments. For example, zoning variance requests are 
typically discussed internally prior to being submitted to the zoning board for resolution. 
Environmental regulations are usually buried inside massive volumes of development codes 
and planners are expected to be accurate interpreters of those rules. Planning staff members 
have regular interaction with code enforcement officers for interpretation of a variety of 
issues during construction as well. Most of these items may be pegged as relatively 
adaptive—using cognitive style terminology. In fact much of this kind of work is 
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considerably adaptive. Enter into this labyrinth of rules and regulations the citizen who 
desires to build a house, develop an apartment complex, or remove trees near a stream. Such 
citizens demand consistent and fair interpretations of the rules—the raison d’être of 
bureaucracy or a bureaucratic system of governance. What this citizen may encounter is a 
system of equivocality as evidenced by the experiments in this research.  
 This research clearly showed considerably different interpretations of the instructions 
by different planner subteams. There were planning subteams which interpreted the 
instructions to strictly limit the solution concepts to non-written information. There were 
planning subteams which interpreted the instructions to remain in the solution room without 
retrieving the operation subteams. And there were planning subteams which provided clever 
solution concepts with both written and graphical information. These observations provide a 
stark realization that the written word alone is, at best, an equivocal guide and therefore 
should be augmented by other forms of communication. This observation also explains why, 
in spite of an attempt at consistent interpretations (the essence of bureaucracy) there are often 
different interpretations on questions from the same planning department. The lesson for 
planning directors in this instance is to not expect all interpretations to be the same across 
different planners and to design systems to minimize the variation.  
 This research revealed cognitive gaps (both level and style) that appeared to influence 
the understanding of the task by the planner subteam. Also, different preferences for 
directions (map versus written) between women and men were revealed. An informed 
response to these realizations would be to design a multi-media communicative system for 
both planners inside the department and for citizens in the community. Such multi-media 
systems may include graphs, charts, photographs, mini-movies such as would be found on 
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Youtube©, Facebook©, or other social networking sites, in addition to the voluminous 
written development codes. Extensive application of the various forms of information 
exchange will narrow the gap between what the citizens understand and the actual intent of 
the development code. Any narrowing of this gap would be considered beneficial to the 
planning director who is usually the person that receives negative feedback from his superior 
based on complaints from citizens. 
 The cognitive gap challenge is the third and final example of possible helpful 
recommendations this research is able to offer to planning directors. In this case I am most 
concerned with the cognitive gaps between the staff planners and the citizens with whom the 
staff must work. In the case of the observed experiments there were several examples of large 
cognitive gaps, both level and style, that seemed to exacerbate the problem-solving process. 
For example, RAL-T1 contained three alpha males and one female planner. The alpha males 
were quite similar in cognitive level (that used for this experiment). The female was 
considerably more junior in both cognitive level and job status level. The range of cognitive 
styles varied by a full 30 KAI points between two of the male planners. It was startling to see 
the degree of communicative disconnect between the high and low cognitive style planners. I 
consider this failed trial to be largely based on the cognitive style gap for the planners’ 
subteam. In another example RAL-T5 planners were relatively innovative. Unlike RAL-T1 
this planner subteam had considerable cognitive level gap between the most innovative of the 
planners and the other three planners. This trial also proved to be unsuccessful based on the 
communicative distrust that emerged in dialogue. I considered this failure to be cognitive gap 
induced similar to RAL-T1 but this one was substantially more a result of cognitive level gap 
than style. The cognitive level measure employed for this problem was largely age based 
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(age + tenure + total experience + job status). The most innovative planner in this trial twice 
voiced pejorative opinions about how the younger people were relatively lax with rules, a 
notion he asserted was “a generational thing.” This obvious bias, while not intended to offend 
the other planners, did exactly that and, consequently this trial was unsuccessful. I want to 
consider these examples in the case where a citizen (land developer) is trying to get land 
rezoned to build a non-conforming project and must deal with the planning department. 
 As indicated above, the nature of development codes and enforcement, from a 
cognitive style perspective is relatively adaptive. And, also for reasons articulated above, the 
planner who is administering such development codes is likely to be somewhat adaptive if he 
is happily employed in the requisite bureaucratic agency which is responsible for these kinds 
of things. Consider the land developer who is seeking a code variance for his non-
conforming project proposal. The land development business is decidedly risky, not for the 
faint of heart, and anything but bureaucratic. The land development business is, in a word, 
innovative. For reasons similar to the argument I made about the average planning staff 
member, there is a high likelihood that the land developer in my example is a relatively high 
innovator. Thus, the two individuals who sit on opposite sides of the table to initially discuss 
the non-confirming request are very likely to be considerably different from a cognitive style 
perspective; that is, the cognitive style gap is likely to be considerable. And, similarly, the 
cognitive level gap between the two is likely to be large. The planner has sat and defended 
the city or county’s development ordinance against many developers who frequently want to 
push the envelope of acceptable practice (like the innovators I suggest they are). And the 
planner has developed considerable reservations about motives and integrity of some land 
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developers. All the many prior encounters the planner has experienced contribute to the 
planners’ general deep seeded distrust of land developers. Now consider the land developer. 
 The land developer in this example may have scores of projects under his belt. He has 
dealt with countless planning bureaucrats whose only job, or so it seems to the land 
developer, is to delay or deny anything the land developer is suggesting. This bias 
accumulates in the cognitive level storage bin for the land developer. Add to this the fact that 
this land developer is considerably innovative—decidedly more so than the planner 
bureaucrat. In some respects they actually have different goals; i.e., the planner’s objective is 
to keep the development ordinance sacrosanct—no modifications from the exact written 
word while the land developer’s objective is to receive a variance—by definition change the 
development ordinance.  
 The land developer and the staff planner begin with three considerable gaps; i.e., a 
considerable cognitive style gap, a considerable cognitive level gap, and really conflicting 
goals as indicated. As mentioned above, cognitive style gaps (KAI) of 10 points or more 
have been known to produce some difficulty in communicating. Cognitive style gaps of 15 
points (approximately one standard deviation) have been shown to be very challenging. And 
cognitive style gaps of 20 or more KAI points have been shown to cause considerable 
distrust and in some cases cause a total breakdown in communication. To those challenges 
for honest and effective communication must be added the cognitive level gaps mentioned 
above and the conflicting goals of the staff planner and the land developer. This example 
bears out the opportunity for mistrust, misunderstanding, and total communication 
breakdown to occur during the deliberations between a staff planner and a land developer. 
Although there are no overt destructive acts either way in this example, the combination of 
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cognitive gaps and conflicting goals can quickly escalate into defective interaction and 
consequently rise up to the community appeals board of adjustment for adjudication. This 
final escalation to the appeals board is deemed by both the staff planner and the land 
developer to reinforce their deep prejudice of the other.  
 I suggest that these cognitive gaps could and should be anticipated by the planning 
director and acted on in a positive way to minimize the pain and emotional discomfort 
appeals often entail. In the cases cited above the employees all knew each other, liked each 
other on some level, and did not have conflicting goals . Yet, large cognitive gaps alone were 
sufficient to render their efforts ineffective. Knowledge of cognitive styles and cognitive 
levels of the planning staff can help anticipate potential conflicts with citizens. Acting on that 
knowledge can be very helpful in minimizing such conflict.   
  
5. Limitations to this Research  
 Honest reflection following this extensive research program requires the 
identification of threats to internal and external validity, or limitations of this research. The 
five areas identified which I will comment on include: 1) interobserver reliability, 2) 
facilitator instructions, 3) boss as principal investigator, 4) sample size, and 5) spatial 
intelligence control. 
 It is common in research such as this to have multiple reviewers of the dialogue and 
to measure interobserver reliability; i.e., the degree to which multiple observers make the 
same interpretation of the observed behaviors or recorded dialogue. In this research there 
were no additional reviewers against which such comparison could be made. This, obviously, 
could be considered a weakness or limitation in the findings. Such interobserver reliability 
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was noted above in the method used by Bales. However, the Bales method, called the 
interaction process analysis, consisted of recording the smallest element of dialogue, not 
interpreting that dialogue. My method required observing larger groupings of dialogue and/or 
behavior and inferring meaning deductively into the cognitive style and cognitive level 
frameworks employed for this task. Not having independent corroboration as indicated by 
interobserver reliability tests certainly weakens this work. However, it would have been 
extremely difficult to either train or find suitably trained observers to assist in this effort 
within the time constraints for this research.   
 The facilitator instructions and the instructions shown on the Hollow Square Puzzle 
sheet could be considered ambiguous for this exercise, a problem that was reported during 
post-exercise debriefings. In point of fact, the instructions were purposely prepared so as to 
leave room for interpretation during the planning portion of the exercise—an outcome that 
was observed in this research. While the proportion of unsuccessful trials made the 
hypothesis testing appear to provide unsatisfactory conclusions, the same unsuccessful trials 
proved very valuable in demonstrating extreme examples of cognitive style and cognitive 
level gaps and how, uncontrolled, they can have very negative consequences during problem- 
solving exercises. In addition, the unsuccessful trials provided the researcher more teachable 
moments during debriefing than did the successful trials.  
 I noted during the explication of the research protocol that I had to make my 
involvement as the principal investigator known to all the participants—all of whom were 
employees of a company I co-founded and in which I currently serve as chairman and chief 
executive officer. This was a condition of the Institutional Review Board’s approval of my 
research plan. My presence in the work could threaten the internal validity to the extent that 
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people modified their behavior in some amount as a result of my observation. The fact that 
my experimental outcomes proved to be not statistically different from those of two other 
major studies gives me some degree of comfort that my personal involvement had minimal 
effect on behaviors and outcomes. 
 There were only 12 trials conducted during this research. That made the statistical 
comparison with the other studies challenging. Based on the limited number, the statistical 
technique I employed for hypothesis testing was suspect when the number of cases was five 
or less. The number of trials surely limited the external validity of this work. However, the 
exploratory analysis that my methods employed provided me considerable evidence of 
marked cognitive style extremes consistent with predicted behaviors. Those observations 
should have reasonable generalizability for broader application, in spite of the relatively 
small number of trials. 
 Some of the planners appeared to possess greater spatial intelligence (or cognitive 
level) for solving such a puzzle than others. There was an effort to account for this in the 
supplemental information which asked the preference for maps versus written directions. 
Individuals who preferred maps were not statistically more successful than individuals who 
preferred written directions. A couple of final comments might be worth sharing. First, 
women prefer written directions while men prefer maps to a statistically significant 
difference, χ2 =13.65, p<.001 (2-tailed test). In spite of this finding, men and women were not 
statistically different in terms of individually solving the puzzle. This indicates a gender 
predisposition toward prescriptive instructions versus conceptual instructions. Kirton (1994) 
has shown that after thousands of subjects women are a few points more adaptive than men 
(approximately 4 points). If this preference for directions is based in cognitive style it points 
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up the extreme sensitivity of the KAI instrument. Otherwise, this may suggest a possible new 
individual difference which may provide future research opportunities for cognitive 
psychologists. Secondly, there were three cases where individual planners appeared to have 
greater spatial intelligence (cognitive level toward this specific puzzle). These cases included 
the two center square keystone solutions and the window pane framing key as indicated in 
Table VII-2. The three pivotal planners in these three cases were all men. Interestingly only 
two of the three pivotal planners preferred maps over written directions. This suggests that 
the control for spatial intelligence was not particularly effective. However, the one male 
planner who preferred written directions was the most adaptive of all the planners in his team 
(KAI 67) which could partially explain the relationship between written directions preference 
and relatively higher adaptive problem-solving style preferences.  
 
6. Postscript and Recommendations for Future Research 
 The standard protocol when conducting analyses using the KAI Inventory and A-I 
theory is to provide personal feedback to the participants either in one-on-one sessions or in 
groups. Following the experimental sessions and after evaluating the video taken during the 
exercises I scheduled debriefing sessions in each of the five offices which participated in this 
work. I prepared a written handout which outlined the basic research and I included a copy of 
the formal KAI Feedback Booklet. While planning a one hour debriefing session I concluded 
that the nearly 12 hours of video was too voluminous to be useful. Consequently I began a 
process of making a movie which captured the essence of the planners’ decision processes. 
Each trial was condensed to roughly four minutes of critical comments or actions. My debrief 
lecture included roughly 10 minutes of A-I theory overview, an introduction to Problem A-
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Problem B challenge, the paradox of structure, and KAI scores. I answered a few questions 
about how each of the subteams was composed. And, lastly I showed the movie.  
 While this was not part of my original research plan it proved to be highly 
educational for the participants and for me as well. Since many of the participants were 
somewhat familiar with the people in the video and since there were many laugh lines the 
interest level remained quite high throughout. One unintended consequence of this post-
research feedback was to observe the visceral impact of being part of the educational video. 
The same video if shown to complete strangers would quickly grow boring. However, when 
the video features many of the viewers there is a considerable affective attention that was 
pleasantly surprising.  
 I would suggest that the experimental procedure in my research program constitutes 
an effective problem-solving training for any kind of groups, public sector or private sector. 
Further, I would argue that a video-based feedback process which provides a video record of 
critical incidents is much more effective than either oral or written instruction. But, 
combining oral, written, and video educational programs can synergistically improve all 
three.  
 Further research should be done in the degree of improvement that such exercises can 
cause. Because this was not a planned part of my original research protocol, I did not have a 
priori expectations. Following my video-based feedback to participants I have received 
considerable feedback about how enlightening the entire process was. I am interested in 
measuring the degree of improvement such a process may foster. That is a topic for future 
research and development.  
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 For managers, agency chiefs, or others who facilitate group decision seeking 
processes, I strongly recommend a three-step process as followed in this research with the 
third step including a video-based feedback lecture using the agency members as featured 
stars.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
THE HOLLOW SQUARE: A COMMUNICATIONS EXPERIMENT16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reproduced from 
A Handbook of Structured Experiences for 
Human Relations Training, Volume II 
J. William Pfeiffer and John E. Jones, Editors 
La Jolla: UNIVERSITY ASSOCIATES Publishers, Inc., 1974 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The Hollow Square exercise is used with permission from the editors for educational/training events based on 
display of the credit box above 
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HOLLOW SQUARE: A COMMUNICATIONS EXPERIMENT 
 
Goals 
 
I. To study dynamics involved in planning a task to be carried out by others. 
II. To study dynamics involved in accomplishing a task planned by others. 
III. To explore both helpful and hindering communication behaviors in assigning and 
carrying out a task. 
 
Group Size 
 
 A minimum of twelve participants (four on the planning team, another four on the 
operating team, and at least four to be observers).  The experiment can be directed with 
multiple groups of at least twelve participants each. 
 
Time Required 
 
 Approximately one hour. 
 
Materials 
 
I. For the four members of the planning team: 
1. A Hollow-Square Planning-Team Briefing Sheet for each 
       member. 
 
2. Four envelopees (one for each member), each containing puzzle 
pieces. (Instructions on how to prepare the puzzle follow.) 
 
3. A Hollow-Square Pattern Sheet for each member. 
 
4. A Hollow-Square Key Sheet for each member. 
 
II. Copies of the Hollow-Square Operating-Team Briefing Sheet for the four 
members of the operating team. 
 
III. Copies of the Hollow-Square Observer Briefing Sheet for all process 
observers (the rest of the group). 
 
IV. Pencils for all participants. 
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Physical Setting 
 
 A room large enough to accommodate the experimental groups comfortably.  Two 
other rooms where the planning and operating teams can be isolated.  A table around which 
participants can move freely. 
 
Process 
 
I. The facilitator selects four people to be the planning team and sends them to 
an isolation room. 
 
II. The facilitator selects four people to be the operating team, gives them copies 
of the Operating-Team Briefing Sheet, and sends them to another room.  This 
room should be comfortable, because this team will have a waiting period. 
 
III. The facilitator designates the rest of the members as the observing team.  He 
gives each individual a copy of the Observer Briefing Sheet and allows time 
to read it.  Each observer chooses one member from each of two teams he will 
observe.  The facilitator explains to the observers that they will gather around 
the table where the planning and operating teams will be working.  Their job 
will be to observe, take notes, and be ready to discuss the results of the 
experiment. 
 
IV. The facilitator then brings in the members of the planning team and has them 
gather around the table.  He distributes a Planning-Team Briefing Sheet and 
an envelopee to each individual on the team. 
 
V. The facilitator explains to the planning team that all the necessary instructions 
are on the Briefing Sheet.  If questions are raised, the facilitator answers, “All 
you need to know is on the Briefing Sheet.” 
 
VI. The facilitator then cautions the observing team to remain silent and not to 
offer clues. 
 
VII. The experiment begins without further instructions from the facilitator. 
 
VIII. After the planning and operating teams have performed the task as directed on 
their instruction sheets, observers meet with the two persons whom they 
observed to give feedback. 
 
IX. The facilitator organizes a discussion around the points illustrated by the 
experiment.  He calls on the observers for comments, raises questions himself, 
and gradually includes the planning and operating teams. 
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An evaluation of the Planning-Team Briefing Sheet may be one topic for 
discussion.  Any action not forbidden to the planning team by the rules is acceptable, 
such as drawing a detailed design on the Pattern Sheet or drawing a template on the 
table or on another sheet of paper.  Did the planning team restrict its efficiency by 
setting up artificial constraints not prescribed by the formal rules?  Did it call in the 
operating team early in the planning phase, an option it was free to choose? 
 
Variations 
 
I. While the operating-team members are waiting to be called, they can be 
involved in a team-building activity such as “Twenty-Five Questions” (Vol. 
IV: Structured Experience 118). 
 
II. An intergroup competition can be set up if there are enough participants to 
form two sets of teams.  The winner is the team that achieves the correct 
solution in the least amount of time. 
 
III. With smaller groups, the number of envelopees can be reduced. (It would be 
possible to have individuals work alone.) 
 
IV. The members of the operating team can be instructed to carry out their task 
non-verbally. 
 
Preparing the Puzzle 
 
 Prepare the hollow-square puzzle from cardboard with dimensions and shapes as in 
the following drawing.  Lightly pencil the appropriate letter on each piece.  Put all letter-A 
pieces in one envelopee, all letter B’s in another envelopee and so on.  Then erase the 
penciled letters. 
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HOLLOW-SQUARE PLANNING-TEAM BRIEFING SHEET 
 
 Each of you has an envelopee containing four cardboard pieces which, when properly 
assembled with the other twelve pieces held by members of your team, will make a hollow-
square design.  You also have a sheet showing the design pattern and a key sheet showing 
how the puzzle pieces fit to form the hollow square. 
 
Your Task 
 
 During a period of twenty-five minutes, you are to do the following: 
 
1. Plan to tell the operating team how the sixteen pieces distributed among you 
can be assembled to make the design. 
2. Instruct the operating team how to implement your plan. 
 
(The operating team will begin actual assembly after the twenty-five minutes 
is up.) 
 
Ground Rules for Planning and Instructing 
 
1. You must keep all your puzzle pieces in front of you at all times (while you 
both plan and instruct), until the operating team is ready to assemble the 
hollow square. 
 
2. You may not touch other member’s pieces or trade pieces during the planning 
or instructing phases. 
 
3. You may not show the key sheet to the operating team at any time. 
 
4. You may not assemble the entire square at any time. (This is to be done only 
by the operating team.) 
 
5. You may not mark on any of the pieces. 
 
6. When it is time for your operating team to begin assembling the pieces, you 
may give no further instructions; however, you are to observe the team’s 
behavior.   
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HOLLOW-SQUARE OPERATING-TEAM BRIEFING SHEET 
 
1. You have the responsibility of carrying out a task according to instructions 
given by your planning team.  Your task is scheduled to begin no later than 
twenty-five minutes from now.  The planning team may call you in for 
instructions at any time.  If you are not summoned, you are to report anyway 
at the end of this period.  No further instructions will be permitted after the 
twenty-five minutes have elapsed. 
2. You are to finish the assigned task as rapidly as possible. 
3. While you are waiting for a call from your planning team, it is suggested that 
you discuss and make notes on the following questions: 
 
i. What feelings and concerns are you experiencing while waiting for 
instructions for the unknown task? 
ii. How can the four of you organize as a team? 
 
4. Your notes recorded on the above questions will be helpful during the 
discussion following the completion of the task. 
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HOLLOW-SQUARE OBSERVER BRIEFING SHEET 
 
 You will be observing a situation in which a planning team decides how to solve a 
problem and gives instructions on how to implement its solution to an operating team.  The 
problem is to assemble sixteen pieces of cardboard into the form of a hollow square.  The 
planning team is supplied with the key to the solution.  This team will not assemble the parts 
itself but will instruct the operating team how to do so as quickly as possible.  You will be 
silent throughout the process. 
 
1. You should watch the general pattern of communication, but you are to give 
special attention to one member of the planning team (during the planning 
phase) and one member of the operating team (during the assembling period). 
 
2. During the planning period, watch for the following behaviors: 
 
i. Is there balanced participation among planning-team members? 
ii. What kinds of behavior impede or facilitate the process? 
iii. How does the planning team divide its time between planning and 
instructing?  (How soon does it invite the operating team to come in?) 
iv. What additional rules does the planning team impose upon itself? 
 
3. During the instructing period, watch for the following behaviors: 
 
i. Which member of the planning team gives the instructions?  How was 
this decided? 
ii. What strategy is used to instruct the operating team about the task? 
iii. What assumptions made by the planning team are not communicated 
to the operating team? 
iv. How effective are the instructions? 
 
4. During the assembly period, watch for the following behaviors: 
 
i. What evidence is there that the operating-team members understand or 
misunderstand the instructions? 
ii. What nonverbal reactions do planning-team members exhibit as they 
watch their plans being implemented? 
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APPENDIX B  
 
 
KIRTON’S ADAPTION-INNOVATION INVENTORY 
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Table B1. KAI Inventory17 
Very 
Hard Hard  Easy 
Very 
Easy  How easy or difficult do you find it to present yourself consistently, over a long period of time, as a person who:  1 2 3 4 5 
1. Has original ideas 
2. Proliferates ideas 
3. Is stimulating  
4. Copes with several new ideas at the same time 
5. Will always think of something when stuck 
6. Would sooner create than improve 
7. Has fresh perspectives on old problems 
8. Often risks doing things differently 
9. Likes to vary set routines at a moment’s notice 
10. Prefers to work on one problem at a time 
11. Can stand out in disagreement against group 
12. Needs the stimulation of frequent change 
13. Prefers changes to occur gradually 
     
14. Is thorough 
15. Masters all details painstakingly 
16. Is methodical and systematic 
17. Enjoys detailed work 
18. Is (not) a steady plodder 
19. Is consistent 
20. Imposes strict order on matters within own control 
     
21. Fits readily into “the system” 
22. Conforms 
23. Readily agrees with the team at work 
24. Never seeks to bend or break the rules 
25. Never acts without proper authority 
26. Is prudent when dealing with authority 
27. Likes the protection of precise instructions 
28. Is predictable 
29. Prefers colleagues who never “rock the boat” 
30. Likes bosses and work patterns which are consistent 
31. Works without deviation in a prescribed way 
32. Holds back ideas until obviously needed 
     
 
                                                 
17 Source: Kirton (1976). Items 1-13 comprise the sufficiency of originality (SO) subscale. Items 14-20 
comprise the reliability and efficiency (E) subscale. And, items 21-32 comprise the rules/group conformity (R) 
subscale. Items are randomly arranged on measurement instrument.  
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 
 
Please provide the following information in addition to the KAI Inventory form: 
 
1. How long have you worked in this organization?                      ____________ 
2. How long have you worked in other, similar, organizations?    ____________ 
3. What is your work group’s name in this organization?     ____________ 
4. What is your title in this organization?       ____________ 
5. Please select the answer that best describes your preference: When I am driving to a 
location that I am unfamiliar with I prefer:     _____Written directions 
          _____A map 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
POST EXERCISE IMPRESSIONS 
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Post Exercise Impressions 
1) Rate how you felt about performing your task role for this problem: 
a) very frustrated b) slightly frustrated c) comfortable d) very comfortable 
2) Rate how well your subteam communicated with each other about the problem 
a) Bad b) poor c) good d) excellent 
3) Rate how well your sister subteam communicated with your subteam  
a) Bad b) poor c) good d) excellent 
4) Rate the amount of time provided for the problem 
a) Way too little b) Slightly too little c) about right d) way too much 
5) Rate your subteam members performance in solving this problem 
a) No help at all b) Not very helpful c) Helped a little d) Great help 
6) Rate your sister subteam members performance in solving this problem 
a) No help at all b) Not very helpful c) Helped a little d) Great help 
7) Rate your subteam member’s communication style on this problem (omit your own) 
Member A a) abrasive b) talk not listen c) listen & talk d) synergistic 
Member B a) abrasive b) talk not listen c) listen & talk d) synergistic 
Member C a) abrasive b) talk not listen c) listen & talk d) synergistic 
Member D a) abrasive b) talk not listen c) listen & talk d) synergistic 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
EMAIL INVITATION TO PARTICIPANTS 
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To: Michael W. Creed 
Subject: Example 080609 Modification 
To: EXAMPLE--080609 Modification 
Subject: Research Opportunity 
Hello all, 
As many of you know, Iʹve been involved with the Department of City & Regional 
Planning at UNC CH for a number of years. I have finally reached the point of 
having an approved research project which will fulfill part of my doctoral 
requirements. To that end, I have attached an invitation for you to participate in my 
research.  
  
The topic is one which many of us are concerned about and, perhaps, you will be as 
well. This invitation is entirely voluntary and I certainly understand if you have no 
interest in participating or are too busy. I will not contact you again about this, and 
it is my sincere wish that you do not in any way feel coerced to participate. 
  
Thanks 
Mike Creed 
  
 
 
Michael W. Creed 
Chief Executive Officer 
__________________________________ 
MCKIM&CREED 
ENGINEERS SURVEYORS PLANNERS  
1730 Varsity Drive, Suite 500 
Raleigh, NC 27606 
919.233.8091  
919.657.8895 fax 
919.219.7402 mobile 
http://www.mckimcreed.com/  
Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail.  
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INVITATION LETTER 
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INTRODUCTORY SCRIPT AND IRB CONSENT FORM 
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Creed Research on Problem Solving 
Introduction and personal invitation 
 
Good morning (afternoon) everyone! I am (NAME) and have volunteered to assist Mike 
Creed in this research project. First, I want to thank you for responding to Mike’s invitation 
for you to participate. I’m sure you have questions like, “what exactly will we be doing and 
when will we be doing it?” You may also be thinking, “Why is (NAME) reading their lines?” 
I’ll begin with the last question and then provide some general explanation of Mike’s 
dissertation research.  
 
Why am I reading this information? 
This process is a major part of Mike Creed’s PhD dissertation research. And, because there 
will be sessions like this one given across all our offices facilitated by different people; we 
need to insure that the instructions and information given to all participants is exactly the 
same. This will provide some assurance that the facilitators did not bias any participant in 
any way.  
 
What exactly will we be doing? 
Today volunteers will be given three documents to fill out: 
1. A Consent Form 
2. A Supplemental Information Form 
3. A KAI Response Sheet 
 
The Consent form is required by Institutional Review Boards (IRB) at every major research 
university for any research involving human subjects. It is for the protection of participants 
and its purpose is to prevent psychological or physical abuses. The research exercise 
proposed by Mike Creed has been performed at two other major universities in the US and 
there have been no reports of problems. In addition, the IRB at UNC has deemed this to be 
very un-invasive research. I want to emphasize that participation in this research is totally 
voluntary and you may withdraw at any time. 
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The Supplemental Information simply asks some basic questions about your relationship 
with this organization such as length of time here and in other similar organizations among 
other things.  
 
The KAI Response Sheet asks you to respond to some questions about “how easy or difficult 
would you find it to present yourself, consistently, over a long period of time” in different 
circumstances.  There are no right answers or wrong answers and we would recommend that 
you not over-analyze the question but simply read the question and respond to it. Also, 
responses bunched to one side or the other side or down the middle of the response form may 
be difficult to interpret. Please answer all 33 questions! The KAI Response Sheet and 
feedback are used across the globe similarly to the MBTI process that many of you have 
gone through.  
 
What is the schedule for this research? 
Today’s meeting (which we call Step One) will be very brief, just long enough for me to read 
this information and ask for volunteers to fill out the three forms mentioned above. As soon 
as you have filled out the information sheets you are free to go.  
 
Each volunteer will be placed in different eight person groups. Each eight-person group will 
be scheduled for a one-hour problem-solving exercise session (which we call Step Two). The 
exercise you will be asked to do is to solve a simple puzzle within a limited amount of time. 
We will video tape the teams during their deliberations, so don’t become anxious if you see a 
camcorder being used by the facilitator.  
 
After all the exercises have been completed across the company we will schedule larger 
group meetings (which we call Step Three) to debrief everyone on the process and provide 
feedback about Mike Creed’s research objectives. In addition, we will give all participants 
feedback on the forms you fill out as part of this research. You will be given a KAI Feedback 
Booklet which contains valuable information on group problem-solving and your personal 
preferences during problem-solving processes. This information, like MBTI feedback, can 
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help you understand yourself and how you relate to others during group problem-solving or 
decision-making processes.  
 
Due to the economy and struggles that our firm is experiencing, I want to assure you that no 
McKim & Creed resources are being used for the research. That is why you are being asked 
to volunteer and why all meetings are scheduled and held outside of normal working hours or 
during lunch. Further, all materials for this research including the KAI Response Sheets, 
Feedback Booklets, and lunches provided for all volunteers will be paid for by Mike Creed 
personally.  
 
Now for everyone willing to continue as a volunteer, I will now pass out envelopees which 
contain the three forms mentioned above. Please fill them out, put them back into the 
envelopees, and give them to me. Thank you for your participation. 
 
Are there any questions?  [BEWARE OF GETTING BOGGED DOWN HERE] 
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University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study  
Adult Participants 
Social Behavioral Form 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IRB Study #: 09-1352 
Consent Form Version Date:  Aug 10, 2009 
 
Title of Study: Planning, Problem Solving, and Kirton’s A-I Theory Within an 
Organizational Framework 
 
Principal Investigator: Michael W. Creed 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department: City & Regional Planning 
UNC-Chapel Hill Phone number: 919-219-7402 
Email Address: mcreed@mckimcreed.com 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
What are some general things you should know about research studies? 
You are being asked to take part in a research study.  To join the study is voluntary.  
You may refuse to join, or you may withdraw your consent to be in the study, for any reason, 
without penalty.  
 
Research studies are designed to obtain new knowledge. This new information may help 
people in the future. You may not receive any direct benefit from being in the research study. 
There also may be risks to being in research studies. 
 
Details about this study are discussed below.  It is important that you understand this 
information so that you can make an informed choice about being in this research study.   
 
You will be given a copy of this consent form.  You should ask the researchers named above, 
or staff members who may assist them, any questions you have about this study at any time. 
 
What is the purpose of this study?  
The purpose of this research study is to learn about how different people interact in small 
group problem-solving activities. The objective is to determine ways to improve small group 
problem solving quality. 
 
How many people will take part in this study? 
If you decide to be in this study, you will be one of approximately 200 people in this research 
study. 
 
 
  342
How long will your part in this study last?  
Your involvement will require about two and one half hours. Two one-hour sessions will 
occur during your lunch period and lunch will be provided. The initial half-hour session will 
also be at lunch time but lunch will not be provided for that session. 
 
What will happen if you take part in the study? 
Volunteers will complete a problem-solving style inventory and a brief questionnaire. 
Researchers will evaluate that information and place participants into small groups for the 
experimental part of the exercise. During the one-hour experiment small groups of people 
will be asked to solve a geometric puzzle in a prescribed way and in a predetermined time. 
Some of the small groups may be videotaped during the experiment.  
 
After all experimental trials have been completed the researchers will do a debriefing of the 
results during a second lunch period. Participants will receive booklets of information of 
some of the theory upon which this research was based.  
 
Participants will be given code names for the experiment in an effort to provide privacy for 
your information.  
 
What are the possible benefits from being in this study? 
Research is designed to benefit society by gaining new knowledge. You may also expect to 
benefit by participating in this study by learning about your most preferred approach to 
problem solving and how your problem solving style agrees with and conflicts with others. 
This may be thought of as similar to the MBTI preferences.       
 
What are the possible risks or discomforts involved from being in this study? 
There may be uncommon or previously unknown risks.  You should report any problems to 
the researcher. This study has been carried out in a similar fashion for approximately 1400 
participants in university settings with no reported problems or discomforts.  
 
How will your privacy be protected? 
 
Participants will not be identified in any report or publication about this study. Information 
collected in this study will be no more invasive than the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
questionnaires that are routinely done and discussed throughout the company. And, there is 
no state or federal disclosure law requiring publication or sharing of this information beyond 
the principal investigator. Some of the small groups will be videotaped during their 
deliberations for the purpose of recording interactions between different people. Only code 
names will be used during this phase of the research so that no real names will be used in the 
recordings. Tapes will be maintained by the researcher for future reference. No tapes will be 
kept in the host company files or personnel records. If the participants so choose, the 
videotaping may be turned off. 
 
Check the line that best matches your choice: 
_____ OK to record me during the study 
_____ Not OK to record me during the study 
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What if you want to stop before your part in the study is complete? 
You can withdraw from this study at any time, without penalty.   
 
Will you receive anything for being in this study? 
You will be receiving lunch on two occasions for taking part in this study.   
 
Will it cost you anything to be in this study? 
There will be no costs for being in the study 
  
What if you have questions about this study? 
You have the right to ask, and have answered, any questions you may have about this 
research. If you have questions, complaints, concerns, or if a research-related injury occurs, 
you should contact the researchers listed on the first page of this form.  
 
What if you have questions about your rights as a research participant? 
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your 
rights and welfare.  If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, 
or if you would like to obtain information or offer input, you may contact the Institutional 
Review Board at 919-966-3113 or by email to IRB_subjects@unc.edu. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
Title of Study: Planning, Problem Solving, and Kirton’s A-I Theory Within an 
Organizational Framework 
 
Principal Investigator: Michael W. Creed 
 
Participant’s Agreement:  
 
I have read the information provided above.  I have asked all the questions I have at this time.  
I voluntarily agree to participate in this research study. 
 
_________________________________________________ _________________ 
Signature of Research Participant  Date 
 
_________________________________________________ 
Printed Name of Research Participant 
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE GAP DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT 
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Table H-1 Correlation Matrix 
  Age Tenure TotExp KAI JobStat 
Age 1.000  
Tenure .485 1.000  
TotExp .794 .570 1.000  
KAI -.132 -.137 -.036 1.000 
Correlation 
JobStat .334 .396 .442 .013 1.000
Age   
Tenure .000   
TotExp .000 .000   
KAI .111 .101 .368   
Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
JobStat .001 .000 .000 .452  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table H-2 Communalities 
Raw Rescaled 
  Initial Extraction Initial Extraction 
Age 128.861 113.947 1.000 .884 
Tenure 41.109 16.477 1.000 .401 
TotExp 125.022 112.787 1.000 .902 
KAI 204.179 204.067 1.000 .999 
JobStat 2.836 .533 1.000 .188 
   Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Table H-3 Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues(a) Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings  
Component 
 Total % of Variance Cum % Total 
% of 
Variance Cum % 
Raw 1 252.664 50.331 50.331 242.337 48.274 48.274 
 2 195.147 38.873 89.204 205.474 40.931 89.204 
 3 30.833 6.142 95.346    
 4 21.194 4.222 99.568    
 5 2.168 .432 100.000    
Rescaled 1 252.664 50.331 50.331 2.353 47.051 47.051 
 2 195.147 38.873 89.204 1.022 20.441 67.492 
 3 30.833 6.142 95.346    
 4 21.194 4.222 99.568    
 5 2.168 .432 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled 
solution. 
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Table H-4 Component Matrixa 
Raw Rescaled 
Component Component 
 1 2 1 2 
Age 10.082 3.508 .888 .309 
TotExp 9.564 4.617 .855 .413 
Tenure 3.933 1.004 .613 .157 
JobStat .635 .359 .377 .213 
KAI -6.609 12.664 -.463 .886 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
a  2 components extracted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table H-5 Rotated Component Matrix a 
Raw Rescaled 
Component Component 
 1 2 1 2 
TotExp 10.619  .950   
Age 10.618  .935   
Tenure 3.988 -.757 .622 -.118 
JobStat .728  .432   
KAI  14.272  .999 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation 
Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table H-6 Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 
1 .906 -.424 
2 .424 .906 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Figure H-2 Component Plot in Rotated Space 
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Table H-7 Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Factor Scores (Planner Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 13.105 1 13.105 1.380 .267 
Within 
Groups 94.987 10 9.499   
Level 
Gap A 
Total 108.092 11    
Between 
Groups 1.576 1 1.576 .830 .384 
Within 
Groups 18.982 10 1.898   
Level  
Gap B 
Total 20.558 11    
Between 
Groups .017 1 .017 .038 .855 
Within 
Groups 1.780 4 .445   
Level  
Gap C 
Total 1.797 5    
Between 
Groups .331 1 .331 .028 .870 
Within 
Groups 116.851 10 11.685   
Level 
Gap D 
Total 117.182 11    
Between 
Groups 3.898 1 3.898 1.104 .318 
Within 
Groups 35.291 10 3.529   
Style 
Gap A 
Total 39.189 11    
Between 
Groups .366 1 .366 .674 .431 
Within 
Groups 5.429 10 .543   
Style 
Gap B 
Total 5.795 11    
Between 
Groups .011 1 .011 .054 .827 
Within 
Groups .841 4 .210   
Style 
Gap C 
Total .852 5    
Between 
Groups .004 1 .004 .000 .991 
Within 
Groups 258.112 10 25.811   
Style  
Gap D 
Total 258.116 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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Table H-8 Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Factor Scores (Operator Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 15.422 1 15.422 1.648 .228 
Within 
Groups 93.586 10 9.359   
Level 
Gap A 
Total 109.007 11    
Between 
Groups 2.620 1 2.620 1.643 .229 
Within 
Groups 15.947 10 1.595   
Level  
Gap B 
Total 18.566 11    
Between 
Groups .015 1 .015 .119 .748 
Within 
Groups .506 4 .127   
Level  
Gap C 
Total .521 5    
Between 
Groups 3.871 1 3.871 .570 .468 
Within 
Groups 67.922 10 6.792   
Level 
Gap D 
Total 71.793 11    
Between 
Groups 1.720 1 1.720 .507 .493 
Within 
Groups 33.932 10 3.393   
Style 
Gap A 
Total 35.652 11    
Between 
Groups .097 1 .097 .141 .715 
Within 
Groups 6.839 10 .684   
Style 
Gap B 
Total 6.936 11    
Between 
Groups .018 1 .018 .054 .828 
Within 
Groups 1.352 4 .338   
Style 
Gap C 
Total 1.370 5    
Between 
Groups 9.176 1 9.176 .674 .431 
Within 
Groups 136.046 10 13.605   
Style  
Gap D 
Total 145.222 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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Table H-9 Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Factor Scores (Planner Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 23.843 1 23.843 1.211 .297 
Within 
Groups 196.822 10 19.682   
Level 
Gap A+B 
Total 220.665 11    
Between 
Groups 6.653 1 6.653 .983 .345 
Within 
Groups 67.650 10 6.765   
Style 
Gap A+B 
Total 74.303 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
 
 
 
Table H-10 Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Factor Scores (Operator Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 30.699 1 30.699 1.656 .227 
Within 
Groups 185.384 10 18.538   
Level 
Gap A+B 
Total 216.083 11    
Between 
Groups 2.632 1 2.632 .376 .553 
Within 
Groups 69.999 10 7.000   
Style 
Gap A+B 
Total 72.631 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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Table H-11  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Factor Scores (Planner Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 29.781 1 29.781 .746 .408 
Within 
Groups 399.352 10 39.935   
Level 
Gap A+B+D 
Total 429.133 11    
Between 
Groups 6.981 1 6.981 .167 .691 
Within 
Groups 417.573 10 41.757   
Style 
Gap A+B+D 
Total 424.554 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
 
 
 
Table H-12  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Factor Scores (Operator Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 56.393 1 56.393 2.127 .175 
Within 
Groups 265.116 10 26.512   
Level 
Gap A+B+D 
Total 321.509 11    
Between 
Groups 21.669 1 21.669 1.397 .265 
Within 
Groups 155.100 10 15.510   
Style 
Gap A+B+D 
Total 176.769 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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Table H-13  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Factor Scores 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 412.137 1 412.137 2.261 .164 
Within 
Groups 1822.919 10 182.292   
Total Team 
Gap 
A+B+C+D 
Total 2235.056 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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Table H-14  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Raw Scores (Planner Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 14309.172 1 14309.172 1.982 .190 
Within 
Groups 72203.017 10 7220.302   
Level 
Gap A 
Total 86512.189 11    
Between 
Groups 1748.892 1 1748.892 1.257 .288 
Within 
Groups 13908.358 10 1390.836   
Level  
Gap B 
Total 15657.250 11    
Between 
Groups 119.122 1 119.122 .339 .592 
Within 
Groups 1404.479 4 351.120   
Level  
Gap C 
Total 1523.602 5    
Between 
Groups 138.305 1 138.305 .018 .896 
Within 
Groups 77277.873 10 7727.787   
Level 
Gap D 
Total 77416.178 11    
Between 
Groups 795.438 1 795.438 1.104 .318 
Within 
Groups 7202.229 10 720.223   
Style 
Gap A 
Total 7997.667 11    
Between 
Groups 75.579 1 75.579 .681 .428 
Within 
Groups 1109.224 10 110.922   
Style 
Gap B 
Total 1184.803 11    
Between 
Groups 2.370 1 2.370 .055 .826 
Within 
Groups 172.316 4 43.079   
Style 
Gap C 
Total 174.686 5    
Between 
Groups .777 1 .777 .000 .991 
Within 
Groups 52660.202 10 5266.020   
Style  
Gap D 
Total 52660.978 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
 
 
  356
Table H-15  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Raw Scores (Operator Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 11924.277 1 11924.277 1.988 .189 
Within 
Groups 59968.132 10 5996.813   
Level 
Gap A 
Total 71892.409 11    
Between 
Groups 2044.992 1 2044.992 2.065 .181 
Within 
Groups 9901.303 10 990.130   
Level  
Gap B 
Total 11946.295 11    
Between 
Groups 3.239 1 3.239 .078 .794 
Within 
Groups 165.683 4 41.421   
Level  
Gap C 
Total 168.922 5    
Between 
Groups 3303.720 1 3303.720 .703 .421 
Within 
Groups 46975.425 10 4697.543   
Level 
Gap D 
Total 50279.145 11    
Between 
Groups 351.086 1 351.086 .507 .493 
Within 
Groups 6924.914 10 692.491   
Style 
Gap A 
Total 7276.000 11    
Between 
Groups 19.861 1 19.861 .142 .714 
Within 
Groups 1396.102 10 139.610   
Style 
Gap B 
Total 1415.963 11    
Between 
Groups 3.760 1 3.760 .055 .827 
Within 
Groups 275.912 4 68.978   
Style 
Gap C 
Total 279.672 5    
Between 
Groups 4562.543 1 4562.543 .578 .465 
Within 
Groups 78915.975 10 7891.597   
Style  
Gap D 
Total 83478.518 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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Table H-16 Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Raw Scores (Planner Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 26062.000 1 26062.000 1.763 .214 
Within 
Groups 147834.859 10 14783.486   
Level 
Gap A+B 
Total 173896.859 11    
Between 
Groups 1361.232 1 1361.232 .986 .344 
Within 
Groups 13812.177 10 1381.218   
Style 
Gap A+B 
Total 15173.409 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
 
 
 
Table H-17  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Raw Scores (Operator Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 23845.864 1 23845.864 2.032 .185 
Within 
Groups 117379.032 10 11737.903   
Level 
Gap A+B 
Total 141224.895 11    
Between 
Groups 537.904 1 537.904 .376 .553 
Within 
Groups 14287.205 10 1428.721   
Style 
Gap A+B 
Total 14825.109 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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Table H-18  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Raw Scores (Planner Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 29997.839 1 29997.839 1.015 .337 
Within 
Groups 295460.122 10 29546.012   
Level 
Gap A+B+D 
Total 325457.960 11    
Between 
Groups 1427.293 1 1427.293 .167 .691 
Within 
Groups 85252.387 10 8525.239   
Style 
Gap A+B+D 
Total 86679.680 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
 
 
 
Table H-19  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Raw Scores (Operator Subteam) 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 44901.036 1 44901.036 2.409 .152 
Within 
Groups 186371.552 10 18637.155   
Level 
Gap A+B+D 
Total 231272.589 11    
Between 
Groups 1966.989 1 1966.989 .324 .582 
Within 
Groups 60679.819 10 6067.982   
Style 
Gap A+B+D 
Total 62646.808 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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Table H-20  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Raw Scores 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 139314.880 1 139314.880 1.071 .325 
Within 
Groups 1300363.306 10 130036.331   
Total Team 
Gap 
A+B+C+D 
Total 1439678.185 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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 APPENDIX I 
 
 
 
QUANTITATIVE REPORTS 
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Table I-1 Person Success Dependence on Number of Planners 
Number of Planners Total   
   3.00 4.00   
Count 19 15 34 
Expected 
Count 7.3 26.7 34.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 55.9% 44.1% 100.0% 
Count 0 54 54 
Expected 
Count 11.7 42.3 54.0 
Solve  
Solve  
% within 
Solve .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 19 69 88 
Expected 
Count 19.0 69.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Solve 21.6% 78.4% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table I-1A. Chi-Square Tests 
  
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 38.486(b) 1 .000   
Continuity 
Correction(a) 35.256 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 45.154 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 38.049 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 88     
a)  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b) 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.34. 
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Table I-1B. Directional Measures for Success versus Number of Planners 
    
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .434 .140 2.495 .013 
Succeed Dependent .559 .085 4.923 .000 Lambda 
NumbPl Dependent .211 .273 .688 .492 
Succeed Dependent .437 .072  .000(c) Goodman and 
Kruskal tau NumbPl Dependent .437 .085  .000(c) 
Symmetric .432 .072 5.107 .000(d) 
Succeed Dependent .385 .076 5.107 .000(d) 
Nominal 
by 
Nominal 
Uncertainty 
Coefficient 
NumbPl Dependent .492 .065 5.107 .000(d) 
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c)  Based on chi-square approximation 
d)  Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-1C. Symmetric Measures Number of Planners 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Phi .661 .000 
Cramer's V .661 .000 Nominal by Nominal 
Contingency 
Coefficient .552 .000 
N of Valid Cases 88  
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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Table I-2. Team Success Dependence on Number of Planners 
Number of Planners 
    3.00 4.00 
Total 
Count 3 2 5 
Expected 
Count 1.3 3.8 5.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 
Count 0 7 7 
Expected 
Count 1.8 5.3 7.0 
Solve 
Solve 
% within 
Solve .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Count 3 9 12 
Expected 
Count 3.0 9.0 12.0 Total 
% within 
Succeed 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-2A. Chi-Square Tests 
  
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.600(b) 1 .018   
Continuity 
Correction(a) 2.857 1 .091   
Likelihood Ratio 6.766 1 .009   
Fisher's Exact Test    .045 .045 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 5.133 1 .023   
N of Valid Cases 12     
a)  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b)  3 cells (75.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.25. 
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Table I-2B. Directional Measures for Success versus Number of Planners 
  
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .500 .342 1.124 .261 
Succeed Dependent .600 .219 2.000 .046 Lambda 
NumbPl Dependent .333 .609 .451 .652 
Succeed Dependent .467 .200  .023(c) Goodman and 
Kruskal tau NumbPl Dependent .467 .227  .023(c) 
Symmetric .454 .193 2.053 .009(d) 
Succeed Dependent .415 .205 2.053 .009(d) 
Nominal 
by 
Nominal 
Uncertainty 
Coefficient 
NumbPl Dependent .501 .178 2.053 .009(d) 
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c)  Based on chi-square approximation 
d)  Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
 
 
 
 
Table I-2C. Symmetric Measures Number of Planners 
 Value Approx. Sig. 
Phi .683 .018 
Cramer's V .683 .018 Nominal by Nominal 
Contingency 
Coefficient .564 .018 
N of Valid Cases 12  
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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Table I-3. Hammerschmidt Findings 
Team 
Category 
Subteam 
Description 
KAI Range 
Mean 
KAI Lower 
Range Mean 
KAI Upper 
Range Mean Success 
Relatively 
Adaptive 
Planners 
90.02 
(σ = 7.66) 
83.24 
(σ = 9.69) 
95.59 
(σ = 7.49) 1. Subteam KAI Means 
Range < 15.7  
N=17 
Relatively 
Innovative 
Implementer 
99.73 
(σ = 5.56) 
96.77 
(σ = 6.28) 
102.59 
(σ = 6.20) 
82.35% 
14/17 
Relatively 
Adaptive 
Planners 
84.41 
(σ = 5.65) 
75.93 
(σ = 8.81) 
91.44 
(σ = 5.70) 2. Subteam KAI Means 
Range > 15.7 
N=16 
Relatively 
Innovative 
Implementer 
112.95 
(σ = 11.62) 
108.38 
(σ = 11.40) 
118.06 
(σ = 12.62) 
87.5% 
14/16 
Relatively 
Innovative 
Planners 
119.31 
(σ = 7.22) 
115.00 
(σ = 7.25) 
124.18 
(σ = 8.23) 3. Subteam KAI Means 
Range < 15.7 
N=22 
Relatively 
Adaptive 
Implementers 
109.69 
(σ = 8.07) 
107.36 
(σ = 8.08) 
111.64 
(σ = 7.66) 
77.27% 
17/22 
Relatively 
Innovative 
Planners 
121.15 
(σ = 6.53) 
115.36 
(σ = 6.83) 
127.29 
(σ = 9.28) 4. Subteam KAI Means 
Range > 15.7 
N=14 
Relatively 
Adaptive 
Implementers 
83.89 
(σ = 12.02) 
78.43 
(σ = 12.48) 
88.21 
(σ = 11.47) 
42.85% 
6/14 
5. Random 
N=50 
 
Unknown 104 N/A N/A 52% 26/50 
6. Total Mixed N/A N/A N/A 64.7% 77/119 
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Table I-4. Scott Findings 
Team Category Description KAI mean s.d. Success Proportion Successes/Trials 
Experimental 
KAI Means 
Range < 15  
N=10 
Similar 
Approach 97 7.22 
90% 
9/10 
Experimental 
KAI Means 
Range > 15 
N=10 
Dissimilar 
Approach 97 20.56 
60% 
6/10 
Control 
 KAI Means 
Range < 15 
N=10 
Similar 
Approach 96 6.57 
70% 
7/10 
Control 
KAI Means 
Range > 15 
N=10 
Dissimilar 
Approach 96 17.55 
40% 
4/10 
Total 
N=40 
 
Mixed 104 N/A 65% 26/40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-5. S.E. of Difference Between Two Independent Proportions 
Comparison 
Categories 
N1 
N2 
Solve1 
Solve2 
Not Solve1 
Not Solve2 
pw qw 


 
21
11
21 nn
qps wwpp  
H4 v. C3 12 119 
7 
77 
5 
42 0.6412 0.3588 0.1453 
H1 v. C2 6 33 
3 
28 
3 
5 0.7949 0.2051 0.1792 
H1 v. C5 5 33 
3 
28 
2 
5 0.8158 0.1842 0.1860 
H4 v. C6 9 119 
7 
77 
2 
42 0.6562 0.3437 0.1641 
S1 v. C3 12 40 
7 
26 
5 
14 0.6346 0.3654 0.1585 
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Table I-6. Supplemental Information Descriptive Statistics 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
  
  
  
  
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
 Bound 
Fail 34 39.5000 11.56864 1.98400 35.4635 43.5365 
Solve 54 41.3148 11.26495 1.53297 38.2401 44.3896 Age 
Total 88 40.6136 11.35167 1.21009 38.2084 43.0188 
Fail 34 15.3235 2.54321 .43616 14.4362 16.2109 
Solve 54 15.5741 1.46148 .19888 15.1752 15.9730 Education 
Total 88 15.4773 1.94154 .20697 15.0659 15.8886 
Fail 34 5.6588 5.29901 .90877 3.8099 7.5077 
Solve 54 7.1250 7.01074 .95404 5.2114 9.0386 Tenure 
Total 88 6.5585 6.41160 .68348 5.2000 7.9170 
Fail 34 9.3529 9.17633 1.57373 6.1512 12.5547 
Solve 54 8.9889 9.28144 1.26304 6.4555 11.5222 Other Experience 
Total 88 9.1295 9.18971 .97963 7.1824 11.0767 
 
 
 
 
Table I-7. Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
  
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Age .115 1 86 .736 
Education 13.573 1 86 .000 
Tenure 3.450 1 86 .067 
Other 
Experience .026 1 86 .872 
 
 
 
Table I-7A. Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
    
Statistic a df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch .273 1 46.888 .604 
Education 
Brown-Forsythe .273 1 46.888 .604 
Welch 1.238 1 83.029 .269 
Tenure 
Brown-Forsythe 1.238 1 83.029 .269 
a Asymptotically F distributed 
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Table I-8. Successful Trials Difference of Means Tests a 
    
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 68.715 1 68.715 .530 .468 
Within 
Groups 11142.148 86 129.560   
Age 
Total 11210.864 87    
Between 
Groups 1.310 1 1.310 .345 .559 
Within 
Groups 326.645 86 3.798   
Education 
Total 327.955 87    
Between 
Groups 44.850 1 44.850 1.092 .299 
Within 
Groups 3531.601 86 41.065   
Tenure 
Total 3576.451 87    
Between 
Groups 2.765 1 2.765 .032 .858 
Within 
Groups 7344.458 86 85.401   
Other 
Experience 
Total 7347.223 87    
a AVOVA with Solve=1, Fail=0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-9. Constructed Variables Descriptive Statistics 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
  
  
  
  
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Fail 5 16.2500 2.42670 1.08525 13.2368 19.2632 
Solve 7 15.0714 .79993 .30234 14.3316 15.8112 
Average 
Education 
Planners Total 12 15.5625 1.69078 .48809 14.4882 16.6368 
Fail 5 55.6000 13.68576 6.12046 38.6069 72.5931 
Solve 7 60.2857 3.19970 1.20937 57.3265 63.2449 
Cumulative 
Education 
Planners Total 12 58.3333 8.91713 2.57415 52.6677 63.9990 
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Table I-10. Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
  
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Average 
Education 
Planners 
3.083 1 10 .110 
Cumulative 
Education 
Planners 
8.672 1 10 .015 
 
 
Table I-10A. Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
    
Statistic a df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch .564 1 4.314 .492 Cumulative 
Education 
Planners 
Brown-Forsythe .564 1 4.314 .492 
a Asymptotically F distributed 
 
 
Table I-11. Successful Trials’ Difference of Means Tests a 
    
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 4.051 1 4.051 1.479 .252 
Within 
Groups 27.395 10 2.739   
Average 
Education 
Planners 
Total 31.446 11    
a AVOVA with Solve=1, Fail=0  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  370
Table I-12. Constructed Variables Descriptive Statistics 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
  
  
  
  
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Fail 34 15.3324 1.95180 .33473 14.6513 16.0134 
Solve 54 15.5852 .82403 .11214 15.3603 15.8101 
Average 
Education 
Teams Total 88 15.4875 1.36893 .14593 15.1975 15.7775 
Fail 17 15.6588 1.90593 .46226 14.6789 16.6388 
Solve 28 15.0857 .74322 .14046 14.7975 15.3739 
Average 
Education 
Planners Total 45 15.3022 1.31866 .19657 14.9061 15.6984 
Fail 17 57.1176 12.63370 3.06412 50.6220 63.6133 
Solve 28 60.2857 3.01671 .57010 59.1160 61.4555 
Cumulative 
Education 
Planners Total 45 59.0889 8.12634 1.21140 56.6475 61.5303 
 
 
Table I-13. Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
  
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Average 
Education 
Teams 
33.120 1 86 .000 
Average 
Education 
Planners 
16.740 1 43 .000 
Cumulative 
Education 
Planners 
45.900 1 43 .000 
 
 
Table I-13A. Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
    
Statistic a df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch .513 1 40.505 .478 Average 
Education 
 Teams Brown-Forsythe .513 1 40.505 .478 
Welch 1.407 1 18.995 .250 Average 
Education 
Planners Brown-Forsythe 1.407 1 18.995 .250 
Welch 1.033 1 17.115 .324 Cumulative 
Education 
Planners Brown-Forsythe 1.033 1 17.115 .324 
a Asymptotically F distributed 
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Table I-14. Successful Trials’ Difference of Means Tests a 
    
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 1.334 1 1.334 .709 .402 
Within 
Groups 161.703 86 1.880   
Average 
Education 
Teams 
Total 163.036 87    
Between 
Groups 3.474 1 3.474 2.046 .160 
Within 
Groups 73.035 43 1.698   
Average 
Education 
Planners 
Total 76.510 44    
Between 
Groups 106.165 1 106.165 1.631 .208 
Within 
Groups 2799.479 43 65.104   
Cumulative 
Education 
Planners 
Total 2905.644 44    
a AVOVA with Solve=1 and Fail=0 
 
 
 
Table I-15. Interaction Variables Descriptive Statistics 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
  
  
  
  
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
 Bound 
Fail 34 85.8529 80.26650 13.76559 57.8466 113.8592
Solve 54 112.4185 115.27198 15.68653 80.9553 143.8817
Tenure 
X 
Education Total 88 102.1545 103.47846 11.03084 80.2296 124.0795
Fail 34 86.5126 79.49951 13.63405 58.7740 114.2513
Solve 54 111.1639 109.07785 14.84361 81.3914 140.9364Tenure X Average Education 
Total 88 101.6395 98.95064 10.54817 80.6739 122.6052
Fail 34 312.9794 301.32934 51.67756 207.8406 418.1182
Solve 54 439.7037 434.48321 59.12568 321.1126 558.2948
Tenure X 
Cumulative 
Education Total 88 390.7420 391.52721 41.73694 307.7854 473.6987
Fail 34 15.0118 10.65417 1.82718 11.2943 18.7292
Solve 54 16.1139 11.57887 1.57568 12.9535 19.2743Total Experience 
Total 88 15.6881 11.18134 1.19193 13.3190 18.0572
Fail 34 684.5912 641.48594 110.01393 460.7662 908.4162
Solve 54 769.6898 688.59751 93.70625 581.7389 957.6408
Education 
X Total 
Experience Total 88 736.8108 668.34462 71.24578 595.2021 878.4195
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Table I-16. Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
  
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Tenure 
X 
Education 
3.859 1 86 .053 
Tenure X 
Average 
Education 
4.331 1 86 .040 
Tenure X 
Cumulative 
Education 
5.166 1 86 .026 
Total 
Experience .406 1 86 .526 
Education 
X Total 
Experience 
.437 1 86 .510 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-16A. Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
    
Statistic a df1 df2 Sig. 
Welch 1.620 1 85.052 .207 Tenure 
X 
Education Brown-Forsythe 1.620 1 85.052 .207 
Welch 1.496 1 84.060 .225 Tenure X Average 
Education Brown-Forsythe 1.496 1 84.060 .225 
Welch 2.604 1 85.123 .110 Tenure X 
Cumulative 
Education Brown-Forsythe 2.604 1 85.123 .110 
a Asymptotically F distributed 
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Table I-17. Successful Trials Difference of Means Tests a 
    
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 14724.092 1 14724.092 1.381 .243 
Within 
Groups 916853.786 86 10661.091   
Tenure 
X 
Education 
Total 931577.878 87    
Between 
Groups 12678.492 1 12678.492 1.299 .257 
Within 
Groups 839158.423 86 9757.656   
Tenure X 
Average 
Education 
Total 851836.916 87    
Between 
Groups 335050.100 1 335050.100 2.216 .140 
Within 
Groups 13001489.235 86 151180.107   
Tenure X 
Cumulative 
Education 
Total 13336539.334 87    
Between 
Groups 25.343 1 25.343 .201 .655 
Within 
Groups 10851.597 86 126.181   
Total 
Experience 
Total 10876.940 87    
Between 
Groups 151089.828 1 151089.828 .336 .564 
Within 
Groups 38710464.674 86 450121.682   
Education 
X Total 
Experience 
Total 38861554.502 87    
a AVOVA with Solve=1 and Fail=0 
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Table I-18. KAI Scores Descriptive Statistics 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
  
  
  
  
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
 Bound 
Fail 34 93.6765 13.69300 2.34833 88.8988 98.4542
Solve 54 94.9074 14.75878 2.00841 90.8790 98.9358KAI 
Total 88 94.4318 14.28913 1.52323 91.4042 97.4594
Fail 34 43.7059 7.91443 1.35731 40.9444 46.4674
Solve 54 43.4444 6.91093 .94046 41.5581 45.3308SO 
Total 88 43.5455 7.27128 .77512 42.0048 45.0861
Fail 34 16.6471 4.70256 .80648 15.0063 18.2879
Solve 54 16.8148 4.08437 .55581 15.7000 17.9296E 
Total 88 16.7500 4.30784 .45922 15.8373 17.6627
Fail 34 33.3235 6.60909 1.13345 31.0175 35.6295
Solve 54 34.6481 7.59632 1.03373 32.5748 36.7215R 
Total 88 34.1364 7.22095 .76976 32.6064 35.6663
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-19. Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
  
Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
KAI .000 1 86 .993 
SO 1.207 1 86 .275 
E .556 1 86 .458 
R .998 1 86 .320 
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Table I-20. Successful Trials’ Difference of Means Tests a 
    
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 31.613 1 31.613 .153 .696 
Within 
Groups 17731.978 86 206.186   
KAI 
Total 17763.591 87    
Between 
Groups 1.426 1 1.426 .027 .871 
Within 
Groups 4598.392 86 53.470   
SO 
Total 4599.818 87    
Between 
Groups .587 1 .587 .031 .860 
Within 
Groups 1613.913 86 18.766   
E 
Total 1614.500 87    
Between 
Groups 36.608 1 36.608 .700 .405 
Within 
Groups 4499.756 86 52.323   
R 
Total 4536.364 87    
a AVOVA with Solve=1 and Fail=0 
 
 
 
Table I-21. Individual Success Dependence on Map Preference 
Map   
  Write Map 
Total 
Count 11 23 34 
Expected 
Count 10.0 24.0 34.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 32.4% 67.6% 100.0% 
Count 15 39 54 
Expected 
Count 16.0 38.0 54.0 
Solve 
Solve 
% within 
Solve 27.8% 72.2% 100.0% 
Count 26 62 88 
Expected 
Count 26.0 62.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Succeed 29.5% 70.5% 100.0% 
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Table I-21A. Chi-Square Tests 
  
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .210(b) 1 .647   
Continuity 
Correction(a) .048 1 .827   
Likelihood Ratio .209 1 .648   
Fisher's Exact Test    .811 .411 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .207 1 .649   
N of Valid Cases 88     
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.05. 
 
 
Table I-21B. Directional Measures for Success Depending on Map Preference 
    
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .049 .107 .454 .650 
Solve Dependent .052 .115 .454 .650 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Somers' d 
Map Dependent .046 .101 .454 .650 
a  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
 
Table I-22. Individual Success Dependence on Gender 
Gender   
  
  
  Female Male 
Total 
Count 12 22 34 
Expected 
Count 11.2 22.8 34.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 35.3% 64.7% 100.0% 
Count 17 37 54 
Expected 
Count 17.8 36.2 54.0 
Solve 
  
  
  
  
  Solve 
% within 
Solve 31.5% 68.5% 100.0% 
Count 29 59 88 
Expected 
Count 29.0 59.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Succeed 33.0% 67.0% 100.0% 
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Table I-22A. Chi-Square Tests 
  
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square .137(b) 1 .711   
Continuity 
Correction(a) .019 1 .891   
Likelihood Ratio .137 1 .712   
Fisher's Exact Test    .817 .443 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association .136 1 .713   
N of Valid Cases 88     
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.20. 
 
 
Table I-22B. Directional Measures for Success Depending on Gender 
    
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .039 .107 .368 .713 
Solve Dependent .041 .111 .368 .713 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Somers' d 
Gender Dependent .038 .103 .368 .713 
a  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
 
Table I-23. Map Preference Dependence on Gender 
Map Total   
  
  
  Write Map   
Count 16 13 29 
Expected 
Count 8.6 20.4 29.0 Female 
% within 
Solve 55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
Count 10 49 59 
Expected 
Count 17.4 41.6 59.0 
Gender 
  
Male 
% within 
Solve 16.9% 83.1% 100.0% 
Count 26 62 88 
Expected 
Count 26.0 62.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Succeed 29.5% 70.5% 100.0% 
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Table I-23A. Chi-Square Tests 
  
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.647(b) 1 .000   
Continuity 
Correction(a) 11.872 1 .001   
Likelihood Ratio 13.235 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 13.491 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 88     
a  Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b  0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.57. 
 
 
 
Table I-23B. Directional Measures for Map Preference Dependence on Gender 
  
  
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .394 .105 3.521 .000 
Map Dependent .406 .109 3.521 .000 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Somers' d 
Gender Dependent .382 .104 3.521 .000 
a  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-24. Block 0-Classification Table (c,d) 
Predicted 
Selected Cases(a) Unselected Cases(b) 
Solve Solve 
 
Observed 
 
 
 Fail Solve 
Percentage 
Correct 
 Fail Solve 
Percentage 
Correct 
 
Fail 0 15 .0 0 19 .0 
Solve 
Solve 0 54 100.0 0 0 . 
Overall Percentage   78.3   .0 
a  Selected cases NoPlan EQ 4 
b  Unselected cases NoPlan NE 4 
c  Constant is included in the model. 
d  The cut value is .500 
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Table I-24A. Block 0-Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant 1.281 .292 19.261 1 .000 3.600 
 
 
Table I-24B. Block 0-Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Aveed 20.850 1 .000 
Tenure .671 1 .413 Variables 
Othexp 3.254 1 .071 
Step 0 
Overall Statistics 23.086 3 .000 
 
 
Table I-24C. Block 1-Omnibus Tests 
 of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 27.680 3 .000 
Block 27.680 3 .000 Step 1 
Model 27.680 3 .000 
 
 
Table I-24D. Block 1-Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 44.575(a) .330 .509 
a  Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
 
 
Table I-24E. Block 1 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 2.724 8 .950 
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Table I-24F. Block 1-Contingency Table for  
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Solve = Fail Solve = Solve  
Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Total 
1 6 5.768 1 1.232 7 
2 4 3.948 3 3.052 7 
3 1 2.049 6 4.951 7 
4 1 1.281 6 5.719 7 
5 1 .734 6 6.266 7 
6 1 .531 6 6.469 7 
7 1 .396 6 6.604 7 
8 0 .174 7 6.826 7 
9 0 .105 7 6.895 7 
Step 1 
10 0 .014 6 5.986 6 
 
 
Table I-24G. Block 1-Classification Table (c) 
Predicted 
Selected Cases(a) Unselected Cases(b) 
Solve Solve 
 
Observed 
 
Fail Solve 
Percentage 
Correct 
 Fail Solve 
Percentage 
Correct 
 
Fail 9 6 60.0 0 19 .0 
Solve 
Solve 3 51 94.4 0 0 . 
Overall Percentage   87.0   .0 
a  Selected cases NoPlan EQ 4 
b  Unselected cases NoPlan NE 4 
c  The cut value is .500 
 
 
Table I-24H. Binary Logistic Regression Model a 
95.0% C.I.for 
EXP(B)   
  
B 
  
S.E. 
  
Wald 
  
df 
  
Sig. 
  
Exp(B) 
  Lower Upper 
Aveed -1.936 .528 13.472 1 .000 .144 .051 .406 
Tenure .004 .065 .004 1 .947 1.004 .884 1.141 
 Othexp -.074 .041 3.283 1 .070 .929 .857 1.006 
Constant 33.614 8.963 14.064 1 .000    
a Dependent Variable, Succeed=1, Fail=0 
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Table I-25. Joint Frequency Distribution for Q1 X Solve  
Rate how you felt about performing your task role for this problem 
Q1Role   
  a b c d 
Total 
Count 6 16 11 1 34 
Expected 
Count 2.3 7.0 13.1 11.6 34.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 17.6% 47.1% 32.4% 2.9% 100.0% 
Count 0 2 23 29 54 
Expected 
Count 3.7 11.0 20.9 18.4 54.0 
Solve 
Solve 
% within 
Solve .0% 3.7% 42.6% 53.7% 100.0% 
Count 6 18 34 30 88 
Expected 
Count 6.0 18.0 34.0 30.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Solve 6.8% 20.5% 38.6% 34.1% 100.0% 
a) Very frustrated;  b) Slightly frustrated;  c) Comfortable;  d) Very comfortable 
 
 
Table I-25A. Chi-Square Tests for Q1 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 45.038(a) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 53.276 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 42.221 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 88   
(a)  2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 2.32. 
 
 
Table I-25B. Directional Measures for Q1  
  
  Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .635 .049 10.496 .000 
Q1Role Dependent .778 .063 10.496 .000 Ordinal by Ordinal Somers' d 
Solve Dependent .536 .042 10.496 .000 
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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Table I-26. Joint Frequency Distribution for Q2 X Solve 
Rate how well your subteam communicated about the problem 
Q2Comm   
  a b c d 
Total 
Count 1 4 25 4 34 
Expected 
Count .4 1.5 14.7 17.4 34.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 2.9% 11.8% 73.5% 11.8% 100.0% 
Count 0 0 13 41 54 
Expected 
Count .6 2.5 23.3 27.6 54.0 
Solve 
Solve 
% within 
Solve .0% .0% 24.1% 75.9% 100.0% 
Count 1 4 38 45 88 
Expected 
Count 1.0 4.0 38.0 45.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Solve 1.1% 4.5% 43.2% 51.1% 100.0% 
a) Bad;  b) Poor;  c) Good;  d) Excellent 
 
 
Table I-26A. Chi-Square Tests Q2 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 36.554(a) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 41.588 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 34.013 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 88   
(a) 4 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is .39. 
 
 
Table I-26B. Directional Measures for Q2  
  
  Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .627 .071 8.029 .000 
Solve Dependent .584 .068 8.029 .000 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Somers' d 
Q2Comm Dependent .677 .077 8.029 .000 
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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Table I-27. Joint Frequency Distribution for Q3 X Solve 
Rate how well your sister subteam communicated with your subteam 
Q3SisCom   
  a b c d 
Total 
Count 13 14 7 0 34 
Expected 
Count 5.0 7.7 11.6 9.7 34.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 38.2% 41.2% 20.6% .0% 100.0% 
Count 0 6 23 25 54 
Expected 
Count 8.0 12.3 18.4 15.3 54.0 
Solve 
Solve 
% within 
Solve .0% 11.1% 42.6% 46.3% 100.0% 
Count 13 20 30 25 88 
Expected 
Count 13.0 20.0 30.0 25.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Solve 14.8% 22.7% 34.1% 28.4% 100.0% 
a) Bad;  b) Poor;  c) Good;  d) Excellent 
 
 
Table I-27A. Chi-Square Tests Q3 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 47.649(a) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 60.378 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 46.090 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 88   
(a) 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 5.02. 
 
 
Table I-27B. Directional Measures for Q3  
  
  Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .647 .042 12.166 .000 
Solve Dependent .533 .038 12.166 .000 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Somers' d 
Q3SisCom Dependent .821 .054 12.166 .000 
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
  384
Table I-28. Joint Frequency Distribution for Q4 X Solve 
Rate the amount of time provided for this problem 
Q4Time   
  a b c d 
Total 
Count 4 7 21 2 34 
Expected 
Count 1.5 4.3 21.3 7.0 34.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 11.8% 20.6% 61.8% 5.9% 100.0% 
Count 0 4 34 16 54 
Expected 
Count 2.5 6.8 33.8 11.0 54.0 
Solve 
Solve 
% within 
Solve .0% 7.4% 63.0% 29.6% 100.0% 
Count 4 11 55 18 88 
Expected 
Count 4.0 11.0 55.0 18.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Solve 4.5% 12.5% 62.5% 20.5% 100.0% 
a) Way too little; b) Slightly too little; c) About right; d) Way too much 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-28B. Directional Measures for Q4  
  
  Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .374 .080 4.239 .000 
Solve Dependent .349 .072 4.239 .000 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Somers' d 
Q4Time Dependent .404 .093 4.239 .000 
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
Table I-28A. Chi-Square Tests Q4 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.010(a) 3 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 17.286 3 .001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 14.747 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 88   
(a) 3 cells (37.5%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 1.55. 
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Table I-29. Joint Frequency Distribution for Q5 X Solve 
Rate your subteams performance on solving this problem 
Q5Team   
  a b c d 
Total 
Count 2 2 17 13 34 
Expected 
Count .8 .8 7.3 25.1 34.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 5.9% 5.9% 50.0% 38.2% 100.0% 
Count 0 0 2 52 54 
Expected 
Count 1.2 1.2 11.7 39.9 54.0 
Solve 
Solve 
% within 
Solve .0% .0% 3.7% 96.3% 100.0% 
Count 2 2 19 65 88 
Expected 
Count 2.0 2.0 19.0 65.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Solve 2.3% 2.3% 21.6% 73.9% 100.0% 
a) No help at all; b) Not very helpful; c) Helped a little; d) Great help 
 
 
Table I-29A. Chi-Square Tests Q5 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 36.586(a) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 39.569 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 29.354 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 88   
(a) 4 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is .77. 
 
 
Table I-29B. Directional Measures for Q5 
  
  Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .630 .074 6.379 .000 
Solve Dependent .682 .070 6.379 .000 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Somers' d 
Q5Team Dependent .585 .087 6.379 .000 
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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Table I-30. Joint Frequency Distribution for Q6 X Solve 
Rate your sister subteams performance in solving this problem 
Q6SisHelp  
 a b c d 
Total 
Count 12 8 13 1 34 
Expected 
Count 5.0 3.9 10.0 15.1 34.0 Fail 
% within 
Solve 35.3% 23.5% 38.2% 2.9% 100.0% 
Count 1 2 13 38 54 
Expected 
Count 8.0 6.1 16.0 23.9 54.0 
Solve 
Solve 
% within 
Solve 1.9% 3.7% 24.1% 70.4% 100.0% 
Count 13 10 26 39 88 
Expected 
Count 13.0 10.0 26.0 39.0 88.0 Total 
% within 
Solve 14.8% 11.4% 29.5% 44.3% 100.0% 
a) No help at all; b) Not very helpful; c) Helped a little; d) Great help 
 
 
Table I-30A. Chi-Square Tests Q6 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 45.832(a) 3 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 55.005 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 42.742 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 88   
(a) 1 cell (12.5%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 3.86 
 
 
Table I-30B. Directional Measures for Q6 
    Value 
Asymp. 
Std. 
Error(a) 
Approx. 
T(b) 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Symmetric .659 .052 11.130 .000 
Solve Dependent .559 .048 11.130 .000 
Ordinal 
by 
Ordinal 
Somers' d 
Q6SisHelp Dependent .803 .060 11.130 .000 
a)  Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b)  Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
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Table I‐31  Cognitive Gaps a 
Trial Solve 
Level 
Aggregate 
Proxy 
Level 
Gap A+B 
Style 
Gap A+B 
Level 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Style 
Gap 
A+B+D 
Total 
Gap 
A+B+C+D 
Operator -1.99 3.06 6.3 0.41 7.38 
FM-T1 
Planner -1.51 3.32 0.89 1.3 6.63 
17.04 
Operator 2.69 0.73 1.17 4.32 6.54 
CW-T1 
Planner -0.94 11.79 7.7 10.61 10.45 
33.84 
Operator 1.21 8.61 1.49 10.23 5.75 
CW-T2 
Planner -0.52 7.22 6.19 6.57 16.38 
40.43 
Operator 0.32 11.05 2.94 11.45 10.5 
WIL-T1 
Planner 4.15 12.47 2.17 17.66 3.69 
45.47 
Operator -2.98 5.8 4.34 2.07 13.3 
WIL-T2 
Planner 2.62 1.53 4.62 5.02 5.14 
28.81 
Operator -1.93 2.53 2.57 -0.04 9.15 
CHL-T1 
Planner -1.95 3.36 3.83 0.76 5.28 
16.44 
Operator -2.54 3.97 3.64 0.79 11.55 
CHL-T2 
Planner -3.95 2.98 7.56 -1.96 7.86 
20.11 
Operator 2.91 4.76 1.26 8.64 0.94 
RAL-T1 
Planner 1.76 9.5 9.8 11.71 17.8 
41.29 
Operator -0.55 10.99 6.58 10.31 15.01 
RAL-T2 
Planner -2.03 7.09 6.44 4.55 4.9 
37.13 
Operator 0.22 15.35 7.56 15.63 7.51 
RAL-T3 
Planner 4.14 8.86 7.14 14.03 15.14 
54.89 
Operator 0.75 9.74 8.82 10.67 10.52 
RAL-T4 
Planner 0.35 13.97 8.4 14.42 22.34 
60.5 
Operator 1.14 10.8 3.78 12.22 3.73 
RAL-T5 
Planner -1.35 13.98 5.88 12.29 15.1 
45.82 
Operator -0.09 8.64 4.60 9.07 9.62 Mean 
Scores b Planner 0.56 9.19 6.51 9.41 11.54 
41.77 
Operator 0.55 5.39 3.65 4.66 6.90 Mean 
Scores c Planner -1.20 6.34 5.00 6.22 9.99 
29.88 
a Unsuccessful trials are highlighted gray 
b Mean scores for successful trials 
c Mean scores for unsuccessful trials 
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Table I-32  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Raw Scores 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 10469.023 1 10469.023 3.253 .101 
Within 
Groups 32179.186 10 3217.919   
Aggregated 
Level 
Subteam 
Mean 
Total 42648.209 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I-33  Difference of Means Tests a 
Additive Model with Factor Scores 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 46790340.49 1 46790340.49 2.003 .187 
Within 
Groups 233567327.43 10 23356732.74   
Aggregated 
Level 
X 
Style 
Total 280357667.92 11    
a Tests conducted for Successful trials 
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